Animadversions

No 44. UPON

Dr. SHERLOCK's Book,

ENTITULED

A Vindication of the Holy and Ever-Blessed Trinity, &c.

TOGETHER

With a most Necessary Vindication of that Sacred, and Prime Article of the *Christian Faith* from his New Notions, and False Explications of it.

Humbly offered to His Admirers, and to Himself the *Chief* of them.

By a Divine of the Church of England.

Dr South Robert South, DD

LONDON,

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MDCXCIII.

A

PREFACE,

OR,

INTRODUCTION

To the following

Animadversions.

TO be *Impugned from without, and Betrayed from within, is certainly the worſt Condition that either* Church *or* State *can fall into; and the beſt of* Churches, *the* Church *of* England, *has had experience of Both. It had been to be wiſhed, and (one would think) might very reaſonably have been expected, That, when* Providence *had took the Work of deſtroying the* Church of England *out of the* Papiſts *Hands, ſome would have been contented with her* Preferments, *without either attempting to give up her* Rites *and* Liturgy, *or deſerting her* Doctrine. *But it has proved much otherwiſe. And amongſt thoſe, who are juſtly chargeable with the latter, I know none, who has faced the* World, *and defied the* Church *with ſo bold a Front, as the* Author *of Two very* Heterodox Books; *the firſt*

Entituled, A Diſcourſe concerning the Knowledge of Jeſus Chriſt, *&c. Publiſhed in the Year,* 1674. *And the other,* A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and ever-Bleſſed Trinity, *&c. Publiſhed in the Year* 1690. *And (as one would think) Wrote purpoſely, to let the World ſee that the Truth cannot be ſo much ſhaken by a direct Oppoſition, as by a* Treacherous, *and* Falſe Defence. *I ſhall in this* Preliminary Addreſs *to the* Reader, *paſs ſome brief Remarks upon both theſe* Books. *But firſt upon this, which I have here undertook to Animadvert upon. It is now of about Three Years ſtanding in the World, and I have wondered, even to Aſtoniſhment, that a Book ſo full of* Paradoxes, *and thoſe ſo poſitively, as well as abſurdly delivered, could paſs* Unanſwered *for ſo long a time. For the* Author, *having therein advanced a Notion immediately and unavoidably inferring* Three Gods, *has yet had the Confidence not only to Aſſert it, but to Declare it* Hereſie and Nonſence *to think, or hold otherwiſe; that is, in other Words, to call the whole* Chriſtian Church, *in all Ages and Places,* Fools and Hereticks. *For I do here averr, and will undertake to prove it, (as far as a Negative may be proved)* That no Church *(known to us by Hiſtory, or otherwiſe)* ever held this Notion of the Trinity before. *And muſt we then be all* Fools and Hereticks, *who will not acknowledge the* Three Perſons of the Bleſſed Trinity to be Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits, *that is, in other Terms, to be* Three Gods? *And can ſo Learned, and every way Excellent a Clergy bear this? For if they could not, whence is it that ſome Writers amongſt them, while they are declaring their diſlike of his* Opinions, *yet do it with ſo ſoft an Air, and ſo gentle a Touch, as if they were afraid either to* Condemn *the* Opinion, *or to* Attack *the* Author? *Nay, and ſome I find creeping under his Feet with the Title of* Very Reverend, *while they are charging him with ſuch* Qualities *and* Humours, *as none can be, juſtly, chargeable with,*

and

and deſerve Reverence *too. For my own part, I franckly own, That I neither* Reverence, *nor* Fear *him; that is, I Reverence none, who gives whole* Communities *and* Churches *ſuch Words, nor Fear any One, who Writes ſuch Things, and in ſuch a manner. For even thoſe* Mean Spirits, *who can both* Court, *and* Cenſure *him in the ſame Breath, complain,* That he gives no Quarter, *where he ſuppoſes he has his Adverſary upon the leaſt Advantage. And if this be his Way and Temper* never to give Quarter, *I am ſure he has no cauſe to expect any, whatſoever he may find. But ſtill, methinks, I can hardly believe my Eyes, while I read ſuch a* Pettit Novellift *Charging the* Whole Church *as* Fools and Hereticks, *for not Subſcribing to a* Silly, Heretical Notion *ſolely of his own* Invention. *For does he, or can he think to Live and Converſe in the World upon theſe Terms? and to throw his* Scurrility *at* High, *and* Low, *at all* About *him,* Above *him, and* Below *him (if there be any ſuch) at this inſufferable rate? Does he, (I would fain know) in this ſpeak his* Judgment, *or his* Breeding? *Was it the* School, *the* Univerſity, *or* Gravel-Lane, *that taught him this Language? Or does he never reflect upon himſelf, nor conſider, That though* he *does not, others aſſuredly will? One would think by his Words and Carriage that he had ingroſſed all Reaſon and Learning to Himſelf: But on the contrary, that this his ſcornful looking down upon all the World beſides, is not from his ſtanding upon any higher ground of Learning, and Sufficiency, than the reſt of the World; and that he* Huffs *and* Dictates *at a much more commanding rate than he* Reaſons, *the peruſal of my Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Chapters will, or (I am ſure) may ſufficiently inform the* Impartial Reader; *and ſhew him how many things there are in this our Author's* Vindication, *which too much need Another, but admit none. In the mean time, I do, and muſt declare both to himſelf, and to all others, That the forementioned Charge of* Hereſie *and* Nonſence (*as he has laid it*) *is ſo*

very

very Rude, Scandalous, *and* Provoking, *that it is impoſſible for the* Tongue, *or* Pen *of* Man *to reply any Thing ſo ſeverely upon him, which the foulneſs of the ſaid Expreſſion will not abundantly warrant both the Speaking and the Writing of.*

The Church of England *is certainly very Merciful*; Ch. Juſtice *Scroggs.* Merciful *(as a Great* Judge *once ſaid of K.* Charles II.) even to a Fault. *For who, by her ſilence upon what this Bold Man has Wrote, and the Encouragement he has ſince received, would not be ſhrewdly induced after ſome conſiderable number of Years (if his ſtuff ſhould live ſo long) to believe, that his Notions were the* Current Doctrine *of our* Church, *or, at leaſt, of our* Church-men *at that time? None then oppoſing them, moſt over-looking them, and ſome countenancing and advancing the Author of them; and, perhaps,* for them *too. This is truly the Caſe; and I hope to do the* Church of England *ſo much Service at leaſt, as to break the Univerſality both of the* Silence, *and the preſumed* Acceptance, *by one plain, reſolute and full* Negative *put in againſt it. For upon a due Conſideration of the Things vented by this* Author, *and comparing them with the Proceedings and Zeal of the* Primitive Church *in its* Councils, *I do from my Heart believe, That had he lived and publiſhed this Book in thoſe Days, and Aſſerted,* That the Three Divine Perſons in the Trinity were Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits. *And that* Their Perſonal diſtinction conſiſted only in Self-Conſciouſneſs, and their Unity only in Mutual-Conſciouſneſs. *And withall, That the Terms* Eſſence, Nature, Subſtance, Perſon, *and* Hypoſtaſis, *or* Subſiſtence, *&c. applyed to the* Godhead *and the* Divine Perſons, *ſerved only to perplex, obſcure, and confound Men's* Apprehenſions *of them; and for that cauſe ought to be laid aſide; I ſay, I do not in the leaſt queſtion, but that all and every one of theſe* Propoſitions, *would have*

been

been publickly and ſolemnly Condemned *in* Council, *and the* Author *of them (as high as he now carries his Head, like another* Abbot Joachim) *ſeverely dealt with for Aſſerting them; and that upon great Reaſon. Foraſmuch, as the Two chief of thoſe Terms,* viz. οὐσία *and* ὑπόστασις, Subſtance *and* Subſiſtence, *were equally with the* ὁμοούσιον *it ſelf oppoſed by thoſe Two grand* Arian Hereticks *and Furious Diſturbers of the* Church, Urſacius *and* Valens, *who with their Accomplices vehemently contended to have them all wholly ſuppreſſed and diſuſed. So that as for the* οὐσία *of the* Father *and the* Son, *they would have* παντελῶς οὐδεμίαν μνήμην, *no mention at all to be made of any ſuch Thing; and as for the* ὑπόστασις *it ought* οὐδαμῶς ὀνομάζεσθαι *not ſo much as to be named concerning any of the* Three Persons. *And, as one Reaſon for this, they alledged the ſatisfaction of* Tender Conſciences. *Which ſhews, That* Tender Conſciences *are ſuch Things, as may, ſome time or other, put the* Church, *not only to part with its* Liturgy, Rites, *and* Ceremonies, *but its very* Faith *alſo for their ſake. But right, or wrong, thoſe Two* Arian Incendiaries *preſſed hard for the Abolition of theſe* Two Words; *as this* Author *alſo does in this his*

Having firſt rejected the ὁμοούσιον in thoſe Words. Τὸ μὲν ὁμοούσιον καὶ τὸ ὁμοιούσιον ἐκβάλλομεν ὡς ἀλλότριον τῶν γραφῶν. *Athanaſ. de Synodis Arimini & Seleuciæ, Tom.* 1. P. 904. *Edit. Colon.* 1686. In the next place, *p.* 906. they proceed to caſhier the Terms οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, in the following Words. Τὸ δὲ ὄνομα τῆς οὐσίας ὅπερ ἁπλούστερον ἀπὸ τῶν πατέρων ἐτέθη, ἀγνούμενον ὑπὸ τοῖς λαοῖς σκάνδαλον ἔφερε, διότι μηδὲ αἱ γραφαὶ τοῦτο περιέχουσιν, ἤρεσε περιαιρεθῆναι, καὶ παντελῶς μηδεμίαν μνήμην τοῦ λοιποῦ γίνεσθαι. Ἐπειδήπερ καὶ αἱ θεῖαι γραφαὶ οὐδαμῶς ἐμνημόνευσαν περὶ οὐσίας Πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ, καὶ οὐδὲ ὀφείλει ὑπόστασις περὶ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος ὀνομάζεσθαι. For this ſee alſo *Socrat. Hiſt. lib.* 2. *cap.* 29. and *Theodoret Hiſtor. lib.* 2. *cap.* 18. & 21. & *Sozomen's Hiſtor. lib.* 4. *cap.* 18.

Vindication;

Vindication; *treading hereby exactly in the ſteps of thoſe* Bleſſed Leaders; *who, no doubt, underſtood the Intereſt of their baſe Cauſe well enough, and were both* Self-Conſcious, *and* Mutually-Conſcious, *how much they ſerved the deſign, they drove at, by what they did. And, ſince Things were ſo in former days, what hinders, but that in theſe latter Days likewiſe, the ſame, if not prevented, may happen again? And, that* One, *who, (though he carries himſelf, as if he were able to teach the whole World, yet, for ſome certain Reaſons, profeſſes himſelf a* * Learner ſtill) *having already exploded the Terms* Subſtance *and* Subſiſtence, *as not to be uſed about the* Trinity, *may, upon the winning proſpect of ſome* Approaching Advantage, *(as, where Advantage is the* Teacher, *ſome care not how long they* continue Learners) *be very eaſily prevailed upon to ſend the ὁμοούσιον packing after its Fellows, and to abandon and caſt off that too? For, though ſuch an One ſhould give the* Church his Oath *to the contrary, there is no ſecurity from thence, but that a* Perpetual Learner *(by a due waiting upon* Providence) *may, all in convenient time,* Learn *to forget it too: And a* Self-Contradictor *having freely allowed a Thing at one time, as freely and fully diſown it at another.*

* See his Preface to his Caſe of Allegiance, *p.* 5. *line* 15.

Wherefore it was, no doubt, upon a moſt ſerious conſideration of the force of Words *in Conjunction with the* Tempers of Men, *That the* Sixth General Council *(and* Third *of* Conſtantinople) *was ſo jealouſly concerned, and ſo remarkably ſtrict to fence againſt all* Hereticall Miſchief *from that Quarter; as appears from the* Concluding Article *of the* Synodical Sentence *pronounced by the ſaid* Council *againſt the* Monothelites, *as we find it thus ſet down in the* Acts *thereof.* Theſe Things therefore, being thus with the utmoſt care and exactneſs, on all ſides, formed and drawn up by

Τέτων τοίνυν μετὰ πάσης παντα-
χόθεν ἀκριβείας τε καὶ ἐπιμελείας
παρ' ἡμῶν διαλυπωθέντων, ὁρί-

by us, We Decree and Enact, That it ſhall not be lawful for any one to Produce, Write, Compoſe, Conceive, or Teach another Faith, or this in any other way, or manner. But as for thoſe who ſhall preſume to Compoſe, or Contrive another Faith, or Publiſh, Teach, or deliver forth another Creed, to ſuch as ſhall be ready to come over to the Acknowledgment of the Truth from Heatheniſm, or Judaiſme, or any other Sect whatſoever, or ſhall introduce any *unuſual* way of ſpeaking, or *new Invented Terms*, as tending to Subvert all that has been defined by us, if they be Biſhops, or in Clerical Orders, we decree, That they ſhall be deprived of their Biſhopricks, or ſaid Orders; or if they be Monks, or Lay-men, that they ſhall be Anathematized. *So that we have here a clear and full Declaration of a* General Council, *againſt all teaching, not only* ἕτερόν τι, *but alſo* ἑτέρως; *that is, not only againſt delivering another Faith, but againſt delivering the ſame in another way, or manner, than the* Council *had ſettled, and againſt the uſe of all new-Invented Terms, all* καινοφωνία, *or* ἐφεύρεσις τῆς λέξεως, (Self-Conſciouſneſs, *and* Mutual-Conſciouſneſs *themſelves not excepted) as in the Judgment of the* Council, *deſtructive in their conſequence to the* Faith *declared; and all this upon pain of* Deprivation, *or* Anathematization, *as*

ζομεν ἑτέραν πίστιν μηδενὶ ἐξεῖναι προφέρειν, ἢγουν συγγράφειν ἢ συνιδέναι ἢ φρονεῖν ἢ διδάσκειν ἑτέρως. Τοὺς δὲ τολμῶντας ἢ συντιθέναι πίστιν ἑτέραν ἢ προκομίζειν ἢ διδάσκειν ἢ παραδιδόναι ἕτερον σύμβολον τοῖς ἐθέλουσιν ἐπιστρέφειν εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας ἐξ Ἑλληνισμοῦ ἢ ἐξ Ἰουδαϊσμοῦ ἤτοιν ἐξ αἱρέσεως οἱασοῦν ἢ καινοφωνίαν ἤτοι λέξεως ἐφεύρεσιν πρὸς ἀνατροπὴν εἰσάγειν τῶν νυνὶ παρ' ἡμῖν διορισθέντων τούτους εἰ μὲν ἐπίσκοποι εἶεν, ἢ κληρικοὶ, ἀλλοτρίους εἶναι τοὺς Ἐπισκόπους τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς καὶ τοὺς Κληρικοὺς τοῦ κλήρου, εἰ δὲ μοναζοντες εἶεν ἢ λαϊκοὶ ἀναθεματίζεσθαι αὐτούς. *Concil. 6. in Actione* 17. *ſeu ultimâ, circa finem.*

a *the*

the Quality of the Perſons concerned ſhould happen to be. According to the rigour of which Sentence, and the Proceeding of the Church *in thoſe* Ages *ſutable to it,* Deprivation, *or* Suſpenſion, *would, no doubt, have attended this Author, had he then lived and produced his new Terms, in defiance and reproach of the former received ones. And if ſuch a puniſhment had actually befallen him, he would have found, that in thoſe Days, Men were not wont either to be* Suſpended, *or* Deprived *in order to their* Promotion.

I know indeed, that in the Apology *lately put out by him for Writing againſt the* Socinians, *he utters ſome Things contrary to what he had Aſſerted in this his* Vindication of the Trinity. *But this the Reader ought not at all to be ſurprized at; it being as Natural to ſome Men to* Write *as to* Breath, *and to* Contradict *themſelves as to* Write: *And no Man of Sence, who knows this* Author, *will reckon that he knows his Judgment, or Opinion from any Book Wrote by Him, any longer, than till he Writes another; nor from that neither, till he has Wrote his laſt.*

Having given the Reader *this ſhort* Prelibation, *or* Taſte *of the Book, which I ſhall more particularly and fully examine preſently, I think fit to remark ſomething alſo upon that other Piece mentioned by me, and Entituled,* A Diſcourſe concerning the Knowledge of Jeſus Chriſt, *&c. A Book fraught with ſuch Vile and* Scandalous Reflexions *upon* God's Juſtice, *with reference to* Chriſt's Satisfaction, *that it may deſervedly paſs for a* Blaſphemous Libel *upon both. And I do ſeriouſly think, that never was any Book* Licenſed, Publiſhed, *and ſuffered to paſs* Uncontrolled, *more to the* Diſgrace *of the* Church of England *than this, which the* Reader *will quickly ſee upon his Reading ſome Paſſages of it; which, I am ſure, if he be but* Chriſtianly diſpoſed, *he cannot do, but with extreme Horrour. But before I direct the* Reader *to his* Blaſphemies, *I ſhall lay before him*

him one Grand leading Abſurdity, which utterly Evacuates and Overthrows the whole Doctrine *of* Free Grace, *and the* Redemption of Mankind thereby; *and indeed, by Conſequence, the whole* Oeconomy *of the* Chriſtian Religion.

And it is that Wonderful Aſſertion concerning the Goodneſs of God, *in Page* 44. of his Knowledge of Chriſt, *viz.* That it is not poſſible to underſtand what Goodneſs is, without Pardoning Grace. *Now certain it is, that* Natural Reaſon, *by its own light, is able from the* Common Works *of* God's Providence, *to collect* the Knowledge of God's Goodneſs; *as St.* Paul *expreſly told thoſe* Heathens *of* Lycaonia, Acts 14. 17. *and therefore, if the* Knowledge *of* God's Goodneſs, *neceſſarily implies in it, the* Knowledge *of* Pardoning Grace, *it will follow, That the* Heathens *by underſtanding* one *from the* Works *of* Providence, *muſt needs underſtand and know the* other *alſo; and conſequently, that the* Knowledge *of* Pardoning Grace *is not owing to* Revelation, *nor the* Goſpel *neceſſary to make a Diſcovery of it to Mankind. A Bleſſed Principle, and Foundation, no doubt, to eſtabliſh the New-deſigned Scheme of a* Natural Religion *upon! For it is not unknown, what Projects were on foot amongſt ſome, when this Book was Wrote, though the* Author *had the ill luck to be left in the Lurch, and not ſeconded in the Attempt.*

But in oppoſition to this Paganiſh *Aſſertion, I do here affirm,* That if *God* may *be Good,* and that, both as to the *Eſſential Attribute* of his *Goodneſs,* and as to the actual Exerciſe of the ſame, without the *Pardon of Sin,* then it is not *impoſſible to underſtand the Goodneſs of God without Pardoning Grace. The Conſequence is evident. For whatſoever any Thing* is, *it is capable of being* underſtood to be. *And as for the Antecedent, that is manifeſt from theſe Conſiderations.*

First, *That* God *was* Good, *and exerted Acts of* Goodneſs, *before there was any* Sin *in the World, and therefore might be, and undoubtedly was,* underſtood *both as* good, *and as exerciſing his* Goodneſs, *by the Angels before the Fall of any of them, and for that reaſon before* Pardon of Sin *could come into Conſideration.*

In the next Place, God *had been* Good, *and had exerciſed his* Goodneſs, *had Men and Angels been Created* Impeccable; *and, I am ſure, it is no Contradiction to hold, That they might* have been *Originally made ſuch, as all Glorified Spirits now actually* are.

And Laſtly, God *is and may be underſtood to be* Good, *even in reſpect of thoſe, whoſe Sins ſhall never be pardoned. And therefore that Aſſertion of this Author,* That it is not poſſible to underſtand what Goodneſs is without Pardoning Grace, *is apparently falſe and abſurd; as drawing after it One of theſe Two Conſequences.*

Firſt, *That either we cannot underſtand the Creation and Support of* Angels, *and of this viſible World, and particularly of* Mankind, *to have been Acts and Inſtances of the* Divine Goodneſs (*which yet, no doubt, were very great ones.*) *Or,*

Secondly, *That we cannot underſtand them as ſuch, but by underſtanding them alſo to imply in them* Pardoning Grace. *And if ſo, then, ſuppoſing the* Creation *of* Man, *and his Sin after his* Creation, *and the* Goodneſs *of* God *remaining ſtill entire, notwithſtanding Man's Sin, (as it certainly did) it will follow, that* Pardoning Grace, *having (according to the forementioned Principle) a neceſſary Connexion with, or reſult from the ſaid* Goodneſs, *muſt have fallen in of courſe, and by neceſſary conſequence from thence. And then, Where could be the* Freedom *of this* Grace? *Nay, Where could be this* Grace *it ſelf? For the very Nature of* Grace *conſiſts in this, that it be an Act perfectly* Free; *ſo*

free,

free, that God *might have choſen, after* Man *had ſinned, whether he would ever have offered him any Conditions of* Pardon, *or no*; *And if he had not, Men might, notwithſtanding that, have abundantly known and underſtood the* Goodneſs *of* God, *by ſeveral other Acts and Inſtances, in which it had ſufficiently declared it ſelf. So that the foregoing Aſſertion is nothing but a groſs Paradox, and a Scurvy Blow at all* Revealed Religion *beſides, if the* Knowledge of Pardoning Grace *could, or may be had without it.*

And now after this Abſurdity *preſented to the* Reader's *Examination*; *I ſhall point out to him ſome of the* Blaſphemies *alſo that occurr in the ſame Book. Such as are theſe that follow.* The Juſtice of God *(ſays he)* having glutted it ſelf with Revenge on Sin in the Death of Chriſt, henceforward we may be ſure he will be very kind, as a Revengeful Man is, when his Paſſion is over. *Knowledge of Chriſt*, *P.* 46. *Again*, The Sum of the Matter is, That God is all Love and Patience, when he has taken his fill of Revenge; as others uſe to ſay, That the Devil himſelf is very good when he is pleaſed, *P.* 47. *Again*, The Death of Chriſt *(ſays he)* diſcovers the Naturalneſs of Juſtice to God; that is, That he is ſo Juſt, that he has not one Dram of Goodneſs in him, till his Rage and Vengeance be ſatisfied; which, I confeſs, is a glorious kind of Juſtice. *And preſently after*. Now the Juſtice and Vengeance of God having their Actings aſſigned them to the full, being glutted and ſatiated with the Blood of Chriſt, God may pardon as many and great Sins as he pleaſes, *P.* 59. *And ſutable to this, he likewiſe calls the Method of* God's *ſaving Sinners upon a Previous Satisfaction made to his Juſtice, as neceſſary for the Remiſſion of Sin*, God's Trucking and Bartering with Sin, and the Devil for his Glory, *P.* 52. *Concerning which and the like Expreſſions uttered by this* Great-

God

Good Man *(as a certain poor Wretch calls him) I cannot but out of a due Zeal, and concern for that* Eternal Truth, *by which, I hope to be Saved, declare,* That the Tongue that ſhould Speak ſuch things, deſerves to Speak no more; and the Hand that ſhould Write them, to Write no more. *And great pity it is, that at this time, and in this caſe alſo, his Aſcendant* had not tyed up his Hands from Writing. *For ſee, how one of the* Leading Diſſenters *Inſults over our* Church, *upon occaſion of theſe Horrid Paſſages.* Is this *(ſays he)* Language becoming a Son of the *Church of England?* Ought it not more juſtly to have been expected from a *Jew*, or a *Mahometan?* From *Servetus*, or *Socinus*, (from whom alſo it was borrowed) than from a Son of the Church, in a Book publiſhed by Licence and Authority? *And thus he goes on, equally Chaſtiſeing his Arrogance, and Expoſing his Ignorance; the poor* Church's *Reputation all the while paying the Scores of both. As to the Licenſing of which Book, here ſo ſeverely reflected upon, it did indeed meet with a Perſon (as it were) framed for the very purpoſe. For none certainly could be ſo fit to ſtamp an* Imprimatur *upon a Book Wrote againſt* Chriſt's *Satisfaction, as One, who while he was* Eating the Bread, *and* Wearing the Honours *of the* Church, *could ſtab the* Doctrine *of it to the Heart, by Writing for* Tranſubſtantiation. *And then in the next place, for its paſſing Uncontrolled, it had really been to be wiſhed, That the* Clergy *in* Convocation, *in the laſt eſpecially (in which ſo many of them acquitted themſelves ſo exceeding worthily upon other Accounts) would have vouchſafed to wipe off this groſs Blot from the* Church *by a due Cenſure paſſed upon the forementioned Poſitions; ſo reproachful to that, and ſo Contumelious to our Common Chriſtianity. For what vaſt advantage the* Diſſenters *have taken from hence to Scandalize and Beſpatter the Government and Governours of our* Church, *is but too*

Owen's Vindication againſt *Sh.* p. 47, 48, &c.

too well known, and cannot be too much Lamented; and I heartily wiſh, That it had been a Scandal *only* Taken, *and not* Given. *And the rather do I repreſent this as a Work fit for the* Convocation; *ſince this* Author *has given the World ſuch a Notable Proof, That nothing but a* Convocation *can Convince, or work upon him.* See the Preface to his *Caſe of Allegiance*, P. 5.

And thus I have given the Reader *a Specimen of the* Doctrines *of this* Author *in theſe Two Books of his. In the former of which, he affects to be the* Socinian's *humble Servant, by Ridiculing and Exploding* Chriſt's *Satisfaction of* God's *Juſtice; and ſo in effect, the whole Myſtery of the* Goſpel: *And in the latter he pretends to oppoſe them by ſuch a* Vindication of the Trinity, *and of* Chriſt's Incarnation, *as one would think, were Wrote by themſelves. But whatſoever it is, that he either pretends, or intends (as it is hard to know the latter by the former) this Character I ſhall give of him as a Writer, That there is hardly any one Subject which he has Wrote upon (that of* Popery *only excepted) but he has Wrote both* for it *and* againſt it *too: Not that I ſay, that he has Printed all which he has ſo Wrote; but Printing is not the only way of Publication; and this I will ſay beſides, That where he has not* Printed, *he has* Acted *it with a Witneſs. And yet even for Printing; could any thing be Wrote and Printed more ſharp and bitter againſt the* Diſſenters, *than what this Man Wrote in his Anſwer to the* Proteſtant Reconciler? *And yet how frankly (or rather fulſomely) does he open both his Arms to embrace them in his Sermon Preached before the* Lord Mayor, *on* Nov. 4. 1688? *Though I dare ſay, That the* Diſſenters *themſelves are of that Conſtancy as to own, That they were of the ſame Principles in* 88, *that they were of in* 85. *But the Truth is, Old Friendſhips cannot be ſo eaſily forgot. And it has been an Obſervation made by ſome, that hardly can any one be found, who was firſt tainted with a* Conventicle, *whom a* Cathedral *could ever after*

after cure; but that ſtill upon every croſs Turn of Affairs againſt the Church, *the irreſiſtible Magnetiſm of the* Good Old Cauſe, *(as ſome ſtill think it) would quickly draw him out of the* Good Old Way. *The Fable tells us of a* Cat *once turned into a* Woman, *but the next ſight of a* Mouſe *quickly diſſolved the Metamorphoſis, caſhiered the Woman, and reſtored the Brute. And ſome* Virtuoſi *(ſkilled in the* Uſeful Philoſophy *of* Alterations) *have thought her much a gainer by the latter change; there being ſo many unlucky turns in the World, in which it is not half ſo ſafe and advantagious to* Walk Upright, *as to* be able to fall always upon one's Legs.

But not to hold the Reader *too long in the Entrance of the Work, which I am about to preſent him with, I do here aſſure him, That, in the following* Animadverſions, *I have ſtrictly purſued this* Author *in every part of his new* Hypotheſis, *I have anſwered all his Arguments, not omitting ſo much as one, or any Thing that looks like one. And if I have thought fit ſometimes in a ſhort Remark or two, here and there to refreſh the* Reader *and my ſelf, by expoſing his* Bold *and* Blind *ſide together; yet this has ſtill been my method, throughly to diſpatch the Argument, before I offer to divert upon the Author.*

As for that part of his Book, which peculiarly concerns the Socinians, *I leave him and them to fight it out. My buſineſs is to ſhew, That the* Doctrine *of our* Church *is abſolutely a ſtranger to his Novel and Beloved Notions: It knows them not: It owns them not; nor ought we to look upon him, ſo far as he Aſſerts and Maintains them, to be any True and Genuine Son of it: And conſequently, whether he worries the* Socinians, *or (which is much the more likely) the* Socinians *worry him, the* Church of England *is not at all concerned.*

THE

THE CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS.

CHAPTER I.

Repreſenting the Sence and Signification of the Word Myſtery; *as alſo a Vindication of the Uſe and Application of it to ſome of the moſt Difficult and Sublime Truths of the* Goſpel; *and laſtly, a full Proof, That the Account given by this Author of his Explication of the* Article *of the* Trinity, *is wholly inconſiſtent with the* Myſteriouſneſs *of it; together with ſome Remarks upon his needleſs* Apology *for Writing againſt the* Socinians.

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CHAP. IV.

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CHAP. X.

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CHAP. XI.

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PReface, Pag. V. lin. 19. Marg. for ἐμνημόνευσαν read ἐμνημόνευσαν. Book. p. 2. l. 7. for מסתזר read מסתור, the laſt Letter, which ſhould be a *Reſh*, in moſt Copies diſappears. p. 3. l. 29. for *quod* r. *quòd*. p. 7. l. 23. and 26. p. 8. l. 8. for *inadæquate* r. *inadequate*. p. 18. l. 16. *& paſſim.* for *Arrians* r. *Arians*. p. 25. l. 30. for *plaineſs* r. *plainneſs*. p. 41. l. 15. for *Subſtance* r. *Subſtance*. p. 61. l. 25. for *it ſelf* r. *her ſelf*. p. 106. laſt line, for *conſci-* r. *moſt*. p. 111. l. 13. for *communicated to* r. *in common belonging to*. p. 119. l. 26. for ἐν τῇ θεότητι r. ἐν θεότητι. p. 123. l. 6. for *10th. Book* r. *1ſt. Book*. p. 131. l. 23. for διακοσμῶντὲ r. διακοσμῶντε. p. 155. laſt line, for ἐσμὲν r. ἐσμὲν. p. 165. l. 18. for πνευματομάχοι r. πνευματομάχοι. p. 173. l. 15. for *Unity* r. *Unity or Singularity*. p. 177. laſt line, for ὁμουσίοτης r. ὁμουσιότης. p. 196. l. 5. Marg. for ἀνέργεια r. ἐνέργεια, and after μία put a Colon, *ibid.* p. 196. l. 7. for ἀρὰ r. ἄρα. p. 205.

l. 6. Marg. for ἓν ἐσμὲν r. ἓν ἐσμὲν for ἐν, ἐμ, οἱ r. ἐν ἐμοὶ, *ibid.* p. 209. l. 2. Marg. for *ejusdemque* r. *ejusdémque.* p. 210. l. 5. Marg. for *eademque* r. *eadémque.* p. 213. l. 1. Marg. or *propria* r, *propriâ*, for *divinæque* r. *divinæque*, ibid. p. 213. l. 2. Marg. for *natura* r. *naturâ.* p. 228. l. 23. for *purpuse* r. *purpose.* p. 232. l. 2. Marg. for ἀῤῥητ☉ r. ἄῤῥητ☉. p. 232. l. 4. Marg. for θαύμα r. θαῦμα p. 234. l. 18. Marg. for *ipsa* r. *ipsâ.* p. 236. l. 2. Marg. for *beatamquè* r. *beatámque.* p. 253. l. 4. and 6. for ᾗ r. ᾗ. p. 255. l. 8. & p. 257. l. 28. for γὰρ ἐστὶν r. γάρ ἐστιν. p. 260. l. 1. for τοινὺν r. τοίνυν. p. 260. l. 22. for ὑποστάσιν r. ὑποστάσεσιν. p. 262. l. 27. for ὑπόστασε r. ὑπόστασις. p. 263. l. 16. for *ita* r. *ità.* p. 264. l. 26. for *Spiritis* r. *Spiritûs*, for *dissimulis* r. *dissimilis. ibid.* p. 266. l. 16. for *audiêrant* read *audierant.* p. 268. l. 9. for *quam* r. *quàm.* p. 268. l. 10. for *rationemque* r. *rationémque.* p. 273. l. 25. for *hoè* r. *hôc.* p. 274. l. 5. for *cum* r. *cùm.* p. 276. l. 7. for *sine* r. *sinè.* p. 276. l. 10. for τρόπω r. τρόπῳ. p. 276. l. 31. for *essentiâ* r. *essentiâ.* p. 288. l. 5. Marg. for ἐνᾶσθαί r. ἐνῶσθαί. p. 289. l. 10. Marg. for κατεργάσαιτο πῶς r. κατεργάσαιτό πως. p. 304. l. 33. for *directer* r. *director.* p. 325. l. 33. for *Sensitive* r. *Sensible.* p. 335. l. 10, 11. for *of the Lateran* r. of *Lateran.* p. 343. l. 12. for *them* r. *it.* pag. 358. l. 1. instead of *fer* r. *for.* p. 361. l. 6. for *antequam* r. *antequàm*, l. 25. for *ideòque* r. *ideóque*, l. 27. for *cum* r. *Cùm*, l. 29. for *Audivisse* r. *Te audivisse*, l. 30. for *quæque* r. *quê.* p. 362. l. 20. for *antequam* r. *antequàm.* Where *Prædicaments*, and such like Words occur, let them be read with a single *e*, instead of an *æ*.

If the Reader chance to meet with any more such Faults in Accents, he is desired to Correct, or Excuse them; together with all Mispointings, which in Books of any length are commonly too many to be particularly and exactly set down.

Animad-

Animadverſions, &c.

CHAP. I.

Repreſenting to us the Sence and Signification of the Word Myſtery, *as alſo a Vindication of the Uſe and Application of it, to ſome of the moſt difficult and ſublime Truths of the Goſpel; and,* laſtly, *a full Proof, That the Account given by this Authour, of his Explication of the Article of the* Trinity, *is wholly inconſiſtent with the* Myſteriouſneſs *of it.*

IN Order to the better Examination of what this Authour has wrote about the Holy *Trinity*, I think it requiſite to premiſe ſomething concerning the Signification, Sence, and Nature of a Myſtery. For certainly the Unity of One and the ſame undivided God-head, in a Trinity of diſtinct Perſons, is one of the greateſt Myſteries, if not abſolutely the greateſt in our Chriſtian Religion. Now a Myſtery, according to the common ſignification of the word, is derived either from the *Greek* word μυέω, which ſignifies to *initiate*, or *enter one into Sacred Rites, or Doctrines*, or from μύω, another *Greek* word (and that in the judgment of *Euſtathius* and *Stephanus*, more

regularly and naturally) ſignifying to *ſhut* or *cloſe up*, and moſt commonly apply'd to the *ſhutting of the eyes or mouth*, the ſolemn poſture of the μυέμυοι, or *Initiati* in the Rites of the Gentile Worſhip. And, *laſtly*, one of no ſmall Note for Critical as well as other Learning, will needs run it up even to a *Hebrew* Original, deriving it from מסתור, which ſignifies *res abſcondita aut ſecretum*. Concerning which, it muſt be confeſſed, That there is a more than ordinary agreement between the *Hebrew* and *Greek* word both as to Sound and Signification. But whether this be not wholly accidental, is left to the Criticks in theſe Languages to determine. In the mean time, moſt account μυſήριον a word purely and perfectly *Greek*: and the Original of it lies ſo manifeſtly in one of the two fore-mentioned *Greek* words, that it ſeems a needleſs Curioſity, or rather a meer Fancy to ſeek for it elſewhere. But whatſoever the Origination of the word is, it always imports *ſomething hidden* or *concealed*, eſpecially with reference to *Sacred* or *Religious Matters*; And in this Sence it occurs frequently, if not always, in prophane Writers; from whence the Holy Pen-men of the New Teſtament ſeem to have borrow'd and apply'd it to ſome of the Great and Arduous Truths of Chriſtianity, ſuch as human Reaſon cannot give a clear and explicit Account of.

See *Caſaub. Exer.* 16. *ad Ann. Baron.* 43. p. 542, &c.

This therefore being the undoubted Notation and Signification of the Word, I ſhall deliver the Nature of the thing it ſelf in this Definition, *viz. That a Myſtery is a Truth reveal'd by God, above the Power of natural Reaſon to find out or comprehend.* This, I take, to be a full and proper Definition of a Myſtery. And accordingly I ſhall conſider the ſeveral Parts of it diſtinctly. As,

Firſt,

Firſt, That it is a Truth. By which we exclude every thing from being a Myſtery that is abſurd or contradictious; ſince a Truth can by no means be ſo. And conſequently hereby ſtand excluded alſo the Fooleries and Falſities of all other Religions, how Myſterious ſoever they may be pretended to be, and with how much Solemnity and Confidence ſoever delivered.

Secondly, The next Qualification is, *That it be revealed by God, viz.* as to its *Exiſtence*, That *there is ſuch a thing*. For otherwiſe, as to the Nature of the thing it ſelf, and ſeveral other reſpects, in which it may be known, the Revelation of it is not ſuppos'd to extend ſo far. In a Word, as a Myſtery implies ſome Revelation of a Thing; ſo it follows, That all Revelation does not overthrow the Myſteriouſneſs of it: but only ſuch a plenary and entire Revelation of it, as leaves nothing in the Nature of it abſtruſe or undiſcovered. But now, though Revelation be a neceſſary Ingredient in this Definition, yet it is not ſufficient; ſomething more being ſtill required. Since nothing hinders, but that the ſame thing may be both revealed by God, and known upon other accounts, too. As the Moral Law was revealed by God to his People, and may be drawn and demonſtrated from Principles of Natural Reaſon alſo. And therefore, the

Third Property of a Myſtery is, *That it ſurpaſs all the Power of Natural Reaſon to diſcover or find it out.* And that not only as to the *Quid ſit*, or particular Nature, but alſo as to the *Quod ſit* of it too. For that there are or ſhould be ſuch or ſuch things, (to conſider only the bare Exiſtence of them) no Principle of human Reaſon, by its own natural or improved Light, could ever have found out, as might be eaſily ſhewn by Induction, through the ſeveral Myſteries

of our Religion, such as are the *Trinity*, the *Incarnation*, the *Mystical Union of Christ with the Church*, the *Resurrecton of the Body*, and the like; of all, and each of which, meer Reason could never have made a discovery.

Fourthly, The fourth and last Condition of a Mystery, express'd in the foregoing Definition of it, is, *That it be such a Thing, as bare Natural Reason (even after it is discovered) cannot comprehend.* I say *comprehend*, that is, know it perfectly, and as far as it is capable of being known. I do not say, That it is, or ought to be wholly Unintelligible. For some knowledge (no doubt) may be had of it. As, first, we may know the Signification and Meaning of the Words or Terms, in which it is delivered or revealed to us. Likewise as to the thing it self, we may have some imperfect, defective knowledge of that too. Such as the Apostle *Paul* calls *a knowing in part, and seeing as through a glass darkly*, 1 Cor. 13. 12. which words manifestly and naturally import, That something is known, though in a very imperfect manner and degree, and that something also remains still unknown, which shall hereafter be clearly and fully discovered, and made known unto us. So that I think nothing could give us a truer, and more satisfactory account of the Nature of an Evangelical Mystery, than this Scripture, *viz.* That it is a Truth, of which we know something, at present, though very imperfectly; but are ignorant of a great deal more belonging to it. And this τὸ ἄγνωστον, this obscure and abstruse part of it, is that which properly constitutes and denominates a Sacred Truth a Mystery; and consequently we may reckon the Account given us of a *Mystery* by St. *Chrysostome*, a true and exact Description of it by its principal Property, *viz.* Τὶ ἀπόῤῥητον καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἀγνοούμενον, *Homily* 7. on the 2 *Corinth.*

2 *Corinth.* and *Homily* 19. on the *Epiſtle* to the *Romans.* Where I deſire the Reader ſtill to obſerve, that I do not affirm, That this laſt Acception of the Word is either the Original Sence of it, or that the Heathen Writers uſed it in this Signification; all that they intended to ſignifie by the Word *Myſterium*, ſeeming to have been only that it was, *Quid ſacrum & ſecretum.* But this I affirm, That the Fathers and Writers of the Chriſtian Church generally uſed it in the Sence ſpecified; that is, They affix'd a farther Sence to it of their own; but ſtill ſuch an one as carried with it ſomething of Analogy and Cognation to the firſt, whereby it ſignify'd only ſomething *obſcure* or *occult in ſacred Matters.* So that now, if any one ſhould argue, That in the Writers of the Chriſtian Church, *Myſterium* ſignified only, *Quid ſacrum & ſecretum*, becauſe it ſignified no more in the Heathen Writers, from whom they borrowed it, this would be very inconſequent and ridiculous; and all one, as if, becauſe *Sacramentum* in the Heathen Writers ſignified only a Military Oath: therefore in the Ancient Chriſtian Writers it muſt ſignifie ſo too. For the Chriſtian Writers apply it, to ſignifie thoſe two great Rites of Chriſtianity, *Baptiſm* and the Holy *Euchariſt*; though ſtill (in this inſtance as well as in the former) with ſome Analogy, Reference, and Affinity to the firſt uſe of the Word, *viz.* That as by this Military Oath, Soldiers did ſolemnly devote themſelves to their Emperor's Service, ſo in theſe two Religious Rites Men do much more ſolemnly devote and bind themſelves over to the Obedience and Service of Chriſt, according to all the Rules and Precepts of his Holy Religion.

I conclude therefore, by a Parity of the Caſe, That *Myſterium*, according to the Chriſtian Uſe of the Word, imports not only, *Quid in ſacris ſecretum*, by reaſon of an

an actual Concealment of the ſame, but moreover ſomething, that is ſo much a *Secretum* in Religion, as to tranſcend and ſurpaſs all Humane Comprehenſion. And it is the Authority of the Ancient Writers uſing the word thus, which I ſtate this Sence of it upon, as abundantly ſufficient to enfranchiſe and render it Authentick in the Church. Though, I confeſs, as to the Adverſary whom I am to deal with, my purpoſe would be ſufficiently ſerv'd againſt him, even by the firſt and narroweſt Signification of the Word, as it imports only ſomething in Religion actually ſecret, hidden, and not open to a common view or perception.

An Account of the word *Myſtery*, as it is taken in the Holy Scripture.

I have now given the *Notation*, *Signification*, and *Definition* of the word *Myſtery*. But after all, there is a new Light ſprung lately into the World, which tells us, the uſe of the Word in Scripture determines the Caſe quite another way; for that the Scripture knows no ſuch ſignification of the word, as we have inſiſted upon; nor that any thing that is Incomprehenſible, is, or ought to be accounted, a Myſtery. The Aſſerter of this (as we may well perceive) is a bold Man, but being at preſent engaged with a much bolder, I ſhall only ſay thus much of this *Socinian* Tract here, *viz.* That as to the Argument which the Author would raiſe againſt the *Trinitarians* (as he calls them) from the Sence of the Word *Myſtery*, as he has there ſtated it, it has been throughly baffled and overthrown by a Learned Perſon, in a ſhort Diſcourſe *in Vindication of the Myſteries of the Chriſtian Faith*, &c. And when this *Anti-Trinitarian* has anſwer'd that Learned Perſon, if there appears need of any further anſwer to the foremention'd piece, he may, all in good time, receive one in a diſtinct Diſcourſe by it ſelf.

Biſhop *Stillingfleet's* Sermon on the 1 *Tim.* 2. 15. Printed 1691.

And ſo I immediately addreſs my ſelf to the Author undertook by me, who by pretending to defend the great

Article

Article of the Trinity, has given the Adverſary thoſe great Advantages againſt it, which the bare Article left to defend it ſelf, (as *the Faith* is generally its own *beſt Defender*) could never have given him. The *Socinians* charge it with Paradox, and downright Contradiction. For the repelling and ſtaving off which Charge from this Doctrine, our Author has thought fit to give us ſome Rules to judge of a Contradiction by, and in ſo doing, has laid down this Remarkable Aſſertion, viz. *That it is a vain and arrogant preſumption, to ſay, what is, or what is not a Contradiction, when we confeſs we do not underſtand, or comprehend the thing we ſpeak of*, p. 4. This, I ſay, is a very remarkable Aſſertion, and the firſt thing remarkable in it, is, That (according to a Cuſtom, very uſual with him) he promiſcuouſly joyns together words, as if they were of the ſame Import and Extent of Signification, when really they are very different. For to *underſtand* a thing, is to know it in any reſpect, or degree, in which it is knowable, and to *comprehend* a thing, is to know it in every reſpect in which it is knowable. And as it is certain, that we cannot know God this latter way; ſo it is as certain, that we may know him the former: For we do, and may know him by inadæquate and imperfect, and uncommenſurate Conceptions; as that he is Juſt, Wiſe, Good, and the like; which are ſeveral Inadæquate ways of repreſenting him to our mind. But now, if this Author's Aſſertion ſhould take place, *viz.* That we cannot ſay what is, or what is not a Contradiction, when we confeſs we do not comprehend the thing we ſpeak of, then we cannot pronounce theſe Propoſitions, *Jupiter Olympius* is the Supreme God, the Sun is the Supreme God, or the World is the Supreme God, to be Contradictions: foraſmuch as it is certain, that ſpeaking here of God, we do not comprehend the thing we ſpeak of.

of. And yet ſince *Jupiter Olympius*, the Sun, and the World are all of them finite Material Beings, and God both Infinite and Immaterial: I doubt not but that to affirm one of the other, is a real and manifeſt Contradiction. And to ſhew that it is ſo, this Author ſhould do well to conſider, That a Contradiction is not properly (or univerſally at leaſt) oppos'd to the *compleat* and adæquate knowledge of a thing, but to the *true* knowledge of it. And we may have a true knowledge even by ſuch inadequate, imperfect, incomplete Conceptions of it, as we have mention'd. For he who knows God to be Juſt, though he cannot comprehend every way and reſpect in which he is, or may be ſo, and much leſs all his other Perfections, has thereby a true knowledge of God, though an Imperfect one. That is, he knows and underſtands, though he does not comprehend him. But according to this Author's Aſſertion, we cannot ſay, that any thing is a Contradiction, with reference to God, ſince it is certain and evident, that we neither do nor can comprehend him. And what abſurd, and inſufferable Conſequences, this muſt needs draw after it in our Diſcourſes of God, I leave to any one but the Author of this Aſſertion to judge.

But the Conſequences of it, as bad as they are, do not ſtop in God. For in the 7th Page, our Author proceeds farther, and affirms, That it is ſo far from being a wonder to meet with any thing, *whoſe nature* (or rather the *Nature of which)* we do not *perfectly underſtand, that he knows nothing in the World which we do perfectly underſtand*, or, in his other word, *comprehend*, (for to *underſtand a thing perfectly*, and to *comprehend* it, I take to be the ſame.) And now let us apply his former Rule, viz. *That we cannot ſay what is, or is not a Contradiction, when we confeſs we do not comprehend the thing we ſpeak of.* I ſay, let us apply this

this Rule here alſo; and ſince he poſitively avers, That there is nothing in the World which we *do comprehend*, or *perfectly underſtand*: it muſt roundly follow, That there can be no ſuch thing as a Contradiction; ſince whatſoever is ſo, is, and muſt be a Contradiction to ſomething or other. Now for the Truth and Reaſon of his Aſſertion, I cannot undertake, but certainly the Prudence and Forecaſt of it is admirable, as being like to do him Knight's Service (as I ſhall ſhew hereafter) at many a turn, and, next to *a Convocation-Book*, help him out at a dead Lift.

In the mean time, let us ſee how our Author makes good this ſtrange and looſe Propoſition, *viz.* That there is nothing in the World, *that we perfectly underſtand.* And in order to this, Let us bring and lay together what he Aſſerts in ſeveral places. And here firſt in *Page* 7. *line* 20. *&c.* It is agreed by all Men, *That the Eſſences of things cannot be known, but only their Properties and Qualities*; and *that the World is divided into Matter and Spirit*; and *that we know no more what the ſubſtance of Matter, than what the ſubſtance of Spirit is*: and then he enumerates ſome of the Eſſential Properties of each, and owns that we *know them* (in Confirmation, I ſuppoſe, of his fore-going Aſſertion, *that we know nothing*.) After which, in *Page* 8. *line* 15. he adds, *As for the Eſſential Properties, Operations, and Powers of Matter, Sence, Experience, and Obſervation will tell us what they are.* And then I hope we may *know alſo what they are*, when *Sence and Experience* has told us. So that we ſee here what our Author aſſerts; but may we rely upon it, and hold him to his Word? Alas! That, I fear, may prove ſomething hard and unkind. For a Man, to whom *a whole Convocation has given a large ſcope and liberty of thinking*, and who has given himſelf as large an one for ſpeaking, loves not, of

all things in the World, to be held too ſtrictly to what he ſays. For in *Page* 4. *line* 25. reckoning up ſome of the Abſurdities, and Contradictions attending the Doctrine of Tranſubſtantiation, he tells us, That *we know them to be ſo*; becauſe *we know the Nature* of a Body (and this alſo we muſt ſuppoſe ſaid in further Confirmation of his other Aſſertion, that we know not the *Nature* of *any thing*) and moreover, *That we know that ſuch things* (as he there mentions) *are a Contradiction to the Eſſential Properties of a Body, line* 26. All this he ſays here, and that in very plain terms. But in the 7th Page (in which it is high time for a Man to forget what he ſaid in the 4th.) He tells us, *That the Eſſences of things cannot be known*; and conſequently one would think, That the Eſſence of a Body could not be known: And yet for one to *know the nature of a Body*, (which in the 4th Page he ſays we do) without *knowing the Eſſence of it*; (which in the 7th Page he ſays, we cannot know) is, I conceive, a way of knowledge peculiar to this Author. In the next place, as for the property of things, he tells us very poſitively in *Page* 8. *line* 33, 34. *That the Properties and Operations both of Bodies and Spirits, are great Secrets, and Myſteries in Nature, which we underſtand nothing of*, &c. And yet in *Page* 7. *li.* 32. he tells us, That we know the *Eſſential Properties of a Spirit, that it is a thinking ſubſtance with the Faculties of Underſtanding and Will*, &c. Now *to know the Eſſential Properties of a Spirit*; And yet for theſe Properties to be *ſuch Secrets and Myſteries in Nature*, that *we underſtand nothing of them*, (both which this Author expreſly affirms in the compaſs of two Pages) is another ſort of knowledge, which ought in all reaſon to be reckon'd peculiar to himſelf. And thus having conſider'd ſome of his Aſſertions in Contradiction to one another (if there be any ſuch thing as a Contradiction) I will conſider ſome of them ſeverally by themſelves. And

And here, as I have already ſhewn, That he ſays poſitively *Page* 4. *line* 28. *That we have no clear and comprehenſive Notion of a Spirit*: So he adds in the next words, That it is impoſſible *to know what is contrary to the Nature of a Spirit, if we know not what the Nature of a Spirit is*, i. e. Comprehenſively, as he muſt ſtill mean. But this, by his favour, I very much queſtion, and deſire him to tell me, Whether we may not know, *That it is contrary to the Nature of a Spirit to be Material*, to be extended, and *to be compounded of the Elements*, &c. Theſe things I take to be ſuch as are contrary to the Nature of a Spirit, and ſuch as may be certainly known to be ſo, and conſequently ſuch as may ſafely, rationally, and conſonantly to all Principles of Philoſophy, be pronounced to be ſo: And therefore this Author's Aſſertion, *viz.* That it is impoſſible to *know what is contrary to the Nature of a Spirit, if we have not a clear, comprehenſive Notion of the Nature of a Spirit*, is apparently Falſe, Abſurd, and Ridiculous.

But to proceed, This Author having ſaid, *That he knows nothing in the World that we do perfectly underſtand*: And for the proof of it alledged, *That the Eſſences of things cannot be known*; and for the farther proof of that, affirm'd, *That the whole World is adequately divided into Matter and Spirit*; *the Natures of which* (as he ſays) *are wholly unknown to us*: Suppoſe now, I ſhould (as I do) deny this whole Argument, and affirm, That there is a third ſort of *Beings*, which are neither *Matter*, nor *Spirit*; which yet (as to ſome of them, at leaſt) may be perfectly underſtood and known by us; and theſe are *Accidents*, which, according to the ableſt Philoſophers hitherto, do together with *ſubſtance*, make a much better, and more comprehenſive Diviſion of the whole World, than *Matter* and *Spirit*. For certain it is,

That *Accidents*, as contradiſtinct to *Subſtance*, are real Beings, and have their reſpective Eſſences and Properties belonging to them, and ſuch as may be matter of Demonſtration; which kind of Argument is known to be the proving of any Property, or proper Attribute of its Subject, by a third thing, or Principle, bearing an Eſſential Connexion with both. And amongſt *Accidents*, I do particularly affirm this of Numbers, Figures, and Proportions, that they are ſuch things as may be perfectly underſtood by us in the ſtrength of Natural Reaſon. For I think it may be perfectly, and comprehenſively known, That two and two make four; and that a Circle is a Figure, every part of the Circumference whereof is equidiſtant from the Centre; and a thouſand more ſuch things, all which are capable of being Scientifically made out to us by Demonſtration: And this indeed to ſuch an height, that as ſome will admit of no Demonſtrations, but in the Mathematicks, *viz.* in Numbers, Figures, and Proportions: ſo there are few, or none, but readily grant, That the Demonſtrations about theſe Matters, are the Cleareſt, the moſt Scientifick, and Convincing of all other Demonſtrations whatſoever. From all which I conclude, That what this Author has affirm'd, *viz.* *That there is nothing in the World but Matter and Spirit, and withal, That there is nothing which we do perfectly underſtand*, is not only a crude, looſe, unwary, but really, and, in ſtrictneſs of truth, a very falſe Aſſertion.

And therefore, though this Author pleaſeth himſelf with a fanciful Harangue about our Ignorance of the Philoſophy; *How the Fire burns, and the Waters are condens'd* (as he calls it) *into Ice? How Stones fall to the Ground, and Vapours aſcend and thicken in Clouds, and fall down again to the Earth in gentle Showres*, &c. (for it muſt be granted, That it is much eaſier to

to *change* like *the Weather*, than to underſtand it) and moreover, though he is pleaſed to ſay, *That he who "thinks he underſtands theſe matters, would make a Man "queſtion, Whether he has any ſenſe at all?* (which is his uſual Complement to moſt whom he deals with) yet all this confident Talk will neither clear him from the Abſurdity and Paradox of the forementioned General Poſition laid down by him; nor convince ſuch as are converſant in the experimental part of Natural Philoſophy, but that a very true, rational, and ſatisfactory Account may be given of all the fore-mentioned Phænomena in Nature, which this Man, with ſo much Confidence, or rather Inſolence, ſays, *No Man* of *unqueſtion'd Sence* will *pretend to give the Reaſon, or Philoſophy of.* Accordingly I will direct him to ſome who took the boldneſs to give a Philoſophical Account of his *Unreſolvable* Problems. As for inſtance, That of the congealing of Water by Cold, into ſuch a ſolid Body as Ice, he will find excellently, and rationally accounted for, by the Learned Mr. *Boyl*, in his Treatiſe of *Cold*, containing new Experiments, and Obſervations touching it, and an Experimental Hiſtory of *it begun.* Likewiſe a reaſon of the ſame given by thoſe Learned *French-men*, the Authors of the *Philoſophia Vetus & Nova*, commonly called, the *Colbertine* Philoſophy, in the 2 Vol. p. 213, 214, 215, 216. And then, *for the Deſcent of heavy Bodies, or Stones falling to the Ground*; he will find the cauſe of it aſſigned by *Galileo*, in his *Syſtema Coſmicum, Collat.* 1. & 2. And ſince by *Gaſſendus*, in his Accurate Tract *de motu impreſſo à motore tranſlato.* As alſo, an Account of the Gravitation, or Deſcent of ſuch Bodies, judiciouſly given by *Claudius Berigardus*, Profeſſor of Philoſophy firſt in *Piſa*, and then in *Padua*, in his *Circulus Piſanus* 3d part, and the 6. Dial. p. 291, 292. in the Perſon of *Ariſtæus.* And

laſt

laſt of all, in the Cauſes of Gravitation briefly, but ingeniouſly given by *Iſaac Voſſius*, in his *Obſervationes variæ*, p. 201, *&c.* In like manner he will find a Philoſophical, and Hiſtorical Account of Winds, by that great Man, the Lord *Bacon*, in his Treatiſe upon that Subject; which, I am ſure, is as difficult an one, as any mentioned by this Author. And as for what he here ſays *of the Aſcent of Vapours* (which is eaſily accounted for, from the Sun and other Celeſtial Bodies) *and their Deſcent again in Showres*; (which might eaſily be ſtated upon their own Gravity, being combined into bigger Bodies, as is lively exemplified in an Alembick) this Author in this, ſeems to give us ſome Philoſophical Account of Rain, and conſequently for preſuming ſo to do, ought to bear his ſhare in the ſame Reproach, which upon the like account he hath ſo inſolently faſtned upon others. But as touching Rain and Vapours, Snow and Froſt, and innumerable more ſuch Subjects; there is not a Natural Philoſopher, whether *Peripatetick*, *Gaſſendian*, or *Carteſian* of any note, but profeſſeth to give a Philoſophical Reaſon of the Nature of them, both as to what they are, and how, and by what means they are cauſed. Concerning all which, Learned Men, who have avowedly travelled, and imployed themſelves in ſuch Studies, and that with great Applauſe of all the Learned World; I deſire *his Haughtineſs* to ſpeak out, and declare freely, whether he taketh them to have been ſuch Perſons, *as a Man would queſtion, Whether they had any Senſe, or no?* For as theſe famous Men were far from *denying their Senſes, in Complement to their Underſtanding*; ſo they were as far from paſſing ſuch a Complement upon their Senſes, as to own, That their Underſtanding could look no farther, and that where *Senſe* had ſtarted the Game, *Reaſon* might not follow it, and by a diligent, and ſagacious purſuit, at length overtake

take it. The Things treated of by theſe mighty Searchers into Nature, I acknowledge to be very difficult; but every thing that is difficult, is not therefore impoſſible, even to him that thinks it ſo. And therefore, as to the ignorance of ſuch like matters, let our Author (in God's Name) and others like him, pronounce each Man for himſelf, and not undertake for others. For there may be ſeveral things, which one Man may not know, and yet others may: As for inſtance, It may ſometimes ſo fall out, That a Man *may not know himſelf*, and yet others may *know him very well*: which is an Obſervation, I conceive, not unworthy of this Author's Remark.

But to go on: Whereas he is very poſitive, and decretory, *That the Eſſences of things cannot be known*: I very much queſtion, (and allow him, if he pleaſes, to queſtion my *Senſe* alſo, for ſo doing) whether this be abſolutely true? For a thing may be known more ways than one; and if it be perfectly known, any *one* way, according to the utmoſt extent of that way, it cannot be truly ſaid, *not to be known*. Now, if by *knowing*, he means the knowledge of a thing, by a direct *Apprehenſion*, and *Intuition* of it, ſo as to have an exact Idea, or reſemblance of it thereby imprinted upon the mind: I pretend not that the *Eſſences of things* are by any Humane Intellect ſo known. But then, this is ſtill but one way of knowledge; and what is not known one way, may (for all that) be very well known another. But if on the other ſide, by *knowing a thing* be meant, the knowing it to be of ſuch, or ſuch a Nature, by ſuch peculiar Properties, ſuch peculiar Effects, and Operations, as diſcriminate it from other things, and that, to know it thus, be truly to know it: Then I affirm, *That the Natures, or Eſſences of things may be truly, and* (one way at leaſt) *perfectly known*. And accordingly, I think it a very

very good Account of the Eſſence of any thing, to ſay, That it is ſuch a thing as always, and neceſſarily has ſuch Properties, ſuch Operations, and produces ſuch Effects. For this is an Anſwer, not only to that Queſtion, that enquires, *Whether there be ſuch a thing, or Eſſence, or no?* But alſo, and much more properly to the Queſtion, that enquires, *What kind of Nature, or Eſſence ſuch a thing is of?* For when that is askt, to ſay, in reply to it, That the Eſſence, or Nature of that thing is a certain Principle, always attended with ſuch Properties, and always, or generally operating in ſuch a manner, and producing ſuch effects, is a full, and ſatisfactory Anſwer to that Queſtion.

If now this Author replys here, that he grants, That the *Properties of things may be known*; I Anſwer, That ſometimes indeed he grants it, and ſometimes again he poſitively denies it, as I have ſhewn. But if in the iſſue he will ſtand by the Conceſſion of it, then he muſt ſtand by the Conſequence of that Conceſſion too, and grant, That Properties are declaratory of the Quality of the Eſſence they flow from, and belong to. For, I hope, he will grant, that the effect declares the Nature of the Cauſe: And conſequently that the Nature of the Cauſe may be known by it; not by way of ſimple and immediate *apprehenſion* of the Cauſe it ſelf, I confeſs, but by way of Inference and Diſcourſe, collecting one thing from another; which is one ſure way of knowing. And therefore I do here affirm, and own to this Confident, Aſſuming Man, That to aſſert abſolutely (as he does) *That the Eſſences of things cannot be known*, is, by no means, a juſtifiable Propoſition; or, in the Latitude it is laid down in, to be admitted: But is really that fallacy, that concludes *à dicto ſecundùm quid ad dictum ſimpliciter*.

Well,

Well, but ſince this Author has concluded the whole World in Ignorance (himſelf, I ſuppoſe, ſtill excepted from ſo general a Doom) What muſt we do in ſo ſad a Condition? Muſt we all take up in Scepticiſm, and acknowledge, that nothing is to be known? What then will that old Principle of Nature, πάντες ὀρέγονται τοῦ εἰδέναι, ſerve for, but to tantalize and torment us? For muſt we thus think, and thirſt, and deſire to know, and, after all, find nothing to be known with any thing of plainneſs, evidence, and demonſtration? Why, Yes; to comfort us under this Cimmerian darkneſs, and to ſhew, that God has not given us our Intellectual Faculties wholly in vain: There is one certain thing in the World, *viz. The Doctrine of the Trinity*; That is, to ſay, *of three diſtinct Perſons, all united in one and the ſame numerical Divine Nature*, which is *wonderfully plain, eaſie, and obvious to be known*: Though ſtill, thanks to our Author for it, who by a New-found Expoſition, and Explication of it, has beſtowed this piece of Charity upon the World as to render it ſo. For thus, in *Page* 58. *line* 2. of his Book, Explaining the Union of the three Perſons in the Godhead, by *Self-Conſciouſneſs, and Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, (which words ſhall be throughly conſidered in their due place) he ſays, *That this is very plain, and intelligible, and makes the three Perſons to be as much one, as every Man is one with himſelf.* And certainly it is hardly poſſible for any thing to be more plain and clear, more evident and intelligible, than *that every Man is one with himſelf.* (Except it be only when he *contradicts* himſelf.) Again in *Page* 65. *line* 31. he tells us, That his Notion of *Self-Conſciouſneſs, and Mutual-Conſciouſneſs, ſeems to him to make a Trinity in Unity as intelligible, as the Notion of one God is.* And in *Page* 66. *line* 2, 3. *That it gives a plain, and intelligible Solution to all the Difficulties, and ſeeming Contra-*

dictions in the Doctrine of the Trinity. And ſurely that thing, from which *all difficulties are removed*, and about which, *all Contradictions are ſolved*, cannot be imagined to have any difficulty remaining in it at all. And again, in *Page* 68. *line* 26. he roundly tells us, That the Explication given by him *of a Trinity in Unity, is a very plain and intelligible Account of this great and venerable Myſtery; as plain and intelligible as the Notion of one God, or of one Perſon in the Godhead.*

And in good earneſt, the Notion of one firſt Cauſe of all things, and of one Supreme Being, and conſequently of one God, is ſo eaſily demonſtrated, or rather, with ſuch a broad light, ſtares all Mankind in the Face, even without any demonſtration, that if the *Trinity in Unity* be as plain as this is, it is hardly poſſible for any thing to the Reaſon of Man to be plainer: and the *Arrians*, and *Socinians* are ten times more inexcuſable, than ever I thought them before. Again, in *Page* 73. *line* 11. having affirmed, *The Trinity to be a moſt Sacred and Venerable Myſtery*; within 6 or 7 Lines after, he ſays, *If Men would but conſider it according to his Hypotheſis* (which he there ſets down) *then a Trinity in Unity is a very plain, intelligible Notion.* Again, in *Page* 74. *line* 9. *There will appear* (ſays he) *no difficulty, or abſurdity in the eſſential Union of Three Minds by a mutual Conſciouſneſs to each other.* But will this Man conclude, That where there is no *Abſurdity*, there is therefore no *Difficulty* neither? So that, that which removes one, muſt needs remove the other too? It is ſtrange to me, That any one who pretends to argue cloſely, ſhould place two words ſo vaſtly different upon the ſame level. But again, in *Page* 82. *line* 30. he tells us, *That this gives an intelligible account of one of the moſt difficult Problems in all School-Divinity*, viz. *That the whole Trinity is not greater than*

any

any one Perſon in the Trinity. And again, in *Page* 85. *line* 14. *This Notion* (ſays he) *gives a plain account too of that Maxime* of the Schools, *That all the Operations of the Trinity,* ad extra, *are common to all the Three Perſons.* So that by this time we ſee here all things relating to the Trinity, made *plain, eaſie*, and *intelligible*; and that, ſince this Man has ſhewed his skill upon it, all knots and difficulties are wholly cleared off; ſo that now none are to be found, though a Man ſhould beat his Brains as much to find them, as Divines did heretofore to ſolve them. And therefore well may he magnifie the Exploits of ſuch a Triumphant Hypotheſis, as he does, firſt in his Preface, *Page* 1. *line* 13. (which though it be always placed firſt in Books, yet is generally written laſt) Having told us, *That his Original Deſign was to vindicate the Doctrines of the Trinity, and Incarnation, from thoſe pretended Abſurdities, and Contradictions which were ſo confidently charged on them:* He adds theſe words, *This* (ſays he) *I am ſure I have done; for I have given a very eaſie and intelligible Notion of a Trinity in Unity.* If he has, 'tis well. But (how great ſoever the aſſurance is, which he utters this with, as he had always a very great ſtock of it) I dare aver, That he has here ſaid more of himſelf, than any Divine of Note, ſince Chriſtianity came into the World, ever durſt ſay, *He was ſure of,* before. But as high as this ſounds, in *Page* 85. *line* 27. he raiſes his Voice ſomething higher, or at leaſt is more particular in the Encomiums he beſtows upon this his Performance in theſe words: *Thus* (ſays he) *I have endeavoured to explain this great and venerable Myſtery of a Trinity in Unity. And this I may ſay, That I have given not only a very poſſible, and a very intelligible Notion of it, but ſuch alſo, as is very agreeable to the Phraſe, and Expreſſions of Scripture, ſuch as preſerves the Majeſty of the Article, and ſolves all the diffi-*

culties of it. By which account, as we ſee that our Author is not wanting to the Commendation of his own Hypotheſis (as it is pitty but *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, and *Self-Commendation* ſhould go together) ſo we ſee alſo, that he does it upon three diſtinct Heads, or Topicks, which, therefore, by his good leave, we will as diſtinctly conſider.

And Firſt, for it's being ſo agreeable to the *Phraſe and Expreſſions of Scripture*, I hope amongſt theſe, ſome conſideration ought to be had of ſuch Texts of Scripture, As that forementioned one in the 1 *Corinth.* 13. 12. Where (no doubt, with reference to the Myſteries of the Goſpel, of which this is one of the chief) *we are ſaid to ſee but as through a glaſs darkly, and to know but in part*, &c. neither of which, can I perſwade my ſelf to think, is only another Expreſſion for *knowing a thing plainly, eaſily, and intelligibly, and without any difficulty.* The like may be ſaid of that place in 1 *Pet.* 1. 12. where the Apoſtle ſpeaking to the Saints, he wrote to, of the things reported to them by ſuch as had preached the Goſpel (amongſt which, this Doctrine, doubtleſs, had it's place, or an equal difficulty at leaſt) he adds, That they *were ſuch things as the Angels deſire to look into.* The *Greek* word is παρακύψαι, which all Interpreters lay a peculiar weight and Emphaſis upon; as importing both the earneſt intention of the Inſpector, and the difficulty of the object inſpected, from the Poſture of ſuch as uſe to ſtoop down for the better diſcerning of ſuch things as cannot otherwiſe be well perceived, or look'd into. And now, is not this (think we) a moſt proper and fit poſture for ſuch as view and look into things very *plain, obvious, and intelligible?* And yet, I doubt not, but the *Angels*, who are ſaid to uſe it, could very eaſily give us the Philoſophy of *Rain, Snow*, and *Ice*, of *the Fires burning*, and *the deſcent of Stones*,

Stones, and *other heavy Bodies*, which yet this Author will allow *no Man of ſenſe and reaſon* (without forfeiting the reputation of both) to preſume *to give a Philoſophical Account of*: Whereas, in the mean time, the *Trinity* is declared to be a very *plain, eaſie, and intelligible Notion*, even to ſuch Perſons as can give no ſuch Account of the other. And thus much for the *Agreement of his Hypotheſis with the Phraſe and Expreſſions of Scripture*.

The next head of its commendation is, That it preſerves the *Majeſty* of this great Article (as he words it:) But in much the ſame ſenſe, I ſuppoſe, as his *Refuſing the Oath*, preſerved the *Majeſty* of King *William*, and *his taking it*, the *Majeſty* of K. *James*: But, that it *preſerves it ſo, as to have a ſingular virtue to encreaſe Men's Veneration of it*, this I very much queſtion, and demur to: foraſmuch as that old Obſervation that *Familiarity breeds Contempt*, holds too frequently, as well as undeſervedly, no leſs in Things than in Perſons; which we are more apt to venerate at a diſtance, than upon a clear, plain, and full knowledge of them. I do not ſay, That Men ought to do thus; but ſuch is the preſent ſtate of Nature, that thus they uſe to do. And it is worth our marking; That where a Man is ſaid to know a thing perfectly, he is ſaid *To be Maſter of it*; and *Maſterſhip* (one would think) is not naturally apt to create in the mind, any great awe for the thing, it is thus Maſter of. But be it, as it may; this I am ſure of, That as the Scripture tells us, *That things revealed belong to us*, ſo the ſame Scripture tells us alſo, *That there are ſecret things, which* (by a kind of ſacred encloſure) *belong only to God, Deut.* 29. 29. And till God ſhall think fit to reveal to us the Nature of the *Trinity*, I, for my part, ſhall reckon it amongſt thoſe *Secret things*: And, accordingly, with all the Pious ſubmiſſion of an humble Reaſon

Reaſon falling down before it, adore and admire it at a diſtance; not doubting, but that for this very cauſe, That Men ſhould do ſo, God in his Infinite Wiſdom thought fit to ſpread ſuch a Cloud and Veil over it. And therefore I cannot but think, that that Man expreſſed the due meaſures of our behaviour to this, and the like Myſteries, extremely well; who being preſſed in the Schools with an Argument from the Trinity, in oppoſition to the Queſtion held by him, gave it no other Anſwer but this: *Magiſter, hoc Myſterium Trinitatis ex quo argumentaris, eſt potiùs flexis genibus adorandum, quàm curioſâ nimis indagine ventilandum.* The Reſpondent who made this Reply, had the Repute of a Learned and Eloquent Man; and I think this Reply repreſents him a very Pious, and Diſcreet one too.

And therefore, as for the third and laſt Topick, upon which our Author would recommend his Hypotheſis about the Trinity, *viz. That it ſolves all the difficulties of it.* I fear, from what hath been laſt ſaid, that it will prove as far from being a *Commendation*, as it is from being a *Truth*; eſpecially when the Author himſelf, after his ſaying ſo, in *page* 85. immediately adds, and that in the very next words, *Page* 86. *line* 1. *That there may be a great deal more in this Myſtery than we can fathom*, &c. But now, if our Author will in this manner utter one Aſſertion, and immediately after it ſubjoyn another which quite overthrows it, who can help this? *For that a great deal more ſhould remain in this Myſtery than we can fathom*, or that there can be any thing unfathomable in that, *in which there is nothing difficult*; or that any thing can *be difficult*, after ſuch an Explication given of it, as *ſolves all the difficulties of it* (for that is his very word in *Page* 85. the laſt *Line*) I muſt freely confeſs, ſurpaſſes my Underſtanding, to conceive; and God bleſs his Underſtanding, if it can.

It

It muſt be confeſſed indeed (as I hinted before in my Preface) that in a ſhort Treatiſe lately Publiſhed by him, and entituled, *An Apology for Writing againſt the* Socinians, he ſeems to deny *the Notion of a Trinity to be comprehenſible and eaſie*, Page 15. telling us, "*That there* "*muſt be infinite degrees of knowledge, where the Object is* "*Infinite; and that every new degree is more perfect than* "*that below it: and yet no Creature can attain the higheſt* "*degree of all, which is a perfect Comprehenſion; ſo that the* "*knowledge of God may encreaſe every day, and Men may* "*write plainer and plainer about theſe matters every day,* "*without pretending to make all that is in God, even a Tri-* "*nity in Unity, comprehenſible and eaſie*, which he calls, *a* "*Spightful and Scandalous Imputation.* By which angry words it is manifeſt, that he would fain rid himſelf from thoſe Inconveniences which his former unwary, and abſurd Aſſertions had involved him in. But by his favour, the *Truth* of the Charge ſhall take off the *Scandal* from ſuch as make it, whereſoever elſe it may fix it. For I have fully ſhewn, That in this his *Vindication*, &c. he has frequently (and as clearly as words can expreſs a thing) affirmed, *a Trinity in Unity to be a plain, eaſie, intelligible Notion*: Where, by *Plain* muſt be underſtood either *1ſt.* ſuch a *Plainneſs*, as excludes all Doubts and Difficulties whatſoever: In which ſenſe alone a thing can be ſaid to be ſimply and abſolutely *plain*: And in this ſence alſo it can admit of none, and much leſs of *Infinite degrees* of *plainer* and *plainer*; ſince that, which excludes *all* doubts, certainly can exclude no more. Or *2dly*, The word may be taken in a Lax, Popular, and Improper ſenſe; for that which is ſo *Plain*, as to have no conſiderable doubt, or difficulty remaining about it. But, now, the Notion which Men have of *God*, or *of the Trinity*, can never be truly ſaid to be *Plain*, in either of theſe

Some Remarks upon his Apology.

theſe Senſes, and therefore not at all. For in the firſt, to be ſure, it cannot: No, nor yet in the ſecond. For let Men know never ſo much of any Object, yet if there remains more of that Object actually unknown, than either is, or can be known of it, ſuch a knowledge can never render, or denominate the Notion of that Object (even in the common ſenſe of the word) *Plain*. And ſo, I hope, our Author will allow it to be in the *knowledge*, Men have of *God*, and *the Bleſſed Trinity*. And, whereas he lays no ſmall ſtreſs upon this, *That Men may write plainer and plainer of theſe matters every day*: I muſt here remind him, That the word *Plainer* in the *Comparative* Degree does not couch under it the *poſitive* ſignification of *Plain*, but denotes only a leſs degree of difficulty, and ſignifies no more than, That a Thing, or Notion, is not quite ſo difficult, or obſcure, as it was before; which it may very well not be, and yet be far from being *Plain*, in either of the two foregoing ſenſes, laid down by us. And therefore, though we ſhould admit, *That Men might write plainer and plainer of the Trinity every day*; yet I affirm notwithſtanding, that *the Notion of a Trinity in Unity*, can in no ſenſe be truly ſaid to *be plain and eaſie*, and much leſs, *very plain and eaſie*, as this Author has expreſly affirmed it. So that if this be a *Scandalous Imputation*, it is eaſie to judge, to whom the Scandal of it muſt belong.

But beſides all this, I ſee no cauſe to grant this Author that, which he ſo freely takes for granted, (for I think it very queſtionable) viz. *That Men may write plainer and plainer of the Trinity every day*. For, ſo far as the Writers of the Church have informed us about this great Myſtery, the Catholick Church for above theſe 1200. Years paſt, has not only had, and held the ſame Notion of a Trinity, but has alſo expreſſed it in the ſame way

way and words, with the Church at this very day. And for ſo much of this Myſtery, as Divines could give no Account of then, neither have they given any clearer Account of it ever ſince; nor has the Church hitherto advanced one ſtep further in this Subject: which is an evident demonſtration, that it has already proceeded as far in it, as the Reaſon of Man could, or can go. And as for any further Diſcoveries of it, which this Author pretends to from two Phantaſtick words, found out by himſelf, it will not be long, before they ſhall be throughly *weighed in the Balance*, and *found as inconſiderable* as *the Duſt of it*.

But there is one thing more, which I muſt not paſs over; and it is this: That in the Paſſage, I tranſcribed from him, he lays down that for a certain Principle, which is indeed an Intolerable Abſurdity, viz. *That where the Object is infinite, there muſt be infinite degrees of knowledge*. Now it is moſt true, That nothing but *Infinite knowledge can adequately comprehend an infinite Object*. For which reaſon, God alone can comprehend himſelf, and he does it by one ſimple, indiviſible act, uncapable of Parts, or *Degrees*. But as for *Degrees* of any ſort, whether of *knowledge*, or any thing elſe, nothing but a Finite Being is capable of them; and therefore for this Man to *aſſert infinite degrees of knowledge*, when Uncreated knowledge is uncapable of *Degrees*, and Created knowledge uncapable of *Infinite Degrees*, is a groſs thick piece of Ignorance, in the firſt, and commoneſt Rudiments of Philoſophy.

But to return to his Abſurdities about the *plaineſs, and eaſineſs of the Notion of a Trinity in Unity*, and therein to be as ſhort with him as I can, I ſhall only demand of him, Whether he does in this *Apology* retract and renounce all that in his *Vindication* he has Aſſerted quite contrary to what he has ſince delivered in his *Apology*.

If he does, let him declare ſo much, and I have done; but till then, no regard at all ought to be had to his *Apology*; as ſerving for nothing elſe, but to ſhew, That according to his accuſtomed way, and known Character, he has denyed ſome things in one of his Books, which he had poſitively, and expreſly affirmed in another; and conſequently proving, *That the Apology, which denies a Trinity in Unity to be comprehenſible and eaſie, and the Vindication, which forty times over affirms it to be plain and eaſie*; nay, *very plain and eaſie*, ought to paſs for the genuine, undoubted Works of this Author, though they had never born his Name.

Wherefore upon the Reſult of all, what ſhall we, or what can we ſay to the fore-cited Particulars, which with ſo much poſitiveneſs over and over aſſert the *plaineſs, and intelligibility of the Notion of a Trinity!* Which yet has hitherto amazed and nonplus'd the whole Chriſtian Church. For if it be really ſo *plain and intelligible*, as this Author tells us, it muſt to my Apprehenſion unavoidably follow, either that a Myſtery *is a very plain intelligible Notion*, or that the *Trinity is no Myſtery*. I ſhall not here preſume to take this Author's beloved word out of his Mouth, and cry *Nonſence*, and *Contradiction*. But certainly if the Trinity *be a Myſtery*, and a *Myſtery* in the nature of it imports *ſomething hidden, abſtruſe*, and by *bare reaſon not to be underſtood*; then to ſay, *we may have a plain, as well* as *an intelligible Notion* of it; nay, *plain even to a demonſtration*; this, to ſay no more, is as like a Contradiction, as ever it can look.

But really our Author has ſhewn himſelf very kind and communicative to the World: For as in the beginning of his Book he has vouchſafed to inſtruct us how to judge of *Contradictions*; ſo in the Progreſs of his Work he has condeſcended to teach us (if we will but learn)

learn) how to *ſpeak* and *write Contradictions* too. There remains therefore only one favour more, *viz.* That he would vouchſafe to teach us how to *reconcile* them alſo. For I, for my own part, think it every whit as hard a task to reconcile Contradictions, *as to reconcile* Proteſtants; and, I hope, much harder. And yet this latter he has endeavoured to prove in a certain Book, wrote by him in the Year 1685, a thing not to be done. But whether it can, or no, I am ſure, he has hardly publiſhed any Book ſince, but what manifeſtly proves, That there is great need of ſome *Reconciler* to do the other.

Anſwer to the *Proteſtant Reconciler, Chap.* 3.

But why do I ſpeak of reconciling Contradictions? It would be a very troubleſome work, if it could be done; and a very uncomfortable one, when it could not: And therefore our Author (to give him his due) has attempted a much ſurer, and more compendious way of clearing himſelf of this imputation, than ſuch a long and tedious way of reconciling inconſiſtent Propoſitions, could poſſibly have been. For having Aſſerted, *That we cannot juſtly charge a Contradiction, where we cannot comprehend the Nature of the thing ſaid to be contradicted*; and that, in the next place, *there is nothing in the World (which he knoweth of) the Nature of which we can throughly underſtand, or comprehend:* I hope it follows, That, where nothing can or ought to be contradicted, none can be guilty of a Contradiction. And this, I ſuppoſe, none will deny to be an Expedient, every way anſwerable, and equal to our Author's Occaſions: For otherwiſe I cannot ſee what can ſtand between him and the charge of many Scurvy, Contradictory Aſſertions; but that which ſhall effectually prove, and make out to us, *That indeed there neither is, nor can be any ſuch thing as a Contradiction.*

CHAP. II.

Containing an Account of ſeveral Terms, commonly made uſe of in Diſcourſing of the Divine Nature and Perſons; and particularly ſhewing the Propriety of applying the Words, Eſſence, Subſtance, Nature, Infinity, *and the like, to this great Subject; and laſtly proving this Author's Exceptions againſt the uſe of them about the ſame, falſe, groundleſs, and impertinent.*

OUR Author ſeems ſo deſirous to advance nothing upon this ſublime Subject, but what ſhall be perfectly new, that in order to the making way for his particular Novelties, he Quarrels with almoſt all the old words, which Divines, in their Diſcourſes about the Divine Nature, and Perſons, were heretofore accuſtomed to make uſe of. He can by no means approve of the words *Eſſence*, *Subſtance*, *Nature*, *Subſiſtence*, and ſuch like; as reckoning them the *Cauſes of all the Difficulties, and ſeeming Abſurdities*, that are apt to perplex Mens minds in their Speculations of the Deity, and the Trinity, 4 *Sect. p.* 68, 69, 70. and therefore they muſt be laid aſide, and made to give way to other Terms, which he judges properer, and more accommodate to thoſe Theories. To which purpoſe, though our Author has fixed upon two purely of his own Invention, (which are to do ſuch

ſuch wonderful feats upon this Subject, as in all paſt Ages were never yet ſeen nor heard of before, and which I therefore reſerve in due place to be conſidered of particularly by themſelves) yet at preſent the Author ſeems moſt concerned to remove, and caſhier the fore-mentioned uſeleſs, cumberſome words, and to ſubſtitute ſome better, and more uſeful, in their room: Such as *Eternal Truth and Wiſdom*, *Goodneſs and Power*, *Mind and Spirit*, &c. which being once admitted, and applyed to all Diſputes about the Divine Nature (and an *Act of Excluſion* paſt upon the other) the way will become preſently ſmooth and open before us, and all things relating to the Myſtery of the Trinity (according to our Author's own excellent words) be made *very plain, eaſie, and intelligible.* Nevertheleſs, *as I may ſo ſpeak* (to borrow another of our Author's Elegancies) *let not him that putteth on his Armour boaſt as he that putteth it off.* A great *Promiſſor*, with a great *Hiatus*, being much better at raiſing an expectation, than at anſwering it. And hitherto I can ſee nothing but words, and vapour: Though after all, it is Performance, and the iſſue of things alone that muſt ſhew the ſtrength and reaſon of the biggeſt *Pretences.*

Now for the clearer, and more diſtinct diſcuſſion of the matter in hand, I ſhall endeavour to do theſe 4 things.

I. I ſhall ſhew, That the ground upon which this Author excepts againſt the uſe of the Terms, *Nature*, *Eſſence*, *Subſtance*, *Subſiſtence*, &c. in this Subject, is falſe and miſtaken.

II. I ſhall ſhew, That the ſame Difficulties ariſe from the Terms, *Truth*, *Wiſdom*, *Goodneſs*, *Power*, &c. uſed for the Explication of the Divine Being, that are objected againſt *Eſſence*, *Subſtance*, *Nature*, and the like.

III.

III. I ſhall ſhew, That theſe Terms do better, and more naturally explain the Deity, or Divine Being, than thoſe other of *Truth*, *Wiſdom*, *Goodneſs*, &c. And,

IV. And Laſtly, I ſhall ſhew, That the Difficulty of our Conceiving rightly of the Deity, and the Divine Perſons, does really proceed from other Cauſes.

Theſe four things, I ſay, I will give ſome brief Account of.

But becauſe the Subject, I am about to engage in, is of that Nature, that moſt of the *Metaphyſical*, and *School-Terms*, hitherto made uſe of by Divines upon this occaſion, will naturally, and neceſſarily fall in with it, I think it will contribute not a little to our more perſpicuous proceeding in this Diſpute, to ſtate the Import and Signification of theſe Terms, *Eſſence*, *Subſtance*, *Exiſtence*, *Subſiſtence*, *Nature* and *Perſonality*, with ſuch others, as will, of courſe, come in our way, while we are treating of, and explaining theſe. And here, firſt of all, according to the old Peripatetick Philoſophy, which, for ought I ſee, (as to the main Body of it at leaſt) has ſtood it's ground hitherto againſt all Aſſaults: I look upon the Diviſion of *Ens*, or *Being* (a ſummary word for all things) into *Subſtance* and *Accident*, as the Primary, and moſt Comprehenſive (as we hinted before in our firſt Chapter.) But that I may fix the ſenſe and ſignification of theſe Terms, all along as I go, by giving them their reſpective Definitions, or at leaſt Deſcriptions, where the former cannot be had, I look upon *Ens*, or *Being*, to be truly and well defined, *That which is*; tho, I muſt confeſs, it is not ſo much a perfect Definition, as a Notation of the word from the original Verb *eſt*. For to define it by the Term *Eſſence*, by ſaying, *That Ens, or Being, is that which has an Eſſence*, though it be a true Propoſi-

Propoſition, yet I believe it not ſo exactly proper a Definition; ſince the Terms of a Definition ought to be rather more known than the thing defined: Which in the fore-mentioned Caſe is otherwiſe. As for *Subſtance*, I define that to be a *Being not inhering in another*; that is to ſay, ſo exiſting by it ſelf, as not to be ſubjected in it, or ſupported, this way, by it. *Accident*, I define, a *Being inherent* in another, as in a Subject ſupporting it, and without which it cannot exiſt, or ſupport it ſelf. Which Diviſion being made by Terms contradictory, viz. *Inhering* in *another*, and *not inhering in another*, muſt needs be adequate, and perfect, and fully comprehenſive of the whole that is divided thereby.

But now, beſides theſe two Terms of *Subſtance* and *Accident*, there is another aſſigned by Logicians, Metaphyſicians, and School-men, called, a *Mode of Being*, viz. ſuch a thing, as being added to another, does not make any addition of another Being, or degree of Being to it, but only reſtrains, and determines it; and may be defined an *Affection of a thing, or Being*, by which the Nature of it, *otherwiſe indeterminate* and *indifferent*, is *determined* to *ſome certain reſpect, ſtate, or condition.* Thus, whereas the Nature of a thing may be conſidered either as yet in it's Cauſes, or as actually produced, and exiſting out of them, either of theſe is a *Mode* of that Nature; the firſt rendring it only *Potential*, the other *Actual:* Nor is this a meer *Ens Rationis*, foraſmuch as it affects the Being of a thing antecedently to any Operation of the mind paſſing upon it. And the Reaſon aſſigned by ſome Logicians for the allowing and aſſerting theſe *Modes*, is this: That ſome things muſt neceſſarily be admitted to belong to *Being*, which are not *Beings* themſelves, to prevent an *Infinite progreſs in Beings*. For ſince every thing is capable of being defined, or deſcribed,

bed, and yet nothing can be defined merely by it ſelf, (an Identical Propoſition being no Definition) it muſt needs be defined by ſome thing or other, diſtinct from it ſelf; but now if that be alſo a *Being*, then that likewiſe muſt be defined by another *Being*, and that by another, and ſo on *in infinitum*; which would be moſt abſurd: whereas, if this definition, or deſcription of a thing be made by ſome *Modus of it*, which is not ſtrictly and properly a *Being* it ſelf, the thing preſently ſtops here, without any neceſſity of proceeding to any more *Beings*. But perhaps it will be here ſaid, if theſe *Modes* are not ſo many meer *Nothings*, or *Entia Rationis*, what order, or rank ſhall they be placed in? Since thoſe ten heads of *Being*, which we call *Prædicaments*, cannot ſeem the proper Receptacles of things, which we own not to be properly, or formally, *Beings*. I Anſwer. That though they are not *Beings*, properly ſo called, and ſo not directly, and upon their own Account, placeable under any of the Ten fore-mentioned Heads of *Being*; yet ſince they are Appendages of *Being*, as cleaving to it, and depending upon it, they are accounted under, and reduced *to* thoſe reſpective Heads, or *genera* of *Being*, to which the *Beings* modified by them, do directly belong. Now the Nature of theſe *Modi* being thus accounted for, we are, in the next place, to take notice of the *difference* reſulting from them, which we call *Modal*; and that is either between two, or more, ſuch *Modes* differing from one another; as the Perſonalities belonging to ſeveral Perſons, differ amongſt themſelves; or when a thing, or Being, differs from the Mode affecting it; or Laſtly, when ſeveral things thus modified, or affected, do by vertue of thoſe Modes differ from one another; and thus the Perſons in the Bleſſed Trinity may be ſaid to differ amongſt themſelves.

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I proceed now to those other Terms of *Essence*, *Existence*, *Nature*, *Subsistence*, and *Personality*. And first for *Essence*: as I shewed, that *Ens*, or *Being*, might be truly defined, *That which is*; so *Essence* may be as truly and properly defined, *That by which a thing is what it is*; that is to say, by which it is Constituted in such a kind, or order of *Being*: And this difference I take to be founded in the different ground, upon which we conceive of the same thing. Accordingly the *Essence* of a thing, no less than the thing it self, may be considered, either as yet in the *Power of its Causes*, and only producible by them, or as *actually existing*, and produced by them. By which we see, that an *Essence*, as such, may be indifferent to exist, or not exist; and that from hence springs the difference between *Essence* and *Existence*. There is indeed a Reality ascribed to it, even without Existence: But that is not properly a reality in the thing it self, but partly in respect of the power of its Causes enabling them to produce it; and partly, because it is properly the Subject of *Science*, and capable of having true Propositions formed of it, and Demonstrations built upon it: As we may form as true Propositions of a Rose in Winter, and demonstrate all the Properties of it, as of their proper Subject, by their proper respective Principles, as well, as while it is actually flourishing upon the Tree. And this is all the reality which I think can be ascribed to *Essence*, in its separation from *Existence*. As for *Existence* it self, it may be defined, that *Mode*, *or Affection of Being*, by which *a thing stands actually produced out of the power of its Causes*; or, at least, not actually included in any Cause; in which sense God himself *does exist*. From whence it appears, That in Created Beings, *Essence* bears no such necessary Connexion with *Existence*, since it is not necessarily included in the Na-

ture of any finite Being, that it muſt needs be produced, or actually Exiſt. But it muſt be confeſſed, That *Exiſtence* being a perfection, and, in God eſpecially, a very great one, muſt of neceſſity be included in his very *Eſſence*, as containing in it (formally, or eminently) all ſorts, or degrees of perfection. The next Term is *Subſiſtence*, which is a Mode of Being, by which a thing exiſts by it ſelf, without exiſting in another, either as a part in the whole, or an *Adjunct* in the *Subject*. I ſay an *Adjunct*, not an *Accident*, for a Subſtance may be an Adjunct. And, I think, if we would aſſign a way, by which the humane Nature of Chriſt exiſts in the Perſon of the λόγος, we ſhall hardly find out a fitter, than to ſay, That it exiſts in it, as an Adjunct in the Subject. For it is certain, That it does not exiſt in it, as a part in the whole; ſince by this means, the ſecond Perſon in the Trinity, muſt, till his Incarnation, have wanted one part of his Perſon. But I ſhall not be poſitive in the Application of this Term here. In the mean time it muſt be obſerved, That *Eſſence and Subſiſtence really differ*, (ſo far as a Modal difference is reduced to a Real) not only in Created Beings, but alſo in Uncreate. In Created, it is evident; foraſmuch as a part divided from the whole, loſes the Subſiſtence which it had from thence, but ſtill continues its Exiſtence, as being ſtill a Subſtance actually ſubſiſting by it ſelf, and not inhering in any Subject, as Accidents do. Nor is it leſs evident in the Deity it ſelf, and the Divine Perſons belonging to it. For one and the ſame undivided *Exiſtence*, as well as one and the ſame *Eſſence* or Nature belongs to all the three Perſons equally, whereas yet every Perſon has his own proper diſtinct *Subſiſtence* by himſelf; which muſt make as great a difference between Exiſtence and Subſiſtence, as that which unites ſeveral Perſons into one Nature, and that which

which perſonally diſtinguiſhes them from one another. And then alſo for Chriſt's Perſon, with reference to his humanity; though this *ſubſiſts* by the Subſiſtence of the λόγος, yet it do's not properly *ſubſiſt* by the *Exiſtence of it*, (ſince every diſtinct Nature muſt have its own diſtinct *Exiſtence*) which ſhews, That even in the Oeconomy of this Divine Perſon, *Exiſtence* and *Subſiſtence* muſt be conſidered as formally different; ſince ſomething, we ſee, may relate to, and be affirmed of one, which cannot be affirmed of, or bear the ſame relation to the other. Now, whatſoever Being, or Nature, this *Mode of Subſiſtence* does belong to, that is properly called a *Suppoſitum*; as being a thing, which by no means exiſts in any other, but as a Baſis, or foundation, ſupports ſuch things, or Beings, as exiſt in it; from which alſo it receives its Name of ὑφιστάμενον. And the Conſequence of this is, That as *Subſiſtence* makes a thing, or Being, a *Suppoſitum*; ſo ſuppoſitality makes it *incommunicable*; ſince that which makes it uncapable of exiſting in another, muſt alſo hinder it from being Communicated to another. And another Conſequence of the ſame is, That every *Suppoſitum, or Being, thus Subſiſting by it ſelf*, is a compleat Being; that is, ſuch an one as is not made for the *Completion of any other*: For whatſoever is ſo, muſt naturally exiſt in it, as a *part* does in the *whole*, or at leaſt be originally deſigned ſo to do. This Account being given of *Subſiſtence*, and of a *Suppoſitum*, which is Conſtituted ſuch by it, it, will be eaſie to give an Account alſo what a *Perſon* is; which is properly defined *Suppoſitum Rationale*, or *Intelligens*. So that as a *Suppoſitum* is *ſubſtantia ſingularis completa per ſe ſubſiſtens*; ſo the *Ratio Intellectiva*, being added to this, makes it a *Perſon*, which is a farther perfection of Suppoſitality, and the utmoſt perfection of Subſiſtence, as Subſiſtence and Suppoſitality is the utmoſt

Bound and Perfection of Exiſtence in all Beings not Intelligent.

If it be here now asked: Whether *Subſiſtence*, or *Suppoſitality* added to bare *Nature*, does not make a Compoſition? I Anſwer, That in Created finite Perſons it does, but not in Uncreated and Infinite: And the reaſon is, Becauſe though all Compoſition implys Union; yet all Union, is not therefore a Compoſition, but ſomething higher and tranſcendental; ſo that in the Divine Perſons of the Trinity, the Divine Nature, and the Perſonal Subſiſtence coaleſce into one, by an Incomprehenſible, Ineffable kind of Union and Conjunction. And if this does not ſatisfie, (as I think it rationally may) I muſt needs profeſs, That my Thoughts and Words can neither riſe higher, nor reach further.

Having thus ſtated and fixed the ſignification of the fore-mentioned Terms, I cannot but remark theſe two things of the Term, or Word, *Eſſence*. As,

1. That it is ſometimes taken not only for the *Ratio formalis entis*, but ſimply and abſolutely for an entire Entity, or Being it ſelf. And

2. That thoſe two other Terms, *Nature* and *Form*, are for the moſt part uſed as Terms equipollent, and of the ſame ſignification with it: *Nature* being the *Eſſence* of a thing conſidered as an Active, Productive Principle; and *Form* being the *Eſſence*, or *Nature* of a thing, as it is the chief Principle, giving Being and Perfection to it, in the way of Compoſition. Nevertheleſs it is ſometimes alſo applyed to ſimple uncompounded Natures promiſcuouſly with the other. So that we ſee here, That *Eſſence*, *Form*, and *Nature*, generally taken, are only three formally diſtinct Conſiderations of one and the ſame thing; which I thought fit to take notice of, to prevent all cavil, or miſtake about the uſe of theſe Terms.

I have now gone over, and ſeverally given an Account of the Notions of *Being*, *Subſtance*, *Accident*, *Modes of Being*, *Eſſence*, *Form*, *Nature*, *Subſiſtence* and *Perſonality*; and hereby, I hope, laid ſome foundation for our clearer, and more intelligible diſcourſing of the great Article we have undertook to reſcue from a falſe *Vindication*: There being hardly any one of all the foregoing Terms, of which a clear and diſtinct Notion is not highly requiſite to a clear, explicite, and diſtinct conſideration of the Subject now before us. Concerning which, I think fit to note this, That (ſo far as I can judge) the thing now in diſpute is not, what fully and exactly expreſſes, or repreſents the Nature of God (for nothing can do that:) But what is our beſt and moſt rational way of conceiving and ſpeaking of him, and ſubject to feweſt Inconveniences; and for this, we ſhall debate it, whether this Author, or we take the beſt courſe.

Theſe things being thus premiſed, and laid down, we ſhall now reſume the four Heads firſt propoſed to be ſpoken of by us, and Diſcourſe of them ſeverally: And,

1. I ſhall ſhew, That the Ground upon which this Author excepts againſt the uſe of the Terms *Subſtance*, *Eſſence*, *Subſiſtence*, &c. in treating of this Subject, is falſe, and miſtaken. His Exceptions againſt them we find in *Page* 68, 69, and 70. of his Book. "*The great* "*difficulty* (ſays he) *of conceiving a Trinity of Perſons* "*in one Infinite and undivided Eſſence, or Subſtance, ariſes* "*from thoſe groſs and material Ideas, we have of Eſſence* "and *Subſtance, when we ſpeak of the Eſſence, or Subſtance* "*of God, or Created Spirits.* We can form no Idea of Sub- "ſtance, but what we have from matter; *that is ſomething* "*extended in a triple dimenſion of length, breadth, and* "*depth, which is the Subject of thoſe Qualities, which in-*

"*here*

" *here and ſubſiſt in it. And therefore, as matter is the* " *Subject of all ſenſible Qualities, ſo we conceive ſome ſuch* " *Subſtance of a Mind, or Spirit, which is the Subject of* " *Will and Underſtanding, Thoughts and Paſſions; and* " *then we find it impoſſible to conceive how there ſhould be* " *three Divine Perſons, which are all Infinite without three* " *diſtinct Infinite Subſtances, each diſtinct Infinite Perſon* " *having a diſtinct Infinite Subſtance of his own: And if* " *we grant this, it ſeems a plain Contradiction to ſay, That* " *theſe three diſtinct Infinite Subſtances are but one Numeri-* " *cal Infinite Subſtance*, &c. Thus far our Author: And I freely grant, That this does not only *ſeem* (as he ſays) but really is a *Contradiction*. And, before I have done with him, I will prove to him alſo, That to ſay, *That three diſtinct Infinite Minds are but one Numerical Infinite Mind*, (which ſhall be effectually laid at his Door) or, *That three diſtinct Infinite Minds, are not three diſtinct Infinite Subſtances, or Eſſences*, are as groſs, and palpable Contradictions as the other. But he goes on in the ſame Page a little lower. " *We know nothing* (ſays he) *of the* " *Divine Eſſence, but that God is an Infinite Mind; and if* " *we ſeek for any other Eſſence, or Subſtance in God, but an* " *Infinite Mind; that is, Infinite Wiſdom, Power, and* " *Goodneſs, the Eſſence of God, though conſidered but as* " *one Numerical Perſon is as perfectly unintelligible to us, as* " *the one Numerical Eſſence, or Subſtance of three Divine* " *Perſons in the ever-bleſſed Trinity.* In which words, I think this Author guilty of a double Abſurdity. One, That he ſuppoſes a *Mind* not to be an *Eſſence*, or *Subſtance*; and it is manifeſt, that he does ſo, ſince he finds fault with *Subſtance*, and puts *Mind* in the room of it: Whereas a *Mind* is really a *Subſtance*, or *Nothing*; not that there is *nothing* in the World beſides *Subſtance*, but nothing elſe which *a Mind* can be properly ſaid to be.

His

His other Abſurdity is, his ſuppoſing *Mind*, *Wiſdom*, *Power*, and *Goodneſs*, to be the ſame; whereas *Wiſdom* and *Goodneſs*, are not properly a *Mind*, but the Affections, or Attributes of a *Mind*. And here let not our Author tell me, That they are all one and the ſame thing in God: For that is no News; yet nevertheleſs, *Mind*, *Wiſdom*, *Power*, *Goodneſs*, &c. are *formally* diſtinct from one another, and ſo not affirmable of one another: And in ſpeaking of things, the *formal* differences of them muſt ſtill be attended to: God's *Juſtice* and his *Mercy* are one pure ſimple Act in Him; but he that ſays, His *Juſtice* is his *Mercy*, ſpeaks abſurdly for all that: And he who ſays, That a *Mind* is *Wiſdom*, or *Goodneſs*, or *Power*, &c. ſpeaks juſt at the ſame rate.

But again in *Page* 70. " *It is this groſs and material* " *imagination* (ſays he) *about the Eſſence and Subſtance of* " *the Deity, which occaſions all the difficulties about the No-* " *tion of one God, as well as of a Trinity in Unity. For* " *we cannot imagine how any Subſtance ſhould be without a* " *beginning, how it ſhould be preſent in all places without* " *parts and without extenſion, how Subſtance, Eſſence, Ex-* " *iſtence, and* all Divine Attributes and Powers (*which are* " *diſtinct things in Created Spirits*) *ſhould be all the ſame* " *and one ſimple Act in God*, &c. From all which we are (according to this Author) to conclude, That the Terms *Subſtance*, *Eſſence*, and *Exiſtence*, ought to be laid aſide in all Diſcourſes of the Deity; as ſerving for nothing but to cauſe in us thoſe falſe Notions of it. Nor are thoſe only excepted againſt, but alſo all *Divine Attributes and Powers*; for in his laſt words (newly quoted) he equally joyns and puts them all together. And what monſtrous work this muſt needs make in our Conceptions and Diſcourſes of God, ſhall, I hope, in the proceſs of this Diſpute, be made to appear.

In

In order to which, I do here firſt of all in oppoſition to what this Author has Aſſerted about *Subſtance* and *Matter*, lay down this Propoſition, *viz.* That Subſtance in the proper Nature, and Notion of it, includes no Communication with, or reſpect to Matter at all. And this I prove to him by one plain Argument, before I proceed to any thing that is Metaphyſical, viz. *That there was Subſtance in the World before ever there was Matter*; and therefore the Notion of the former does not eſſentially include in it the Notion of the latter: For, ſurely, if the Being of one might be without the Being of the other, the Notion of the one may be no leſs without the Notion of the other too. Now that there was Subſtance in the World before Matter, I prove from this, That there was a *Being exiſting by it ſelf*, in the World, before Matter, and therefore there was *Subſtance*: For this is the very definition of *Subſtance*, That *it is a Being exiſting by it ſelf*, and conſequently they muſt reciprocally infer one another, as the definition and the thing defined by it always do. And then, that there was a *Being thus exiſting by it ſelf*, before Matter, is proved from hence, That there was a Being which produced Matter, which nothing but a Being exiſting by it ſelf could do. And now I would fain know of our Author, Whether we may not have a clear and diſtinct Conception of ſuch a Being, without ſo much as thinking of Matter. And if we may, (as I ſee nothing to hinder us) then it is falſe, that the Notion of Subſtance does neceſſarily engage our thoughts in, or confound them with the Idea of Matter. Beſides, all the World does, and muſt allow, that we may have a full and perfect Conception of a *Genus*, or Generical Nature of a thing, without conſidering any of its *Species*. And withall, that it is impoſſible, that ſuch a Generical Nature ſhould include in it any one of the Specifick

cifick Differences of the things, which it is Communicable to, and which are contained under it; for if ſo, then one *Species* would include in it the Specifick difference of the other oppoſite *Species*; foraſmuch as including in it the Generical Nature, it muſt include all that is included in that Nature too: Which would be infinitely abſurd. But now Subſtance is a Generical Nature, equally communicable both to Material and Immaterial Subſtances, as to two diſtinct *Species*; and conſequently in its Preciſe Conception, implys nothing of Materiality in it; and for that cauſe may be conceived and known, and diſtinctly repreſented to our minds without it. Nay, and to ſhew further the difference between *Subſtance*, and *Matter* in the proper Notions of each, This Propoſition, *Subſtance is not Matter*, is certainly true; true, I ſay, *particularly* though not *univerſally*; that is, with reference to all thoſe Subſtances, the Nature of which excludes all Matter, as the Nature of Angels, and of the Souls of Men, confeſſedly does. But now, if the general Nature of Subſtance eſſentially implyed in it Matter, it could not be truly ſaid of any one particular Subſtance in the World, *That it is not Matter*. Mr. *Hobbs* I know, makes *Subſtance* and *Matter* Commenſurate, or rather the ſame. But methinks, though ſome have lately wrote after him in his lewd Politicks, no Divine ſhould venture to fall in with him in his Natural Philoſophy too, for fear of ſome certain Conſequences, which, it is too well known, muſt follow from it. In a word, the firſt thing to be conceived in God, is, *That he is a Being*; the next, *That he is a Being exiſting by it ſelf*; that is, in other words, *He is a Subſtance*: And therefore, I hope, we may both form an Idea of Subſtance, and afterwards apply it to God, without plunging our ſelves into the groſs Imagi-

nations of Matter. And ſo far do all other Divines, and Philoſophers differ from this Man, that they affirm the word *Subſtance* much more properly, and really applicable to God, than to any of the Creatures; which certainly it could never be, if it implyed any ſuch eſſential cognation to Matter, either in the Nature, or Notion of it.

It is evident therefore, That there is no neceſſity from the thing it ſelf to juſtifie this Author's Objection. And as for thoſe groſs and Material Imaginations of Subſtance, taken up and borrowed from Material Corporeal things, nothing can be inferred from thence to his purpoſe. For is it good arguing to conclude, That becauſe a thing is actually thus or thus, it cannot poſſibly be otherwiſe? Do not ſome form to themſelves groſs and abſurd Imaginations of God the Father, from that Expreſſion of the *Ancient of Days*, Dan. 7. 9. repreſenting Him to their thoughts, as an Old Man ſitting in Heaven? But may not others therefore, who are wiſer, conceive more worthily of him, without laying aſide that Scripture-expreſſion? If it be a good Argument (as it is all our Author brings) that Terms, which may occaſion groſs and Material Imaginations in the minds of Men, ought not to be applyed to God; then I hope it is as much an Argument in one thing as in another. And accordingly I deſire to know of him, Whether the Terms *Begetting*, and *being begot*, *Father* and *Son*, are not very fitly applyed to, and uſed about the Divine Perſons? And if ſo, Whether they are not altogether as hard to be abſtracted from material Imaginations, as the Notions of *Eſſence*, or *Subſtance* are, or rather, indeed, much harder? I believe all thinking Men will conclude they are. Nay, and I ſhall venture to tell him further, That theſe two words, partly through their Corporeal ſignification, and partly through

through the weakneſs of Men's minds, have occaſioned more difficulties about the Notion of a *Deity*, and a *Trinity* too, than ever the words *Eſſence*, or *Subſtance* did, or perhaps could do: And yet, for all that, the Spirit of God has thought fit to make uſe of them to expreſs ſo ſacred a Myſtery by. But this Man ſhould have remembred, That how groſs and Material ſoever the Repreſentations of things are, which our ſenſes firſt make to us, there is a *Judicium Correctivum* in Reaſon, as the ſuperiour faculty, which is to conſider and ſeparate what is groſs and Material in them, from what is otherwiſe, till at length by rejecting ſome Notions, and retaining others, it finds out ſomething even in the moſt Material things, which may truly, properly, and becomingly be applyed to the pureſt and moſt Immaterial. But to give a fuller Account of this matter, we muſt obſerve, That the Idea of *Subſtance* may be ſaid to be taken from *Matter* two ways.

1. Remotely and *Occaſionally*; as the Obſervation of Material Things may firſt ſet Reaſon to work, which in the ſtrength of its own Diſcourſe may draw from thence the knowledge of Immaterials, as the Apoſtle tells us in *Rom.* 1. 20. That the *Inviſible things of God, from the Creation, were clearly ſeen and underſtood from the things that are made*, viz. Such viſible ſenſible Objects, as Men daily converſe with: And if ſo, then ſurely theſe do not neceſſarily diſpoſe the mind of Man to groſs and Material Imaginations of the things ſo apprehended by it. But

2. The Idea of Subſtance may be ſaid to be taken from Matter *immediately* and *exemplarily*, as when the Imagination does, (as it were) tranſcribe and copy one from the other, and take one for the repreſentation of the other; and this, I confeſs, muſt needs imprint a ve-

ry groſs Idea of *Subſtance* upon the Imagination: And to this way may be referred all thoſe groſs and Material Ideas of Subſtance, which this Author ſo much exclaims againſt. But then, all this is from the neglect of the Perſon, in not imploying his Reaſon to correct and refine the firſt reports of Sence, as it might and ought to have done; and if from hence we conclude an utter Incapacity in the thing it ſelf to be improved and heightened into Immaterial Repreſentations, and thereupon to be conceived and ſpoken of agreeably to them, we muſt even expect a Teacher to be ſent down from Heaven to furniſh us with a new Language, or we muſt ſhut up our Mouths, and put up our Pens, and not ſpeak, or write of Divine matters at all.

And therefore whereas this Author further adds, in *Page* 70. *That we cannot imagine how any ſubſtance ſhould be without a Beginning, and how it ſhould be Preſent in all places.* I tell him, This is not the Point in Controverſie, Whether we can imagine it, or no? But I tell him withal, That it is as eaſie for the mind of Man to conceive all this of *Subſtance*, as of any thing elſe whatſoever. For, Why not *a Subſtance without a Beginning*, as well as *Truth, or Wiſdom, or Goodneſs*, without a Beginning? I ſay, Let him ſhew me ſome ſolid Reaſon why. In the mean time, I can tell him, That of the two, it ſhould ſeem leſs difficult to imagine the Eternal Exiſtence of *Subſtance*, than of *Truth*; ſince Subſtance is in order of Nature before it; as the Subject muſt needs be before that which affects it. Though in very deed, the main difficulty here, is not ſo much to find out which of thoſe Perfections may be the moſt eaſily conceived to have been without a Beginning, as it is to bring the mind to a full and clear Conception, How any thing at all is ſo? while it finds it ſelf wholly at a loſs in running up its thoughts

thoughts ſtill higher and higher, without any bound or ſtint to determine them. And this it is, and not the particular Nature of Eſſence, or Subſtance, that nonpluſſes and confounds our Reaſon in theſe unlimited Speculations. And whereas he goes on in the next words, and tells us, That we cannot imagine, How *Subſtance, Exiſtence, and all the* Divine Attributes *and Powers ſhould be all one and the ſame ſimple Act in God?* I Anſwer. What if we cannot? Muſt nothing be applyed to God, but what ſhall let us into the full knowledge of all that is difficult and myſterious in the Divine Nature? Or will this Man ſay, That the Application of the Terms *Eſſence* and *Subſtance* to God, is the true cauſe and reaſon, why we cannot apprehend, *How Subſtance and Exiſtence, and all the Divine* Attributes and Powers, *are one and the ſame ſimple Act in God?* For this is the thing that he has been profeſſedly driving at, and therefore ought to prove. And beſides, as what he has here alledged, is nothing to his purpoſe, without the proof of that, ſo it is all but a meer fallacy, *a fallacy of the Accident:* For albeit, we cannot apprehend how all theſe Attributes are one and the ſame ſimple Act in God, yet ſurely it will not follow hence, that we cannot apprehend them ſingly and ſeverally by themſelves, and as we ſo apprehend them, apply them properly and fitly to God. And here I cannot but take notice of a way of Arguing uſual with this Author, as, *I cannot conceive,* and *I cannot underſtand,* and *I cannot imagine,* &c. After which, as if he had laid down irrefragable Premiſes, he concludes, That the thing it ſelf is not to *be conceived, underſtood,* or *imagined.* But for my part, I muſt be excuſed, that I cannot allow this Man's ſingle Judgment (or prejudice rather) for the univerſal Standard, or meaſure of humane Reaſon; or that ſuch a way of diſcourſing proves any thing but the

aſſuming

aſſuming humour of him who uſes it; and one ſtrangely full of Himſelf, inſtead of better things.

In concluſion therefore, I do here aſſert, That the groſs and Material Imaginations which Men form to themſelves of *Subſtance*, proceed not from the thing it ſelf, but from the groſſneſs and fault of the Perſons who take up theſe Imaginations. And accordingly I affirm to this Author, That that Aſſertion of his in *Page* 69. *That we can form no Idea of Subſtance, but what we have from Matter*, is falſe, and manifeſtly proved to be ſo. And moreover, That it is not only as poſſible, but as eaſie to form in the mind, a conception of a *Subſtance, or Being Exiſting by it ſelf* (which is all one) as abſtracted from, and ſtrip'd of all conception of Matter and Corporeity, as it is to frame to our ſelves a conception of *Truth*, or *Wiſdom*, or of a Being eternally True and Wiſe, ſeparate from all thoſe groſs Qualifications: And conſequently that the word *Subſtance*, with others of the like import, may be moſt fitly and ſignificantly applyed to the Divine Nature and the Perſons of the Holy Trinity, which was the thing to be proved.

But becauſe our Author avers, in *Page* 70. *That if we conſider God as Truth and Wiſdom, which is his true Nature and Eſſence, without confounding our mind with ſome material conceptions of his Subſtance* (as he had already affirmed all conceptions of Subſtance muſt needs be) *then theſe things* (*viz.* the Difficulties before-mentioned concerning our Apprehenſions of God) *are all plain and eaſie.* Where, by the way it is obſervable, That he *calls Truth and Wiſdom the true* Nature and Eſſence *of God*; whereas in this very *Page*, as well as in 68. he had excepted againſt the Term *Eſſence*, no leſs than that of *Subſtance*, as (by reaſon of the groſs Material Ideas raiſed by it in the mind) very unfit to be applyed to God. So happy

is this Author above other Men, that he can rectifie the moſt improper words and expreſſions barely by his own uſing them.

But becauſe he is ſo poſitive in making the Terms *Truth* and *Wiſdom* an effectual Remedy againſt all the Inconveniences alledged from the Terms *Eſſence* and *Subſtance*, as applyed to the Deity, this brings us to our ſecond *Propoſition*, *viz.* That the ſame Objection lies againſt the Terms *Truth*, *Wiſdom*, *Goodneſs*, &c. as applicable to the Deity, that are made againſt *Eſſence*, *Subſtance*, *Exiſtence*, and the like. In order to the proving of which, I ſhall obſerve, That *Truth* may be taken in a three-fold ſenſe.

Firſt, For the truth of Propoſitions, which is called Logical.

Secondly, For an Affection of Being, which is Truth Metaphyſical. And

Thirdly and Laſtly, As it is a Qualification of Men's Words and Actions, and conſiſts properly in an Agreement of the mind with both.

Concerning all which I obſerve, That the Truth of Propoſitions is no further eternal, than as it exiſts in the mind of God. That the Metaphyſical Truth of Things is eternal, or not eternal, as the Being, or Thing it belongs to, is, or is not ſo. And for the Moral Truth of Men's Words and Actions, it is no more eternal than the ſaid Words and Actions, the proper Subject of them, can be ſaid to be. This premiſed, I would here ask our Author, Whether the firſt Notions we actually entertain of *Truth* and *Wiſdom*, are not drawn from the Obſervations we make of theſe things in Men; that is, in Beings ſenſible and Material, and conſiſting of Body as well as Soul, and accordingly cloathed with ſenſible Accidents and Circumſtances? I cannot imagine that he will

will deny this, ſince we do not ſpeak immediately, or converſe viſibly with God, or Angels; and I ſuppoſe alſo, that he now ſpeaks of *Truth*, *Wiſdom*, *Goodneſs*, &c. not as they are exhibited to us in Books, or Propoſitions, but as they actually exiſt and occurr in perſons, and conſequently as they are firſt apprehended by us in Concretion, or Conjunction with Men; that is, with Beings ſo Compounded, Qualified, and Circumſtantiated, as above expreſſed, and as we find, ſee and obſerve them, in Men's Words and Actions, in what they ſpeak, and what they do; and theſe are certainly very ſenſible things, and ſuch as incurr into, and affect the ſence as much as Matter it ſelf can do. And if ſo, I deſire to hear ſome ſatisfactory Reaſon, Why the Obſervation of *Subſtance* in Material Beings, and our firſt *Occaſional* collection of it from thence, ſhould ſo neceſſarily pervert, and cauſe ſuch a groſſneſs in our Conceptions of it, as to make it hardly (if at all) poſſible to conceive of *Subſtance*, without the groſs Conception of Matter; and yet that the ſame conſideration and cauſe ſhould not equally take place in *Truth* and *Wiſdom*, and equally pervert and thicken our Apprehenſions of them, when they are equally drawn from ſenſible, groſs, and Material Objects, *viz.* the Words and Actions of Men, which they both Exiſt in, and Converſe about? For I can ſee no ground why the ſame Reaſon ſhould not infer the very ſame thing, and the ſame Antecedents draw after them the ſame Conſequents, whatſoever they are applyed to. For the Argument *à Quatenus ad omne*, &c. is certain and infallible.

If it be here ſaid, That *Truth* and *Wiſdom* in the proper Notion and Conception of them, imply no Communication at all with Matter: I Anſwer, That as the Notion of them is Abſtracted, and gathered up by the Diſcourſes

Diſcourſes of Reaſon it does not; but ſo neither does that of *Subſtance*, after ſuch an Act of the Mind has paſſed upon it. So that hitherto the Caſe is much the ſame in both.

But to carry the matter a little further. *Truth* and *Wiſdom* as obſerved in and amongſt Men, are certainly finite Things. For whatſoever exiſts in a finite *Subject* (whatſoever the *Object* be which it converſes about, or is terminated upon) is certainly it ſelf finite alſo. And here I would have this Author tell me, Why a Notion drawn off, and borrowed from finite Things, ſhould not be as apt to perplex and confound our Minds, when applyed to an Infinite Being; as a Notion abſtracted from a *Material Being*, can be to diſtract and confound our Thoughts when applyed to an Immaterial? I muſt confeſs, I can ſee nothing alleageable for one, which may not be as ſtrongly alledged for the other. All that can be ſaid, is what has been mentioned already, *viz.* That Reaſon may, and does, extract ſome Notions from a finite Being, that may be properly applicable to an Infinite, due allowance made for the diſproportion between both; and in like manner I affirm, That it can and does draw Notions from a thing endued with Matter, which may as well agree to Things Spiritual and Immaterial. So that I cannot perceive, that *Truth*, *Wiſdom*, or *Goodneſs*, have upon this Account any Preheminence, or Advantage over *Eſſence*, *Subſtance*, *Exiſtence*, and the like Terms at all, but the one may be applyed to the Divine Nature as well and properly as the other.

But this is not all; for I affirm in the 3d *Place*, *That Eſſence*, *Subſtance*, *Nature*, *Exiſtence*, and other Terms equipollent to Being, conſidered preciſely in and by themſelves, are naturally fitter to expreſs the Deity by, than thoſe other Terms, *Truth*, *Wiſdom* and *Goodneſs*, contended for by

our Author. This is our Third Propoſition; and for the proof of it I firſt appeal to that high and glorious Account, which *God* himſelf gave of his own Nature, when *Moſes* deſired to be informed of it, viz. *I am that I am*, Exod. 3. 14. In which he deſcribes himſelf only from his *Being* and *Subſtance*, which indeed rendered him more eminently, and even more *ſubſtantially*, and truly *a Being or Subſtance*, than all other Beings, or Subſtances whatſoever, which, in compariſon of him, can hardly be ſo much as ſaid to *Exiſt*, or *Be*. And I am perſwaded, that God knew his own Name and Nature, and withal, how to give the beſt and moſt proper Declaration of Both, as well as the Author of *Self-Conſciouſneſs, and Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* does or can pretend to do. And indeed this ſeems to have been the very Character by which God would be then known to all the World, *viz.* All the Rational part of the Creation; for it was ſent to his People, then living under, and with a Heathen Prince, to anſwer them and him even in thoſe Notions of a God, which meer Nature ſuggeſted to all Mankind; and conſequently were ſo known and received by them, that they could not eaſily queſtion, or deny them. For otherwiſe we know God addreſſed himſelf to the ſame People afterwards in a Character extreamly different, and more peculiar, viz. *A God Merciful and Gracious, Long-ſuffering, abundant in Goodneſs and Truth, and pardoning Iniquity, Tranſgreſſion, and Sin*, Exod. 34. 6, 7. Which, it ſeems, was the Opening a Particular Attribute to them, which the bare Account of his Being (as known as it was) could not ſufficiently inform the World of before.

But to proceed to other Conſiderations, vaſtly indeed inferiour to this, but yet of ſingular uſe in their degree, to direct our Speculations about theſe Matters,

I have ſome other Things to offer in behalf of the Propoſition laid down by us.

As Firſt, That all Divines hitherto have looked upon, and profeſſedly treated of *the Divine Nature and Attributes*, as different and diſtinct from one another; ſtill conſidering the firſt as the *Subject*, and the other as the *Adjuncts* of it; or, at leaſt, as Analogous to theſe Terms as they ſtand properly applyed to other Things. According to which Notion, as the *Subject*, or that which is Analogous to it, naturally both precedes and ſupports the *Adjuncts*; ſo all Notions importing the Divine *Nature*, *Being*, or *Subſtance*, are to be accounted as *the Subject*, in reſpect of all God's other Attributes, or Perfections, whether they be *Truth*, *Wiſdom*, *Goodneſs*, *Power*, *Eternity*, *Omniſcience*, or any other whatſoever. Which being ſo, I do here affirm, That the Terms *Eſſence*, *Subſtance*, *Exiſtence*, and others Synonymous to them, ought to have the Precedence of the other Divine Perfections, commonly called *Attributes*, in their Application to God, and that upon a three-fold Account, *viz.*

1. *Of Priority.*
2. *Of Simplicity.*
3. *Of Comprehenſiveneſs.* Of each of which ſeverally.

1. For that of *Priority*. As we have already obſerved. That the firſt thing in order of Nature Conceivable of God, is, *That he is a Being*; and the next to it, *That he is a Being exiſting by it ſelf*, or (in another word) *a Subſtance*; ſo the ſame is yet further evidenced from this, That the Notion of Being, or Subſtance, is that, which fully anſwers and determines the laſt Queſtion and Enquiry, which can be made concerning God. For if we deſcribe his Nature by any particular Attribute, or Per-

fection, and be thereupon asked, *What that is?* And having given an Anſwer to that Queſtion, be afterwards urged with another, and perhaps another; and accordingly, after an Anſwer given to thoſe alſo, the Enquiry be ſtill continued, till at length we Anſwer, *That God is a Being; a Being exiſting by it ſelf*, that is, *a Subſtance*. Then we muſt of neceſſity ſtop, and can go no further; which makes it evident even to a Demonſtration, That this is the firſt and Original Notion which we have, or can have of God. Foraſmuch as that which anſwers the laſt Enquiry, or Queſtion, naturally made concerning any thing, is certainly the firſt Thing into which the Being, or Reaſon of that Thing is reſolved. And thus much for *Priority*.

Paſs we now to the *Second Thing*, which is the *Simplicity* of theſe Terms. For *Primum in omni genere ſimpliciſſimum*. So that when we ſay, *God is a Being exiſting by it ſelf*, viz. *A Subſtance*; this includes in it no reſpect to, and much leſs any Conjunction with any other Thing or Notion whatſoever: But on the contrary, *Truth*, *Goodneſs*, *Power*, &c. are all Affections of Being, or Subſtance, and ſo connote a Relation to, and a Conjunction with it, as their *Subject*. So that to give you the ſame thing in words at length, *Truth* and *Goodneſs* are nothing elſe but *Being, or Subſtance, with theſe Qualifications*, or Being and Subſtance under ſuch certain reſpects formally determining them to ſuch a condition, *viz.* either of *Conformity* to the *Underſtanding*, as *Truth* determines them, or of *Conformity to the Will*, as *Goodneſs* does. So that in theſe, and all other the like Attributes, *Being or Subſtance* do, as it were, paſs from their abſolute and Original Simplicity by the Acceſſion of the fore-mentioned Perfections ſuperadded to them.

And

And then in the *Third and laſt place*. For the *Comprehenſiveneſs* of Being, or Subſtance, above any one, or more of the Divine Attributes, This alſo is evident; foraſmuch as it runs through and contains them all, which no other particular Attribute does, or can be ſaid to do. And certainly that which ſignifies *Being* in the whole compaſs and perfection of it, ſhould be much more properly applicable to God; than that, which ſignifies *Being* only under ſome certain and particular determination of it, as every one of his Attributes does, and no more. For we cannot ſay, That *God's Juſtice, Mercy, Wiſdom, Holineſs and Power*, are properly contained under, and formally attributable to his *Truth*, but they are all contained under, deducible from, and referible to his *Being or Subſtance*. So that it may properly be ſaid, That God is an *Infinitely True, Wiſe, Good, Holy, Omnipotent, Omnipreſent Being* or *Subſtance*. But we cannot with any propriety of Speech pitch upon any one of the other *Divine Attributes*, and in like manner affirm all the reſt of that one. As to ſay that God is an Infinitely Wiſe, Good, Eternal, Omnipotent, Omnipreſent *Truth*. This (I ſay) cannot be equally ſaid: For though the Thing be fundamentally true, yet the Expreſſion is neither Proper, nor Natural: Foraſmuch as *Goodneſs, Juſtice, Omnipotence, Omnipreſence*, and the like, are not the proper Affections of Truth, but they are properly ſo of *Subſtance*, or *Being*. And moreover, Whereas this Author will needs have the Terms *Subſtance, Eſſence and Exiſtence* diſcarded, and the Terms *Truth, Wiſdom and Goodneſs* put in their room, when we ſpeak of the Divine Nature; I deſire him to give me ſome good Reaſon, why he pitches upon *Truth, Wiſdom and Goodneſs*, rather than upon *Eternity, Omnipotence and Omnipreſence*. For theſe, in their proportion, expreſs the *Divine Nature*.

ture as much as the other; but neither the one nor the other can graſp in the whole Compaſs of the *Divine Perfections*, ſo as to be properly denominable from all and every one of them, as *Subſtance*, *and Eſſence*, and ſuch other Terms as barely import *Being*, are found to be. I conclude therefore, that in our Diſcourſes of *God*, *Eſſence*, *Subſtance*, *Nature*, and the like, are ſo far from being neceſſary to be laid aſide, as diſpoſing our Minds to groſs and unfit Apprehenſions of the Deity; that they are much fitter to expreſs and guide our thoughts about this great Subject, than *Truth*, *Wiſdom*, or *Power*, or all of them together, as importing in them both a *Priority*, and a greater *Simplicity*, and larger *Comprehenſiveneſs of Notion*, than belong to any of them; and theſe ſurely are Conſiderations moſt peculiarly ſuted to, and worthy of the Perfections of the *Divine Nature*.

I have now done with my *Third Propoſition*, and ſo proceed to the *Fourth and laſt*, viz. *That the Difficulty of our Conceiving rightly of the Deity and the Divine Perſons, does really proceed from other cauſes, than thoſe alledged by this Author*. I ſhall aſſign three: As,

Firſt, *The Spirituality of the Divine Nature*. *For God is a Spirit*, Joh. 4. 14. And it is certain that we have no clear, explicit and diſtinct Idea of a Spirit. And if ſo, muſt we not needs find a great difficulty in knowing it? For we know things directly by the Ideas, the *Species Intelligibiles*, or Reſemblances of them, imprinted upon the Intellect, and theſe are refined and drawn off from the *Species Senſibiles*, and ſenſible Reſemblances of the ſame imprinted upon the Imagination. And how can a Spirit incurr directly into that? Indeed not at all. For we can have no knowledge of a Spirit by any direct Apprehenſion, or Intuition of it; but all that we know of ſuch Beings, is what we gather by Inference,

Di-

Diſcourſe, and Ratiocination: And that is ſufficient. But

2. The Second Reaſon of our Short and Imperfect Notions of the Deity, is, *The Infinity of it*. For this we muſt Obſerve, That we can perfectly know and comprehend nothing, but as it is repreſented to us under ſome certain Bounds and Limitations. And therefore one of the chief Inſtruments of our knowledge of a Thing, is the Definition of it. And what does that ſignifie, but the bringing, or repreſenting a Thing under certain Bounds and Limitations, as the *Greek* Word ὁροϑεσμὸς manifeſtly imports. Upon which Account, what a loſs muſt we needs be at, in underſtanding or knowing the *Divine Nature*, when the very way of our knowing ſeems to carry in it ſomething oppoſite to the thing known? For the way of knowing, is by *Defineing*, limiting and determining; and the Thing known is that, of which there neither are nor can be any Bounds, Limits, Definitions, or Determinations. And this, I think, is not only a ſufficient, but ſomething more than a ſufficient Reaſon, why we ſtumble and fail, when we would either have, or give a diſtinct Account of the Deity.

3. A Third Reaſon of the ſame, eſpecially with reference to the Trinity of Perſons belonging to the *Divine Nature*, is, *The utter want of all Inſtances and Examples of this kind.* For when a long and conſtant courſe of Obſervation has ſtill took notice that every numerically diſtinct Perſon, and every *Suppoſitum* has a numerically diſtinct Nature appropriate to it, and Religion comes afterwards, and calls upon us to apprehend the ſame Numerical Nature, as ſubſiſting in three Numerically diſtinct Perſons; we are extreamly at a loſs how to conform our Notions to it, and to conceive how that

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can be in three Perſons, which we never ſaw before, or in any thing elſe, to be but only in One. For humane Nature, which originally proceeds by the Obſervations of ſenſe, does very hardly frame to it ſelf any Notions, or Conceptions of things, but what it has drawn from thence. Nay, I am of Opinion, That the Mind is ſo far governed by what it ſees and obſerves, that I verily believe, that had we never actually ſeen the beginning or end of any thing, the Generality of Men would hardly ſo much as have imagined, That the World had ever had any beginning at all: Since with the greateſt part of Mankind what *appears*, and what does *not appear*, determines *what can*, and *what cannot be*, in their Opinion.

And thus I have ſhewn three Cauſes (which I take to be the True Cauſes) why we are ſo much to ſeek in our Apprehenſions of, and Diſcourſes about the Divine Nature, and the three Glorious Perſons belonging to it. And the Reaſon of them all is founded upon the Eſſential Diſparity which the Mind of Man bears to ſo diſproportionate, and ſo tranſcendent an Object. So that it is a vain thing to Quarrel at Words and Terms, eſpecially ſuch as the beſt Reaſon of Mankind has pitched upon as the fitteſt, and propereſt, and moſt ſignificant to expreſs theſe great things by. And I queſtion not, but in the Iſſue of all, Wiſe Men will find, That it is not the defect of the Terms we uſe, but the vaſt incomprehenſibility of the thing we apply them to, which is the True Cauſe of all our Failures, as to a clear and diſtinct Apprehenſion and Declaration of what relates to the Godhead.

From all which I conclude, That the Terms, *Eſſence*, *Subſtance*, *Nature*, &c. have had nothing yet objected againſt them, but that they may ſtill claim the place, and continue

continue in the uſe, which the Learned'ſt Men the *Chriſtian* Church has hitherto had, have allotted them in all their Diſcourſes and Diſputes about the Divine Nature, and the Divine Perſons; which are confeſſedly the greateſt and moſt Sacred Myſteries in the Chriſtian Religion. But as in my time, I have obſerved it a practice at Court, That when any one is turned out of a conſiderable Place there, it is always firſt reſolved (and that out of *merit foreſeen*, no doubt) who ſhall ſucceed him in it: So all this ado in diſmounting the Terms *Eſſence*, *Subſtance*, *Nature*, &c. from their ancient Poſt, I perceive, is only to make way for theſe two ſo highly uſeful and wonder-working Terms, *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*. And therefore let us, with all due and aweful Reverence (as becomes us) expect their Auguſt appearance, and for a while ſuffer the *Mountain* to ſwell, and *heave up its Belly*, and look big upon us, and all in good time, no doubt, we ſhall have the happineſs to ſee and admire, and take our meaſures of the *Mouſe*.

But before I cloſe this Chapter, to ſhew how like a Judge upon Life and Death, this Man ſits over all the formerly received Terms, by which Men were wont to diſcourſe of *God*, Sentencing and Condemning them as he pleaſes; not content to have caſhiered the words *Eſſence*, *Subſtance* and *Nature* from being uſed about this Subject, he has as great, or greater a Quarrel at the word *Infinite*, as applyed to *God*; and I ſhall here give his Exceptions againſt it in his own words, being ſuch, as I believe few would dare to utter but himſelf, and approaching ſo near, or rather quite coming up to Blaſphemy, that it may be truly ſaid, That he has not ſpoke more blaſphemouſly of *God*'s *Vindictive Juſtice* in his *Book of the knowledge of Chriſt*, than he has ſpoken

See my Preface.

of *God*'s *Infinity* in this: For in the 77, 78, 79. *Pages* he expreſſes his thoughts of it thus. *The truth is* (ſays he) *this very word* Infinite *confounds our Notions of God, and makes the moſt perfect and excellent Being the moſt perfectly unknown to us. For* Infinite *is only a Negative Term, and ſignifies that which has no end, no bounds, no meaſure, and therefore no poſitive and determined Nature, and therefore is Nothing* (mark that) and withal, *That an Infinite Being, had not Uſe and Cuſtom reconciled us to that expreſſion, would be thought Nonſence and Contradiction.* Which I am ſo far from granting him, that I affirm, if there had never been any thing in the World beſides *God* alone, it had yet been moſt True and Rational. But he goes on. *For* (ſays he) *every Real Being has a certain and determined Nature, and therefore is not infinite in this ſence, which is ſo far from being a Perfection, that it ſignifies Nothing Real.* Thus he diſcourſes: And yet this word *Infinite* has been univerſally received and applyed to the *Divine Nature*, by Learned Men in all Places and Ages; and I deſire this Man to tell me, How, if this word *Infinite* were ſo liable to be thought *Nonſence* and *Contradiction*, this could poſſibly come to paſs. For what he ſpeaks of *uſe and cuſtom reconciling us to this Expreſſion*, is Impertinent, and begs the Thing in diſpute. For ſtill I would know of him, how a word ſo utterly unfit to expreſs the thing it was applyed to, could ever paſs into *Uſe* and *Cuſtom*, ſo as to be took up, approved, and made uſe of by all Mankind. Let him prevail with the whole World to ſpeak *Nonſence*, and to uſe words that *ſignifie nothing*, if he can. But this Man, before he played the *Ariſtarchus* at this rate, ſhould have done well to have conſidered, That every Term is not *Negative*, which has a *Negative* Particle in the Compoſition of it. Of which, innumerable Inſtances may be given. And if he

he does not know this, for all his flirting at his *Socinian* Adverſary, as if he *knew neither* Greek *nor* Latin, *P.* 95. it is a ſcurvy ſign that he is not ſo over-ſtocked with either of them as to have any to ſpare.

And therefore, whereas he goes on in *Page* 78. and pretends there to explain this word *Infinite*, he might have kept his explication to himſelf. For no body ever uſed it otherwiſe, but ſo as to ſignifie a *Poſitive Perfection* by it, but yet withal connoting an *Illimitation* belonging to it. It ſignifies, I ſay, a Thing *Real, Abſolute and Poſitive*, but ſtill with a Connotation of ſomething, which is to be removed from it, and denied of it; ſuch as are all *bounds and limits* in reſpect of that Subſtantial, all-comprehending perfection of the *Divine Nature*. In a word, the thing principally ſignified by this Term, is *Poſitive*, the Thing Conſignified, or Connoted (which is but Secondary and Conſequential) is a *Negation*. And this ſufficiently overturns all his odd Deſcants upon it. But if, after all, our Minds cannot fully maſter this Notion, Perſons, as thinking as he can be, know and acknowledge, that it is not the *word Infinite*, but the *Thing Infinite*, that renders them ſo ſhort and defective in this matter.

But it is pleaſant to ſee him take his Turns backwards and forwards in ſpeaking of this Thing. *There is* (ſays he) Page 78, *a meaſure of the moſt Abſolute and (in this ſenſe) Infinite Perfections*; and if ſuch a *meaſure* there be, then I hope there is as much *Nonſence* and *Contradiction* in the word *Immenſe*, as in the word *Infinite*; and withal, if there is even in the moſt Abſolute and *Infinite Perfections*, a *ne plus ultrà*, and an *ultimum quod ſic* (as the School-men, who were never bred at St. *Mary Overies*, are apt to ſpeak) then I confeſs, That an *Infinite*, with all theſe Qualifications about it, muſt needs (ac-

cording to his beloved Dialect) be *Nonſence and Contradiction*; and that of the higheſt rank. And again, *P.*79. *We know not* (ſays he) *How far Infinite Wiſdom, and Power, and Goodneſs reaches*, (and thus much is very true) but then (ſays he again) *we certainly know that they have their* Bounds, *and that the Divine Nature is the utmoſt* Bounds *of them*. By which words if he means, That they have their fixed determinate Notions, whereby they are formally diſtinguiſhed among themſelves, as well as from other Things, it is right. For the Notion of *Infinite Wiſdom* is ſo bounded, that it cannot be ſaid to be *Infinite Power*, or *Infinite Power* to be *Infinite Goodneſs*, or the like; but ſtill the Thing couched under all theſe is *Infinite*, and neither has nor can have any *Bounds* ſet to its Being. And if he ſhould here reply, That then the Notion of *Infinite Wiſdom*, *Power*, and the like, are falſe Notions, as not anſwering the Things they are applyed to. I Anſwer, That they are indeed imperfect and *inadequate*, as not fully anſwering the Thing it ſelf, but they cannot be ſaid to be *falſe* for all that. But on the contrary, if he will needs have the thing hereby ſignified to have any Real Bounds or Limits of it's Being; then it will and muſt follow, That in the forecited words he has with Accurate and Profound Speculation preſented to us *An Infinite with* Bounds, *and the Divine Nature* (which has no Bounds) *made the* Bounds *of it*. Theſe are the very words he uſes; and withal delivered by him with ſuch a Magiſterial Air and Contempt of the whole World beſides, who have hitherto approved and made uſe of theſe Expreſſions (and that in a ſenſe and ſignification not to be born down by every ſelf Opiniator, after ſo long and univerſal a Preſcription) that ſo much Confidence cannot be ſufficiently wondred at, nor too ſeverely rebuked.

And

And therefore to review a little the foregoing particulars, and thereby to take ſome eſtimate of the Man; Where ſhall we find ſuch another Inſtance of a *private Presbyter*, who in the Communion, or rather in the very Boſom of ſo pure and Orthodox a Church, as this our Church of *England*, ever before durſt, in ſo great an Article of the *Chriſtian Faith*, draw his Pen againſt all the Writers of the Church Ancient and Modern, Fathers and School-men, and with one daſh of it explode and ſtrike off all thoſe received Terms by which they conſtantly explained this Myſtery, as not only uſeleſs, but miſchievous in all Diſcourſes about it? Whereas (not to anticipate what I intend more particularly and fully upon this Head in my eighth Chapter) I ſhall only affirm thus much at preſent; That the *Greek* Writers in expreſſing the *God-head*, or *Divine Nature*, whenſoever they do not uſe the words, Θεότης, or Τὸ Θεῖον, conſtantly expreſs it by φύσις and οὐσία, and ſometimes by ὑπόστασις, while οὐσία and ὑπόστασις were commonly uſed in the ſame ſenſe. And likewiſe the *Latines*, where they expreſs not the ſame by *Deitas*, or *Divinitas*, do as conſtantly expreſs it by *Natura* and *Subſtantia*; which words ſtand now particularly condemned by this Preſuming Man; and that, not only in defiance of all the Ancients, but alſo of the Church of *England* it ſelf, which has ſet her Authorizing ſtamp upon thoſe two words *Subſtance* and *Perſon*, by applying them to this Subject both in her *Articles* and *Liturgy*. In the firſt of them teaching us, *That in the Unity of the Godhead there are three* Perſons, *of one* Subſtance, *Power and Eternity*. Artic. 1. And in her Liturgy rendring the *Athanaſian Creed* by the ſame words, *Neither confounding the* Perſons, *nor dividing the* Subſtance. As likewiſe that Paſſage in the *Nicene Creed*, by the *Son's being of one* Subſtance *with*

with the Father. And again in the Doxology at the Communion on *Trinity Sunday*, it gives us theſe full and notable words, *One God, one Lord, not one only* Perſon, *but three Perſons in one* Subſtance. After all which, with what face can this ſtrange, Anomalar Son of the Church (while he is ſucking her Breaſts, and at the ſame time poyſoning the *Milk*, with which ſhe ſhould feed her Children) I ſay, with what face can he aver to the World, That this word *Subſtance* thus embraced, owned and uſed by her, ought to be thrown away, as the Direct Cauſe of all the Errours Men are apt to fall into, about this great Myſtery? and that we can have no *Notion of Subſtance*, but what *implys in it ſomething groſs and material*? Which, were it ſo, can any one imagine, that the Church of *England* would ever have made uſe of ſuch a *word*, as could ſerve for nothing, but a Snare and a Trap to betray the Underſtandings and Conſciences of Men, into ſuch Errours as may coſt them their Souls? This is ſo fouly Reflexive upon her, that I would have any Man living give me a good Reaſon, Why this Author ſhould not be call'd upon by Publick Authority to give the Church ſatisfaction for the ſcandal given to all the Orthodox Members of it, by the Contumely and Reproach which he has paſſed upon thoſe *Terms* and *Words* which ſhe has thought fit ſo ſolemnly to expreſs her *Faith* and her *Devotions* by. But ſome Men, (ſuch is the Regard had to her Laws and Diſcipline) will venture to utter and write any Thing, that the Bookſeller will pay them for, though they throw their Conſcience and Religion into the Bargain.

Some further Remarks upon his Apology.

But *God* himſelf, *who reſiſteth the Proud*, ſeems to have took the Matter into his own Hands, and (to ſhew his Controlling Providence over the Minds and Hearts of Men) has at length brought this Scornful Man *to eat his own*

own words (the hardeſt Diet certainly that a proud Perſon can be put to) and after all the black Dirt thrown by Him upon the *School-men* and their *Terms*, to lick it off again with his own Tongue. So that after he had paſſed ſuch a Terrible killing Doom upon theſe words, *Eſſence*, *Subſtance*, *Subſiſtence*, *Suppoſitum*, *Perſon*, and the like, here in his *Vindication*, all on a ſuddain, in a relenting fit, he graciouſly reaches out his *Golden Scepter* of *Self-Contradiction*, and reſtores them to Life again, in his *Apology*. And that the Reader may behold both ſides of the Contradiction the more clearly, I think it the beſt and faireſt way to give him the *ſenſe* of this Author (if it may be ſo call'd) in his own words.

Vindication.

"I Have not troubled "my Reader with the "different ſignification of "*Eſſence*, *Hypoſtaſis*, *Subſiſtence*, *Perſons*, *Exiſtence*, "*Nature*, &c. which are "Terms very differently "uſed by the *Greek* and "*Latin* Fathers, *and have "very much obſcured this Doctrine inſtead of explaining it*, P. 101. l. 12.

"The School-men have "no Authority where they "leave the Fathers; *whoſe "ſenſe they ſometimes ſeem "to miſtake, or to clog it*

Apology.

"HE (*viz.*) the *melancholy Standerby*, is very angry with "the School-Doctors, as "worſe Enemies to Chriſtianity, than either Heathen Philoſophers, or "Perſecuting Emperours. "'Pray what hurt have "they done? I ſuppoſe he "means the corruption of "Chriſtianity, with thoſe "Barbarous Terms of *Perſon*, *Nature*, *Eſſence*, *Subſiſtence*, *Conſubſtantiality*, "&c. *which will not ſuffer* "Hereticks *to lie concealed*

" *with ſome peculiar Niceties*
" *and Diſtinctions of their*
" *own*, P. 138. l. 28.

" The Truth is, that
" which has confounded
" this *Myſtery* (*viz.* of the
" Trinity) has been the
" vain endeavour to reduce
" it to Terms of Art, ſuch
" as *Nature*, *Eſſence*, *Sub-*
" *ſtance*, *Subſiſtence*, *Hypo-*
" *ſtaſis*, and the like, P. 138.
" l. the laſt, and p. 139.
" l. 1.

And ſpeaking of the Ancient Fathers in the ſame Page, he tells us: " They
" nicely diſtinguiſhed be-
" tween *Perſon* and *Hypo-*
" *ſtaſis*, and *Nature*, and
" *Eſſence*, and *Subſtance*;
" that they *were three Per-*
" *ſons*, but one *Nature*, *Eſ-*
" *ſence and Subſtance*: But
" that when Men curiouſly
" examined the ſignificati-
" on of theſe words, they
" found that upon ſome ac-
" count or other, *They were*
" *very unapplicable to this*
" *Myſtery*.

Hereupon he asks the following Queſtions in an upbraiding manner, *viz.*

" *under Scripture-Phraſes.*
" *But why muſt the School-*
" *men bear all the blame of*
" *this*? Why does he not
" accuſe the *Ancient Fa-*
" *thers, and Councils, from*
" *whom the School-men*
" *learnt theſe Terms.* Why
" does he let St. *Auſtin* e-
" ſcape, from whom the
" Maſter of the Sentences
" borrowed moſt of his
" Diſtinctions and Subtle-
" ties? But ſuppoſe, theſe
" unlucky Wits had uſed
" ſome new Terms, have
" they taught any new
" Faith about the Trinity
" in Unity, which the
" Church did not teach?
" And if they *have only*
" *guarded the* Chriſtian
" *Faith with an Hedge of*
" *Thorns, which diſguiſed*
" Hereticks *cannot break*
" *through*, is this to wound
" Chriſtianity in its very
" Vitals? No, no: *They*
" *will only prick the Fin-*
" *gers of* Hereticks, *and ſe-*
" *cure Chriſtianity from be-*
" *ing wounded*; and this
" is one great Cauſe, why
" ſome Men are ſo angry

"*What is the Subſtance and*
"*Nature of* God?
"*How can three*
"*diſtinct Perſons*
"*have but one*
"*Numerical Sub-*
"*ſtance?* And,
"*What is the Diſtinction be-*
"*tween Eſſence*, and *Perſo-*
"*nality*, and *Subſiſtence?*

See theſe empty Queſtions diſtinctly anſwered in my 7th. Chapter.

And Laſtly, at the end of the ſame Page, "He "confeſſes, that ſome to-"lerable Account of the "School-Terms and Di-"ſtinctions might be gi-"ven, but that it would be "a work of *more difficulty* "than *uſe*. "with the School-Doctors; "though the more General "Cauſe is, becauſe they "have not Induſtry enough "to Read, or underſtand "them. *Apology*, P. 4, 5.

I have (to prevent all Exceptions) given the Reader the whole Paragraph; in which the laſt Clauſe *ſtrikes Home* indeed; tho' in ſuch Caſes, ſome think this Author would do well to take heed of ſtriking *too Home* and *Hard*, for fear the Blow ſhould *rebound* back again, and do execution where he leaſt intended it.

Now here the Reader is deſired to obſerve the Sovereign uſefulneſs aſcribed by our Author to thoſe School-Terms: *Perſon*, *Nature*, *Eſſence*, *Subſiſtence*, *Conſubſtantiality*, &c. As, *That they will not ſuffer* Hereticks *to lie concealed under Scripture-Phraſes.* That *the Schools learned all theſe Terms of the Ancient Fathers.* That *they have guarded the Chriſtian Faith with an Hedge of Thorns, which diſguiſed* Hereticks *cannot break through. That inſtead of wounding* Chriſtianity *in its Vitals, they only prick the Fingers of* Hereticks, *and ſecure* Chriſtianity *from being wounded.* All theſe great and good things he tells us have been done in behalf of Chriſtianity by the *Schoolmen*, and their fore-mentioned *Terms*, here in this *Apology*; and now if the Reader will but look back into the

Vindication too, our Author will there tell him also, *How*, and by *what Way* and *means* the said *School-men* and their *Terms* have Atchieved all these worthy Feats, *viz. By their obscuring instead of explaining the Doctrine of the Trinity. By their mistaking the meaning of the Fathers, or clogging it with peculiar Niceties of their own.* Also *by confounding the Mystery of the Trinity, through a vain endeavour to reduce it to such Terms of Art, as* Essence, Substance, Subsistence, Nature, Person, *and the like.* As likewise *by the said Terms being found very* unapplicable *to this Mystery.* And lastly, *Because though some tolerable Account might possibly be given of their meaning, yet that it would be of little or* no use *to give any such Account, or Explication of them: So useful* (it seems) does he account them, to *secure* Christianity *against* Hereticks, that it is *of no use* at all to *explain* them. And now, I hope, when the Reader has considered, what this Author has said on both sides, he will acknowledge, that *Hand* and *Glove* cannot more exactly agree, than the *Vindication* and the *Apology*. And as for that *Melancholy Stander-by*, upon whose Account this *Apology* is pretended to have been written, if he will but read and compare the *Apology* and *Vindication* together, I dare undertake, that he will not be half so *Melancholy* as he was before.

But does this Author, in sober sadness, think that this is the way to *Confute Hereticks*, thus to play backwards and forwards, to say, and unsay, and only to set two Books together by the Ears? Let me tell him, *That* God *is not mocked*, nor the World neither; and that he owes an Account, of what he has wrote, to both. For my own part, so far as my Converse reaches, I meet with no serious and judicious Person, who does not reckon, that this Author, by his *Desultorious, Inconsistent*,

ſtent, but withal *Impoſing* way of writing, will in all likelihood make twenty *Hereticks*, before he Confutes one.

It is indeed an amazing Thing to conſider, That any one Man ſhould preſume to Brow-beat all the World at ſuch a rate; and we may well wonder at the force of Confidence and Self-Conceit, that it ſhould be able to raiſe any one to ſuch a pitch. But *Naturaliſts* have obſerved, That Blindneſs in ſome *Animals*, is a very great Help and Inſtigation to Boldneſs. And amongſt Men, as *Ignorance* is commonly ſaid to be the *Mother* of *Devotion*, ſo in accounting for the Birth and Deſcent of *Confidence* too, (whatſoever other Cauſe ſome may derive it from) yet, certainly, He who makes *Ignorance the Mother of this* alſo, reckons its Pedigree by the *ſurer ſide*.

CHAP. III.

In which the Author's New Notion of Self-Conſciouſneſs *and* Mutual-Conſciouſneſs, *is briefly declared.* Self-Conſciouſneſs *made by him the formal Conſtituent Reaſon of* Perſonality *in all Perſons, both Create and Uncreate; and on the contrary, proved againſt him in the firſt place, That it is not ſo in Perſons Create.*

OUR Author not being ſatisfied with the Account given of the Myſtery of the Bleſſed Trinity by the Schools, nor with thoſe Notions about it, which have hitherto obtained in the World, till he came into it (no doubt as a Perſon peculiarly ſent and qualified to rectifie all thoſe Imperfect, and Improper Notions, which had been formerly received by Divines.) He, I ſay, with a Lofty Undertaking Mind, and a Reach beyond all *before*, and indeed *beſide* him, and (as the Iſſue is like to prove) as much *above* him too, undertakes to give the World a much better, and more ſatisfactory Explication of this great Myſtery, and that by two new Terms, or Notions (purely and ſolely of his own invention) called, *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*; which, though ſtill joyned together by our Author in his Explication of the *Bleſſed Trinity*, have yet

yet very different Effects, as we ſhall preſently ſee.

For by *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, he means, a Mind's, or Spirit's being Conſcious to its own Thoughts, Reaſonings and Affections (and I ſuppoſe all other Internal Motions too) which no other finite Spirit is, or can be naturally Conſcious to, but it ſelf. And this (he ſays) makes a finite Spirit Numerically one, or *one with it ſelf* (for he uſes both Expreſſions) and withal ſeparates and diſtinguiſhes it from all other Spirits; ſo that hereby every Spirit feels only its own Thoughts, Paſſions, or Motions, but is not Conſcious to the Thoughts, Paſſions, or Motions of any other. And this (ſo far as his own words import) he means by *Self-Conſciouſneſs*.

As for *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*. That takes place, when two or more Spirits, or Minds know all that of one another, which each Mind, or Spirit knows of it ſelf, by a particular *Self-Conſciouſneſs* of its own. And this, I conceive to be a juſt Account of what this Man means by *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*.

Now the Effects of theſe two (as I noted before) are very different.

For *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, (according to him) is the Conſtituent Principle, or formal Reaſon of Perſonality. So that *Self-Conſciouſneſs* properly Conſtitutes, or makes a Perſon, and ſo many *Self-Conſciouſneſſes* make ſo many diſtinct Perſons.

But *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, ſo far as it extends, makes an Unity, not of Perſons, (for Perſonality as ſuch imports diſtinction, and ſomething perſonally Incommunicable;) but an Unity of Nature in Perſons. So that after *Self-Conſciouſneſs* has made ſeveral diſtinct Perſons, in comes *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, and ſets them all at *one* again; and gives

gives them all but one and the ſame Nature, which they are to take amongſt themſelves, as well as they can. And this is a True and ſtrict Account of this Author's New Hypotheſis; and ſuch, as I ſuppoſe, he will not except againſt, becauſe juſtly, I am ſure, he cannot; howſoever I may have expreſſed the Novel Whimſey ſomething for the Reader's Diverſion.

Now, by what has been ſaid, it is evident, that the Author aſſigns *Self-Conſciouſneſs* as the formal Reaſon of Perſonality, in all Perſons Univerſally, whether Finite, or Infinite, Create, or Uncreate. For having firſt ſtated it ſo in Finite and Created Spirits, *Page* 48. *line* 26. &c. He afterwards applys it to Infinite and Uncreate, *viz.* the three Perſons of the *God-head.*

And therefore, that we may proceed fairly, and without any ground of Exception in the Caſe, we will examine,

I. Whether or no *Self-Conſciouſneſs* be the Reaſon of Perſonality in *Finite* Perſons? And,

II. Whether it be ſo in *Infinite?*

And Firſt, For *Finite*, or Created Spirits. I deny *Self-Conſciouſneſs* to be the formal Reaſon of Perſonality in theſe. And before I give my Reaſons againſt it, I ſhall premiſe this one Conſideration, *viz.* That whereſoever the formal Reaſon of Perſonality is, there is Perſonality. And again, That whereſoever Perſonality is, there is the formal Reaſon of Perſonality, *viz.* That they exiſt Convertibly, and that one Mutually and Eſſentially infers the other.

Now this premiſed and laid down, my Reaſons, why I deny *Self-Conſciouſneſs* to be the formal Reaſon of Perſonality in Finite, or Created Beings, are theſe.

1. *Argument.*

1. *Argument.* According to the natural order of Things, *Self-Conſciouſneſs* in Perſons, pre-ſuppoſes their Perſonality, and therefore is not, cannot be the Reaſon of it. The Argument, I conceive, is very plain. For whatſoever pre-ſuppoſes a Thing, is in order of Nature Poſterior and Subſequent to the Thing ſo pre-ſuppoſed by it; and again on the other hand the formal Reaſon of any Thing is in Order of Nature precedent to that thing, of which it is the Reaſon. We will therefore prove the Major Propoſition. And we do it thus. Perſonality is the Ground and Principle of all Action, whereſoever it is. For where there is a *Suppoſitum*, whether it be *Rational* (which is another word for Perſon) or not, ſtill it is the whole *Suppoſitum*, which Acts. So that there muſt be a Perſon before there can be an Act, or Action proceeding from, or Attributable to a Perſon. In a word, there muſt be a Perſon in Being, before any Action iſſues from him; and therefore the Act muſt eſſentially and neceſſarily pre-ſuppoſe the Perſon for the Agent. But now *Self-Conſciouſneſs* does not only do this; but (which is more) it alſo pre-ſuppoſes another Act Antecedent to it ſelf. For it is properly and formally a *Reflex Act* upon the Acts, Paſſions, or Motions of the Perſon whom it belongs to. So that according to the Nature of the Thing, there is not only a Perſon, but alſo an Action (which is, and muſt be ſubſequent to a Perſon) that is Antecedent to *Self-Conſciouſneſs*; which being a *Reflex Act*, muſt needs in order of Nature be Poſteriour to the Act reflected upon by it. And therefore *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, which is by two degrees Poſterior to Perſonality, cannot poſſibly be the *formal Reaſon* of it. This I look upon as a Demonſtration of the Point. And I leave it to our Author (who is better a great deal at

ſcorning

ſcorning the Schools, than at confuting them) to anſwer and overthrow it *at his leiſure.*

2. Our Second *Argument* is this. The Humanity, or Humane Nature of Chriſt, is perfectly Conſcious to it ſelf of all the Internal Acts, whether of Knowledge, Volition, Paſſion, or Deſire, that paſs in it, or belong to it; and yet the Humanity, or Humane Nature of Chriſt is not a Perſon, and conſequently *Self-Conſciouſneſs* is not the proper formal Reaſon of Perſonality; foraſmuch as it may be in that, which is no Perſon. That the Humane Nature of Chriſt is thus *Self-Conſcious*, is evident, ſince it has all the Principles and Powers of Self-reflexion upon its own Acts, whereby it intimately knows it ſelf to do what it does, and to be what it is, which are in any particular Man whatſoever; ſo that if any Man be Conſcious to himſelf of theſe things, the Humane Nature of Chriſt, which has the ſame Operative Powers in perfection (and thoſe eſſentially proper to, and inſeparable from it ſelf) which the reſt of Mankind are endued with, muſt needs be ſo too. And then, as for the Aſſumption, *That the Humane Nature of Chriſt is not a Perſon*, is no leſs evident. Since it is taken into, and ſubſiſts in and by the Perſonality of the ſecond Perſon of the Trinity, and therefore can have no diſtinct Perſonality of its own; unleſs we will with *Neſtorius* aſſert two Perſons in Chriſt, an Humane, and a Divine. And the Truth is, If *Self-Conſciouſneſs* were the formal Reaſon of Perſonality, ſince there are two diſtinct *Self-Conſciouſneſſes* in Chriſt, no leſs than two diſtinct Wills, an Humane, and a Divine, *viz.* One in each Nature, I cannot ſee how, upon this Author's Hypotheſis, to keep off the Aſſertion of *Neſtorius*, That there are *Two diſtinct Perſons* in him alſo.

3. My

3. My Third *Argument* againſt the ſame ſhall be taken from *the Soul of Man in a ſtate of ſeparation from the Body.* And it is this: The Soul in its ſeparate Eſtate is Conſcious to it ſelf of all its own Internal Acts, or Motions, whether of Knowledge, Paſſion, or Deſire, and yet the Soul in ſuch an Eſtate is not a Perſon: And therefore *Self-Conſciouſneſs* is not the formal Reaſon of Perſonality; for if it were, it would and muſt conſtitute a Perſon, whereſoever it was. Now, that the Soul, in its ſeparate Eſtate, is thus *Self-Conſcious*, I ſuppoſe no body will pretend to deny, but ſuch as hold a Pſychopannychiſme, *viz.* ſuch a dormant Eſtate, as renders it void of all Vital Motion or Action, during its ſeparation from the Body. But this being an errour which few now a-days think worth owning, neither ſhall I think worth the diſproving.

But for the *Minor Propoſition*, *That the Soul in its ſeparate Eſtate is not a Perſon.* In this I expect to find ſome Adverſaries, and particularly our Author himſelf, who expreſly affirms, That *the Soul in ſuch a ſeparate ſtate is a Perſon*, Page 262. *A Soul* (ſays he) *without a Vital Union to an Humane Body, is a Perſon.* Nor does he beſtow the Name and Nature of a Perſon upon the Soul only as ſeparate from, but alſo (as ſhall be afterwards made appear) as it is joyned with the Body; which Aſſertion of his, together with ſome others of near affinity with it, ſhall in due place be examined by themſelves.

At preſent in Confirmation of my *Argument*, I ſhall produce my *Reaſons* againſt the Perſonality of the Soul, held by this Author, and in order to it, ſhall lay down this Concluſion in direct oppoſition to his, *viz. That*

the Soul of Man is not a Perſon. And ſince (as we have noted) he holds, that it is ſo, both in its Conjunction with the Body, and its ſeparation from it, I ſhall bring my *Arguments* againſt the Perſonality of it in both.

And Firſt, I ſhall prove, That the Soul while joyned to, and continuing in the Body, is not a Perſon; and as a ground-work of the Proof thereof, I ſhall only premiſe this one Thing, as a Truth acknowledged on all Hands, viz. *That the Soul and Body together conſtitute the Perſon of a Man*: The ſame being plainly aſſerted in the *Athanaſian Creed*, where it tells us, *That the Reaſonable Soul and Fleſh, is one Man*, [or one Human Perſon] for both ſignifie but the ſame Thing; which being thus laid down, as a Thing certain and confeſſed, I Argue thus: If the Soul and Body in Conjunction conſtitute the Perſon of a Man, then the Soul in ſuch a Conjunction is not a Perſon. But the former is true, and therefore the latter muſt be ſo too. The *Propoſition* is proved thus. Nothing which, together with the Body, Conſtitutes a Perſon, is, or can be it ſelf a Perſon. For if it be, then the Body muſt be joyned to it, either by being aſſumed into the Perſonal Subſiſtence of the Soul, as the Humane Nature of Chriſt is aſſumed into the Perſonal Subſiſtence of the λόγος. Whereupon the *Compoſition* and *Conſtitution* of a Man, will be an Hypoſtatick Union between Soul and Body; which, I ſuppoſe, no Body will be either ſo bold, or abſurd as to affirm; all Divines accounting an Hypoſtatical Union ſo peculiar to Chriſt's Perſon, as not to be admitted in any other Perſon or Being whatſoever. Or,

Secondly, The Body muſt be joyned with the Soul, as one part, joyntly concurring with another, to the Com-

Compoſition of the whole Perſon. And if ſo, then the Soul being a Part, cannot poſſibly be a *Perſon*. Foraſmuch as a *Part* is an Incomplete Being, and therefore, in the very Nature of it, being deſigned for the Completion of ſomething elſe, muſt ſubſiſt in and by the Subſiſtence of the whole. But a Perſon imports the moſt compleat Degree and Mode of Being, as ſubſiſting wholly by it ſelf, and not in or by any other, either as a Subject of Inherence, or Dependence. So that it is a direct Contradiction to the very Definition and Nature of the Thing, for the ſame Being to be a *Part* and a *Perſon* too. And conſequently that which makes the Soul the former, does irrefragably prove it not to be the other.

Beſides, if the Soul in the Compoſition of a Man's Perſon, were an entire perſon it ſelf, and, as ſuch, concurred with the Body towards the Conſtitution of the Man; then a Man would be an Imperfect, Accidental, and not a Perfect, Natural Compound. He would be that which Philoſophy calls *Unum per Accidens*, that is, a thing made up of two ſuch Beings, as cannot perfectly coaleſce and unite into one. For a Complete Being (as every Perſon eſſentially is) having received the utmoſt degree of Subſiſtence, which its Nature can give it, if it comes afterward to be compounded with another Being, whether Complete, or Incomplete, it muſt neceſſarily make ſuch a looſe, unnatural Union and Compoſition. But to aſſert, That the Perſon of a Man is ſuch a compound, would be exploded by all who underſtood any thing of Natural Philoſophy. So that it would be a very idle thing to attempt any further Confutation of it. Let this Author overthrow theſe Reaſonings, and ſupport his Aſſertion againſt them if he can.

But having thus diſproved the Perſonality of the Soul while in Conjunction with the Body, I go on to diſprove it alſo while in a ſtate of Separation from it: Which I do thus. If the Soul in ſuch a ſtate be a Perſon, then it is either the ſame Perſon, which the Man himſelf was, while he was living and in the Body; or it is another Perſon: But to Aſſert either of them, is extreamly Abſurd, and therefore equally Abſurd, that the Soul in ſuch a ſtate ſhould be a Perſon.

And Firſt, It is Abſurd to affirm it to be the ſame Perſon. For a Perſon compounded of Soul and Body, as a Man is, and a ſimple uncompounded Perſon, as the Soul (if a Perſon at all) muſt needs be, can never be numerically one and the ſame. For that, differing from one another as *Simple* and *Compound*, they differ as two things, whereof one implys a Contradiction and Negation of the other. A Compound, as ſuch, including in it ſeveral parts compounding it. And a ſimple Being utterly excluding all Parts and Compoſition. So that if a Man, while alive, be one Perſon, and His Soul after his Death be a perſon too, it is impoſſible for the Soul to be one and the ſame Perſon with the Man.

And then for the other part of the Disjunction. To Aſſert, That they are two diſtinct Perſons, is as Abſurd as the other, as drawing after it this Conſequence, *viz.* That it is one Perſon who lives well or ill in this World, to wit, The Man Himſelf while he was perſonally in the Body; and another Perſon, who paſſes out of the Body into Heaven, or Hell, there to be rewarded, or puniſhed (at leaſt till the Reſurrection) for what that other Perſon had done well or ill here upon Earth. And does not this look mightily agreeable to all the Principles of Reaſon and Divinity? Nevertheleſs ſo much is certain,

tain, That whereſoever there are two diſtinct Perſons, we do, and muſt by all the Rules of Grammar and Logick, ſay, That one of them is not the other; and, where one is not the other, we cannot in Truth, or Juſtice ſay, That one ought to account for what was done, or not done by the other. But then, if it be intolerably Abſurd, (as no doubt it is) That the Soul in the other World ſhould not be reſponſible for what the Man himſelf in Perſon had done in this, then it is altogether as Abſurd and Intolerable, for any one to repreſent and ſpeak of theſe Things under ſuch Terms and Notions, as muſt neceſſarily throw all Diſcourſe and Reaſoning about them, into Paradox and Confuſion.

But 'tis needleſs to inſiſt any longer upon a thing ſo clear, or to add any other Arguments in ſo plain a Caſe. And indeed to me, the Soul's thus changing its ſtate forwards and backwards, from one *manner of Subſiſting* to another, looks very odd and unnatural. As, that from an *Incomplete ſtate in the Body*, it ſhould paſs to a *Perſonal and Complete ſtate* out of the Body, (which ſtate is yet preternatural to it) and then fall back into an *Incomplete ſtate* again by its re-union to the Body at the Reſurrection (which yet, one would think, ſhould rather improve our principal parts, in all reſpects, not merely relating to the *Animal Life*; as the bare *Subſiſtence* of them, I am ſure, does not.) Theſe Things, I ſay, ſeem very uncouth and improbable, and ſuch as ought not, without manifeſt Neceſſity, to be allowed of; which here does not appear; ſince all this Inconvenience may be avoided, by holding, That the Soul continues but *a Part of the whole Perſon*, and no more, in all its Conditions.

And thus having proved our Aſſertion againſt the *Perſonality of the Soul*, Whether *in the Body*, or *out of it*; let us now ſee what may be oppoſed to it.

And

And here, I ſuppoſe, ſome will object, That the Soul in a ſtate of Separation, is not properly a Part, foraſmuch as it exiſts not in any Compound, nor goes to the Compoſition of it. To which I Anſwer, That an Actual Inexiſtence in a Compound, is not the only Condition which makes a Thing a part, but its Eſſential Relation to a Compound; which Relation is founded partly upon its *Original Deſignation*, and partly upon its *Natural Aptitude* to be an Ingredient in the Conſtitution of a Compound. And this Relation to the Compound, I affirm the Soul to retain, even while it is ſeparated from it; as is evident from what both Philoſophers and Divines hold concerning the Soul, *viz.* That even in its Separation and Disjunction from the Body, it yet retains a ſtrong Appetite and Inclination (as well as an Eſſential Aptitude) to return and be re-united to it: Which Reunion alſo we know will be effected at the great and laſt Day.

But you will ſay, Does not the Scripture, in *Heb.* 12. 23. ſpeaking of Bleſſed Souls in a ſtate of Separation from the Body, call them, *The Spirits of Juſt Men made perfect*, Πνεύματα δικαίων τετελειωμένων; And if thoſe Juſt Men were made *Perfect*, muſt it not have been in reſpect of *the Perfection* of *their Souls*, ſince their Bodies were then Rotting, or (rather) rotten under ground? And if they derived this *Perfection* from their Souls, muſt not their Souls have been eminently perfect themſelves, which rendred them ſo? And if perfect, can we deny them the perfection of Perſonality, which (as we have ſhewn) in Rational Beings, carries in it the greateſt Natural Perfection?

To all which I Anſwer, That the Perfection here ſpoken of, is not *Natural*, but *Supernatural*; and relates only to the Conſummation of their *Graces*, and not to the manner

manner of their *Subſiſtence*. Which being the only Thing now in diſpute, This Scripture, which ſpeaks only of the former, can make nothing at all to the preſent Purpoſe.

Having thus evinced, That the Soul, notwithſtanding its *Self-Conſciouſneſs* is neither during its Conjunction with the Body, nor its Separation from it, properly a Perſon; and having withal ſhewn the grounds and Reaſons upon which I conclude it impoſſible to be ſo, I ſhall however think it worth-while ſomething more particularly to examine (as I promiſed) this Author's extraordinary and peculiar Notions of *Perſon* and *Perſonality*, as he applies them to the Soul, even while it is joined with the Body alſo. And firſt in the 268th Page, he diſcourſes of it in this manner. *All the Sufferings* (ſayes he) *and Actions of the Body, are attributed to the Man, though the Soul is the* Perſon, *becauſe it is the Superiour and Governing Power, and* Conſtitutes *the Perſon.* Theſe are his words, and they contain a very pleaſant way of arguing, though wholly contrary to the common known Rules of *Philoſophy*. For according to theſe, one would, and muſt have concluded, That for this very Reaſon, *That all the Actions and Sufferings of the Body* (and he ought to have added of the Soul too) *are aſcribed to the Man*, therefore the Man himſelf, to whom theſe Perſonal Acts are aſcribed, muſt indeed be the Perſon, and that for the ſame reaſon alſo, the Soul cannot be ſo. But our Author has a way of Reaſoning by himſelf. For (ſays he) *The Soul is the Perſon, becauſe it Conſtitutes the Perſon.* But for that very Cauſe, ſay I, The Soul is not the *Perſon*. For whatſoever Conſtitutes a Perſon, muſt do it either efficiently, or formally. That is, either as a Principle producing it, or a Principle compounding it. As for the firſt way, whatſoever Conſtitutes

ſtitutes a perſon efficiently, muſt do it either by Creation, or Generation; but this the Soul (as much a *Superiour Power as it is*) is not able to do. For will any one ſay, That the Soul can either Create or Generate the Perſon, or (to ſpeak more plainly) the Man who is the Perſon? And then, for the other way, by which it may be ſaid to Conſtitute a Perſon, to wit, *formally*. This it can do no otherwiſe than as it is a *Conſtituent Part*, and therefore only as a *Partial*, and not a *Total* Adequate Cauſe of the Conſtitution. That is, in other words, the Soul, as the *Form*, muſt concur with the Body as the *Matter*, to the Conſtitution of the whole Perſon of the Man. But then for that very Reaſon again, the Soul cannot poſſibly be a Perſon, ſince it contributes to the Conſtitution of the Perſon only as a *Part*; which, by reaſon of its *Incomplete Being*, can upon no Principle of Philoſophy be a *Perſon*. And I would fain have this profound *Philoſopher* give me but one allowed Inſtance, where one Perſon is the conſtituent Principle of another.

But to examine the forementioned Aſſertion yet more particularly, ſince this Man ſo peremptorily ſays, *That the Soul is the Perſon, becauſe it is the Superiour Power, and Conſtitutes the Perſon.* I muſt tell him, That the *Superiour Power* is not therefore the ſole Power, and conſequently cannot ſolely Conſtitute the Perſon, which yet this Author pretends it does. If indeed he had ſaid, That the Soul as the *Superiour Power* bears the chief and principal part in the Conſtitution of a perſon, this had been ſence, but by no means ſufficient for his purpoſe; for ſtill this would not prove the Soul to be a Perſon, (which he contends for) but on the contrary, by proving it to concur thereto only as a *Part*, demonſtrate it, upon the ſame Account not to be a *Perſon*.

But

But this is not all, for in *Page* 169. he calls the *Mind* of Man a *Perſon*, and thus Diſcourſes about it. *Faculties*, (ſays he) *Vertues and Powers have Perſonal Acts and Offices aſcribed to them only upon the Account of their Unity and Sameneſs with the mind in which they are, which is a Perſon, and Acts by them.* Now this alſo is very odd and ſtrange (could any thing in this Author, which is *odd*, be *ſtrange* too;) For the thing Aſſerted by him amounts to neither more nor leſs than this, That *Powers*, *Faculties*, and *Vertues* have *perſonal* Acts aſcribed to them upon the account of their Unity and Sameneſs with that, which it ſelf neither is, nor can be a *Perſon*; as we have abundantly proved, That the *Mind* of Man, (taking it in his ſenſe for the *Soul*) cannot be. And for his further Conviction, I could tell him of ſomething which has *perſonal* Acts very remarkably aſcribed to it; and yet neither for being it ſelf a *Perſon*, nor for its *Unity* and *Sameneſs* with the *Mind*, in which it is, and which ſometimes acts by it. And that, if he pleaſes to turn to 1 *Corinth.* 13. he will find to be that notable Grace and Virtue, called *Charity*; which, being but an *Accident*, I believe, that even this Author himſelf will not affirm to be a *Perſon*; and, I am ſure, as little can be ſaid for any *Unity* or *Sameneſs* that it has with the Mind, which it is lodged in: Since, though it ſhould be utterly loſt, the Mind would nevertheleſs retain all the Eſſentials of a Mind, and continue as truly a Mind, as it was before: Which, I think, is but an ill *Argument* of any *Unity or Sameneſs* between the Mind and that; and this being indubitably true, all that this Author here diſcourſes about *perſonal* Acts being aſcribed to the Mind, and about their *Identity* with the Mind, as the Reaſon of it, is with equal miſtake and impertinence alledged by him in this caſe. For he might and ſhould

have known, That *perſonal* Acts are often aſcribed to *Faculties*, *Vertues*, *and Graces*, not in ſtrict propriety of Philoſophical ſpeaking, but *Tropically* and Figuratively, by a Figure (which he ſhall hear further of hereafter) called *Proſopopœia*; which repreſents Things, that are not *Perſons*, ſpeaking and doing as if they were ſo.

But beſides this, there are here two Things which this Author takes for granted, which yet ſuch dull Mortals as my ſelf will be apt a little to demurr to.

As Firſt, That he takes the *Mind* and the *Soul* of Man for one and the ſame Thing; whereas very Learned Men, both *Grammarians* and *Philoſophers* hold, That in Men there is a great difference between *Animus* and *Anima*; and that as *Anima* imports the Spiritual Subſtance which we call the Soul, ſo *Animus* ſignifies only a Power or Faculty, *viz.* The Supreme Intellectual, Reaſoning, Governing Faculty of the Soul, or at leaſt, the Soul it ſelf conſidered, as exerting the forementioned Acts. But whether it be one or the other, we have ſufficiently proved againſt this Authour, That neither of them can be a Perſon.

The other Thing here ſuppoſed by him, is the *Unity* or *Sameneſs* of the Powers or Faculties of the Soul, with the Soul it ſelf; which yet the *Peripateticks* generally, and moſt of the *School-men* with *Thomas Aquinas* in the Head of them do poſitively deny, and think they give very good Reaſon for ſuch their Denial. For if Subſtances and Accidents are Beings really diſtinct, and if Qualities be Accidents, and the Powers and Faculties of the Soul come under the ſecond *Species* of Quality, as *Ariſtotle* reckons them, then it is manifeſt, that they are really diſtinguiſhed, and that there is no Identity between them. Nor does there want a further Reaſon for the ſame. For, ſince the bare *Subſtance* or *Eſſence* of

of the Soul, considered nakedly in it self, may rationally be supposed undetermined, and therefore Indifferent to all those Acts or Actions that naturally proceed from it; and since withal, bare Objects can of themselves neither enable nor dispose the Agent to exert any Action, there seems a Necessity of asserting the Intervention of some Third Thing distinct from both, which may thus enable, dispose, and determine the Soul to exert it self in such a particular way of acting rather than another, suitably to the several Objects which shall come before it; which thing is properly that Quality residing in the Soul, which we call a *Faculty* or *Power*. And this to me seems the true Philosophy of the matter. But I need not here press the Decision of the Case one way or other; as not directly affecting the Point in debate between us. Only I thought fit to suggest these Remarks, to check this Author's bold unwary way of dictating and affirming in things disputable and dubious, and to remind him how much it becomes and concerns one that writes Controversies, to be more liberal in his Proofs, and less lavish in his Assertions.

But before I quit this Point about the *Personality of the Soul*; since this Authour has so absolutely and expressly affirmed, *That the Soul, or Mind of Man is a Person*, and given this for the Reason of it, *That being the Superiour Governing Power* in Man, it does, as such, *Constitute the Person*; over and above the Arguments which have been already brought for the Confutation of it, I desire to leave with him two or three Questions, which seem naturally to rise from this Wonderful Position. As,

First, Whether the *Soul*, or *Mind* of Man be *one Person*, and the Man himself *Another*?

Secondly, Whether the aſſerting of the *Soul to be a Perſon*, becauſe it *Conſtitutes the Perſon*, does not infer ſo much, *viz.* That the *Soul* is *the Perſon that Conſtitutes*, and the *Man the Perſon that is Conſtituted*; unleſs we will ſay, That the *Soul Conſtitutes it ſelf a Perſon?* And then,

Thirdly, Whether to ſay, or aſſert this, does not infer *Two diſtinct Perſonalities* in the ſame *Soul*, one in order of Nature before the other, *viz.* That, by which it is it ſelf *formally a Perſon*, and that other, which by its Conſtituting it ſelf a Perſon, is *Conſtituted* and *cauſed by it?*

But ſince it is too hard a Task to drain any one Abſurdity (eſpecially a very great one) ſo, as to draw forth and repreſent all its naturally deſcending Conſequences, I deſire the Author with the utmoſt (if Impartial) ſtrictneſs to compare the foregoing Queſtions with his own Aſſertion and to ſee, Firſt, Whether they do not directly ſpring from it: And next, Whether the Matter couched under the ſaid Queſtions, if drawn out into ſo many Poſitive Propoſitions, would not afford as many Intolerable Defiances to Common Senſe, Reaſon and Philoſophy. But thus it is, when Men will be Writing at Thirty, and ſcarce Thinking till Threeſcore.

But to proceed and ſhew, That it is not only the *Soul, or Mind of Man* which our Authour dignifies with the Name and Nature of a *Perſon*; but that he has almoſt as free an hand in making every thing he meets with a *Perſon*, as K. *Charles the Second* had in making almoſt every *Perſon* he met with, a *Knight*; (So that it was very dangerous for any one who had an Averſion to Knighthood, to come in his way,) our Author, out of the like Over-flowing Communicative Goodneſs and Libera-

berality, is graciouſly pleaſed, to take even the *Beaſts* themſelves into the Rank and Order of Perſons; in ſome imitation, I ſuppoſe, of the Diſcreet and Humble *Caligula*, ſo famous in Hiſtory for making his Horſe *Conſul*. And for this, Let us caſt our Eyes upon *page* 262. where he has theſe words, worthy (*in ſempiternam rei memoriam*) to be wrote in Letters of Gold. *A Beaſt* (ſays he) *which has no Rational Soul, but only an Animal Life (as a Man has together with an Humane Soul) is a Perſon, or* Suppoſitum, *or what you will pleaſe to call it.* But, by your favour, Good Sir, the Matter is not ſo indifferent; for *Perſon* and *Suppoſitum*, are by no means the ſame Thing; and I pity you with all my heart, that you ſhould think ſo. For any ſingle Complete Nature actually ſubſiſting by it ſelf, is properly a *Suppoſitum*, but not therefore a *Perſon*. For as *Subſiſtence* ſuperadded to Nature, Conſtitutes a *Suppoſitum*, ſo *Rationality* added to *Suppoſitality*, Conſtitutes a *Perſon*; which is therefore properly defined *Suppoſitum Rationale*, or *Intelligens*, as we have ſufficiently ſhewn already in our Second Chapter: So that to call a *Beaſt* a *Perſon*, is all one as to call it a *Rational Brute*: Which this Author, who can ſo eaſily reconcile Contradictions, or (which may ſerve him as well) *ſwallow them*, may do, if he pleaſes; *and ſo ſtand alone by himſelf* in this, as well as (he ſays) he had done in ſome other Things. But others, who think themſelves obliged to uſe Philoſophical Terms only as Philoſophers intended them, dare not venture to ſpeak thus, for fear *Ariſtotle* ſhould bring an *Action of Battery* againſt them; who certainly has *a Pate* to break as well as *Priſcian*, and is as ſenſible of hard uſage, how patiently ſoever he has took it hitherto at this Author's hands. But to give the ſaid Author his due, he is not ſo much *a Slave to his word*, as to ſpeak the ſame Thing

in

in all places of his Book. For, to quote his own Authority (though of little value, but when brought againſt himſelf) in *page* 62. of this very Tract, he has theſe words. *A Perſon* (ſays he) *and an Intelligent Subſtance are Reciprocal Terms.* And, are they ſo? Why, how then comes a *Beaſt*, in *page* 269. to be *a Perſon?* Is a *Beaſt* an *Intelligent Subſtance?* Or, can a *Beaſt* be a *Perſon*, and yet not an *Intelligent Subſtance*, when he affirms, That they are Terms Reciprocal? If I have not quoted this Author fairly and juſtly, let the Advantage be his, and the ſhame mine. But if I have, then let all the Learned and Impartial World (which I appeal to) judge, whether one who talks thus Ignorantly and Self-Contradictiouſly about the Nature of a *Perſon*, be fit to preſcribe to the whole Church New Terms and Models never heard of before, to explicate the *Perſons* of the *Sacred Trinity* by. But the Truth is, the diſtance between the 69. and the 262. *pages*, was ſo great, and the Contradictions which paſſed within that compaſs ſo Numerous, that how groſs and bulky ſoever this one might be, yet with the help of a little good luck, it might well eſcape the Author's Eye in ſuch a Crowd. And perhaps, it had been never the worſe luck for the Author Himſelf, if it could as eaſily have eſcaped the Reader's Eye too.

And now, to ſum up in ſhort, the Chief Heads of what has been treated of in this Chapter, I have proved againſt this Authour, That *Self-Conſciouſneſs* is not the formal Reaſon of Perſonality in Created Beings. And that firſt by an Argument drawn from the very Nature of the Thing; For that, *Self-Conſciouſneſs* preſuppoſes Perſonality, and therefore cannot be the formal Reaſon of it. As alſo from two Notable Inſtances, One of the Humanity, or Humane Nature of Chriſt.

The

The other of the Soul of Man in its ſtate of Separation from the Body: Both of which I have ſhewn to be perfectly *Self-Conſcious* of all the Internal Acts, Motions and Paſſions reſpectively belonging to each of them; and yet that they were, neither of them, *Perſons*. And purſuant to this Subject, I have, by clear, and ſolid Reaſons overthrown the pretended Perſonality of the Soul, both in a ſtate of Conjunction with the Body, and of Disjunction from it; which in both is aſſerted by this Author. And Laſtly, I have examined his Abſurd Unphiloſophical Aſſertions about theſe Matters; in one whereof, he aſcribes a Perſonality even to Beaſts themſelves. By all which, it is but too manifeſt againſt this Aſſuming big-talking Man, that, as loftily as he carries it, yet in very Deed and Truth he does not underſtand what thoſe Terms *Suppoſitum and Subſiſtence*, *Perſon and Perſonality* mean. So fit is he (as I have ſaid) to treat of the *Divine Perſons* of the *God-head*; whom yet he has made ſo bold with.

And here I ſhould judge it high time to conclude this Chapter; but that, methinks, it is pity to leave this fine Trim Notion of *Self-Conſciouſneſs* ſo; without taking a little further View of the Curious Artifice and admirable Contrivance of ſo rare a production. For if it were not ſuch, could this Authour vaunt of it at ſuch a rate as he does, pleaſing himſelf, and proclaiming his Εὕρηκα, εὕρηκα, as upon an Invention (forſooth) which all Antiquity before him could never yet reach to?

Nevertheleſs to deal clearly and plainly amongſt Friends, ſuch a Cheating, Lurching thing does this Expectation uſually prove, that after all theſe Pompous Shews, and Glorious Boaſts of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, uſhered in with twenty *Encomium's* (at leaſt)

leaſt) like ſo many Heralds, or Tip-ſtaves, or (rather) *Yeomen of the Guard* marching before it; yet, in Truth, after all this noiſe, it is, (like an Owl ſtripp'd of its Feathers) but a very Mean, Meagre, Ordinary Thing; being, in down-right Terms, neither more nor leſs than only *one Property of a Rational, or Intelligent Being*; by vertue whereof, the Soul is (as the Schools expreſs it) *Supra ſe Reflexiva*, that is to ſay, Able by a Reflex Act of Knowledge, intimately to know and conſider it ſelf, and its own Being, together with its own Acts, Motions, and Operations. This is the Sum Total of the Matter, and all that *Self-Conſciouſneſs* is, or can truly pretend to be.

And, (which is yet a further Diminution to it) as poor and mean a Notion as it is, it is Borrowed too. But you will ſay, From whom? Why? Even from Honeſt *Des Cartes*, and his *Cogito ergo ſum*. Only with this unhappy difference in the Application of it, That this Propoſition, which *Des Cartes* lays as the Baſis and Ground-work of his Philoſophy, our Author places with its Heels upwards in his Divinity. For whereas *Des Cartes* inſiſts upon *Cogitation*, only to prove and infer Being, as one would prove a Cauſe from its Effects, or rather an Antecedent from its Conſequent: our Author on the contrary, makes *Cogitation* the very Cauſe and Principle of Being and Subſiſtence, by making it the formal Conſtituent Reaſon of Perſonality in the Perſon who Thinks, or Reflects; than which nothing can be more falſe, and ridiculous.

And this, according to the Trueſt, and moſt Philoſophical Account of the Thing, is the very utmoſt which this New, and ſo much bragg'd of Notion amounts to. And I do hereupon Challenge this Author to prove theſe two Things if he can.

First,

First, That the *Self-Conſciouſneſs* hitherto ſpoken of by him is any Thing more than a bare *Property* of an Intelligent Being, whereby it reflects upon it ſelf, and its own Thoughts and Actions.

And in the next place, That ſuch a *Property* does, or can Conſtitute the Being or Nature which it flows from, and belongs to, properly *a Perſon*.

Theſe two things, I ſay, I call upon him to prove; and if he does not by dint of *Argument* make them good, he expoſes a poor, ſenceleſs, infant Hypotheſis to the wide World, and then very unmercifully leaves it to ſhift for it ſelf. In fine, I cannot but again and again own my Amazement at the Confidence of ſome bold preſuming Men, who ſet up for Enlightners of the Church, and new Modellers of Divinity in the ſtrength of ſome odd upſtart Notions, which yet are not able to acquit, or ſupport themſelves *upon*, and much leſs *againſt* the very firſt Elements and Principles of a long tryed, and never yet baffled Philoſophy.

CHAP. IV.

In which is proved againſt this Author, That neither is Self-Conſciouſneſs *the formal Reaſon of* Perſonality *in the three Perſons of the Bleſſed Trinity; nor* Mutual-Conſciouſneſs *the Reaſon of their Unity in one and the ſame Nature.*

HAving thus examined, and (as I think) overthrown our Author's Notion of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, with reference to Created and Finite Perſons, I ſhall now proceed to the Conſideration of what he ſays of it with reference to the three Perſons in the Glorious Godhead. And this I ſhall do under theſe following Heads, which ſhall be the Subjects of five diſtinct Chapters. As,

Firſt, I ſhall treat of his two new Notions, *viz.* of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, and ſhew, That *Self-Conſciouſneſs* is not the *formal Reaſon* of *Perſonality* in the three *Divine Perſons*, nor *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* the Reaſon of their Unity in one and the ſame Nature. And this we have here allotted for the buſineſs and Subject of this 4th Chapter.

Secondly, I ſhall prove, That the Three *Divine Perſons* of the Godhead, are not Three *Diſtinct*, *Infinite Minds*, *or Spirits*, in the 5th Chapter.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, I ſhall Conſider, what this Author pretends to from the Authority of the *Fathers* and *School-men*, in behalf of his New invented Hypotheſis, and ſhew, That they ſpeak nothing *at all for it*, or *towards it*: And this ſhall make the 6th and 7th Chapters.

Fourthly, I ſhall ſet down the Ancient and generally received Doctrine of the Church and Schools concerning the Article of the *Trinity*, and Vindicate it from this Author's Exceptions, in the 8th Chapter.

And when I ſhall have diſcuſſed and gone over theſe Particulars, I cannot imagine what can be found Conſiderable in this his Book (ſo far as I have undertook it) but what will have received hereby a full and ſufficient Anſwer.

Though, when all is done, I confeſs I have ſome further Complements to make to this Author upon ſome other Accounts (though ſtill occaſioned by this Work of his) which, I ſhould be extremely wanting both to him and the Cauſe now before me, ſhould I not, with all due Addreſs, paſs upon him. And this will add three or four Chapters more to the former, and ſo conclude this Work.

And Firſt, To begin with the firſt of theſe, I ſhall endeavour to prove, That *Self-Conſciouſneſs is not the formal Reaſon of Perſonality in the Three Divine Perſons.*

In order to which, I ſhall premiſe and lay down theſe following *Conſiderations.*

Conſideration 1. That although the *Divine Nature* be one Pure, Simple, Indiviſible Act, yet in our Conceptı-

ceptions of it (which are always inadequate to it) there is a Natural Order of *Prius* and *Poſterius* founded in the Univerſal Reaſon of Things (according to which, the Conception of one Thing preſuppoſes, and depends upon the Conception of another) which, though it can make no *Prius* and *Poſterius* in the *Divine Nature*, yet is by no means to be contradicted, or confounded in our diſcourſing of *God*; foraſmuch as without our admitting this Rule it is impoſſible for any Humane Underſtanding either to Conceive, or Diſcourſe conſiſtently, or intelligibly of Him at all.

Conſideration 2. (Which, I think, affords us a Rule ſafely and univerſally to be relied upon) is this, That in Things having a dependence between them, where we may form to our ſelves a clear and diſtinct Conception of one Thing, without implying, or involving in it the Conception of any other Thing, there that Thing is in Order of Nature precedent to all thoſe Things which are not eſſentially included in the Conception of it. Thus, for inſtance, we may have a clear and diſtinct Conception of *Entity and Being*, and of *Unity* too, without entertaining in our Mind, at the ſame time, any Notion, or Conception of *knowledge* at all; and therefore the *Ratio Entitativa* of any Thing muſt needs in Nature precede the *Ratio Cognitiva*, or *rather Cognoſcibilis* of the ſame.

Conſideration 3. We muſt diſtinguiſh between the Affections, or *Modes* of Being (as they are ſtrictly ſo called) and between the *Attributes* of it. The firſt ſort are reckoned of the ſame Order with *Being* it ſelf, and ſo precede whatſoever is conſequent upon it, as the Attributes of it are accounted to be; which relate to the Being

Being or Subject they belong to, as things in Order of Nature *Posterior* to it. Accordingly in the first rank are *Existence*, *Subsistence*, *Personality*, &c. and in the second are all Acts issuing from a *Nature*, or *Subject* so Subsisting; whether they be of *Knowledge*, *Volition*, *Power*, *Duration*, or the like: The *Denominations* derived from which, are properly called *Attributes*.

Consideration 4. Though there can be no Accidents inhering in God, yet there may be *Accidental* Predications belonging to him. And I call those *Accidental*, which are not *Necessary*, or *Essential*. Such as are all *Extrinsecal Denominations* of him founded on such Acts of God, as were perfectly free for him to do, or not to do; nothing in the *Divine Nature* obliging him thereto. Of which number are the *Denominations*, or *Predicates* of *Creatour*, *Redeemer*, and the like: Since there was nothing in God that made it necessary for him to be so.

Consideration 5. When the Terms [*Cause*, *Formal Reason*, *Constituent*, *or productive Principle*, and the like] are used about the *Divine Nature*, and *Persons*, they are not to be understood as applicable to them in the strict and proper signification of the said Terms, but only by way of Analogy; as really meaning no more than a Causal, or Necessary Dependence of one Notion, or *Conceptus objectivus* upon another; so that it is impossible for the *Mind* to Conceive distinctly of the one, but as depending upon, or *proceeding from* the other.

Consideration 6. That the *Divine Nature* may with all fair Accord to the Rules of Divinity and Philosophy be Considered as *Prescinding*, or *Abstracting* (*though* not as *divided*) from the *Divine Persons*.

Consideration

Conſideration 7. That whatſoever is Eſſentially included in the *Divine Nature* thus Conſidered, is equally Common and Communicable to all the *Divine Perſons*.

Conſideration 8. That whatſoever is the proper *Formal Reaſon* of *Perſonality*, is utterly Incommunicable to any Thing, or *Perſon* beyond, or *beſide the Perſon* to whom it belongs.

Conſideration 9. That for any Abſolute Perfection eſſentially included, or implyed in the *Divine Nature* to be *multiplyed* in the Three *Perſons* belonging to it, is a manifeſt Multiplication of the *Divine Nature* it ſelf in the ſaid *Perſons*. By which we are given to underſtand the difference between the *Multiplication*, and the *Communication* of the *Divine Nature* to thoſe *Perſons*.

Theſe Rules, I thought fit to draw up and lay down before-hand, in order to the uſe which we ſhall have of them in the enſuing Diſputation.

And ſo I proceed to my *Arguments* againſt this Author's New Notion of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, with reference to the Perſons of the *Bleſſed Trinity*. And the Firſt is This:

Argument I. No *Perſonal* Act can be the formal Reaſon of *Perſonality* in the *Perſon*, whoſe Act it is. But *Self-Conſciouſneſs* is a *Perſonal* Act, and therefore *Self-Conſciouſneſs* cannot be the formal Reaſon of *Perſonality* in the *Perſon*, whoſe Act it is, and to whom *perſonally* it belongs. The Minor, I ſuppoſe, neither our Author Himſelf, nor any one elſe, can deny. For if *Self-Conſciouſneſs*

ſciouſneſs be not a *Perſonal* Act, let any one aſſign what elſe it is, or what it ought to paſs for. It is certainly an Act of Knowledge, by which each *Perſon* knows and comprehends himſelf, and whatſoever belongs to him. The Major Propoſition therefore is to be proved, *viz.* That no *Perſonal* Act can be the formal Reaſon of *Perſonality* in the *Perſon* whoſe Act it is. And I prove it thus: The formal Reaſon of every Thing, is in order of Nature, before the Thing of which it is the formal Reaſon; but no *Perſonal* Act is, in order of Nature, before the *Perſonality* of the *Perſon* whoſe Act it is, and therefore it cannot be the formal Reaſon of his *Perſonality*. The Major is Self-evident. And as for the Minor, That no *Perſonal* Act is before the *Perſonality* of the *Perſon* whoſe Act it is; This alſo is manifeſt; Becauſe ſuch an Act cannot be before the *Perſon* himſelf, and therefore not before his *Perſonality*: For as much as his *Perſonality* is that by which he is formally a *Perſon*; ſo that it is impoſſible to be before the one without being before the other too. And now, that it cannot be before the *Perſon* himſelf, is manifeſt from hence, that as every *Perſonal* Act in general bears a Relation of *Poſteriority* to the *Perſon* to whom it belongs, as to the Cauſe or Productive Principle of all the Acts proceeding from Him; ſo this particular Act of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, bears a Treble Relation of *Poſteriority* to the *Perſon* whoſe Act it is, *viz.* as to the Agent or *Principle* producing it. 2. As to the *Subject* Recipient of it, and ſuſtaining it. And Thirdly and Laſtly, As to the *Object* which it is terminated to. All which Reſpects it ſuſtains, not barely as it is an Act, but partly as it is an *Immanent Act*, and partly alſo a *Reflex Act*.

In the firſt place therefore, every *Perſon* being the Agent, or Productive Cauſe of all the *perſonal* Acts iſſuing

ing from Him, he muſt upon that Account, in Order of Nature, precede the ſaid Acts; and conſequently every *Divine Perſon* muſt in Nature be before that Act of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, which *perſonally* belongs to him. And moreover ſince it is likewiſe an *Immanent* Act, it relates to him, as *the Subject in which it is*, as well as *the Cauſe from which it is*, and upon that Account alſo, muſt bear a *Natural Poſteriority* to Him. And then laſtly, as it is alſo *a Reflex Act*, by which the *Perſon* knows himſelf to be a *Perſon*, and is Conſcious to Himſelf, what he is, and what he does, it terminates upon him as its Object alſo. So that the *Cauſe*, the *Subject*, and the *Object* of this Act being the ſame *Perſon*, in this laſt reſpect, no leſs than in the two former, it bears another and third Relation of *Poſteriority* to Him; ſince every Act, not productive of ſomething beſides, and without the Agent, is in Order of Nature *Poſterior* to the *Object* it terminates upon.

From all which I conclude, That that Act of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, by which each *Divine Perſon* knows, or is *Conſcious* to Himſelf of his own *Perſonality*, cannot be the *Formal Reaſon* of the ſaid *Perſonality*, without being, in Order of Nature, *both before it*, and *after it* too, *viz.* Before it, as it is the *Formal Reaſon* of it, and yet *Poſterior* to it, as it is an Act *proceeding from*, *lodged* and *received in*, and laſtly, *Terminated upon* the *ſame Perſon*.

All which is ſo very plain, that hardly can any Thing be plainer: And indeed, the very word *Self-Conſciouſneſs* contradicts and overthrows its being the *ground*, or *Formal Reaſon* of *Perſonality*. For ſtill *Self* muſt be before *Conſciouſneſs*; and *Self* imports *Perſonality*; as being that, by which a *Perſon* is ſaid *to be*, *what he is*; and they both ſtand united in this one Word, as the *Act and the Object*, and therefore *Conſciouſneſs* cannot be the

Reaſon

Reaſon of it. Or to expreſs the ſame Thing by other Terms, *Self-Subſiſtence* muſt precede *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, and *Self-Subſiſtence* here implys *Perſonality*; and therefore *Perſonality*, upon the ſame Account, muſt in Nature precede *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, and conſequently cannot be the *formal Effect*, or *Reſult* of it. For, ſurely, according to the moſt Eſſential Order of Things, *a Perſon muſt be what he is*, before he can *know what he is*.

And this *Argument*, I confeſs, being founded upon the *Priority* of *Subſiſtence* to all *Acts*, and particularly to thoſe of *knowledge* in every *Perſon Self-Conſcious*, does, and muſt Univerſally run through all Inſtances, in which *Perſonality* and *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, with reference to one another, come to be treated of. And as it affects *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, ſo it will equally take place in *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* too.

What Allowances are to be here made for the abſolute *Simplicity*, *Eternity*, and *Pure Actuality* of the *Divine Nature* and *Perſons*, (when theſe Notions are applyed to them) we have already obſerved, in the firſt of thoſe Preliminary Conſiderations mentioned in this Chapter. The proper uſe and deſign of all which Notions, is to lead, guide, and direct our Apprehenſions about that *Great Object*, ſo much too big for our Narrow *Faculties*; ſo that whatſoever contradicts the Natural Order of theſe Apprehenſions ought upon no grond of Reaſon to be admitted in our Diſcourſes of the *Divine Nature*, how much ſoever it may and does tranſcend the ſaid Apprehenſions. And this muſt be allowed us, or we muſt ſink under the vaſt Diſproportion of the thing before us, and not diſcourſe of it at all. For I cannot think, that the Word *Self-Conſciouſneſs* has brought the *Deity* one jot lower to us, or raiſed our Underſtandings one degree higher and nearer to that.

Argument II. My Second *Argument* againſt *Self-Conſciouſneſs* being the *Formal Reaſon* of *Perſonality* in the *Divine Perſons*, is this: *Nothing* in the *Nature* of it *Abſolute and Irrelative* can be the *Formal Reaſon* of *Perſonality* in the *Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*; but *Self-Conſciouſneſs* is in the Nature of it *Abſolute and Irrelative*; and therefore it cannot be the Reaſon of *perſonality* in any of the ſaid *Perſons*.

Now the Major Propoſition is proved thus. Nothing in the *Nature* of it *Abſolute* can be the *Formal Reaſon* of any Thing in the Nature of it purely and perfectly Relative. But the *Perſonality* of every one of the *Divine Perſons* is purely and perfectly Relative; and therefore Nothing *Abſolute* can be the *Formal Conſtituent Reaſon* of their *Perſonality*. The Major of which Syllogiſm is alſo manifeſt. For Things Eſſentially different, and thereby uncapable of being affirmed of one another, cannot poſſibly be the *Formal Reaſon* of one another. And, that the Perſons in the *Bleſſed Trinity* are purely Relative to one another, and conſequently, that their Perſonalities are ſo many Relations, is no leſs evident from this, That Two of them relate to one another, as *Father and Son*, and the Third to Both, as proceeding from Both; and it is impoſſible for one Thing to proceed from another, eſpecially by a Continual Act of Proceſſion, without Importing a Relation to that from which it ſo proceeds; ſo that the very *perſonal Subſiſtence* of theſe *Perſons* implys and carries in it a Formal Relation. For the Father Subſiſts perſonally as a Father, by that Eternal Communication of his Nature to his Son; which Act, as proceeding from him, is called *Generation*, and renders him Formally a Father, and as Terminated in the Son, is called *Filiation*, and Conſtitutes him Formally

mally a Son; and in like manner the Holy Ghoſt Subſiſts perſonally by that Act of *Proceſſion*, by which he proceeds from, and relates to both the Father and the Son. So that, that *proper Mode of Subſiſtence* (by which in Conjunction with the *Divine Eſſence* always included in it, each of them is rendred a *Perſon*) is wholly Relative, and ſo belongs to one of them, that it alſo bears a Neceſſary reference to another. From all which, it undeniably follows, That the Three *Perſons* in the *Bleſſed Trinity*, are in the Formal Conſtitution of them Relative to one another; and conſequently, That the Three *Perſonalities*, by which they become Formally Three *Perſons*, and are ſo denominated, are Three *Eternal Relations*.

But now, for the Minor Propoſition in the firſt Syllogiſm, viz. *That Self-Conſciouſneſs is a Thing in the Nature of it Abſolute and Irrelative*, that, I think, can need but little Proof; it being that Act by which each *Perſon* intimately knows, and is Conſcious to himſelf of his own *Being*, *Acts*, *Motions*, and every Thing *perſonally* belonging to him; ſo that, as ſuch, it terminates within, and looks no further than that one *Perſon*, whom it is an Entire Survey and Comprehenſion of. And as it is an *Abſolute* and *Irrelative* Term, ſo it may be Conceived diſtinctly and fully without Conceiving, or implying the Conception of any Thing, or *Perſon* beſides. And now, what *Relation* does or can ſuch an Act of *Self-Conſciouſneſs* imply in it? It is indeed on the contrary, a direct Contradiction to all that is *Relative*. For it incloſes the *Perſon* wholly within himſelf; neither pointing nor looking further, nor referring to any one elſe.

If it be here ſaid, That each *Perſon*, by an Act of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, intimately knows the *Relation* which he ſtands in to the other Two Perſons.

To this, I Anſwer Two Things.

1. That to know a *Thing* or *Perſon* to be Relative, or to be Conſcious of the Relation belonging to it or him, does not make that Act of Knowledge to be either a Relation, or of a Relative Nature.

2. I Anſwer, That this very Thing proves *Self-Conſciouſneſs* not to be the Conſtituent Reaſon of *Perſonality*. For, if the Father knows himſelf to be a Father by an Act of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, it is evident, That *Self-Conſciouſneſs* did not make him ſo: but that he was a Father, and had the Relation of a Father, and thereby a *Perſonality* belonging to him as ſuch, in Order of Nature Antecedent to this Act of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*; and therefore that this *Self-Conſciouſneſs* cannot be the Reaſon of the Relation, nor of the *Perſonality* implyed in it. Foraſmuch as it is in ſeveral reſpects Poſterior to the Perſon whom it belongs to, as in the foregoing *Argument* we have abundantly ſhewn.

But to take a particular and diſtinct Account of this Notion, in the ſeveral *Perſons* of the *Trinity*; Does the *Father* become a *Father* by being *Conſcious to himſelf*, that he is ſo, or rather by that Act by which he Communicates his *Nature* to, and thereby generates a Son? Or does the *Son's Relation to the Father* conſiſt in his being *Conſcious to himſelf* of this *Relation?* Or Laſtly, does the Holy Ghoſt *proceed from the Father and the Son*, and ſo *perſonally* relate to both by that Act of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, by which he is Conſcious to himſelf of this *Proceſſion?* All this is *Abſurd*, *Unnatural*, and *Impoſſible*. For

no

no *Perſon* is related to another by that Act of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, by which he knows and reflects Perſonally upon himſelf. And yet it is certain, That *to be a Father*, is a *Relative Subſiſtence*, and to be a Son depending upon the Father by an Eternal Act of Generation perpetually begetting him, is alſo to have a *Relative Subſiſtence*; and Laſtly, to be *Eternally proceeding from Both*, as the Holy Ghoſt is, muſt likewiſe import *a Way or Mode of Subſiſting altogether as Relative* as the Two former. In which three ways of *Subſiſtence* conſiſt the Perſonalities of the Three Perſons reſpectively; and upon theſe *Self-Conſciouſneſs* can have no Conſtituting Influence at all; as being an Act quite of another Nature; to wit, *Abſolute and Irrelative*, and reſting wholly within the Perſon, whom it belongs to.

From all which, I conclude, That *Self-Conſciouſneſs* neither is, nor can be the *Formal Reaſon* of *Perſonality* in the Three *Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*. And this *Argument* I take to have the force and clearneſs of a *Demonſtration*.

Argument III. The Third *Argument* is this. If *Self-Conſciouſneſs* be the *Formal Reaſon* of *Perſonality* in the Three *Divine Perſons*, then there is no Repugnancy in the *Nature* and *Reaſon* of the Thing it ſelf, but that there might be Three Thouſand Perſons in the *Deity* as well as Three. But this is Abſurd, and therefore ſo muſt that be likewiſe from which it follows. The Conſequence appears from this, That there is no Repugnancy but that there might be ſo many *Self-Conſciouſneſſes*, or *Self-Conſcious Minds* or *Spirits*, for the *Deity* to Communicate it ſelf to: And therefore, if *Self-Conſciouſneſs* be the *Formal Reaſon* of *Perſonality*, there is no Repugnancy, but that there might be Three Thouſand Perſons in the God-head, as well as Three.

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The Propoſition is proved thus. Becauſe this Repugnancy (if there be any) muſt be either from the *Nature* of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, in the ſeveral *Self-Conſcious Minds* or *Spirits* it belongs to, or from the *Nature* of the *God-head*, which is to be Communicated to them. But it is from neither of them, For

Firſt, there is nothing in the Nature of *Self-Conſciouſneſs* to hinder its Multiplication into never ſo great a Number of Particulars; but that there may be Three Thouſand, or Three Millions of *Self-Conſcious Minds* or *Spirits*, as well as Three. Nor, in the next place, is there any Repugnancy on the Part of the *God-head*, *That Three Thouſand Self-Conſcious Spirits* ſhould ſubſiſt in it any more than that Three ſhould: For the *Godhead* conſidered preciſely and abſtractedly in it ſelf (and not as actually included in any Perſon) is as able to Communicate it ſelf to the greateſt Number as to the ſmalleſt.

If it be here ſaid, That the Three *Perſons* are not only Three *Self-Conſcious Spirits*, but alſo Three diſtinct Infinite *Self-Conſcious Spirits* (as our Authour ſays they are, and of which, more in the next Chapter.) I Anſwer, That there may be as well Three Thouſand diſtinct *Infinite Spirits* as Three. For Infinity is as much inconſiſtent with the leaſt Plurality of Infinites, as with the greateſt; and therefore if it be no Repugnancy, that there ſhould be Three diſtinct *Infinite Minds*, neither is there that there ſhould be Three Thouſand. So that if *Self-Conſciouſneſs* be the *Formal Reaſon* of *Perſonality*, there appears no Repugnancy either from the Nature of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, or the Number of the *Spirits* endued with it, nor from the [ſuppoſed] *Infinity* of the ſaid *Spirits*, no nor yet from the *Nature* of the *God-head* it ſelf, but that there might be Three Thouſand *Perſons* in it as well as Three.

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But how then comes there to be only Three? Why, upon theſe grounds no other Reaſon can be aſſigned for it, but only that it was God's free Determination that there ſhould be Three and no more. And then the *Trinity* of *Perſons* muſt be an Effect of God's Will, and not a Neceſſary Condition of the Divine Nature; and the further Conſequence of this muſt be, that the three *Perſons* are Three *Created Beings*, as proceeding from the free Reſults of God's Will, by vertue whereof they equally might, or might not have been.

But on the contrary our Author himſelf holds *Page* 129. *line* 13. That the Three *Perſons* are Eſſential to the Divine Nature, and ſo Eſſential to it, that they neceſſarily belong to it in this number, *and can be neither more nor fewer than Three.* And if this be ſo, I am ſure it is a Contradiction that it ſhould be otherwiſe: for it is a Contradiction, that that ſhould not be, which neceſſarily is, and cannot but be. But now I have proved, that there is no Repugnancy or Contradiction to the Nature of Things conſidered barely according to their Nature, that three thouſand *Self-Conſcious Minds* or *Spirits* ſhould ſubſiſt in the *Godhead* any more than that three ſuch *Spirits* ſhould ſo ſubſiſt. And therefore if it be Abſurd, and Impoſſible, (as undoubtedly it is) that ſo many *Perſons* ſhould belong to the *Divine Nature*, then muſt the Reaſon of this Abſurdity be fetched from ſome other Thing, than either from *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, with reference to the *Divine Nature*, or from the *Divine Nature*, (conſidered in it ſelf abſtractedly from all Actual *Perſonality*:) for theſe, as we have ſhewn, afford no ſufficient Proof of this Abſurdity. And therefore, I ſay, ſome other *Reaſon* muſt be found out, and aſſigned againſt it. And accordingly, let this Author produce ſuch an one (whatſoever it be) as ſhall

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ſolidly and concluſively prove, That there cannot be Three Thouſand *Self-Conſcious Perſons* belonging to the *Godhead*, and that from the Nature of the Thing it ſelf (as ſeveral ſuch *Reaſons* may be brought) and I will undertake to him to prove, by the very ſame *Reaſon* and *Argument* as Concluſively, That *Self-Conſciouſneſs* is not, cannot be the *Formal Reaſon* of *Perſonality* in the Three *Divine Perſons* of the *Trinity*. In the mean time, by that kind of Arguing, which is called *Deductio ad Abſurdum*, I have ſufficiently diſproved it, by ſhewing what an Intolerable Abſurdity muſt follow the Aſſerting it.

Argument IV. The Fourth and Laſt *Argument* ſhall proceed thus. If Three diſtinct *Self-Conſciouſneſſes* Formally Conſtitute Three diſtinct *Perſonalities*, then Three diſtinct *Self-Complacencies* will Conſtitute Three diſtinct *Perſonalities* too. But our Author, I ſuppoſe, will not allow of the latter, and therefore neither ought he to aſſert the former.

The Conſequence is plain. Becauſe there is no Reaſon alleagable (according to our Author's Hypotheſis) why *Self-Complacency* may not found a *Perſonality* as well as *Self-Conſciouſneſs*.

For they are both of them equally diſtinct *Internal* Acts in the Perſon whom they belong to; and as to the Formal Effect of each, an Act of *Self-Complacency* ſeems to have the Preheminence; ſince it is a greater Perfection to be *United* to an *Infinite Good*, that is, to the *Deity*, by way of *Love* and *Adheſion*, than barely by way of knowledge and Intellection. And *Self-Complacency* is the former, whereas *Self-Conſciouſneſs* riſes no higher than the latter. And conſequently ſince *Self-Complacency* is the more perfective Act of the two (knowledge of good being

being ſtill in order to the Love of it) and ſince withall *Perſonality* is the moſt perfect way of *Subſiſting*, which any *Nature* is capable of, it ſeems moſt rational to derive the perfecteſt way of *Subſiſtence*, belonging to an *Intelligent Being*, from the moſt *Perfective* Act of that *Being*; if from any *Act* at all.

And now if this Author ſhould Object, That *Self-Complacency* is in Order of Nature Subſequent to *Self-Conſciouſneſs*; and ſo, that there cannot be the ſame ground to make it the *Formal Reaſon* of *Perſonality*, that there is, to make *Self-Conſciouſneſs* ſo.

I Anſwer, That, according to my Principle, whereby I deny *Self-Conſciouſneſs* to be the *Reaſon* of *Perſonality*, becauſe it is poſtnate to *Self-Subſiſtence*, it is, indeed, a good Reaſon; but according to our Author's Hypotheſis, it is none at all. For if the Priority of *Self-Subſiſtence* to *Self-Conſciouſneſs* (according to him) hinders not but that *Self-Conſciouſneſs* may nevertheleſs be the *Principle* or *Reaſon* of *Perſonality*, why ſhould the precedency of *Self-Conſciouſneſs* to *Self-Complacency*, hinder *Self-Complacency* from being as proper a Reaſon or Principle to found *Perſonality* upon, as the other.

All this I alledge only as *an Argument ad Hominem*; and deſire this Author to conſider, if any one ſhould borrow ſome of that Boldneſs of him, by which he diſſents from all Antiquity, and confidently averr, That *Self-Complacency is the Proper formal Reaſon of Perſonality in each and every one of the Divine Perſons*, I would have him, I ſay, conſider by what Reaſon or Argument, conſiſtent with his New Opinion he could Confute this other New Aſſertion.

For my own part, ſince I think as much may be ſaid for the one as for the other, I am ready to ſet up for *Self-Complacency* againſt his *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, when he

pleaſes; and will undertake to give as good Reaſons for my Notion, as he can for his, and perhaps better; let him begin and enter into the Diſpute, as ſoon as he will. And as I ſhall oppoſe my *Self-Complacency* to his *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, ſo I ſhall find out a *Mutual-Complacency* to Vye againſt his *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* too. And if any one ſhould here Object, That this and the like Diſputes are of that Nature, that the World is not like to be much Edified by them; I, perhaps, think ſo as much as he: But that is no great matter; ſince our Author is of ſo very Benign a Temper, That he does not always Write only for the *Reader's Edification*, but ſometimes *for his Diverſion* too.

Having thus given my Reaſons againſt this Author's New Notion of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, both with reference to Perſons Create and Uncreate, and proved, That it neither is, nor can be the *Formal Reaſon* of *Perſonality* in either of them: I ſhall now paſs to his other New Notion of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, whereby thoſe *Perſons*, who were diſtinguiſhed from one another by their reſpective *Self-Conſciouſneſſes*, are United and made one in Nature by vertue of this *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*. Concerning which Notion alſo, I muſt profeſs my ſelf in the number of thoſe who are by no means ſatisfied with it, as of any ſuch peculiar Efficacy to the uſe and purpoſe it is here brought for.

And there are ſufficient Reaſons againſt it. In giving of which, as I muſt acknowledge, That that one Conſideration of the *Priority* of *Being* (whether *Eſſentially*, or *Perſonally* conſidered) together with the firſt Modes and Affections of it, to any *Act* of *Knowledge* Attributable to the ſaid *Being*, is the Fundamental Principle upon which I impugn this Author's New Hypotheſis; ſo it does and muſt (as I have noted) run through all, or

Conſci-

moſt of the parts of this Diſputation, both about *Self-Conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* too. And accordingly, in the firſt place I Argue againſt it thus.

Argument I. No *Act of Knowledge* can be the *Formal Reaſon* of an Unity of Nature in the *Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*: But an Act of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, is an Act of *Knowledge*; And therefore no Act of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* can be the *Formal Reaſon* of an Unity of Nature in the Three *Divine Perſons*. The Major I prove thus. Every *Act of Knowledge* ſuppoſes the *Unity* of a Thing, or *Being* from which that Act flows, as Antecedent to it, and therefore cannot be the *Formal Reaſon* of the ſaid *Being*. For ſtill I affirm, that *Being*, and conſequently *Unity of Being* (which is the firſt Affection of it) muſt in Order of Nature precede *Knowledge*, and all other the like Attributes of *Being*. And if ſo, no *Attribute* Subſequent to a Thing, can be the *Formal Reaſon* of that Thing, which it is thus, in Order of Nature, Subſequent to. For neither can *Omniſcience* it ſelf (one of the greateſt and moſt acknowledged Attributes of the *Divine Nature*) be ſaid to be the Reaſon either of the *Being*, or of the *Unity* of the ſaid *Nature*: And therefore neither can any *Act of Knowledge* whatſoever be ſo. This is my firſt *Argument*, which I think ſufficient fairly to propoſe, without any farther Amplification.

Argument II. If Unity of Nature in the *Divine Perſons* be the Cauſe, Reaſon, or Principle of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* in the ſaid *Perſons*, then their *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* is not the Cauſe or Reaſon of the Unity of their *Nature*: But the former is true, and therefore the latter is ſo too.

As for the Conſequence of the Major Propoſition, it is as evident, as, that Nothing can be the Cauſe and Effect of the ſame Thing.

And for the Minor, *That Unity of Nature, or Eſſence in the Divine Perſons is the Cauſe, Reaſon, or Principle of Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, is proved from this, That we can no otherwiſe conceive of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, than as of an Eſſential Property equally belonging to all the Three *Perſons*: And all Properties, or Internal Attributes, are accounted to iſſue and reſult from the *Eſſence* or *Nature* of the Things which they belong to; and therefore can have no Antecedent Cauſal Influx upon the ſaid *Nature*, ſo as to Conſtitute either the *Being*, or the *Unity* thereof. But the *Divine Nature* or *Eſſence* being one and the ſame in all the Three *Perſons*, there is, upon this Account, one and the ſame *Knowledge* in them alſo. And they are not *one in Nature*, by vertue of their *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*; but they are therefore *Mutually Conſcious*, becauſe the *perfect Unity and Identity of their Nature*, makes them ſo. And to Aſſert the contrary, is of the like import (ſtill allowing for the Diſproportion of an *Infinite* and a *Finite Nature*) as if we ſhould make *Riſibility* in a Man, the Principle of *his Individuation*, and affirm, That *Peter*'s having this Property, is that which Conſtitutes him this particular Individual Man; which is egregiouſly abſurd in all the Philoſophy I ever yet met with, whatſoever it may be in this Author's.

Argument III. To affirm *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* to be the Cauſe of the *Union* of the Three *Divine Perſons*, in the ſame *Nature*, is to confound the *Union* and *Communion* of the ſaid *Perſons* together: But ſuch a confuſion ought by no means to be allowed of: and therefore neither ought that to be Aſſerted, from whence it follows.

Now

Now certain it is, That all Acts of ſeveral Perſons upon one another (as all that are *Mutual* muſt needs be) are properly Acts of *Communion*, by which the ſaid Perſons have an Intercourſe amongſt themſelves, as acting interchangeably one upon the other. But then, no doubt, both their *Eſſence* and *Perſonality* muſt ſtill go before this *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, ſince the Three *Perſons* muſt needs be really one in Nature before they can know themſelves to be ſo. And therefore *Union* of *Knowledge* (as I think *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* may properly be called) cannot give an *Union* of *Nature*. It may indeed ſuppoſe it, it may reſult from it, and upon the ſame Account may infer and prove it, but it can never give or cauſe it, nor be that Thing or Act, wherein an *Unity of Nature* does properly conſiſt, whatſoever this Author Aſſerts to the contrary.

But the Truth is, all that he has ſaid both of *Self-Conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* (and he has no more than ſaid it, as never offering at the Proof of any Thing) is founded in a manifeſt Perverſion of that Natural Order, in which Humane Reaſon Conceives and Diſcourſes of Things: Which Order (to give an Inſtance of it in our diſcourſing of any particular Perſon, or Complete Being) proceeds by theſe ſteps. Firſt we conceive of this Perſon as poſſeſſed of a certain *Eſſence* or *Nature* Conſtituting or rendring him what he is. Then we conceive of this Nature *as one*, which is the firſt Affection reſulting from *Being*. After this we conſider this *Being*, as ſtepping forth, or exerting it ſelf in *ſome Acts*, whether of *Intellection*, *Volition*, *Power*, or the like. In which whole proceſs the Order of theſe Conceptions is ſuch, That it cannot, with any Accord to *Reaſon*, be tranſpoſed, ſo as to have the ſecond or third put into the place of the firſt.

But

But now let us ſee how contrary to this Order our Author's Hypotheſis proceeds. For whereas *Nature or Being* ſhould be *firſt*, *Unity next*, and the *Acts iſſuing* from thence obtain the *Third place*, and then thoſe Acts ſtand in their due Order amongſt themſelves. This Author, on the contrary, makes *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, which is by two Degrees, or Removes poſterior to Unity of Nature (in the Perſons whom it belongs to) to be the Cauſe or *Formal Reaſon* of the *ſaid Unity*. For firſt *Self-Conſciouſneſs* is poſterior to this *Unity*, and then *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* is poſterior to *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, as being an Act ſupervening upon it. For *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* is that Act by which each *Perſon* comprehends, or is Conſcious of the *Self-Conſciouſneſs* of the other two; and therefore muſt needs preſuppoſe them, as the Act muſt needs do its *Object*. And therefore to make (as this Author does) *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* the Conſtituent Reaſon of the *Unity* of the Three *Perſons*, when this *Unity* is by two degrees, in Order of Nature, before it, runs ſo plainly counter to all the Methods of true Reaſoning, that it would be but time loſt to purſue it with any further Confutation.

Argument IV. Our 4th and laſt *Argument* proceeds equally againſt *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* and *Self-Conſciouſneſs* too; and is taken from that known Maxime in Philoſophy, That *Entities, or Beings, are not to be multiplied without manifeſt Neceſſity*: That is, we are not to admit of New Things, nor to coin new Notions, where ſuch as are known and long received are ſufficient to give us a true and full Account of the Nature of the Things we diſcourſe of, and to anſwer all the Ends and Purpoſes of Argumentation.

Accordingly

Accordingly I affirm, That the Notions of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* and *Self-Conſciouſneſs* in the Subject now before us ought to be rejected not only as New and Suſpicious, but as wholly Needleſs. For what can be ſignified by thoſe, which is not fully, clearly, and abundantly ſignified by that one plain Word, and known Attribute, the *Divine Omniſcience?* And what are *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* and *Self-Conſciouſneſs* elſe (if they are any thing) but one and the ſame *Omniſcience* exerting it ſelf ſeveral ways, and upon ſeveral *Objects?* As to apply it to the Matter before us; does not every one of the *Divine Perſons*, by vertue of the *Divine Nature*, and of this *Omniſcience* therewith Communicated to him, Perfectly, Intimately, and Intirely know himſelf as a *Perſon*, and all the *Actions*, *Motions*, and every thing elſe belonging to him? No doubt he does; for that otherwiſe he could not be *Omniſcient*. And does not the ſame *Perſon* again, by the very ſame *Omniſcience*, know all that is known by the other Two *Perſons*, and the other Two *Perſons* by the ſame Mutually know all that is known by him? No doubt they may and do: Foraſmuch as *Omniſcience* knows all things that are knowable, and conſequently all that is or can be known of, or in any one or all of the *Divine Perſons* joyntly or ſeverally conſidered.

But to argue the Matter yet more particularly. Either *Self-Conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* are one and the ſame with the *Divine Omniſcience*, or they are diſtinct ſorts of knowledge from it. If they are the ſame, then they are uſeleſs and ſuperfluous Notions, as we affirm they are; but if they import diſtinct ſorts of knowledge, then theſe two Things will follow.

1. That

1. That in every one of the *Divine Perſons* there are three diſtinct ſorts of *Knowledge*, *viz.* A Knowledge of *Omniſcience*, a Knowledge of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, and a Knowledge of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* too; which, I think, is very abſurd and ridiculous.

2. And in the next place: If we affirm them to be diſtinct ſorts of Knowledge from that of *Omniſcience*, then they muſt alſo have *Objects* diſtinct from, and not included in the *Object* of *Omniſcience*; ſince all ſuch difference, either of ſorts or Acts of Knowledge is founded upon the difference of their *Objects*. But this is impoſſible; ſince the *Object* of *Omniſcience* comprehends in it all that is knowable; and conſequently if *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* and *Self-Conſciouſneſs* have *Objects* diſtinct from, and not included in the *Object* of *Omniſcience*, thoſe *Objects* muſt be ſomething that is not knowable; for that *Omniſcience* (as we have ſhewn) claims all that is knowable, or poſſible to be known, for its own *Object*. From all which it follows, That *Self-Conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* conſidered as diſtinct from *Omniſcience* are two empty Chimerical Words, without any diſtinct Senſe, or Signification.

In a word, Every Perſon in the *Trinity*, by one and the ſame Act of *Omniſcience*, knows all the Internal Acts, Motions, and Relations proper both to himſelf, and to the other Two Perſons beſides. And if ſo, what imployment or uſe can there be for *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, or *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, which *Omniſcience* (that takes in the Objects of both) has not fully anſwered and diſcharged already?

If it be here ſaid, That *Omniſcience* cannot give *Perſonality*; foraſmuch as the Perſonality of each *Perſon* diſtinguiſhes him from the other two; which *Omniſcience* (being common to them all) cannot do. This I grant,

and

and own it impoſſible for any Thing Eſſentially involved in the *Divine Nature*, to give a Perſonal Diſtinction to any of the Three *Perſons*; but then I add alſo, That we have equally proved, that neither was *Self-Conſciouſneſs* the *Formal Reaſon* of this *Perſonal* Diſtinction, by ſeveral *Arguments*; and more eſpecially, becauſe that *Self-Conſciouſneſs* being a Thing Abſolute and Irrelative, could not be the *Formal Reaſon* of any thing in the Nature of it perfectly Relative, as the *Divine Perſons* certainly are. For this is a received Maxime in the Schools, with reference to the *Divine Nature* and *Perſons*, *Repugnat in Divinis dari Abſolutum Incommunicabile*, Greg. de Valen. 1 Tom. p. 874. And it is a ſure Rule, whereby we may diſtinguiſh in every one of the *Divine Perſons*, what is *Eſſential*, from what is *Perſonal*. For every Attribute that is Abſolute, is Communicable, and conſequently Eſſential, and every one that is purely Relative, is Incommunicable, and therefore purely Perſonal, and ſo *è converſo*: Upon which Account *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, which is a Thing Abſolute and Irrelative, cannot be Incommunicable, nor conſequently the *Formal Reaſon* of *Perſonality* in any of the *Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*; as we have already at large demonſtrated.

So that ſtill our Aſſertion ſtands good, That all that can be truly aſcribed to *Self-Conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* with reference to the *Divine Nature* and *Perſons*, may be fully and fairly accounted for from that one known Attribute, the *Divine Omniſcience*. And therefore, that there is no uſe at all either of the Term *Self-Conſciouſneſs* or *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, to contribute to the plainer or fuller Explication of the *Bleſſed Trinity*; as this Author, with great fluſter of Oſtentation pretends, but has not yet by ſo much as one ſolid *Argument* proved.

But when I conſider how wonderfully pleaſed the Man is with theſe two new-ſtarted Terms ſo high in ſound, and ſo empty of ſence, inſtead of one ſubſtantial word, which gives us all that can be pretended uſeful in them, with vaſt overplus and advantage, and even ſwallows them up, as *Moſes*'s Rod did thoſe pitiful Tools of the *Magicians*; This (I ſay) brings to my Mind (whether I will or no) a certain Story of a Grave Perſon, who Riding in the Road with his Servant, and finding himſelf ſomething uneaſie in his Saddle, beſpoke his Servant thus. John (ſays he) *a-light*; *and firſt take off the Saddle that is upon my Horſe, and then take off the Saddle that is upon your Horſe*; *and when you have done this, put the Saddle that was upon my Horſe, upon your Horſe, and put the Saddle that was upon your Horſe upon my Horſe*: Whereupon the Man, who had not ſtudied the Philoſophy of Saddles (whether *Ambling* or *Trotting*) ſo exactly, as his Maſter, replys ſomething ſhort upon him; *Lord! Maſter, What needs all theſe words? Could you not as well have ſaid, Let us change Saddles?* Now I muſt confeſs, I think the Servant was much in the right; though the Maſter having *a Rational Head of his own*, and being withal willing to make the Notion of *changing* Saddles more *plain, eaſie, and intelligible*, and to give a clearer Explication of that word, (which his Fore-Fathers, how good *Horſe-men* ſoever they might have been, yet were *not equally happy in the explaining of*) was pleaſed to ſet it forth by that more full and accurate Circumlocution.

And here it is not unlikely but that this Author, who, with a ſpight equally Malicious and Ridiculous, has reflected upon one of his Antagoniſts, and that for no Cauſe, or Provocation that appears (unleſs for having Baffled him) may tax me alſo, as one Drolling upon

See Chapter II.

Things

Things ſacred, for repreſenting the vanity of his Hypotheſis by the forementioned Example and Compariſon. But I hope the World will give me leave to diſtinguiſh between Things *Sacred*, and his Abſurd Phantaſtick way of treating of them; which, I can, by no means look upon as *Sacred*, nor indeed any Thing elſe in his whole Book, but the bare *Subject* it treats of, and the *Scriptures* there quoted by him. For to ſpeak my thoughts plainly, I believe this Sacred Myſtery of the *Trinity*, was never ſo ridiculed and expoſed to the Contempt of the Profane Scoffers at it, as it has been by this New-faſhioned Defence of it.

And ſo I diſmiſs his two ſo much *Admired* Terms (by himſelf I mean) as in no degree anſwering the Expectation he raiſed of them. For I cannot find, That they have either heightned or ſtrength'ned Men's Intellectual Faculties, or caſt a greater light and clearneſs upon that Object which has ſo long exerciſed them; but that *a Trinity in Unity* is as Myſterious as ever; and the Mind of Man as unable to graſp and comprehend it, as it has been from the beginning of Chriſtianity to this day. In a word, *Self-Conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* have rendred nothing about the *Divine Nature* and *Perſons*, *plainer*, *eaſier*, and more *Intelligible*; nor indeed, after ſuch a mighty ſtreſs ſo irrationally laid upon two ſlight empty words, have they made any thing (but the Author himſelf) *better underſtood than it was before.*

CHAP. V.

In which is proved againſt this Author, That the Three Perſons *of the* Bleſſed Trinity, *are not Three Diſtinct* Infinite Minds, *or* Spirits.

IT being certain both from *Philoſophy* and *Religion*, that there is but one only *God*, or *God-head*, in which *Chriſtian Religion* has taught us, That there are Three *Perſons*; Many Eminent Profeſſors of it have attempted to ſhew, how one and the ſame Nature might Subſiſt in Three *Perſons*, and how the ſaid Three *Perſons* might meet in one, and make no more than one ſimple, undivided *Nature*. It had been to be wiſhed, I confeſs, that Divines had reſted in the bare Expreſſions delivered in Scripture concerning this Myſtery, and ventured no further by any particular, and bold Explications of it. But ſince the Nature, or rather Humour of Man has been ſtill too ſtrong for his Duty, and his Curioſity (eſpecially in things Sacred) been apt to carry him too far; thoſe, however, have been all along the moſt pardonable, who have ventured leaſt, and proceeded upon the ſureſt grounds both of Scripture it ſelf, and of Reaſon diſcourſing upon it. And ſuch I affirm the Ancient Writers and Fathers of the Church, and after them the Schoolmen to have been; who with all their Faults (or rather Infelicities, cauſed by the Times and Circumſtances they

they lived in) are better Divines, and Soberer Reaſoners than any of thoſe Pert, Confident, Raw Men, who are much better at Deſpiſing and Carping at them, than at Reading and Underſtanding them: Though Wiſe Men Deſpiſe nothing, but they will know it firſt; and for that Cauſe very rationally deſpiſe them.

But among thoſe, who leaving the Common Road of the Church have took a By-way to themſelves, none (of late Years eſpecially) have ventured ſo boldly and ſo far as this Author; who pretending to be *more happy* (forſooth) *in his Explication of this Myſtery than all before him* (as who would not believe a Man in his own Commendation?) and to give a more ſatisfactory Account of this long received, and Revered Article by Terms perfectly New, and peculiarly his own, has advanced quite different Notions about this Myſtery, from any that our Church was ever yet acquainted with; Affirming, (as he does) *That the Three Perſons in the God-head, are Three Diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*, as will appear from the ſeveral places of his Book, where he declares his Thoughts upon this great Subject. As, Firſt in *Page* 50. he ſays, The Three *Divine Perſons*, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, *are Three Infinite Minds really diſtinct from each other*. Again, in *Page* 66. The *Perſons* (ſays he) are perfectly diſtinct; *for they are Three diſtinct and Infinite Minds, and therefore Three diſtinct Perſons*: For a *Perſon is an Intelligent Being*; *and to ſay, they are Three Divine Perſons, and not Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, is both Hereſie and Nonſence*. For which extraordinary Complement paſſed upon the whole Body of the Church of *England*, and perhaps all the Churches of *Chriſtendom* beſides, as I have paid him part of my thanks already, ſo I will not fail yet further to account with him before I put an end to this Chapter. In the mean time,

time, he goes on, in *Page* 102. *I plainly aſſert* (ſays he) *That as the Father is an Eternal and Infinite Mind, ſo the Son is an Eternal and Infinite Mind diſtinct from the Father*, and the *Holy Ghoſt* is an *Eternal and Infinite Mind diſtinct both from Father and Son*: Adding withall theſe words; *Which* (ſays he) *every Body can underſtand without any skill in Logick, or Metaphyſicks*. And this, I confeſs, is moſt truly and ſeaſonably remarked by him: For the want of this Qualification is ſo far from being any hindrance in the Caſe mentioned, that I dare undertake, that nothing but want *of skill* in *Logick and Metaphyſicks*, can bring any Man living, who acknowledges the *Trinity*, to own this Aſſertion. I need repeat no more of his Expreſſions to this purpoſe; theſe being ſufficient to declare his Opinion; ſave only that in *Page* 119. where (he ſays) *That Three Minds, or Spirits, which have no other difference, are yet diſtinguiſh'd by Self-Conſciouſneſs, and are Three diſtinct Spirits*. And that other in *Page* 258. where ſpeaking of the Three *Perſons*, *I grant* (ſays he) *that they are Three Holy Spirits*. By the ſame Token, that he there very Learnedly diſtinguiſhes between *Ghoſt* and *Spirit*, allowing *the ſaid Three Perſons* (as we have ſhewn) to be *Three Holy Spirits*, but at the ſame time denying them to be *Three Holy Ghoſts*, and this with great ſcorn of thoſe who ſhould hold, or ſpeak otherwiſe. To which at preſent I ſhall ſay no more but this, That he would do well to turn theſe two Propoſitions into *Greek*, or *Latin*; and that will preſently ſhew him what difference and diſtinction there is between a *Ghoſt* and a *Spirit*, and why the very ſame things which are affirmed of the one (notwithſtanding the difference of thoſe words in *Engliſh*) may not, with the ſame Truth, be affirmed of the other alſo. But the Examination of this odd Aſſertion will fall in more naturally towards the latter end of this

this Chapter, where it ſhall be particularly conſidered.

I have now ſhewn this Author's Judgment in the Point, and in oppoſition to what he has ſo boldly Aſſerted, and laid down, I do here deny, *That the Three Perſons in the Bleſſed Trinity, are Three diſtinct Infinite Minds or Three diſtinct Infinite Spirits.* And to overthrow his Aſſertion, and evince the Truth of mine, I ſhall trouble neither my Reader nor my ſelf, with many *Arguments.* But of thoſe, which I ſhall make uſe of, the firſt is this.

Argument I. *Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits, are Three diſtinct Gods.*
But the Three Perſons of the Bleſſed Trinity, are not Three diſtinct Gods.
And therefore the Three Perſons of the Bleſſed Trinity, are not Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.

The Minor, I ſuppoſe, this Author will readily concur with me in; howbeit his Hypotheſis (as ſhall be ſhewn) in the certain Conſequences of it Contradicts it, and, if it ſhould ſtand, would effectually overturn it. For by that he Aſſerts a perfect *Tritheiſme*, though I have ſo much Charity for him, as to believe, that he does not know it.

The Major Propoſition therefore is that which muſt be debated between us. This Author holds it in the Negative, and I in the Affirmative: and my Reaſon for what I affirm, *viz.* That Three *diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits, are Three diſtinct Gods*, is this, That *God* and *Infinite Mind*, or *Spirit*, are Terms Equipollent, and Convertible. *God* being truly and properly an *Infinite Mind, or Spirit*, and *an Infinite Mind or Spirit* being as truly

truly and properly *God*. And to ſhew this Convertibility and Commenſuration between them yet further: Whatſoever may be affirmed or denied of the one, may with equal Truth and Propriety be affirmed or denied of the other. And to give an Inſtance of this with reference to the Three *Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*; As it is true, that one and the ſame *God*, or *God-head* is Common to, and Subſiſts in all and every one of the Three *Perſons*; ſo is it true, *That one and the ſame Infinite Mind, or Spirit*, is Common to, and Subſiſts in the ſaid Three *Perſons*: And conſequently, as it is falſe, That one and the ſame *God*, or *God-head*, by being Common to, and Subſiſting in the Three *Perſons*, becomes Three *Gods*, or Three *God-heads*; ſo is it equally falſe, That one and the ſame *Infinite Mind*, or *Spirit*, by being Common to, and Subſiſting in the ſaid Three *Perſons*, becomes Three *Infinite Minds* or *Spirits*. This is clear Argumentation, and craves no Mercy at our Author's Hands.

If it be here Objected, That we allow of Three *diſtinct Perſons* in the *God-head*, of which every one is *Infinite*, without admitting them to be Three diſtinct *Gods*; and therefore, why may we not as well allow of Three *diſtinct Infinite Minds* or *Spirits* in the ſame *God-head* without any neceſſity of inferring from thence, That they are Three diſtinct *Gods*?

I Anſwer, That the Caſe is very different, and the Reaſon of the difference is this, Becauſe Three *Infinite Minds*, or *Spirits* are Three Abſolute, Simple *Beings*, or *Eſſences*, and ſo ſtand diſtinguiſhed from one another, by their whole *Beings* or *Natures*. But the *Divine Perſons* are Three Relatives, (or one ſimple *Being*, or *Eſſence*, under three diſtinct Relations) and conſequently differ from one another, not wholly, and by all that is in them,

them, but only by ſome certain *Mode*, or *reſpect* peculiar to each, and upon that Account cauſing their Diſtinction. And therefore to Argue from a *Perſon* to a *Spirit* here is manifeſtly Sophiſtical, and that which is called, *Fallacia Accidentis*, or (ſince ſeveral Fallacies may concur in the ſame Propoſition) it may be alſo *à dicto ſecundùm quid ad dictum ſimpliciter*. For ſo it is to conclude, That Three *Perſons* are Three *diſtinct Gods*; ſince the difference of Perſons is only from a *diverſe reſpect* between them; but Three *Gods* import Three abſolutely *diſtinct Natures or Subſtances*. And whereas we ſay, That the Three *Perſons* are all and every one of them *Infinite*, yet it is but from one and the ſame Numerical Nature Common to them all that they are ſo, the Ternary Number all the while not belonging to their *Infinity*, but only to their *Perſonalities*. The Caſe therefore between *a Mind, or Spirit*, and *a Perſon*, is by no means the ſame. Foraſmuch as [*Perſon*] here imports only a Relation, or Mode of *Subſiſtence* in Conjunction with the Nature it belongs to: And therefore a Multiplication of *Perſons* (of it ſelf) imports only a Multiplication of ſuch *Modes*, or *Relations*, without any neceſſary Multiplication of the Nature it ſelf to which they adhere. Foraſmuch as one and the ſame Nature may ſuſtain ſeveral diſtinct Relations, or Modes of Subſiſtence. But now on the other ſide, a *Mind*, or *Spirit*, is not a Relation, or Mode of *Subſiſtence*, but it is an Abſolute *Being*, *Nature*, or *Subſtance*; and conſequently cannot be multiplyed without a Multiplication of it into ſo many Numerical Abſolute *Beings*, *Natures*, or *Subſtances*; there being nothing in it to be *multiplyed* but it ſelf. So that Three *Minds*, or *Spirits*, are Three Abſolute *Beings*, *Natures*, or *Subſtances*, and *Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*, are accordingly *Three diſtinct*

Infinite Abſolute Beings, Natures, or Subſtances. That is, in other words, *They are Three Gods*; which was the Thing to be proved; and let this Author ward off the Proof of it as he is able.

Argument II. My Second *Argument* againſt the Three *Perſons* in the *Bleſſed Trinity* being *Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits, is this.*

Three diſtinct Minds, or Spirits are Three diſtinct Subſtances.
But the Three Perſons in the Bleſſed Trinity are not Three diſtinct Subſtances.
And therefore they are not Three diſtinct Minds, or Spirits.

The Major Propoſition is proved from the Definition of a *Mind*, or *Spirit*, That it is *Subſtantia Incorporea Intelligens*, an Intelligent, Incorporeal, [or Immaterial] Subſtance; and therefore Three *diſtinct Minds*, or *Spirits*, muſt be Three ſuch *diſtinct Subſtances*. And beſides, if a *Mind*, or *Spirit*, were not a *Subſtance*, what could it be elſe? If it be any Thing, it muſt be either *an Accident, or Mode of Being*. But not an Accident, ſince no Accident can be in *God*; nor yet *a Mode of Being*, ſince a *Spirit* (not deſigned to concur as a part towards any Compound) is an Abſolute, Entire, Complete Being of it ſelf, and has it's proper Mode of Subſiſtence belonging to it; and therefore cannot be *a Mode* it ſelf. From whence it follows, That a *Spirit* is, and muſt be a *Subſtance*, and can be nothing elſe.

As for the Minor, viz. *That the Three Perſons in the Bleſſed Trinity are not Three diſtinct Subſtances*; this is evident both from Authority, and from Reaſon.

And

And first for Authority, *Tertullian* against *Praxeas* affirms, *Semper in Deo una Substantia.* And St. *Jerom* in his Epistle to *Damasus*, *Quis ore sacrilego Tres substantias prædicabit?* And St. *Austin* in his 5th Book *de Trinitate*, Chap. 9. and in Book 7. Chap. 4. And *Ruffinus* in the 10th Book of his History, Chap. 29. All affirm One Substance in *God*, and deny Three, and yet the same Writers unanimously hold Three *Persons*, which shews, That they did not account these Three *Persons*, Three *Substances*. And *Anselmus* in his Book *de Incarnatione*, Chap. 3. says, That the Father and the Son may be said to be Two *Beings*, provided that by Beings we understand Relations not Substances. And *Bellarmine*, a Writer Orthodox enough in these points, and of unquestionable Learning otherwise, in his 2d *Tome*, *page* 348. about the end, says, That to assert, that the Father and the Son differ in Substance, is *Arianism*: And yet if they were Two *distinct Substances*, for them not to differ in Substance, would be impossible. And as for the *Greek* Writers, they never admit of Three οὐσίαι in the *Deity*, but where οὐσία is used to signifie the same with ὑπόστασις, as sometimes it was used: And by reason of this Ambiguity it was, that the *Latine* Church was so long fearful of using the word Hypostasis, and used only that of *Persona*, answering to the *Greek* Πρόσωπον, lest they should hereby be thought to admit of *Three Substances*, as well as Three *Persons* in the *God-head*.

Nor, in the next place, is the same less evident from Reason, than we have shewn it to be from Authority. For if the Three *Persons* be Three *distinct Substances*, then Two *distinct Substances* will concur in, and belong to each Person; to wit, *That Substance* which is the *Divine Essence*, and so is Communicable or Common to all the *Persons*, and *that Substance* which Constitutes each

Perſon, and thereby is ſo peculiar to him as to diſtinguiſh him from the other, and conſequently to be incommunicable to any beſides him to whom it belongs: Since for one and the ſame Subſtance to be Common to all Three *Perſons*, and withal to belong incommunicably to each of the Three, and thereby to diſtinguiſh them from one another, is Contradictious and Impoſſible. And yet on the other ſide to aſſert Two *diſtinct Subſtances* in each *Perſon*, is altogether as Abſurd; and that, as upon many other Accounts, ſo particularly upon this, That it muſt infer ſuch a Compoſition in the *Divine Perſons*, as is utterly Incompatible with the Abſolute Simplicity, and Infinite Perfection of the *Divine Nature*. And therefore the Three *Perſons* in the *Bleſſed Trinity*, can by no means be ſaid to be Three *diſtinct Subſtances*, but only one *Infinite Subſtance*, equally Common to, and Subſiſting in them all, and diverſified by their reſpective Relations. And moreover, ſince Three *diſtinct Minds*, or *Spirits* are Eſſentially Three *diſtinct Subſtances*, neither can the Three *Perſons* of the *Trinity* be ſaid to be Three *diſtinct Minds, or Spirits*; which was the Point to be made out.

Argument III. My Third *Argument* againſt the ſame ſhall proceed thus.

If it be truly ſaid, That one and the ſame Infinite Mind, or Spirit is Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, (I mean all Three taken together) and it cannot be truly ſaid, That one and the ſame Infinite Mind, or Spirit is Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits; then it follows, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt are not Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.

But

But it may be truly ſaid, That one and the ſame Infinite Mind, or Spirit is Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt; and it cannot be truly ſaid, That one and the ſame Infinite Mind, or Spirit is Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.

Therefore the Three Perſons in the Trinity, viz. *Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt are not Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.*

This is the *Argument*.

Now the Conſequence of the Major appears from this, That the ſame Thing, or Things, at the ſame time, and in the ſame reſpect, cannot be truly affirmed and denied of the ſame Subject: And therefore ſince [*Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt*, taken joyntly together] are truly predicated of one and the ſame *Infinite Mind*; and [Three *diſtinct Infinite Minds*, or *Spirits*] cannot be truly affirmed or predicated, and conſequently may be truly denied of the ſame; it follows, That [*Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt*] and [Three *diſtinct Infinite Minds*, or *Spirits*] neither are, nor can be accounted the ſame, nor be truly affirmable of one another.

As for the Minor, it conſiſts of two parts, and accordingly muſt be proved ſeverally in each of them.

And Firſt, That it is, and may be truly ſaid, *That one and the ſame Infinite Mind is Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt* (*viz.* joyntly taken) as I noted before. This, I ſay, may be proved from hence, That *God* is truly ſaid *to be Father, Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt* (ſtill ſo taken.) And it having been already evinced, That [*one Infinite Mind, or Spirit*] and [*one God*] are terms convertible and equipollent, it follows, That whatſoever is truly affirmed or denied of the one, may be as truly affirmed or denied of the other. And this is too evident to need any further proof.

And

And therefore in the next place, for the proof of the other part of the Minor, viz. *That one and the ſame Infinite Mind, or Spirit, cannot be truly ſaid to be Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*; This is no leſs evident than the former, becauſe in ſuch a Propoſition both Subject and Predicate imply a Mutual Negation of, and Contradiction to one and another; and where it is ſo, it is impoſſible for one to be truly affirmed, or predicated of the other.

And now, after this plain proof given both of the Major and the Minor Propoſition, and this alſo drawn into ſo little a compaſs, I hope this Author will not bear himſelf ſo much above all the Rules which other Mortals proceed by, as, after the Premiſes proved, to deny the Concluſion, viz. *That the Three Perſons in the Bleſſed Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, are not Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.* The Affirmation of which, is that which I undertook to confute.

But before I diſmiſs this *Argument*, I cannot but take notice, That the ſame Terms, with a bare Tranſpoſition of them, *viz.* by ſhifting place between the Predicate and the Subject (which in Adequate and Commenſurate Predications, may very well be done) will as effectually conclude to the ſame Purpoſe, as they did in the way in which we have already propoſed them. And ſo the *Argument* will proceed thus.

If it be truly and properly ſaid, That the Three Perſons in the Bleſſed Trinity, are one Numerical Infinite Mind, or Spirit; then they cannot be truly ſaid to be Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.

But they are truly and properly ſaid to be one Numerical Infinite Mind, or Spirit.

And

And therefore they neither are, nor can be truly ſaid to be Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.

The Conſequence of the firſt Propoſition is manifeſt, becauſe (as we have ſhewn before) *one and the ſame Infinite Mind* cannot be Three *diſtinct Infinite Minds* without a Contradiction in the Terms.

And for the Minor, viz. *That the Three Perſons are truly ſaid to be one Infinite Mind, or Spirit*; That alſo is proved by this, That all and every one of them, are truly and properly *ſaid to be God*; *and God is truly and properly one Numerical Infinite Mind, or Spirit:* And therefore if the Three *Perſons* are ſaid to be the Firſt, they muſt be ſaid to be this Latter alſo; and that (as I ſhew before) becauſe of the Reciprocal Predication of thoſe Terms. But as to the Matter before us, *That God is truly and properly one Numerical Infinite Mind, or Spirit*, even this Author himſelf allows, who in *Page* 69. poſitively ſays, *That we know nothing of the Divine Eſſence, but that God is an Infinite Mind.* Very well; and if he grant him to be an *Infinite Mind*, let him prove *this Infinite Mind* to be *three diſtinct Infinite Minds*, if he can. The Truth is [*Infinite Mind or Spirit*] is an Eſſential Attribute of the *Divine Nature*, and Convertible with it, and whatſoever is ſo, belongs equally to all the Three *Perſons*, and conſequently cannot be aſcribed to them *plurally* any more than the *Deity* it ſelf; it being as uncapable, as that, of being multiplied. Upon which Account, if the Three *Perſons* are with equal Truth ſaid to be [*one Infinite Mind, or Spirit*] and to be [*one God*] they can no more be ſaid to be Three *diſtinct Infinite Minds*, than they can be ſaid to be Three *diſtinct Gods.*

So

So that which way ſoever the *Argument* be propoſed, either, *That one Infinite Mind is Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt*; or, *That Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, are one Infinite Mind*, it ſtill overthrows this Author's Hypotheſis, That the ſaid Three *Perſons* are Three *diſtinct Infinite Minds*, or *Spirits*.

Argument IV. My Fourth and Laſt *Argument* againſt the ſame, ſhall be this.

Whatſoever Attribute may be truly predicated of all and each of the Divine Perſons in the Athanaſian *Form, ſo belongs to them all in Common, that it can belong to none of them under any Term of diſtinction from the reſt.*

But the Attribute [Infinite Mind, or Spirit] *may be truly predicated of all and each of the Divine Perſons in and according to the* Athanaſian *Form.*

And therefore it can belong to none of them under any Term of diſtinction from the reſt.

The Major is as evident; as that no Attribute can be Common to ſeveral Subjects, and yet peculiar and appropriate to each of them.

And the Minor is proved by Inſtance thus; The *Father* is an *Infinite Mind*, the *Son* is an *Infinite Mind*, and the *Holy Ghoſt* is an *Infinite Mind*; and yet they are not Three *Infinite Minds*, but one *Infinite Mind*.

And this I affirm to be as good Divinity as any part in the *Athanaſian Creed*, and ſuch as I ſhall abide by, both againſt this Author, and any other whatſoever.

But now let us ſee how his Aſſertion caſt into the *Athanaſian* Model, ſhews it ſelf, as thus.

The

The Father is a diſtinct Infinite Mind, the Son is a diſtinct Infinite Mind, and the Holy Ghoſt is a diſtinct Infinite Mind; and yet they are not Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, but one diſtinct Infinite Mind.

And this is ſo far from being true, that it is indeed neither *Truth* nor *Sence*. For what Truth can there be in denying, That Three *Perſons*, of which every one is ſaid to be a *diſtinct Infinite Mind, are Three diſtinct Infinite Minds?* And what ſence can there be in affirming, or ſaying, *That they are but One diſtinct Infinite Mind?* Whereas the Term [*diſtinct*] is never properly uſed or applyed, but with reſpect had to ſeveral Particulars each diſcriminated from the other; but by no means where there is mention made only of *one* Thing and no more, as it is here in this Propoſition.

But to make what allowances the Caſe will bear, and for that purpoſe to remit ſomething of the ſtrictneſs of the *Athanaſian Form*, by leaving out the word [*diſtinct*] in the laſt and illative Clauſe, we ſhall then ſee that our Author's Hypotheſis will proceed thus.

The Father is a diſtinct Infinite Mind, the Son is a diſtinct Infinite Mind, and the Holy Ghoſt is a diſtinct Infinite Mind; and yet they are not Three Infinite Minds, but one Infinite Mind.

Thus, I ſay, it muſt proceed in the *Athanaſian* way with the word [*diſtinct*] left out of the Concluſion. Nevertheleſs even ſo, the Inference is ſtill manifeſtly and groſly falſe in both the branches of it. For it is abſolutely falſe [That *Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, are not Three Infinite Minds*] and altogether as falſe [*That Three Infinite Minds, are but One Infinite Mind.*]

The Author's Hypotheſis put into the *Athanaſian* Model, muſt needs fall in with that Fallacy ſometimes

urged againſt us by the *Socinians*, viz. The *Father is a Perſon, the Son a Perſon, and the Holy Ghoſt a Perſon, and yet they are not Three Perſons, but one Perſon*; which is manifeſtly Sophiſtical, by arguing *ab imparibus tanquam paribus*, viz. Concluding that of an Attribute *Relative*, and *Multiplicable*, which can be concluded only of ſuch as are not So.

For the *Athanaſian* Inference holds only in Attributes *Eſſential* and *Common* to all the Three *Perſons* joyntly, or ſeverally taken, and not in ſuch as are *Proper*, *Perſonal*, and Peculiar to each. As alſo in ſuch as are *Abſolute* (as the Attribute of *Mind*, or *Spirit* without the word [*diſtinct*] is) and not in ſuch as are *Relative*. For thoſe Attributes, which agree to the *Divine Perſons*, Perſonally, Peculiarly, and Relatively, can never Unite, or Coincide into *one* in the Inference, or Concluſion. In a word [*Infinite Mind, or Spirit*] is a Predicate perfectly Eſſential, and ſo in its Numerical Unity Common to all the Three *Divine Perſons*, and for that cauſe not to be affirmed of, or aſcribed to, either all or any of them with the Term [*diſtinct*] added to it, or joyned with it. For that would *multiply* an Attribute that cannot be *multiplyed*.

And now, what I have here diſcourſed upon, and drawn from the *Athanaſian* Creed with reſpect to this particular Subject, I leave to our Author's ſtricteſt Examination. For my own part, I rely upon this *Creed*, as a ſure Teſt, or Rule to diſcover the falſhood of his Hypotheſis by. So that as long as it is true, that *God is one* numerical *Infinite Mind or Spirit*, and as long as the *Athanaſian* Form duely applied is a firm and good way of Reaſoning, this Author's Aſſertion, *That the Three Divine Perſons, are Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*, is thereby irrefragably overthrown.

And

And therefore I ſhall not concern my ſelf to produce any more Arguments againſt it. Only by way of *Overplus* to, and *Illuſtration* of thoſe, which have already been alledged, I cannot but obſerve the Concurrent Opinion of the Philoſophers, and moſt Learned Men amongſt the Heathens about *God's being One Infinite Mind, or Spirit*, as a neceſſary deduction (no doubt) made by Natural Reaſon from the Principles thereof concerning the *Divine Nature*. For moſt of thoſe Philoſophers looked upon *God* as the *Soul of the World*, as *One Infinite Mind, or Spirit*, that animated and preſided over the Univerſe. For ſo held *Pythagoras*, as *Cicero* in his firſt Book, *de Naturâ Deorum*, and *Lactantius* in his Book *de irâ Dei*, tells us, *Pythagoras quoque unum Deum confitetur dicens Incorpoream eſſe* mentem *quæ per omnem Naturam diffuſa & intenta vitalem ſenſum tribuit*. In like manner the Great *Hermes* being asked, *What God was*, anſwered, ὁ πᾶσι ὅλων δημιουργὸς σοφώτατος νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀίδιος, The Maker of all Things, a moſt Wiſe and Eternal Mind. *Thales* called him, νοῦν τοῦ κόσμου Θεὸν, God, the Mind of the World. *Diogenes*, *Cleanthes*, and *Oenipides*, τὸν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν, The Soul of the World. *Plato* in *Phædone*, ſays of God, That he is νοῦς ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, a Mind that is the Cauſe and orderer of all Things. And *Plato* the Son of *Ariſton* ſays, ὁ μὲν Θεὸς νοῦς ἐστι τοῦ κόσμου, God is the Mind of the World. And *Lactantius* gives this Teſtimony of *Ariſtotle*, That, *Quamvis ſecum ipſe diſſideat, ac repugnantia ſibi & dicat, & ſentiat*, (by which one would think our Author better acquainted with him than he is) *in ſummum tamen unam mentem mundo præeſſe teſtatur*. Lact. de falſâ Relig. Lib. 1. Cap. 5. Agreeably to all which, *Seneca* in the Preface to his Natural Queſtions, putting the Queſtion, *Quid eſt Deus?* What is God? Anſwers, *Mens Univerſi*, The Mind of the Univerſe. As the Learned

Emperour *Antoninus* after him, expreſſes God the ſame way, and by the ſame word in *Greek*, ὁ τῶ ὅλω νῶς, *Lib.* 5. *p.* 148. *Oxon. Edit.* And that Paſſage in *Virgil*'s 6. *Æneid* is famous; where ſpeaking of God, as the *Great Soul of the World*, running through all the Parts of that vaſt Body, he expreſſes it in thoſe known Verſes:

> ----- *Cœlum, ac Terras, Campoſq; liquentes,*
> *Lucentemq; Globum Lunæ, Titaniaq; Aſtra,*
> *Spiritus intus alit, totamq; infuſa per artus*
> *Mens agitat molem, & magno ſe corpore miſcet.*

And the ſame was the Opinion of *Cato* before him, a great Man, though but a ſmall Author, who tells us from the Ancient Poets (who were accounted the Philoſophers of the firſt Ages) That *Deus eſt animus*, God is a Mind, or Spirit.

And the Truth is, I reckon that theſe Learned Men, all along, *by an Infinite* Mind, or Spirit, underſtood as truly and certainly *One* Infinite Mind, or Spirit, as if the Term of Unity had been added by them. For beſides that the Particles *a*, or *the*, (which we uſe in tranſlating any ſingle word into our own Language) import ſo much, the very condition alſo of the Subject ſpoken of, as being *Infinite*, muſt needs infer the ſame. So that we ſee here how the Judgment of Natural Reaſon in theſe Eminent Philoſophers amongſt the Heathens falls in with what God himſelf revealed by the Mouth of our Saviour concerning his own Nature, in *John* 4. 24. viz. *That God is a Spirit*. For we have them expreſſing him by theſe words, *Animus, Mens, & Spiritus*. So that had they all lived after St. *John*, (as one of them did,) their Sentences might have paſſed for ſo many Paraphraſes upon

upon the Text, all declaring God to be *One Infinite Soul, Mind, or Spirit.*

But perhaps our Author will here ſay, What is all this to the purpoſe, ſince we found our knowledge of the Three *Divine Perſons,* wholly upon *Revelation?* And I grant, we do ſo: Yet nevertheleſs I ſhall, by his good favour, ſhew, That what I have alledged is very much to the purpoſe. And to this end, premiſing here what we have already proved, *viz.* That *to be One Infinite Mind, and to be Three diſtinct Infinite Minds,* involve in them a Mutual Negation of, and Contradiction to one another: (Foraſmuch as to be *Unum,* is to be *Indiviſum in ſe*; that is to ſay, Indiviſible into more things, *ſuch* as it ſelf.) This, I ſay, premiſed,

Firſt, I deſire this Author to produce that Revelation, which declares the Three *Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity,* to be Three *diſtinct Infinite Minds,* or *Spirits.* For I deny that there is any ſuch.

Secondly, I affirm, That whatſoever is a Truth in Natural Reaſon, cannot be contradicted by any other Truth declared by Revelation; ſince it is impoſſible for any one Truth to contradict another.

Upon which grounds, I here ask our Author, Is it a Contradiction *for One God to be One Infinite Mind,* or *Spirit, and to be alſo Three Infinite Minds,* or *Spirits?* If he grant this (as I have proved it, whether he does or no) then I ask him in the next place, Whether it be a Propoſition true in Natural Reaſon, [*That God is one Infinite Mind,* or *Spirit?*] If he grants this alſo, then I infer, That it cannot be proved true from Revelation, [*That God is Three Infinite Minds, or Spirits,*] ſince the certain Truth of the firſt Propoſition ſuppoſed and admitted muſt needs diſprove the Truth of that *Revelation,* which pretends to eſtabliſh the ſecond.

But

But ſome again may perhaps ask, Suppoſe it were revealed in *expreſs Terms*, [*That God is Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*,] would you in this caſe throw aſide this Revelation in ſubmiſſion to the former Propoſition declared by Natural Reaſon? I Anſwer, No: But if the Revelation were *expreſs* and undeniable, I would adhere to it; but at the ſame time, while I did ſo, I would quit the former Propoſition, and conclude, That Natural Reaſon had not diſcourſed right when it concluded, *That God was one Infinite Mind, or Spirit*: But to hold both Propoſitions to be True, and to aſſent to them both as ſuch, This the Mind of Man can never do.

So that, in a word, I conclude, That if it be certainly true from Reaſon, *That God is One Infinite Mind, or Spirit*. No Revelation can, or ought to be pleaded, *That he is Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*: And if Revelation cannot, or ought not to be pleaded for it, I am ſure, we have no ground to believe it. And yet at the ſame time I own and aſſert a Revelation of the truth of this Propoſition, [*That God is Three Perſons*,] or, which is all one, [*That God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt*,] ſince it does not at all contradict the forementioned Propoſitions founded upon Natural Reaſon, [viz. *That God is One Infinite Mind, or Spirit*,] nor could it yet ever be proved to do ſo, either by *Arrians*, or *Socinians*. But on the contrary, theſe two Propoſitions, viz. [*God is One Infinite Mind, or Spirit*] and that other, [*God is Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*] (which he muſt be, if the Three *Divine Perſons* are Three *diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*) are Groſs, Palpable, and Irreconcileable Contradictions. And becauſe they are ſo, it is demonſtratively certain, *That the ſaid Three Perſons are not Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*: As this Author againſt all

all Principles of Philoſophy and Divinity, has moſt erroneouſly affirmed them to be.

I have ſaid enough, I hope, upon this Subject. But before I quit it, it will not be amiſs to obſerve what work this Man makes with the *Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*, (as indeed he ſeldom almoſt turns his Pen, but he gives ſome ſcurvy ſtroke at it or other,) particularly in *Page* 89. he affirms, That the Expreſſion of [*the One true God*, and *the only true God*] *cannot properly be attributed to the Son, nor to the Holy Ghoſt*. From whence I infer, That then neither can the Expreſſion of [*God, or the True God*] be properly attributed to the *Son*, or to the *Holy Ghoſt*. Foraſmuch as the Terms [*One God*] and [*One True God, or one only True God*] are equivalent. The Term [*One God*] including in it every whit as much as the Term [*One True God, or One only True God*] and the Term [*One True God, or One only True God*] including in it no more than the Term [*One God*;] and conſequently if he aſſerts, That theſe Terms cannot with equal Propriety be attributed to, and predicated of the *Son* and the *Holy Ghoſt*, we have him both *Arrian* and *Macedonian* together in this Aſſertion.

And I believe his Adverſary the *Author of the Notes* could hardly have deſired a greater Advantage againſt him, than his calling it (as he does) *a Corruption of the* Athanaſian *Creed*, to joyn the Term [*One True God*] to every *Perſon* of the *Trinity*; adding withal, That upon the doing ſo, *it would ſound pretty like a Contradiction to ſay in the cloſe* [*That there was but One True God.*] Theſe are our Author's words, but much fitter to have proceeded from a *Socinian*, than from one profeſſing a belief, and (which is more) *a defence* of the *Trinity*. But in anſwer to them, I tell him, That the repeated Attribution of [*The One True God, or only True God*] to each of the

the Three *Perſons* is no Corruption of that Creed at all. Foraſmuch as theſe Terms [*The One True God, and the only True God*] import, an Attribute purely Eſſential, and ſo equally, and in Common belonging to all the Three *Perſons*, and not an *Attribute properly Perſonal*, and ſo appropriate to ſome one or other of the ſaid *Perſons*. And if this Author would have duly diſtinguiſhed between *Eſſential* and *Perſonal* Attributes, he could not have diſcourſed of theſe Matters at ſo odd a rate, as here he does. And therefore I deny it to be any *Contradiction* (let it ſound in his Ears how it will) to conclude, That the ſaid Three *Perſons* (notwithſtanding this Repetition) *are not Three True Gods, but only One True God.* But he ſays, *That ſuch a Repeated Application implies as if each Perſon conſidered as diſtinguiſhed and ſeparated from the other were the One True God.* To which I Anſwer,

1. *That to imply as if a thing were ſo*, and to imply, *that really it is ſo*, makes a very great difference in the caſe; indeed ſo great, that this Author muſt not think from words implying only the former to conclude the latter; which yet muſt be done, or what he here alledges is nothing to his purpoſe. But

2. I Anſwer yet farther, That the forementioned words do indeed *imply*, and (which is more) plainly declare, That the Three *Perſons* who are ſaid to be [*the One, or only True God*] are, while they ſuſtain that Attribute, really diſtinct from one another, but it does not imply, That this is ſaid of them under that peculiar *Formality, as they are diſtinct*, and much leſs, *as ſeparated*; which latter they neither are, nor can be. The truth is, what he has ſaid againſt the repeated Application of this Term to every one of the Three *Perſons*, may be equally objected

objected againſt all the repeated Predications in the *Athanaſian* Creed; but to as little purpoſe, one as the other; ſince, albeit all theſe Predications do agree to *Perſons really diſtinct*, yet they agree not to them under that formal and preciſe conſideration *as diſtinct*: For nothing but their reſpective Perſonal Relations agree to them under that Capacity; and this effectually clears off this Objection.

But here I cannot but wonder, that this Man ſhould jumble together theſe two Terms [*diſtinguiſhed* and *ſeparated*] as he does twice here in the compaſs of eight Lines; when the ſignification of them, as it is applyed to the Three *Divine Perſons*, is ſo vaſtly different, that one of theſe Terms [viz. *diſtinguiſhed*] neceſſarily belongs to them, and the other which is [*ſeparated*] neither does nor can take place amongſt them: Nay, and when this Author himſelf has ſo earneſtly and frequently contended for the difference of them; as all along aſſerting the *diſtinction of Perſons*, and as often denying their *ſeparation*.

But he proceeds, and ſays, That this Expreſſion of [*The One* [*or only*] *True God*] *is never (that he knows of) attributed to Son, or Holy Ghoſt, either in Scripture, or any Catholick Writer*. Which words, methinks, (as I cannot but obſerve again) do not look, as if a Man were writing againſt the *Socinians*. Nevertheleſs admitting the Truth of his Allegation, *That this Term* [*the One True God*] *is not to be found expreſly attributed to the Son, or the Holy Ghoſt*, will he infer from hence, that therefore it neither can, nor ought to be ſo? For if that be attributed to them both in Scripture and Catholick Writers, which neceſſarily and eſſentially implys [*The one True God*] and does, and muſt ſignifie the very ſame Thing, is it not all one, as if *in Terminis* it had been

aſcribed to them? Doubtleſs there are ſeveral other Expreſſions in the *Athanaſian* Creed, as hardly (as this) to be found elſewhere: However, the Thing being certain from other words equivalent, this exception is of no force at all; nor by any one, who underſtands theſe Matters, is, or ought to be accounted ſo; and much leſs can I ſee to what end it ſhould be inſiſted upon by any one, while he is encountring the *Socinians*: And therefore, whereas he ſays, This Attribute, or Title, *viz.* [*The One True God*] *cannot* ſo properly *be aſcribed to any one Perſon, but only to the Father*; (whom, he tells us, the Fathers call *the Fountain of the Deity*) what he here deſigns by the words *ſo properly* (which ſeem to import degrees of Propriety) I cannot well tell: But this I ask, in ſhort, May it be *properly* attributed *to the Son*, and *to the Holy Ghoſt*, or may it not? If not; then they are not properly [*The One True God*] nor conſequently are they properly [*The True God*:] For whatſoever any *one properly is*, that he may be *properly ſaid to* be.

And as for [the Father's being *the Fountain of the Deity*,] I hope he looks upon this Expreſſion only as Metaphorical, and ſuch as ought not to be ſtretched to the utmoſt of its Native Sence, for fear the Conſequences of it may engage him too far, to be able to make an handſome Retreat; which I aſſure him, if he does not take heed, they certainly will. But, in a word, I demand of him, Whether [*the Father's being the Fountain of the Deity*] does appropriate and reſtrain the Thing expreſſed by the [*One True God*] to the *Father* in contra-diſtinction to the other Two *Perſons*, or not? If it does, then the ſame Abſurdity recurs, *viz.* [That neither *is the Son, nor the Holy Ghoſt, the One True God*] and conſequently, neither ſimply, really and eſſentially [*God.*]

But

But on the other ſide, if [*the Father's being the Fountain of the Deity*] does not appropriate the Thing ſignified by [*the One True God*] to the Father, then it leaves it common to the other Two Perſons with Himſelf, and to each of them. And whatſoever is ſo, may with the ſame Propriety and Truth of Speech be aſcribed to, and affirmed of them, as it is often aſcribed to, and affirmed of the *Father* Himſelf. The Truth is, this Man's adventurous and unwary way of expreſſing himſelf in this ſacred and arduous Subject, (to give it no worſe word, whatſoever it may deſerve) affords the *Arrians* and *Socinians* no ſmall Advantages againſt this Doctrine; ſhould it ſtand upon the ſtrength of His Defence, as (thanks be to *God*) it does not.

But I muſt not here omit that Paſſage, which, in the former part of this Chapter, I promiſed more particularly to conſider; a Paſſage, which indeed looks ſomething ſtrangely. It is that in *P.* 258. *line* 27. where he tells us, that he allows, *That in the Bleſſed Trinity there are Three Holy Spirits*, but denys, *That there are Three Holy Ghoſts*; ſo natural is it for falſe Opinions to force Men to abſurd Expreſſions. But my Anſwer to him is ſhort and poſitive, That neither are there *Three Holy Spirits nor Three Holy Ghoſts* in the *Bleſſed Trinity* in any ſenſe properly belonging to theſe words. However, the Thing meant by him (ſo far as it is reducible to Truth and Reaſon) is, and muſt be this, *viz.* That when the Third *Perſon* of the *Trinity* is called the *Holy Ghoſt*, there the word *Holy Ghoſt* (which otherwiſe ſignifies the ſame with *Holy Spirit*) muſt be taken *Perſonally*, and conſequently *Incommunicably*; but when the *Father*, or *Son*, is ſaid to be a *Spirit*, or *Holy Spirit*, there *Spirit* muſt be underſtood *Eſſentially*, for that *Immaterial*, *Spiritual*, and *Divine Nature*, which is common to, and

Predicable of all the *Divine Perſons*. All which is moſt true. But then, for this very Reaſon, I muſt tell our Author withal, That as *Holy Ghoſt* taken *Perſonally* is but *Numerically one*; ſo *Spirit*, or *Holy Spirit*, as it is underſtood *Eſſentially*, is but *Numerically one* too. And therefore, though the *Father* may be called a *Spirit*, or *Holy Spirit*, and the two other *Perſons* may each of them be called ſo likewiſe, yet they are not therefore *Three diſtinct Spirits*, or *Holy Spirits*, nor can be truly ſo called (as this Author pretends they ought to be, and we have ſufficiently diſproved) but they are all one and the ſame *Holy Spirit Eſſentially* taken; and which, ſo taken, is as much as *one and the ſame God*. And moreover, though *Spirit* underſtood *Perſonally* diſtinguiſhes the *Third Perſon* from the other two, yet taken *Eſſentially*, it ſpeaks him *one* and the *ſame Spirit*, as well as *one* and the *ſame God* with them, and can by no means diſtinguiſh him from them, any more than the *Divine Eſſence*, or *Nature*, (which *Spirit*, in this ſence, is only another word for) can diſcriminate the Three *Perſons* from one another. So that upon the whole Matter, it is equally falſe and impoſſible, That in the *Bleſſed Trinity* there ſhould be *Three Holy Spirits*, or *Holy Ghoſts*, (Terms perfectly Synonymous) either upon a *Perſonal*, or an *Eſſential* account; and conſequently that there ſhould be ſo at all. For, as the word *Spirit* imports a peculiar Mode of *Subſiſtence*, by way of *Spiration* from the *Father* and the *Son*, ſo it is *Perſonal* and *Incommunicable*; but as it imports the *Immaterial Subſtance* of the *Deity*, ſo indeed (as being the ſame with the *Deity* it ſelf) it is equally Common to all the Three *Perſons*; but ſtill, for all that, remains *Numerically one* and no more; as all muſt acknowledge the *Deity* to be. And this is the true ſtate of the Caſe. But to ſtate the difference between the *Holy Ghoſt*, and

and the other Two *Perſons*, upon ſomething ſignified by *Holy Ghoſt*, which is not ſignified by *Holy Spirit*, (as the words of this Author manifeſtly do; while *he affirms Three Holy Spirits*, but *denies Three Holy Ghoſts*) this is not only *a playing with words* (which he pretends to ſcorn) but *a taking of words for things*; which, I am ſure, is very ridiculous.

And now, before I conclude this Chapter, (having a Debt upon me declared at the beginning of it) I leave it to the Impartial and Diſcreet Reader to judge, what is to be thought or ſaid of that Man, who in ſuch an Inſolent, Decretorious manner, ſhall in ſuch a point as this before us, charge *Nonſence* and *Hereſie*, (two very vile words) upon all that Subſcribe not to this his New (and before unheard of) Opinion. I muſt profeſs, I never met with the like in any Sober Author, and hardly in the moſt Licentious Libeller: The Nature of the Subject, I have, according to my poor Abilities, diſcuſſed, and finding my ſelf thereupon extremely to diſſent from this Author, am yet by no means willing to paſs for a Nonſenſical Heretick for my pains. For muſt it be Nonſence not to own Contradictions? viz. *That One Infinite Spirit is Three diſtinct Infinite Spirits?* Or muſt it be *Hereſie* not to Subſcribe to *Tritheiſme*, as the beſt and moſt Orthodox Explication of the Article of the *Trinity?* As for *Non-ſence*, it muſt certainly imply the aſſerting of ſomething for true concerning the Subject diſcourſed of, which yet in Truth is contradictory to it (ſince there can be no Non-ſence but what contradicts ſome Truth.) And whereas this Author has elſewhere, *viz.* P. 4. declared it *unreaſonable to charge a contradiction in any Thing, where the Nature of the Thing diſcourſed of is not throughly* comprehended *and underſtood*, I deſire to know of him, whether he throughly underſtands and comprehends

hends the Article and Myſtery of the *Trinity*? If he ſays, he does, I need no other Demonſtration of his unfitneſs to write about it. But if he owns that he does not, let him only ſtick to his own Rule, and then he may keep the Charge of *Non-ſence* to himſelf.

But what ſhall we ſay to the Charge of Hereſie, (in which St. *Auſtin* would have no Perſon, who is ſo charged to be ſilent?) Why, in the firſt place we muſt ſearch and enquire, whether it be ſo, or no? And here, if my Life lay upon it, I cannot find either in *Irenæus adversùs Hæreſes*, or in *Tertullian*'s *Preſcriptions contra Hæreticos*, Cap. 49. Nor in *Philaſtrius*'s Catalogue, nor in *Epiphanius*, nor in St. *Auſtin*, nor in *Theodoret*, nor in *Johannes Damaſcenus*'s Book *de Hæreſibus*; nor in the latter *Hæreſiologiſts*, ſuch as *Alphonſus à Caſtro & Prateolus*, with ſeveral others: I cannot, I ſay, find in all, or in any one of theſe the Hereſie *of not aſſerting the Three Perſons of the Bleſſed Trinity to be Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*; no, nor yet the Hereſie *of denying them to be ſo*. But where then may we find it? Why, in this Author's Book. And therefore look no further; it is enough, that ſo great a *Maſter* has ſaid it; whoſe Authority in ſaying a Thing, is as good as another Man's in proving it, at any time: And he ſays it (as we ſee) poſitively, and perhaps (if need be) will be ready to take his *Corporal Oath* upon it, That ſuch as deny his Hypotheſis are *Hereticks*.

Now in this caſe our Condition is, in good earneſt, very ſad; and I know nothing to comfort us, but that the Statute *de Hæretico comburendo* is Repealed. And well is it for the Poor Clergy and Church of *England*, that it is ſo; for otherwiſe this Man would have kindled ſuch a Fire for them, as would have torrified them with a vengeance. But as he has ſtocked the Church with ſuch plenty

plenty of New *Hereticks* (and all of his own making) ſo could he, by a ſway of Power, as *Arbitrary* as his *Divinity*, provide for them alſo ſuch a *Furnace* as that of *Nebuchadnezzar* (whom in his Imperious Meen and Humour he ſo much reſembles) yet he muſt not think, That the *Sound* and *Jingle* of *Self-Conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* (how melodiouſly ſoever they may tinkle in his own Ears) will ever be able to Charm Men over to the Worſhip of his *Idol*; or make them Sacrifice their Reaſon and Religion either to *Him*, or to the *New Notions* which he *has ſet up*. And indeed I cannot but here further declare, that to me it ſeems one of the moſt prepoſterous and unreaſonable things in Nature, for any one firſt to aſſert Three *Gods*, and when he has ſo well furniſhed the World with *Deities*, to expect that all Mankind ſhould fall down and Worſhip *Him*.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

In which is Conſidered, what this Author pretends to from the Authority of the Fathers *and* School-men, *in behalf of his Hypotheſis; and ſhewn, in the firſt place, That neither do the* Fathers *own the Three* Divine Perſons *to be Three Diſtinct* Infinite Minds, *nor* Self-Conſciouſneſs *to be the* Formal Reaſon *of their Diſtinction.*

I Have in the foregoing Chapters debated the Point with this Author, upon the Reaſon and Nature of the Thing it ſelf. But that is not all, which he pretends to defend his Cauſe by; endeavouring to countenance it alſo with great Authorities; and that in theſe poſitive and remarkable words.

This is no New Notion (ſays he) *but the conſtant Doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools*, Page 101.

Theſe are his very words; and I deſire the Reader carefully to conſider, and carry them along with him in his Memory. For as they are as poſitive, as Confidence can make them: ſo if they are not made good to the utmoſt, they ought ſeverely to recoil upon any one, who ſhall preſume to expreſs himſelf at ſuch a Rate.

And

And now, that we may do him all the right that may be, The way to know, whether this Author's Hypotheſis be the Conſtant Doctrine of the *Fathers* and *Schools*, is in the firſt place truly and fairly to ſet down, what this Author's Doctrine is, and wherein it does conſiſt; as we ſhall declare, what the received Doctrine of the *Fathers* and *Schools* is, in our Eighth Chapter.

Now we ſhall find, That the whole Doctrine delivered by him concerning the *Bleſſed Trinity*, is comprehended under, and reducible to theſe four Heads.

Firſt, That the Three *Perſons* in the *Bleſſed Trinity*, are *Three diſtinct Infinite Minds*, or *Spirits*.

Secondly, That *Self-Conſciouſneſs* is the *Formal Reaſon* of *Perſonality*; and conſequently that each of the *Divine Perſons* is ſuch by a *diſtinct Self-Conſciouſneſs* properly and peculiarly belonging to him.

Thirdly, That the Three *Divine Perſons* being thus diſtinguiſhed from one another by a *diſtinct Self-Conſciouſneſs* proper to each of them, are all United in one and the ſame Nature, by one *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* Common to them all. And

Fourthly and Laſtly, That a *Trinity in Unity*, and *an Unity in Trinity*, by this Explication and Account given of it, is a very *Plain, Eaſie and Intelligible Notion.*

Theſe four Heads, or Particulars, I ſay, contain in them a full and fair repreſentation of this Author's whole Hypotheſis concerning the Oeconomy of the *Bleſſed Trinity*: And I am well aſſured, That the knowing and impartial Reader, neither will, nor can deny, that they do ſo.

In the next place therefore, that we may ſee how far our Author makes good all the ſaid Particulars by the Authority of the *Fathers*, as he has peremptorily promiſed and undertook to do, I think it requiſite to conſider, how the *Fathers* expreſſed themſelves upon this Subject, and how this Author brings the ſaid Expreſſions to his purpoſe. For ſurely the natural way of knowing any Writer's Mind is by the Words and Expreſſions, which he pretends to deliver his Mind by. But concerning theſe we have our Author declaring,

Firſt, That he has not troubled his Reader with the ſignification of *Eſſence, Hypoſtaſis, Subſtance, Subſiſtence, Perſon, Exiſtence, Nature*, &c. Pag. 101. and ſome of his Readers could give him a very good Reaſon why, though I fear too true for him to be pleaſed with. But the Reaſons which he himſelf alledges for his not troubling his Readers either with theſe Terms, or the Explication of them, are,

Firſt, *That they were very differently uſed by the Fathers themſelves*, Page 101. And be it ſo; yet ſtill for all that, *uſed by them* they were; and that not ſo very differently neither; the chief difference having been about the words οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, which yet was fairly accorded, and well nigh ſetled between the *Greeks* and the *Latines*, before the end of the 6th Century, as ſhall be further made to appear in our Eighth Chapter. And his next Reaſon for *his not troubling his Reader* (forſooth) with theſe Terms is, Becauſe they have (as he tells us) *very much obſcured the Doctrine of the Trinity, inſtead of explaining it*, Page 101. which being one of the Chief Things, which, he might conclude, would aſſuredly be diſputed with Him; for Him thus to preſume it, before he had proved it, is manifeſtly to beg the Queſtion. In the mean time, certain it is, That theſe, and theſe only were

were the Terms which the *Fathers* uſed in their Diſputes about the *Trinity*, and by which they mannaged them; and conſequently, were they never ſo *Ambiguous, Faulty, or Improper* (as they are much the contrary) yet, whoſoever will pretend to give the Sence of the *Fathers*, muſt have recourſe to them, and do it by them; and to do otherwiſe would be to diſpute at Rovers, or (as the word is) *to ſpeak without Book*; which may much better become our Author in the Pulpit, than in the mannagement of ſuch a Controverſie.

And now let the Reader (whom he is ſo *fearful of troubling* with any Thing that is to the Purpoſe) judge, Whether this Man has not took a moſt extraordinary *way of proving his Doctrine the very ſame with the Fathers*. For neither in the firſt place does he ſet down, what the Doctrine of the *Fathers* concerning the *Trinity* was; which yet, one would have thought, was abſolutely neceſſary for the ſhewing how his own Doctrine agreed with it, which he profeſſed to be his deſign: Nor, in the next place, does he either *uſe, or regard*, or offer to explain thoſe Terms, which the *Fathers* all along delivered that their Doctrine in; but is ſo far from it, *That he reproaches, explodes, and utterly rejects them, as ſerving only to obſcure this Doctrine, inſtead of explaining it*: Which, in my poor Judgment, is ſuch a way of proving the *Fathers* on his ſide, as perhaps the World never heard of before, and will be amazed at now. But it is *his way*, and it will not be long before we find him beſtowing a like caſt of his kindneſs upon the *School-men* too.

But ſince, notwithſtanding all this, He allows the *Fathers* (good Men) to have *meant well*, and taught right; albeit, by reaſon of a certain Infelicity and Awkwardneſs they had in repreſenting *what they meant, by*

what they wrote, their *meaning* ought, by no means, to be gathered from their *own words* (as, poſſibly alſo for the introducing a new and laudable Cuſtom amongſt the *Fathers* and *Sons* of the Church, that the *Sons* muſt teach the *Fathers* to ſpeak) our Author has, for theſe and the like Reaſons, in great Charity and Compaſſion to their Infirmities, provided two other and better words of his own Invention, viz. *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, by which alone the True Senſe and Doctrine of the Fathers, in all their Writings about this Article of the *Trinity*, may, or can be underſtood.

Nevertheleſs how kind ſoever this deſign of his may be, yet to me it ſeems very unreaſonable. For, in the firſt place, it is, (upon the moſt allowed grounds of Reaſon) a juſt, and a ſufficient Preſumption, that the *Fathers* were wholly Strangers to what our Author intends by theſe two words, for that they never ſo much as mention, or make uſe of the words themſelves: Whereas, *to be Self-Conſcious, and Mutually-Conſcious*, were things (no doubt) eaſie enough, not only for the *Fathers*, but for any Man elſe of Common Senſe to find out and underſtand; and they might alſo, without much difficulty, have been applyed to the *Divine Nature*, as well as other *Acts of Knowledge*; and therefore ſince the *Fathers* never uſed them in this caſe, it is but too plain, that they never thought them fit, or proper for this purpoſe. For the *Arrian* Controverſie was then, *viz.* in the 4th and 5th Centuries (in which alſo the moſt Eminent of the *Fathers* wrote againſt it) at the Higheſt. Among which Writers, *Gregory Nyſſen* (whom this Author ſo often quotes) has a Paſſage, which, in this caſe, is to me very remarkable, and a Rational ground to conclude, that he knew nothing of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, as it is here applyed by this Author. For that,

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ſpeaking of the Unity of the *Divine Perſons*, in reſpect of one *Common* (though *Single)* Nature, he expreſſes it by κοινότης κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, inſtead of which, certainly he could not have choſen a more appoſite and proper place to have expreſſed the ſame by a κοινότης κατὰ τὴν συνείδησιν, had that *Father* had the ſame Notion of it, which this Author ſo much contends for. But it ſeems, he was either *leſs Happy*, or more judicious in this Particular. And beſides all this, it is moſt worthy to be Noted, That the very Terms in which the Orthodox Writers expreſſed themſelves about the *Trinity*, and whatſoever related to it, were ſeverely canvaſed and examined, and ſome of them ſettled by Councils; which is a fair Proof, that the ſaid Terms were fixed and authentick, and excluſive of all others, and conſequently of thoſe of this Author, as well as of the Notion ſignified by, and couched under them, which he would here with ſuch Confidence obtrude upon the World, by and from the Credit of the *Fathers*, tho' their Writings demonſtrate, that they were wholly unconcerned, both as to his Doctrines, and his Expreſſions.

— ὅτε τὴν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν κοινότητος τὸ ἰδιάζον τῶν γνωρισμάτων ἀναχεούσης. Greg. Nyſſen. de differentiâ οὐσίας καὶ ὑποστάσεως. Tom. 2. P. 465. Edit. Pariſ. 1615.

Nor can any Want, or Penury of words be here pleaded for their ſilence in this Matter, ſince the *Greek* being ſo happy, above all other Languages, in joyning and compounding words together; in all probability had *the Fortunes of Greece* (as the word is) been concerned in the caſe, we might have heard of ſome ſuch words, as, αὐτοσυνείδησις, and κοινοσυνείδησις. Or ſince moſt ſuch words, as in *Engliſh* terminate in *-neſs*, uſually in the *Greek* terminate in -μος, poſſibly we might have met with ſome ſuch made-words, as, αὐτοσυνειδησμὸς, and κοινοσυνειδησμὸς, ſince theſe do more properly import *Conſciouſneſs* than the former; which rather ſignifie *Self-Conſcience*

Conſcience and *Mutual-Conſcience*, and ſo in, ſtrictneſs of Speech, differ ſomething from the other. But he who ſeeks in the *Greek Fathers* for theſe words, or any thing like them (as applyed to the *Trinity)* may ſeek longer than his Eyes can ſee.

Nor will his Inqueſt ſucceed at all better amongſt the *Latines*. For although that Language be extremely leſs copious than the other, and ſo affords no one *Latine* word either for *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, or *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, but what we muſt firſt *make*, and being *made* would ſound very barbarouſly; yet,no doubt, there were ways and words enough to have otherwiſe expreſſed the ſame thing, had they found it the fitteſt and beſt Notion to have expreſſed this great Article by. But no ſuch thing or word occurs in any of their Writings.

But why do I ſpeak of the *Greek* and *Latine Fathers?* When the very *School-men*, the boldeſt Framers and Inventors of Words and Terms, of all others, where they think them neceſſary to expreſs their Conceptions by, notwithſtanding all their *Quiddities*, *Hæcceities*, and *Perſeities*, and the like, have yet no word for *Self-Conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*: which is a ſufficient Demonſtration, that either the thing it ſelf never came into their Heads; or (which is moſt likely) that they never thought it of any uſe for the explication of this Myſtery, which yet they venture further at, than any other Writers whatſoever.

But after all; though this Author is very much concerned to ward off the charge of Novelty and Singularity from his Notions, (for which I cannot blame him; this being a charge ſufficient to confound and cruſh any ſuch Notion applyed to ſo Sacred and received an Article as the *Trinity)* and for this cauſe is not a little deſirous to ſhelter it with the Authority of the *Fathers*; yet I aſ-

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ſure the Reader, That he is no leſs careful and concerned to keep the Glory of the Invention wholly to himſelf, and would take it very ill either of *Fathers*, *School-men*, or any one elſe, ſhould they offer to claim the leaſt ſhare in it. For he roundly tells us, That the *Fathers were not ſo happy as to hit upon his way of explaining this Myſtery*, Page 126. Line 5. nay, and that, how right a Judgment ſoever they might have of it, yet in down-right Terms, *That they knew not how to explain it*, Page 126. Line 18. which, I confeſs, is no ſmall Complement paſſed upon himſelf (a thing which he is ſeldom or never failing in) but, in good earneſt, a very courſe one upon the *Fathers*. In ſhort, he would appropriate the *Credit* of the *New Invention* entirely to himſelf, but with admirable, and more than Metaphyſical Abſtraction, at the ſame time clear himſelf of the *Novelty of it*; and ſo, in a word, prove it of at leaſt 12 or 13 hundred years ſtanding in the World; when yet the Author of it was Born ſince *Conventicles* began in *England*, as is well known. But I frankly yield him the Invention, as perfectly his own; and ſuch an one too, as he is more like to be known by, than ever admired for; and ſo, much happineſs attend him with it.

But as little ſucceſs as we have had in ſeeking for his Darling and peculiar Notion of *Self-Conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, in the Ancient Writers of the Church, we are like to find no more in ſeeking for his other equally eſpouſed Notion and Opinion there, *viz.* That the Three *Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity are Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*: We find indeed the Terms πρόσωπα, ὑποστάσεις, ἰδιότητες, γνωρίσματα, &c. but not one Tittle of τρία πνεύματα, or τρεῖς οὐσίαι, except where οὐσία (as I hinted before) is ſometimes uſed in the ſame ſenſe and ſignification with ὑπόστασις. And in this caſe

caſe (I am ſure) no difficulty of framing Words, or Terms (as might poſſibly in ſome meaſure be pretended in the Caſe of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*) can with any colour of Reaſon be alledged for our not finding this Notion in the *Fathers*, had the thing it ſelf been at all there. For can there be any words more Obvious, and Familiar than τρία πνεύματα, or τρεῖς Νόες, in the *Greek*, or than *Tres Spiritus*, or *tres Mentes*, in the *Latine*? But neither one nor the other are to be met with any where amongſt them, as applyed to the Subject now before us.

But in Anſwer to this, I expect that our Author will reply, That they are not the words [*Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*] or thoſe other [of *Self-Conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*] but the Things meant and ſignified by them, which he affirms to be found in the *Fathers*. But this is the very Thing which I inſiſt upon againſt him, *viz.* That the Non-uſage of theſe words, (nor any other equivalent to them) in the Works of thoſe Ancient Writers, (while they were ſo particularly, and nicely diſputing this Matter) is a ſolid Argument, That neither are the things themſelves there. For that all thoſe Great and Acute Men ſhould mean the very ſame thing with this Author, and not one of them ever light upon the ſame words, is not rationally to be imagined. For, What Reaſon can be given of this? Was either the Thing it ſelf (as I noted before) of ſuch deep, or ſublime Speculation, as not to be reached by them? Or the Language, they wrote in, too ſcanty to expreſs their Speculations by? Or can we think that the *Fathers* wrote *Things* without *Words*, as ſome do but too often write *Words* without *Things*? So that to me it is evident to a Demonſtration, That the *Fathers* never judged, nor held in this Matter, as this Author pretends they did: And beſides all this, there is yet one Conſideration more, and that

that of greater weight with me, than all that has been, or can be objected againſt this Man's pretenſions, *viz.* That it ſeems to me, and I queſtion not but to all Sober Perſons elſe, (and that upon good reaſon) wholly unſutable to the wiſe and good Method of *God's Providence*, That a clear Diſcovery of ſuch a Principal Myſtery of the *Chriſtian Religion, as the Trinity* is, ſhould now at length be owing to the Invention, or lucky Hit of any one Man's ſingle Mind, or Fancy; which ſo many Pious, Humble, as well as Excellently Learned Perſons, with long and tedious ſearch, and the hardeſt ſtudy, (and theſe, no doubt, joyned with frequent and fervent Prayers to *God*, to enlighten and direct them in that ſearch) have been continually breathing after, but could never attain to for above Sixteen Hundred Years together. This, I freely own and declare, That I judge it morally impoſſible for any ſerious, thinking Perſon, ever to bring himſelf to the belief of; and much leſs for any one, not Intoxicated with intolerable Pride, to arrogate to Himſelf. To which ſort of Perſons *God* never reveals any thing extraordinary for the good of the World, or of themſelves either.

But, ſince I am now upon *Diſputation*, which has its proper Laws, and that this Author may have no ground of Exception, I will proceed to examine his Quotations out of the *Fathers*, and try whether his *Hypotheſis* may be found there, where, it is certain, that we can find none of his Terms.

And here, he firſt begins with the Diſtinction of the *Divine Perſons*, where I muſt remind him, That it is not the bare proving a *Diſtinction of Perſons* (which none, who acknowledges a *Trinity*, either doubts of, or much leſs, denies) which will here ſerve his turn; but He muſt prove alſo, That they ſtand diſtinguiſhed as

Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits, and that this Diſtinction is owing to Three *diſtinct Self-Conſciouſneſſes* belonging to them; otherwiſe all his Proofs will fall beſide his *Hypotheſis*.

This premiſed, I will conſider what he alledges. And in the firſt place he poſitively tells us, *Page* 101. *That no Man who acknowledges a Trinity of Perſons, ever denied, That the Son and Holy Spirit were Intelligent Minds, or Beings*. To which I Anſwer,

Firſt, That it is not ſufficient for him, who advances a Controverted Propoſition, that none can be produced, who before denied it; but it lies upon him the Advancer of it, to produce ſome who have affirmed it. Foraſmuch as a bare non-denial of a Thing, never before affirmed, can of it ſelf neither prove nor diſprove any Thing. But

Secondly, I Anſwer further, That if none of the Ancient Writers did ever, in expreſs Terms, deny this, it was becauſe none had before in expreſs Terms aſſerted it. But then I add alſo, That the *Ancients* have expreſly aſſerted that, which irrefragably infers a Negation of the ſaid Propoſition: For they have affirmed, *That the Son and Holy Spirit are one ſingle Intelligent Mind*, and conſequently that being ſo, they cannot poſſibly *be more*. And this is a full Anſwer to this ſorry ſhift; for an Argument, I am ſure, it deſerves not to be called.

But he proceeds from Negatives to Poſitives, and tells us, Page 101. *That it is the Conſtant Language of the Fathers* (for it ſeems, he has read them all) *That the Son is the Subſtantial Word and Wiſdom of the Father, and that this can be nothing elſe, but to ſay, That he is an Intelligent Being, or Infinite Mind*. And he is ſo, I confeſs. But does this infer, That He is therefore *a diſtinct Intelligent Mind, or Being from the Father?* This we deny, and

and it is the very Thing, which he ought to prove. And it is not come to that paſs yet, that we ſhould take his bare affirmation for a Proof of what he affirms.

He comes now to Particulars, and tells us, That *Gregory Nyſſen* (though ſince he neither mentions Book nor Page, this ought not to paſs for a Quotation) calls the Son νοερόν τι χρῆμα, which this Author renders *Mind, or Intellect*: And I will not deny, but that it may, by conſequence, import ſo much; but I am ſure it does not by direct Signification. Νοερόν τι χρῆμα, ſignifies properly, *Res quædam Intellectualis*, or *Intellectu prædita*: And ſince nothing is ſo, but a *Mind*, or *Spirit*, it may (as I have ſaid) imply a *Mind*, but it does not directly ſignifie it. But admitting that it does both; does this expreſſion prove, That the Son is a νοερόν τι χρῆμα, *diſtinct* from the *Father*? By no means: For not only the *Son*, but the *Father* may be called, Νοερόν τι χρῆμα, and the *Holy Ghoſt*, Νοερόν τι χρῆμα, and yet they are not Three Νοερὰ χρήματα, but ἓν νοερὸν χρῆμα. And the Reaſon of this is, becauſe Νοερὸν χρῆμα, is an *Eſſential Attribute* following the *Divine Nature*, and therefore common to all the Three *Perſons*, and not a *Perſonal Attribute* peculiar to any one of them. So that granting the *Son* to be as truly and properly νοερόν τι χρῆμα, as this Author would have him, yet we abſolutely deny, That he is a *diſtinct* νοερὸν χρῆμα, from the *Father*. And this Expreſſion, I am ſure, is far enough from proving him to be ſo.

From *Nyſſen*, he paſſes to St. *Athanaſius*, who (he tells us) obſerves out of theſe words of our Saviour, *John* 10. 30. ἐγὼ & πατὴρ ἓν ἐσμεν, that our Saviour does not ſay, ἐγὼ ὁ πατὴρ ἓν εἰμι, but ἓν ἐσμεν, and that, by ſo ſpeaking, he gave us a perfect *Duality of Perſons* in the word ἐσμεν, and an *Unity of Nature* in the word ἓν.

All which is very true, and that this diſtinction of *Perſons* overthrows the *Hereſie* of *Sabellius*; and the Unity of their Nature, the *Hereſie* of *Arius*. But then this is alſo as true, that all this is nothing at all to our Author's Purpoſe. For how does this prove, either that the Three *Divine Perſons* are *Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits?* Or, that *Self-Conſciouſneſs* is the proper ground, or Reaſon of their diſtinction? Why, yes, (ſays He) *If the Father be an Eternal Mind and Wiſdom, then the Son is alſo an Eternal, but begotten Mind and Wiſdom.* Very true; but ſtill I deny, that it follows hence, *That the Eternal Mind, or Wiſdom, Begetting, and the Eternal Mind, or Wiſdom Begotten, are Two diſtinct Minds, or Wiſdoms*, but *only one and the ſame Mind, or Wiſdom*, under theſe *Two diſtinct Modifications of Begetting* and *being Begot*.

But he pretends to explain and confirm his Notion of a *diſtinct Mind, or Wiſdom*, out of thoſe words of the *Nicene Creed*, in which the *Son is ſaid to be God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God*.

By which words, I cannot imagine, how this Author thinks to ſerve his turn; Unleſs that by *Light* muſt be meant *Infinite Wiſdom*, or *Infinitely Wiſe Mind*, and that this muſt alſo infer the *Father* and *Son* to be *Two diſtinct Infinitely wiſe Minds, or Wiſdoms*, one iſſuing from the other.

But if ſo; then the ſame words will, and muſt infer them alſo to *be Two diſtinct Gods, and very Gods*. For all theſe words ſtand upon the ſame level in the ſame Sentence; and then, if we do but joyn the Term [*Diſtinct*] equally with every one of them, we ſhall ſee what Monſtrous Blaſphemous Stuff will be drawn out of this Creed.

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In the mean time let this Author know once for all, *That Light of Light* imports not here *Two distinct Lights*; but *one Infinite Light under Two different ways of Subsisting*, viz. either *of* and *from it self*, as it does in the *Father*, or of and from another, as it does *in the Son*. All which is plainly and fully imported in and by the Particle [*of*] signifying properly *Derivation*, or *Communication* in the thing which it is applyed to. And this is the clear undoubted sense of the Word, as it is used here. In the mean time, I hope the *Arrians* and *Socinians* will joyn in a Letter of Thanks to this Author, for making such an Inference from the *Nicene Creed*.

In the next place, he comes to St. *Austin*; where, though I am equally at a loss to find how he proves his Point by him, any more than by those whom he has already produced; yet I will transcribe the whole Quotation into the Margin, that so both the Reader may have it under his Eye, and the Author have no cause to complain, that he is not fairly dealt with.

Quæ ratiocinatio ad id cogit, ut dicamus Deum Patrem non esse sapientem nisi habendo sapientiam quam genuit non existendo per se pater sapientia. Deinde si ità est, Filius quoque ipse, sicut dicitur, *Deus de Deo*, *Lumen de Lumine*, videndum est utrùm possit *Sapientia de Sapientiâ* dici, si non est Deus pater ipsa sapientia, sed tantùm Genitor sapientiæ. Quod si tenemus, cur non & magnitudinis suæ, & bonitatis, & æternitatis, & omnipotentiæ suæ Generator sit? ut non ipse sit sua magnitudo, & sua bonitas, & sua æternitas, & sua Omnipotentia, sed eâ magnitudine magnus sit, quam genuit, & eâ bonitate bonus, &c. Aug. Tom. 3. Lib. 6. de Trinitate.

Now that which he would infer from thence, seems to be this, That *God the Father* is *Infinitely Wise*, by a Wisdom of his own distinct from that Wisdom by which the *Son* is called *The Wisdom of the Father*; and consequently, that they are *Two distinct Infinite Wisdoms*, or *Infinitely Wise Minds*. This, I say, is that, which he would infer, and argue from St. *Austin*, or I know not what else it can be.

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But this is by no means deducible from his words: for the *Father* is wiſe by one and the ſame *Infinite Wiſdom* equally belonging both to the *Father* and the *Son*, but not by it under that peculiar Formality, *as it belongs to the Son.* For it belongs to the *Son*, as *Communicated to Him*; whereas it belongs to the *Father*, as *Originally in and from Himſelf.*

And whereas it is objected, *That if the Father ſhould be Wiſe by the Wiſdom which he Begot, then he could not be ſaid to be Wiſe by a Wiſdom of his own, but only by a Begotten Wiſdom proper to the Son.* I Anſwer, That neither does this follow; ſince it is but one and the ſame *Eſſential Wiſdom* in both, *viz.* in him who Begets, and in him who is Begotten: Though [*as*] *it is in him* who is Begotten, it is not *after the ſame way* in Him who Begets: So that it is this determining Particle [*as*, or *Quatenus*] which by importing a diſtinction of the *manner*, cauſes a quite different application of the Term, while the Thing is ſtill the ſame. For the *Father* himſelf is not denominated *Wiſe*, even by that very *Wiſdom* that is *Eſſential* to *Him*, conſidered as *Perſonally determined* to the *Son*; for ſo it muſt be conſidered as *Derived* and *Communicated*, and no *Divine Perfection* can agree to the *Father* under the Formal Conſideration of [*Derived* and *Communicated*] albeit the Thing it ſelf, *which is Derived* and *Communicated*, abſolutely conſidered, may and does. In a word, the *Father* is Wiſe by one and the ſame Wiſdom, which is both in himſelf and in his Son, but not by it, *as it is in the Son.*

But, by the way, it is worth obſerving, That this Man who here in the 102 and 103 Pages denies *the Father to be Wiſe by this Begotten Wiſdom*, which the Son is here called (and which, in the Senſe we have now given of it, is very true) and alledges St. *Auſtin* and *Lombard* to abett

abett him in it. This very Man, I ſay, *Page* 131. *Line* 24. affirms, That the Son is that *Wiſdom* and *Knowledge*, *wherewith his Father knows himſelf.* Where, *If for the Father to be Wiſe and to know himſelf* be formally the ſame Act, and as much the ſame as his *Wiſdom* and *Knowledge* can be, as it is manifeſt, they are; then, I leave it to this Author to tell us, which of theſe two Aſſertions is falſe; for both of them, I am ſure, cannot be true. But he who makes nothing to contradict himſelf within the compaſs of two or three Pages (and ſometimes as many Lines) may do it *cum Privilegio* at the diſtance of near Thirty.

And whereas it is urged again from the ſame place in St. *Auſtin*, *That if we ſay the Father begets his own Wiſdom, we may as well ſay, That he Begets his own Goodneſs, Greatneſs, Eternity*, &c.

I Anſwer, No doubt but we may ſay one as well as the other, but that in Truth and Propriety of Speech, we can ſay neither. For *God* cannot properly be ſaid *to beget Wiſdom*, and much leſs *his own Wiſdom*, nor indeed any of his other Attributes, or Perfections *Eſſentially* taken and conſidered; he may indeed be ſaid to *Communicate them*, and by ſuch *Communication* to *Beget a Son.* But ſtill, though theſe are thus ſaid to be *Communicated*, it is the *Perſon only*, who is, or can be properly ſaid to be *Begotten.*

But our Author tells us, *Page* 103. out of the next Chapter of St. *Auſtin* (the words of which he ſhould have done well to have quoted) that he there calls *God the Father*, *Sapientia Ingenita*, and the *Son*, *Sapientia Genita*, and are not theſe *Two diſtinct Infinite Wiſdoms?*

I Anſwer, No: For that the Wiſdom here ſpoken of, is not taken *Abſolutely and Eſſentially*, but *only Perſonally:* That is, for *Wiſdom* under two ſeveral Modifications; which

which Modifications, though they *diverſifie* and *diſtinguiſh* the Thing they belong to, yet do not *multiply* it. For ſtill it is one and the ſame *Wiſdom*, which is both *Genita*, and *Ingenita*, though *as it is one*, it is not the *other*. *Sapientia*, or *Wiſdom*, conſidered *Abſolutely* and *Eſſentially* in it ſelf, belongs in Common to all the *Three Perſons*; but with the Term *Genita*, or *Ingenita* joyned with it, it imports a peculiar *Mode* of *Subſiſtence*, which determines it to a particular *Perſonality*: So that *Sapientia quatenus Genita* properly and only denotes the *Perſon* of the *Son*. In like manner when the *Third Perſon* of the *Trinity* is called the *Spirit*, The Term *Spirit* is not there taken *Eſſentially* for that *Infinite Immaterial Incorporeal Nature*, *Abſolutely* conſidered (for ſo it is common to all the Three *Perſons*) but for that *Infinite Incorporeal Nature*, *Quatenus procedens aut ſpirata*, and under that peculiar *Mode* of *Subſiſtence*, it belongs not to the other Two *Perſons*, but ſtands appropriate only *to the Third*. Nevertheleſs this makes them not *Three diſtinct Infinite Spirits* (as we have already ſhewn) but only one *Infinite Spirit* under *Three diſtinct Modalities*. Accordingly, when the *Son* is here called *the Wiſdom of the Father*, that very Term [*of the Father*] imports a Modification of it peculiar to the *Son*, but yet this Modification does not make it *another Wiſdom*, from that which is in the *Father*; ſince one and the ſame *Wiſdom* may ſuſtain ſeveral determining *Modes*.

Our Author's next Quotation is out of *Peter Lombard*, *Page* 103. whom (for the Credit of what he Quotes from him) he ſtyles *the Oracle of the Schools* (though he, who ſhall read *Lambertus Danæus* upon the firſt Book of his Sentences, will quickly find what a Doughty Oracle he is.) The Paſſage quoted, proceeds upon the ſame Notion which we find in the foregoing Citation out of St. *Auſtin*,

St. *Auſtin*, whom he alſo alledges for it. Nevertheleſs, I ſhall Tranſcribe this alſo, as I did the other, both for the Choice Stuff contained in it, as alſo that the Reader may have it before him, and thereby ſee, what uſe our Author is able to make of it for his purpoſe.

—— Sed abſit ut ità ſit; [viz. That the *Father ſhould be wiſe only by the Wiſdom he Begets*] quia ſi hoc eſt ibi *eſſe* quod *ſapere*, non per illam ſapientiam quam genuit ſapiens dicitur Pater, alioquin non ipſa ab illo ſed ille ab ipsâ eſt. Si enim ſapientia quam genuit cauſa eſt illi ut ſapiens ſit, etiam ut *ſit* ipſa illi cauſa eſt; quod fieri non poteſt niſi gignendo eum, aut faciendo: Sed nec genitricem nec conditricem Patris ullo modo quiſquam dixerit Sapientiam. Quid enim inſanius? &c. Lib. 1. Diſt. 32. Cap. 3.

Firſt of all then, he tells us, *That in God* to be, *and* to be *Wiſe, is the ſame thing*. And I grant it, with reſpect to the Abſolute Simplicity of the *Divine Nature*: but, for all that, I muſt tell him, That *to Be, and to be Wiſe*, fall under two formally diſtinct Conceptions, of which the former does not include the latter; and that for this Reaſon, ſuch as treat Scholaſtically of theſe Matters, do always allow *a formal difference* between them, and never treat of them, but as ſo conſidered. And let me tell him alſo, that this Conſideration looks yet ſomething further; as inferring, That Things *formally* diſtinct, muſt have *formally* diſtinct Effects; ſo that the *formal* effect of one cannot be aſcribed to the other. And moreover, that it is a very groſs Abſurdity to confound the *Formal Cauſe with the Efficient*, and ſo, to argue from one, as you would do from the other.

Which Obſervations being thus laid down, let us ſee how this Man and his Oracle argue in the Caſe. And it is thus.

If the Wiſdom which He [*viz.* God the Father] *Begets, be the cauſe of his being wiſe, then it is the cauſe alſo of his very Being.*

In Anſwer to which, I deny the Conſequence. For that, Wiſdom is the cauſe of one's being Wiſe only *by a formal Cauſality*, viz. by Exiſting in Him, and affecting him in ſuch a particular way; and this it does without being the Cauſe alſo of his *Exiſtence*, that being a Thing formally diſtinct from his *Being Wiſe*: And therefore, though Wiſdom, I grant, muſt preſuppoſe the Exiſtence of the Subject, where it has this effect: Yet it does not *formally* cauſe it; or rather indeed, for this very reaſon, cannot poſſibly do ſo.

But he proceeds and argues further, viz. *That ſuppoſing the Wiſdom Begotten by the Father were the Cauſe both of his* Being, *and of his* being Wiſe, *then it muſt be ſo either by Begetting, or Creating him* (for ſo I Interpret *Conditricem*) but for *one to ſay, That Wiſdom is any way the Begetter, or Maker of the Father, would be the heighth of Madneſs.*

It would be ſo indeed. And ſo on the other ſide to attempt to prove the *Father* and the *Son* to be Two *diſtinct Infinite Minds* by ſuch ſtrange, odd, uncouth Notions as theſe, which St. *Auſtin* himſelf (particularly treating of them in his 7 and 15 Books *de Trinitate*) confeſſes to be *Quæſtiones inextricabiles*, this, I ſay, (whatſoever may *be the height of Madneſs*) is certainly not *the height of Diſcretion.* Nevertheleſs, as to the Argument it ſelf, I deny the Conſequence. And that becauſe the *Begetting*, or any otherwiſe *Producing* a Thing imports a Cauſe operating by a proper Efficiency, or Cauſality; whereas Wiſdom, being only the *formal Cauſe* of one's being Wiſe, (as it would be no other, could it be the Cauſe of one's very Being alſo) operates only by an Internal, Improper Cauſality, *viz.* in a word, *Wiſdom* makes one *Wiſe*, as Whiteneſs makes a Thing White, not by producing any Thing in him, but by Exiſting in him,

him, and affecting him by it ſelf, after ſuch a certain manner, and thereby giving him ſuch a certain Denomination.

Now from hence let any one judge how forcibly and Philoſophically this Man Diſputes; the Truth is, were the whole Argument Concluſive, it were nothing to his purpoſe. But I was willing to ſhew, That his way of arguing is as defective, as the Thing he Argues for is Abſurd:

Nevertheleſs let us ſee, what the main Concluſion is, which he would draw from the Premiſſes. Why, it is this, *That the Father is Eternal Wiſdom, or Mind, and the Son Eternal Wiſdom and Mind.* I give you his very Terms. And who denies this? Or what does it conclude for him? For ſtill I ask, Does he who ſays, That the *Father is Eternal Wiſdom, or Mind*, and the *Son Eternal Wiſdom and Mind*, by ſaying ſo, affirm, That the *Father* and the *Son* are *Two diſtinct Eternal Wiſdoms*, or *Minds?* Any more than he who ſays, That the *Father* is *God*, and the *Son God*, affirms them to be *Two diſtinct Gods?* Let him ſay it if he can; and he ſhall not fail of a through Confutation as ſoon as it can be Printed off.

But to give the *Reader* an Account of the whole matter in ſhort. This Author has eſpouſed a very Heterodox and dangerous Notion, viz. *That the Three Perſons of the Bleſſed Trinity, are Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*; and, in order to the proof of this, would perſwade us, That there are *Two diſtinct Wiſdoms*, one in the *Father*, and the other in the *Son*; and that, for this *Reaſon:* Becauſe the *Father*, who is *Eſſentially Wiſe*, cannot be ſaid to be *Wiſe* by *that begotten Wiſdom, which is in the Son* (albeit the *Son* be yet ſaid to be *the Wiſdom of the Father*) but that the *Father* muſt have one *diſtinct*

Wiſdom of his own, and the *Son* another *diſtinct Wiſdom* of his own. This, I am ſure, is the full Account of his Argument from top to bottom. In Anſwer to which, I have plainly and undeniably ſhewn, That the *Father* is Wiſe by one and the ſame *Eſſential Wiſdom*, common to *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt*, though not under that particular Modification, as it Subſiſts in the other Two *Perſons*, but by that peculiar Modification, by which it is appropriated to, and Subſiſts in his own. And that thoſe different Modifications do not, for all that, make it any more than one ſingle Numerical Wiſdom, but only one and the ſame under ſo many *diſtinct Modes* of *Subſiſtence*, determining it to ſo many *diſtinct Perſonalities*.

This is the Sum both of his Opinion and of mine, and I refer it to the Judicious Reader to arbitrate the Caſe between us, with this profeſſion and promiſe, that if in all, or any one of the Quotations alledged by him he can ſhew, That it is either expreſly affirmed, or neceſſarily implyed, *That the Father and the Son are Two diſtinct Infinite Minds*, I will, without further proof of any ſort, forthwith yield him the Cauſe, and withal renounce all my poor ſhare in Common Senſe and Reaſon; nay, and all belief of my own Eyes for the future.

But there is one Clauſe more, which he brings in as one part of his main Concluſion, *Page* 103. *Line* 33. viz. *That if we confeſs this of the Father and the Son*, to wit, That they are each of them *Eternal Mind*, or *Wiſdom*, *there can be no diſpute about the Holy Ghoſt who is Eternal Mind, and Wiſdom, diſtinct both from Father and Son.*

Now this is perfectly *gratis dictum*, without either proof, or pretence of proof; and that whether we reſpect the Orthodox, or the Heterodox and Heretical. And,

Firſt,

First, For the Orthodox, they utterly deny the *Holy Ghost* to be an *Eternal Mind*, or *Wisdom* distinct both from the *Father* and the *Son*; and I challenge this Author to produce me but one reputed *Orthodox Writer*, who affirms it. In the mean time, it argues no small Confidence (to give it the mildest Term) in this Man to Assert that *as certain, and without Dispute*, which is neither granted on one side, nor so much as pretended to be proved on the other. But

Secondly, If we respect the Heterodox and Heretical, who (no doubt) *can dispute* as much as others, will this Man say, That these also grant this his Assertion about the *Holy Ghost without any dispute?* No, it is certain, that they neither do, nor will. For this Author may be pleased to observe, That as some in the *Primitive Times*, allowed the Son to be only *like the Father*; so they made the *Holy Ghost* a downright *Creature*, and an inferiour Agent to Both. Such were the Πνευματομάχοι under their Head and Leader *Macedonius*; as we see in St. *Austin de Hæresibus*, Cap. 52. hereby placing him as much below the *Son*, as they had placed the *Son* below the *Father*; or rather more. Whereupon, I appeal even to this Author Himself, whether those, who did so, would *without all dispute* have allowed the *Holy Ghost* to be an *Eternal Infinite Mind, or Wisdom*, distinct both from the *Father* and the *Son*; and, upon that Account, Essentially and Necessarily equal to them Both? Let this Author rub his Fore-head, and affirm this if he can; and for the future take notice, That it becomes a True and Solid Reasoner, where a Thing is disputed, fairly to prove it, and not boldly and barely to presume it.

In the last place he alledges the Judgment of *all* the *Fathers* indefinitely in the Case. And truly where he cannot cite so much as one of them to the purpose, I think

think he does extremely well to make ſhort work of it, and with one bold Impertinent ſtroke to alledge them *all* together.

His Allegation is this, *That it is uſual with the Fathers to repreſent the Three Perſons in the Bleſſed Trinity as diſtinct as* Peter, James, *and* John. Well; and what then? Why; *That then the ſaid Three Perſons are Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits.* I deny the Conſequence, and to give a particular Anſwer to his general Allegation, I tell him, That it is a Fallacy of the *Homonomy of the Word*, and that the Term [*as diſtinct*] is Ambiguous. For it may either ſignifie,

1. *As Real.* Or,
2. *As Great* a Diſtinction.

As for the firſt, I grant, That the *Three Perſons* in the *Bleſſed Trinity differ as really* as *Peter*, *James*, and *John*; Foraſmuch as they differ by ſomething in the Thing *it ſelf*, or, *ex parte rei*, antecedent to, and independent upon any Apprehenſion, or Operation of the Mind about it; which is a *Real difference*, and whatſoever is ſo, is altogether *as Real* as the Difference between one Man and another can be. But,

Secondly, If by *Real* diſtinction be meant as *great a diſtinction*, ſo we utterly deny that the *Three Divine Perſons* differ as much as *Peter*, and *James*, and *John* do, or that the *Fathers* ever thought they did ſo. For this would infer a greater difference, or diſtinction between them, than even our Author himſelf will allow of; even ſuch a difference, as reaches to a *Diviſion*, or *Separation* of the *Perſons* ſo differing. And ſince it is impoſſible for the *Perſons* of the *Trinity* to differ ſo, it is hard to imagine upon what bottom of Reaſon our Author ſhould meaſure the Diſtinction, or Difference of the *Three Divine Perſons*, by the Diſtinction, or Difference, that is between

between *Peter*, *James*, and *John*. For though the *Three Divine Perſons* differ *as really*, yet it is certain, that they do *not differ as much*. But what the *Fathers* alledged only as an Illuſtration of the Caſe, this Man is pleaſed to make a direct proof of his Point; which, by his favour, is to ſtretch it a little too far: For, if he would make the foregoing Example a Parallel Inſtance to the Thing which he applies it to, it would prove a great deal too much, (as has been ſhewn) and therefore, as to the Thing, which it is brought for, does indeed prove nothing at all. Now the Thing it is brought to prove, is, *That the Three Divine Perſons are Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*; but ſince we have ſhewn, That a *Real Difference*, or *Diſtinction*, may be much ſhort of ſuch an one as is between *two or more Minds, or Spirits*, (which we own to be as great, as between two or more Men) it follows, That the *Real Difference*, which is between the *Three Divine Perſons*, cannot prove them to *be ſo many diſtinct Minds, or Spirits*. In ſhort, our Author's whole Argument amounts to no more but this (which, though it may ſound ſomething jocularly, is really and ſtrictly true) *viz.* That becauſe *Peter*, *James*, and *John are ſo many Men*, therefore *Father*, *Son*, *and Holy Ghoſt are ſo many Minds*. A pleaſant way of Arguing certainly.

I have now examined all, that this Author has alledged about the *diſtinction of the Three Divine Perſons*, and I have done it particularly and exactly, not omitting any one of his Quotations. But how comes it to paſs all this while, that we have not ſo much as one Syllable out of the *Fathers*, or *School-men*, in behalf of *Self-Conſciouſneſs?* Which being, according to this Author, the *Conſtituent Reaſon* of the *Perſonality* and *Perſonal Diſtinction* of the *Three Divine Perſons*, will he pretend to prove the Diſtinction it ſelf from the *Fathers*, and at the ſame

ſame time not ſpeak one Tittle of the Principle, or Reaſon of this Diſtinction? Or will he profeſs to prove his whole Hypotheſis by the Authority of the *Fathers*, and yet be ſilent of *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, which he himſelf makes one grand and principal part of the ſaid Hypotheſis? Certainly, one would think, that the very ſhame of the World, and that Common Awe and regard of Truth, which Nature has imprinted upon the Minds of Men, ſhould keep any one from offering to impoſe upon Men in ſo groſs and ſhameleſs a manner, as to venture to call a Notion or Opinion, the *Conſtant Doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools*; nay, and to profeſs to make it out and ſhew it to be ſo, and while he is ſo doing, not to produce *one Father*, or *School-man*, I ſay again, not ſo much *as one of either* in behalf of that, which he ſo confidently and expreſly avows to be the joynt Sentiment of Both. This ſurely is a way of *proving*, or rather of *impoſing* peculiar to Himſelf. But we have ſeen how extremely fond he is of this new Invented Term and Notion: And therefore ſince he will needs have the Reputation of being the ſole *Father* and *Begetter* of the *Hopeful Iſſue*, there is no Reaſon in the World that Antiquity ſhould find other *Fathers* to maintain it.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

In which is ſhewn, That the Paſſages alledged by this Author out of the Fathers *do not prove* Mutual-Conſciouſneſs *to be that, wherein the* Unity *of the* Divine Nature *in the* Three Perſons *of the* Bleſſed Trinity *does Conſiſt: But that the* Fathers *place it in ſomething elſe.*

OUR Author having undertook to make good his Doctrine about the *Bleſſed Trinity*, from the *Fathers*; and that both as to the Diſtinction of the *Divine Perſons*, and alſo as to their Unity in the ſame Nature; And having ſaid what he could from thoſe Ancient Writers, for that new ſort of Diſtinction which he aſcribes to the ſaid *Perſons*, in the former part of his 4th Section, which I have confuted in the preceding Chapter; he proceeds now, in the following, and much longer part of the ſame Section, to prove the Unity of the *Three Perſons* in one and the ſame Nature, according to his own Hypotheſis.

And the Proofs of this we ſhall reduce under theſe Two following Heads, as containing all that is alledged by him upon this point of his Diſcourſe, *viz.*

Firſt, That it is one and the ſame *Numerical Divine Nature*, which belongs to all the *Three Divine Perſons*. And,

Secondly, That the Thing, wherein this *Numerical Unity* of the *Divine Nature* does conſiſt, is that *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, by which all the *Three Perſons* are intimately *Conſcious* to one another of all that is known by, or belongs to each of them in particular.

And here the Authority of the *Fathers* is pleaded by him for both of theſe, and I readily grant it for the *firſt*, but however ſhall examine what this Author produces for the one, as well as for the other.

But before I do this, I muſt obſerve to him, That if that Diſtinction Aſſerted by him between the *Divine Perſons*, whereby they ſtand diſtinguiſhed as Three *Infinite Minds*, or *Spirits*, holds good, all his proofs of the Unity of their Nature will come much too late. For he has thereby already deſtroyed the very Subject of his Diſcourſe; and it is in vain to ſeek, wherein the *Numerical Unity* of the *Divine Nature* (as it belongs to the *Three Perſons*) does Conſiſt, after he has affirmed that, which makes ſuch an *Unity* utterly impoſſible. And it has been ſufficiently proved againſt him in our 5th Chapter, That *Three Infinite Minds, or Spirits*, can never be one *Numerical Infinite Mind, or Spirit*, nor conſequently one *God*. Three *diſtinct Spirits* can never be otherwiſe *One*, than by being United into one Compound, or *Collective Being*, which, (could ſuch a Thing be admitted here) might be called indeed *an Union*, but *an Unity* properly it could not. And hereupon I cannot but obſerve alſo, That this Author very often uſes theſe Terms promiſcuouſly, as if *Union* and

and *Unity, being United into One, and being One,* ſignified the very ſame Thing; whereas, in ſtrictneſs and propriety of Speech, whatſoever Things are *United into One,* cannot be Originally *One*; and *è Converſo,* whatſoever is Originally *One,* cannot be ſo, by being *United* into *One:* For as *Suidas* explains the word, ἕνωσις εἴρηται, ἀφ' οὗ εἰς ἓν ζωωθέντος τὰ πράγματα, that is to ſay, *Union* is ſo called from the preſſing [or thruſting] together ſeveral Things into one. But our Author, who with great profoundneſs, tells us *of the ſame Nature in Three diſtinct Perſons being United into One Numerical Eſſence, or God-head,* Page 118. Lines 9, 10. has certainly a different Notion of *Union* from all the World beſides. For how one and the ſame Nature (though in never ſo many *diſtinct Perſons*; ſince it is ſtill ſuppoſed the ſame in all) can be ſaid to be *United* into any *one* Thing, I believe ſurpaſſes all Humane Apprehenſion to conceive; *Union* in the very Nature of it, being of *ſeveral Things, not of one and the ſame.* I deſire the Reader to conſult the place, and to extract the beſt ſenſe out of it that he can.

And thus having preſented our Author with this Preliminary Obſervation, I ſhall now proceed to conſider how he acquits himſelf in the *firſt Thing* undertook by him, *viz.* The proving a *Numerical Unity* of *Nature* in the *Three Divine Perſons, out of the Fathers*; which tho' I do as readily grant, and as firmly believe, as this Author does, or can; yet I think it worth while to ſhew, with what Skill, Decency, and Reſpect he Treats the *Fathers* upon this Subject.

And here in the firſt place he tells his Reader, *That this being a Myſtery ſo great, and above all Example in Nature, it is no wonder if the Fathers found it neceſſary to uſe ſeveral Examples, and to allude to ſeveral kinds of Union*

to form an adequate Notion of the Unity of the God-head. And withal, *That they take ſeveral ſteps towards the Explication of this great Myſtery*, viz. of an *Unity of Nature* in a *Trinity of Perſons*, Page 106. In our Examination of which Paſſages (reſerving his former words to be conſidered elſewhere) we will firſt conſider the *ſteps* which (he ſays) the *Fathers* made towards the Explication of this Myſtery.

And theſe, he tells us, are Two.

Firſt, The τὸ ὁμοούσιον, or ὁμουσιότης, (*i. e.*) the *Coeſſentiality* of the *Divine Perſons*, whereby all the *Three Perſons* of the *God-head* have the ſame *Nature*, Page 106.

Secondly, The other is a *Numerical Unity* of the *Divine Eſſence*, or *Nature*, Page 121. Line 6. which (to anſwer one *Greek* word with another) we may call the τὸ ἕν, or the ἑνότης τ ὐσίας, or φύσεως, St. *Cyril* Authorizing the Expreſſion, whom we find ſpeaking of an ἑνότης φυσικὴ & ὐσιώδης ἐν τῷ πατρὶ & υἱῷ & πνεύματι ἁγίῳ, as *Ammonius* Cites him in his *Catena* upon *John* 17. 11, 21.

Now as this ὁμοούσιον, or *Sameneſs of Nature*, and this *Numerical Unity of Nature*, lying fifteen whole Pages, in this Author's Book, diſtant from one another, muſt be confeſſed to make a very *large ſtride*; ſo, for all that, they will be found to make but an inſignificant *ſtep*; as ſetting a Man not one jot further than he was before. For as touching thoſe Words and Terms, which the *Fathers* uſed to expreſs the Unity of the *Divine Nature* by, I do here, without any demur, affirm to this Author, That *Coeſſentiality*, *Sameneſs of Nature*, *and Sameneſs of Eſſence*, all ſignified by the τὸ ὁμοούσιον, or ὁμουσιότης, as alſo, *Unity of Nature*, *and Unity of Eſſence*, expreſſed by the τὸ ἕν, or ἑνότης τ ὐσίας, or φύσεως, do all of them, in the

the ſenſe of the *Fathers*, denote but one and the ſame Thing, viz. *A Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature*, only, I confeſs, with ſome Circumſtantial Difference, as to the way, or manner of their ſignification. For,

1. The τὸ ὁμοούσιον, ſignifies *Unity of Nature*, with a Connotation of ſome Things, or Perſons to whom it belongs. Upon which Account it is, that St. *Ambroſe* (whom this Author cites) ſpeaking of this word in his 3d Book, Chap. 7. tells us, That ὁμοούσιον *aliud alii, non ipſum eſt ſibi*: Nor indeed is any Thing ſaid to be the *ſame*, but with reſpect to ſome Thing, or Circumſtance beſides it ſelf. And therefore no wonder if the μονούσιον was anciently rejected, ſince the τὸ μόνον, relating to the *Perſon*, whom the οὐσία belongs to, muſt import an *Unity* in *Perſonality*, as well as in *Eſſence*, which would be contrary to the *Catholick Faith*. But,

2. The τὸ ἕν, or the ἑνότης τῆς οὐσίας, or φύσεως, ſignifies *Unity of Nature*, or *Eſſence*, without Connotation of any to whom it belongs: Not but that it does really and indeed belong to the *Three Divine Perſons*, but that according to the ſtrict and proper ſignification and force of the word, it does not connote, or imply them, but abſtracts, or preſcinds from them.

And this is a true Account of theſe words, by which the *Fathers* (without making more ſteps than one) intended and meant the ſame Thing, *viz.* a *Numerical Unity* of the *Divine Nature* belonging to all the *Three Perſons*, only with this difference, That the ὁμοουσιότης ſignifies the *Unity* of the *Divine Nature*, with a Connotation of the *Perſons* in whom it is; which alſo gives it the Denomination of *Sameneſs*; and that the τὸ ἕν, or the ἑνότης, ſignifies the *Unity* of the ſame *Nature* abſolutely and abſtractedly, without implying, or co-ſignifying any reſpect to thoſe in whom it is, and to whom it belongs.

So

So that theſe words (as much *Two* as they are) yet in the ſenſe and meaning of the *Fathers*, import but one and the ſame *Unity*.

But our Author tells us, That though indeed the *Fathers* own *an Unity of Nature* in the *Divine Perſons*, yet, ſince there is a *Specifick*, as well as a *Numerical Unity*, the Diſpute is here, which of theſe two *Unities* we ſhall aſſign to the *Divine Nature*, with reference to the *Divine Perſons*.

And for this; He tells us, That *Petavius* and Dr. *Cudworth* have abundantly proved, That the *Nicene Fathers did not underſtand the word* ὁμοουσιότης *of a* Numerical, *but of a* Specifical Sameneſs *of Nature, or the agreement of Things Numerically different from one another in the ſame Common Nature*, Page 106. about the end.

In Anſwer to which, I muſt confeſs my ſelf very unfit to take ſuch Great and Truly Learned Perſons to task, and that upon comparing this Author and *Petavius* together (if there can be any compariſon between them) I find much more Reaſon to believe that he miſtook the meaning of *Petavius*, than that *Petavius* could miſtake the meaning of the *Fathers*.

But however, I ſhall lay down this as a Concluſion, which I take to be undoubtedly true, *viz.* That the *Ancient Fathers*, as well the *Nicene*, as thoſe after them, held only a *Numerical Unity* of the *Divine Nature* in the *Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*: That is, in other words, They held and acknowledged one *Numerical God*, and no more. This Concluſion I hold, and have good reaſon to believe, That neither *Petavius*, nor Dr. *Cudworth* ſhall be able to wreſt it from me. For the chief Reaſon of ſome Men's charging the *Fathers* with holding a *Specifick Unity of Nature* amongſt the *Divine Perſons*, is drawn from this, That ſome of them, and particularly

Maximus

Maximus and *Nyſſen* (cited by this Author) ſeem to argue from that *Specifick Unity of Nature* which is found in ſeveral Individual Men, to an *Unity of the Divine Nature* in the *Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*.

To which I Anſwer, That the *Fathers* never uſed the Example of Three or more Individual Men, agreeing in the ſame *Nature* as a Parallel Inſtance of the ſame ſort, or degree of *Unity* with that which is in the *Three Divine Perſons*; but always alledged it, *one*, or (perhaps ſometimes) *both* of theſe two ways.

Firſt, By way of Alluſion, or Illuſtration (as I have already noted in the foregoing Chapter) and as it is the neareſt Reſemblance of, and Approach to this *Divine Unity* of any that could be found in *Created Beings*. For ſtill their Argument proceeds only by the ὅιος and the ὅιως on the one ſide, and the ὅτως on the other, (as appears from that place quoted out of *Maximus*, P. 107.) which Terms ſurely do not of neceſſity import an *Identity* of the Caſe, but only ſome *Similitude* in the parts of the Compariſon.

Secondly, The *Fathers* uſed the forementioned Example as an Argument *à minore ad majus*, viz. That if ſeveral Individual Men could not properly be ſaid to have more than one *Nature* (upon which *Nyſſen*'s whole Argument turns) much leſs could this be ſaid of the *Three Divine Perſons*. Foraſmuch as it is not only certain, but evident, That Perſons merely diſtinguiſhed from one another and no more, muſt have a greater *Unity of Nature*, than ſuch as are not only *diſtinguiſhed*, but alſo *divided* from one another by a ſeparate Exiſtence. And let any one ſtretch this Argument of the *Fathers* further if he can.

I do

I do not in the leaſt deny, but ſeveral Expreſſions may have dropped from the *Fathers*, which, if we look'd no further, might be drawn to a very inconvenient ſenſe. But then alſo it is as little to be denied, That the ſame *Fathers* profeſſedly and deſignedly treating of the ſame Points, have declared themſelves in ſuch Terms, as are very hardly, if at all reconcileable to thoſe Occaſional and Accidental Expreſſions. And therefore ſince their meaning cannot be taken from Both, it ought much rather to be taken from what was Aſſerted by them deſignedly, than what was Aſſerted only occaſionally.

To which I ſhall add this further Remark, That a due conſideration of the Circumſtances, under which thoſe *Fathers* wrote, may very well Apologize for the Defects of ſome of their Arguments. For the Grand Controverſie which exerciſed the *Orthodox Writers* of the fourth and part of the fifth Century, was that with the *Arrians*. So that we have the leſs cauſe to wonder if ſome of their Reaſonings about the *Trinity* ſeem to look no further than the Proof of a *Specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Perſons*, while they had to deal with Adverſaries who would not allow ſo much as this between the *Father* and the *Son*, but inſtead of an ὁμοούσιον, or *Sameneſs*, held only an ὁμοιούσιον, or *Likeneſs of Nature* between them; which, together with the foregoing Conſiderations, may ſerve as a Key to let us into the true Explication of ſeveral Paſſages of the *Fathers*; about the meaning of which we might otherwiſe poſſibly be ſomething at a loſs. And the ſame likewiſe may ſerve to give a fair Account of what has been alledged by *Petavius*, and miſtook by this Author upon the preſent Subject. For to traverſe and examine all *Petavius*'s Allegations particularly would require a full and diſtinct Work by it ſelf.

But

But ſtill our Author ſeems extremely ſet upon making good his firſt ſtep of a *Specifick Unity* of the *Divine Nature* from the *Fathers*; and to that purpoſe he tells us, *Page* 107. *Line* 23. *That one Thing wherein the Fathers place the Unity of the God-head is, that all the Three Perſons have the ſame Nature*, by which he means (as ſhall be ſhewn preſently) Specifically the ſame *Nature*; and a few Lines after, he tells us again, *That ſome of the Fathers went further than this, and plac'd the Eſſential Unity of the Divine Nature in the Sameneſs of Eſſence*, Lines 30, 31, 32. of the ſame Page.

Now here I would deſire this Author to inform me of Two Things.

Firſt, By what rule of ſpeaking, or upon what Principle of Divinity, Logick, or Philoſophy, *Sameneſs of Nature* ought to ſignifie one Thing, and *Sameneſs of Eſſence* to ſignifie another; and withal to be ſo contra-diſtinguiſhed to each other, that in the degrees of *Unity*, this latter muſt be a ſtep beyond the former? For the *Fathers*, I am ſure, make no ſuch Diſtinction, but uſe the words *Sameneſs of Nature*, and *Sameneſs of Eſſence*, as well as the words οὐσία and φύσις themſelves promiſcuouſly; ſo that neither by their Native ſignification, nor yet by their uſe, do they import any more than one ſort of *Unity*.

Secondly, Whereas in *Page* 106. *Lines* 23, 24. he makes the *firſt ſtep* towards this *Unity* to conſiſt in the ὁμουσιότης, or *Coeſſentiality*, (which alſo in the next Page, *Line* 23. &c. he explains by *Sameneſs of Nature*); And whereas, in *Page* 121. he makes *a Numerical Unity of the Divine Eſſence*, the *next ſtep* (introducing it with the word *Secondly*) and telling us, That the *Fathers* added it to the ὁμοουσιότης, which he had before made the

firſt ſtep; And whereas, notwithſtanding this, having in *Page* 107. told us, *That Sameneſs of Nature was one Thing wherein the Fathers placed the Unity of the Divine Nature*, within ſeven Lines after, he tells us, *That ſome of the Fathers went further, and placed it in the Sameneſs of Eſſence*, (which, yet it is manifeſt all along, that he reckons not the ſame thing with *Numerical Unity of Eſſence*,) I deſire to know of him, whether there be *Two ſecond ſteps* in this *Unity*? or, whether there be *one between the firſt and the ſecond*? For he makes ὁμοουσιότης, *or Sameneſs of Nature one ſtep*, Page 106, 107. *And Sameneſs of Eſſence a further ſtep*, Page 107. Line 30. *&c.* And then *Numerical Unity of Nature another ſtep*, calling it alſo *the Second*, Page 121. Line 5. Theſe Things, I muſt confeſs, I am utterly unable to give any Conſiſtent Account of, and I ſhrewdly ſuſpect, that our Author himſelf is not able to give a much better. But it is ſtill his way to forget in one place what he has ſaid in another; and how kind ſoever he may be to himſelf, I ſhould think it very hard for another Man to *forget* himſelf ſo often, and to *forgive* himſelf too.

Nevertheleſs our Author, without mincing the Matter, roundly Aſſerts a *Specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Perſons*, telling us, *Line* 23. *&c.* of the fore-cited *Page* 107. *That this is abſolutely neceſſary to make the Three Perſons one God, and that it is impoſſible that they ſhould be ſo without it*; where it is evident, that he means a *Specifick Unity*, both from this, that it was the *Subject*, which he had been there treating of, as alſo from this, that immediately after he mentions another ſort, or degree of *Unity*, as a *ſtep further* than this; which, ſince nothing can be *but a Numerical Unity*, it follows, That that which was *one ſtep* ſhort of a *Numerical*, muſt needs be a *Specifical*. And now is it not ſtrange, that in *Page* 109. which

which is but the next ſave one after this, this Man ſhould poſitively ſay, (as he does) *That the Fathers never ſo much as Dream'd of a Specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Perſons*, having here in *Page* 107. affirmed it *to be no leſs than abſolutely neceſſary to make the Three Perſons one God?* And that certainly is a neceſſity with a witneſs. But he, who exacts of this Author a conſiſtency with himſelf for five Pages together, deals very ſeverely with him.

And accordingly, the more I conſider of this Matter, I cannot but think, That what he ſays of the *Nicene Fathers holding a Specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Perſons*, Page 106. And his affirming that *Gregory Nyſſen*, St. *Cyrill*, *Maximus* and *Damaſcen never ſo much as Dream'd of any ſuch Unity*, Page 109. Line 22. will by no means conſiſt together.

For Firſt, If by the *Nicene Fathers* be meant not only thoſe who were preſent at that Council, but thoſe *Fathers* alſo, who about thoſe Times held the ſame Faith which was Eſtabliſhed in that Council, then his two fore-cited Paſſages contain a groſs, manifeſt, fulſome Contradiction; even as groſs as the *poſitive aſſerting of a thing*, and the *never ſo much as dreaming of it*, can import. But if by the *Nicene Fathers* he means only thoſe who ſat and acted in that Council, he will hardly however perſwade any underſtanding Man, That *Gregory Nyſſen*, who Wrote and flouriſhed between fifty and Sixty Years after the Council, and *Maximus* about Sixty, and St. *Cyrill* about Ninety, could be ſo groſly ignorant of, and Strangers to the Sentiments of thoſe *Fathers*, as not ſo much *as to Dream of that wherein they had placed the Unity of the God-head.* This to me ſeems Incredible and morally Impoſſible: ſince it is not to be imagined, that *Nyſſen*, *Cyrill*, and *Maximus* could ſo ſoon forget, or knowingly dare to relinquiſh the Doctrine of the

fore-mentioned *Fathers*, whoſe Authority was ſo great and Sacred all the *Chriſtian World* over. And therefore ſince this Author allows theſe *Fathers* not to have *Dreamt* of a *Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature*; I conclude, That neither did the *Nicene Fathers Dream* of it any more than they, howſoever they might expreſs themſelves upon ſome occaſions.

And thus having (as well as he could) made *his firſt ſtep*, by Aſſerting a *Specifick Unity*, or *Sameneſs of Nature* in the *Three Divine Perſons* from the *Fathers*, that is to ſay, partly from what *Petavius* and Dr. *Cudworth* had told him of the *Nicene Fathers* holding ſuch a *Specifick Unity* between them, and partly from the other *Fathers never ſo much as dreaming of it*, he proceeds now to his other *ſtep*, or rather *Counter-ſtep*; which is to ſhew, That the *Unity* between the *Divine Perſons*, held by the *Fathers*, was no other than a *Numerical Unity of Nature*, or *Eſſence* belonging to them: For ſince *to be one only Specifically*, and to be *one only Numerically*, are by no means conſiſtent with one another, in reſpect of the ſame *Perſons*, what can this be ſo truly and properly called as *a Counter-ſtep to* that which he had made before? His Method being plainly this. Firſt he tells us, That the *Nicene Fathers* by the ὁμοουσιότης underſtood only a *Specifick Unity*, or *Sameneſs of Nature* in the *Divine Perſons*, Page 106. And then, that the *Fathers* [mentioning them indefinitely] *held this Sameneſs of Nature* abſolutely neceſſary to make the ſaid *Three Perſons one God*, Page 107. And now at length he tells us, Page 121. Lines 27, 28, 29. *That though ſeveral of the Fathers attempted ſeveral ways of explaining that Unity of Nature that is in the Divine Perſons, yet they all agree in the Thing, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, Three diſtinct Divine Perſons are united in one Numerical Nature and Eſſence.* So that the Sum of all

muſt

muſt be this (as appears alſo from his own words in the latter end of *Page* 120. and the four firſt Lines of the 121.) that, according to him, the *Fathers* held a *Specifick Unity of Nature neceſſary* to make the *Three Divine Perſons one God*, but not *ſufficient* without the Completion of it by a *Numerical Unity* ſuperadded to it.

This, I ſay, is the Sum of what he delivers; and in direct oppoſition to which, I do here deny, That there is any ſuch Thing as a *Specifick Unity of Nature* belonging to the *Divine Perſons*, or that the *Fathers* ever held, that there was.

And to prove this, I ſhall premiſe this Aſſertion both as certain in it ſelf, and withall affirmed by this Author in thoſe fore-cited words, *viz. That all the Fathers held, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, Three diſtinct Perſons are United in* (or rather *are One, by*) One Numerical *Nature and Eſſence.*

Which being ſo premiſed, I have theſe *Conſiderations* to oppoſe to the Admiſſion of any *Specifick Unity* in the *Divine Nature* as it belongs to the *Divine Perſons.* As,

Firſt, If a *Numerical Unity* in the ſame *Divine Nature* be ſufficient to make the *Three Divine Perſons* to whom it belongs, *One God*, then a *Specifick Unity* of the ſame is not neceſſary; but a *Numerical Unity* in the ſame *Divine Nature* is ſufficient to make the ſaid *Three Perſons One God*, and therefore a *Specifick Unity* is not neceſſary. The Conſequence is evident, becauſe nothing can be *neceſſary* to any Thing, or Effect, beyond, or beſide what is *ſufficient* for the ſame; ſince this would imply a manifeſt Contradiction, by making the ſame Thing, in the ſame reſpect, both *ſufficient* and *not ſufficient*. And as for the Minor, That an Agreement in one and the ſame *Numerical*

rical Divine Nature is ſufficient to make the *Perſons* ſo agreeing *One God*. I ſuppoſe this carries with it ſo much Self-Evidence, that no Man of Reaſon will pretend to doubt of, and much leſs to deny it.

Secondly, A greater degree of *Unity*, and a leſs degree of *Unity* are not to be admitted in the *Divine Nature*. But a *Numerical Unity* and a *Specifical Unity*, are a greater and a leſs degree of *Unity*, and therefore they are not both to be admitted in the *Divine Nature*. The Major is proved thus, Becauſe two ſuch *Unities* would overthrow the ſimplicity of the *Divine Nature*; foraſmuch as they muſt be either two *degrees* of the ſame kind of *Unity*, or they muſt be two different *kinds* of *Unity*: Either of which would infer a Compoſition by no means to be endured in the *Divine Nature*. As for the Minor, it is evident in it ſelf, and needs no Proof.

Thirdly, Such a degree, or ſort of *Unity of Nature*, as may agree to Ten Thouſand Individuals, neither can nor ought to be admitted in the *Divine Nature*, with reference to the *Divine Perſons*. But a *Specifick Unity of Nature* may agree to Ten Thouſand Individuals, as well as to Two or Three; ſince (upon a *Specifick* Account) it has no Stint or Limitation, but may be every whit as well and properly in the former Number, as in the latter; and therefore it neither can nor ought to be admitted in the *Divine Nature*.

Fourthly, Such an *Unity* as is principally, if not abſolutely *Notional* and depends upon the Operation of the Intellect drawing one common Notion from the agreement, which it obſerves in ſeveral Individuals, is by no means neceſſary to make the *Three Divine Perſons One God*, nor can any way properly belong to them. But a *Specifick Unity* is ſuch an one. And therefore it neither is, nor

nor can be neceſſary to the making the *Three Divine Perſons One God*; as this Author moſt abſurdly Aſſerts, *P.* 107. *Line* 23, 24. The Major is evident. For that, if ſuch an *Unity* could be neceſſary upon that Account, then there would be ſome ſort or degree of *Unity* in the *Divine Nature* ſo depending upon the Operation of ſome Intellect, or other (forming one common Notion out of ſeveral Particulars,) that, had not ſuch an Operation paſſed upon the ſaid Particulars, ſuch an *Unity* could not have been; nor conſequently could the *Three Divine Perſons* have been one *God* without it; which to affirm, would certainly be both a Monſtrous and Blaſphemous Aſſertion.

Fifthly and Laſtly, If a *Specifick Unity of Nature* conſiſts with, and indeed implys a *Multiplication* of the ſaid *Nature*, in every one of the Particulars, to which it belongs; then ſuch a *Specifick Unity* can by no means be admitted in the *Divine Nature*. But a *Specifick Unity of Nature* imports a *Multiplication* of the ſaid *Nature* in every one of the Particulars to which it belongs; And therefore ſuch an *Unity* cannot be admitted in the *Divine Nature*. The Reaſon of the Conſequence is evident; becauſe the *Divine Nature* is uncapable of any *Multiplication*: And herein conſiſts the difference of the *Divine Nature*'s belonging to the *Divine Perſons*, and of any other *Nature's* belonging to its proper Individuals; That this latter is by a *Multiplication of it ſelf in them*, and the other by a bare *Communication of it ſelf to them*, ſo as that the ſame *Numerical Nature exiſts in*, and becomes thereby common to all the *Three Perſons*. As for the Minor Propoſition, That a *Specifick Unity of Nature* conſiſts with and implies a *Multiplication* of the ſaid *Nature* in the ſeveral Individuals which it belongs to;

I refer him to all the *Logicians* and *Metaphyſicians* who have wrote of *Species*, and *Specifick Unity*, of *Idem*, & *Diverſum*, whether they do not give this Account of it.

But I fancy this Author has a reach of Cunning (tho' but a ſhort one) in the caſe. For that having made the *Three Divine Perſons Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*, which can never be *One* by a *Numerical Unity*; he is willing to provide them a *Specifical Unity*, and to ſee whether that will ſerve the turn; but as the *Nature of the Thing* unhappily falls out to be, that will not do it neither.

Theſe are the *Conſiderations* which I thought fit to advance againſt the Admiſſion of a *Specifick Unity* in the *Divine Nature*, with reference to the *Divine Perſons*. And the Concluſion, which I draw from them all, is this, That ſince the *Fathers* (and that even by this Author's own Confeſſion) held a *Numerical Unity of Nature in the Three Divine Perſons*, we can by no means grant that the ſaid *Fathers* admitted alſo a *Specifick Unity* in the ſame, without making them guilty of a groſs Abſurdity and Contradiction. Foraſmuch as theſe Two ſorts, or degrees of *Unity* are utterly incompatible in the *Divine Nature*.

I hope by this time the Judicious Reader ſees how fit this Man is to be truſted with the *Fathers*, whoſe Judgment about ſo weighty an Article he dares miſrepreſent in ſuch a manner. For to ſum up briefly what he has ſaid upon this Point.

Firſt, he tells us, *That the Fathers agree very well in the Account they give of a Trinity in Unity*, Page 106. and the four firſt lines. Next he tells us, *That the Nicene Fathers aſſerted a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature in the*

the Perſons of the Bleſſed Trinity, and underſtood the word ὁμοούσιον *only of ſuch an Unity, and not of a Numerical,* Page 106. and the five laſt Lines. And Thirdly, *That this Specifick Unity, or Sameneſs of Nature, was abſolutely Neceſſary to make the Three Divine Perſons One God, and that it was impoſſible they ſhould be ſo without it,* Page 107. Lines 23, 24. And Fourthly, That the other *Fathers* (of which he there names four) *never ſo much as Dream'd of a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature,* Page 109. Lines 22, 23. And Laſtly, *That the Fathers do not ſtop in this Specifick Unity and Identity of Nature, but proceed to ſhew how the* ὁμοούσιον *proves a true Numerical and Eſſential Unity of the God-head in the Three Divine Perſons,* Page 114. Lines 30, 31, 32, 33.

From all which Aſſertions, which lie plain and open in the forecited Pages, I deſire this Author to reſolve me theſe following Queries.

1. Whether thoſe *Fathers* who Aſſert a *Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature,* and *thoſe who never Dreamt of ſuch an Unity*; And thoſe again, who by the ὁμοούσιον underſtood only a *Specifick,* and not a *Numerical Unity of Nature*; and thoſe who by the ſame ὁμοούσιον proceed to prove a *Numerical Unity of Nature* in the *Divine Perſons,* can be ſaid to agree ſo very well in the Account they give of a *Trinity in Unity?*

2. Whether thoſe could give a true and right Account of a *Trinity* in *Unity,* who never ſo much as *Dreamt* of that, which was ſo abſolutely neceſſary to make the *Three Divine Perſons One God,* that they could not poſſibly be ſo without it?

3. Whether a *Specifick Unity,* or *Sameneſs of Nature* in ſeveral *Perſons,* is or can be a direct and proper proof of a *Numerical Unity* and *Identity of Nature* in the ſaid *Perſons?*

Theſe Queſtions, I ſay, being the Natural and Immediate Reſults of this Author's Poſitions, I hope he will graciouſly vouchſafe, ſometime or other, to give the World a Satisfactory Reſolution of.

In the mean time I will tell him what it was, that impoſed upon him ſo, as to make him talk thus Abſurdly and Unphiloſophically of a *Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature*, and traduce the *Fathers* alſo, as if they held the ſame. And that in one word is, That in the Subject before us, he takes *Specifick Nature* and *Common Nature* to ſignifie one and the ſame Thing; whereas, though every *Specifick Nature* be a *Common Nature*, yet every *Common Nature* is not *a Specifick Nature* (no nor a *Generical* neither.) And that this was his miſtake appears from thoſe words of his in Page 106. where he ſays, That Petavius *and Dr.* Cudworth *have abundantly proved, That the* Nicene Fathers *did not underſtand the word* ὁμοούσιον *of a Numerical, but of a Specifical Sameneſs of Nature, or the agreement of Things Numerically differing from one another, in the ſame* Common *Nature.*] In which words it is evident, That he makes *Specifick Sameneſs of Nature, and the Agreement of Things numerically different, in one and the ſame* Common *Nature*, to ſignifie Convertibly the ſame Thing; and when he has done ſo, he oppoſes them Both to a *Numerical Sameneſs of Nature*; as appears from the Adverſative Particle [*But*] placed between them. In which, let me tell him he is guilty of a very great miſtake, both by making thoſe Things the ſame, which are not the ſame, and by making an Oppoſition where there is a real Coincidence. For, by his favour, *one and the ſame Numerical Divine Nature is a* Common *Nature too*; foraſmuch as without any Diviſion, or Multiplication of it ſelf, it *belongs in Common* to the *Three Divine Perſons*. The Term [*Deus*] indeed is neither a *Genus*, nor a *Species*.

cies. Nevertheleſs all *Divines* and *School-men* allow it to be a *Terminus Communis*, as properly predicable of, and Common to *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt*; and in this very Thing conſiſts the Myſtery of the *Trinity*, That one and the ſame *Numerical Nature* ſhould be *Common* to, and Exiſt in *Three Numerically diſtinct Perſons*. And therefore for one (who pretends to teach the whole World Divinity) while he is Diſcourſing of the *Divine Nature* and *Perſons*, to oppoſe *Common Nature*, to *Nature Numerically One*, and from the *Commonneſs of it*, to make the *Fathers* Argue againſt *its Numericalneſs* (whereas the ſame *Divine Nature* may be, and really is both) it is a ſhrewd ſign of the want of ſome thing or other in that Man, that muſt needs render him extremely unfit to preſcribe, and dictate in theſe Matters.

In fine, the ſole Point driven at all along by the *Fathers*, as to the Queſtion about the *Unity* of the *Divine Nature* (for their Arguments to prove the Coequality of the *Three Divine Perſons* againſt the *Arrians* are not now before us) is an Aſſertion of a Real Numerical Exiſting *Unity* of the ſaid *Nature* in the ſaid *Perſons*. I ſay, a *Numerical Unity*, without making any more *ſteps*, *or degrees* in it than *One*, or owning any diſtinction between *Sameneſs of Nature*, and *Sameneſs of Eſſence*. And much leſs by making (as this Author does) a *Specifick Sameneſs of Nature*, one thing wherein they place the *Unity* of the *Divine Nature*, and then making *Sameneſs of Eſſence another and further degree* in the *Unity* of the ſaid *Nature*; and when they have done ſo, by a return back explaining this *Sameneſs of Eſſence*, by the *Sameneſs of Nature* newly mentioned; as, he ſays, they do, in theſe words, immediately following (by way of Exegeſis of the former) viz. *That there is but one God, becauſe all the Three Divine Perſons have the ſame Nature*, Page 107. and

the two laſt Lines. All which is a Ridiculous Circle, and a Contradiction to boot, making *Sameneſs of Nature* one *ſtep*, and *Sameneſs of Eſſence* another, and then making this *Sameneſs of Eſſence* no more than *a Sameneſs of Nature*, again; ſo that according to him the *Fathers* muſt be ſaid to go *further*, by reſting in the very ſame *ſtep* which they firſt made: Which way of Reaſoning, I confeſs, may ſerve well enough for one, who can forget in one Page, what he had ſaid in the other juſt before. But (by his favour) the *Fathers* were a little more Conſiſtent, and underſtood themſelves better than to run Diviſions in ſuch a ſenſeleſs manner upon a Thing that admitted none.

And thus having ſhewn how he has dealt with the *Fathers* in the Account given by him of their Opinion about *the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Perſons of the Bleſſed Trinity*, (which was the *firſt Head*, under which I reduced his Allegations from them,) I come now in the

2d Place, to the other and Principal Head; under which he undertakes to prove the chief and more peculiar part of his Hypotheſis from the ſaid *Fathers*, viz. *That the Unity and Identity of Nature belonging to the Three Divine Perſons, conſiſts in the* Mutual-Conſciouſneſs *which is between them*, That is in Truth, That they are therefore *One God*, becauſe they are *Conſcious* to themſelves, that they are ſo.

And here I ſhall begin with ſhewing how this Author overthrows the Point undertook by him before he produces any Arguments from the *Fathers* for it. And to this Purpoſe I ſhall reſume thoſe words of his before cited by me out of Page 106. In which he reminds his Reader, *That Trinity in Unity being ſo great a Myſtery, and of which we have no Example in Nature, it is no wonder*

der if it cannot be explained by any one kind of Natural Union, and that therefore it was neceſſary to uſe ſeveral Examples, and to allude to ſeveral kinds of Union, to form an adequate Notion of the Unity of the God-head. Now here, ſince our Author's Notion, and the *Fathers* too (as he ſays) of this *Unity* is nothing elſe but *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, I deſire to Learn of him, what neceſſity there was, or is of *uſing ſeveral Examples, and alluding to ſeveral kinds of Union to explain, or form an adequate notion of that?* And I wonder what kind of *Thing he would make of his Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, ſhould he come to explain and deſcribe it by ſeveral Examples, and ſeveral Kinds of Union? But this is not all, for he tells us likewiſe (as we alſo obſerved before) that there are ſeveral *ſteps* to be taken towards the Explication of this Myſtery. Whereupon I would again learn of him how many *ſteps* are neceſſary to explain *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*; for one would imagine one ſingle *ſtep* ſufficient to repreſent and declare a Thing which every Body underſtands. This Author indeed confidently enough Aſſerts, That *the Fathers give no other Account of a Trinity in Unity, than the ſame which he gives of it*, Page 101. Line 2. But certainly if the *Fathers* thought *ſeveral Examples*, Steps *and Kinds of Union abſolutely neceſſary to explain the Notion they had of this Unity*, and if theſe cannot be neceſſary to explain the Notion of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, then it muſt follow, That the *Fathers* neither did, nor poſſibly could by that *Unity* mean *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*. And if this Author doubts of the force of this Reaſoning, let him try his skill, and ſee what Learned ſtuff he is like to make of it when he comes to explain his Notion of *Mutual-Conſcioufneſs by ſeveral Examples, Steps, and Sorts of Union, and out of them all to form one adequate Notion of this ſo much admired Thing*. Wherefore

I conclude, and, I think, unanſwerably, That the *Fathers* by this *Unity* between the *Divine Perſons*, mean one Thing, and this Man quite another; and conſequently that they have given a very different Account of it, from what he gives, contrary to his equally bold and falſe Aſſeveration, affirming it to be *the very ſame*.

And now I am ready to ſee what he has to offer us from the *Fathers* in behalf of his *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*; but becauſe I am extremely deſirous, that the Reader ſhould keep him cloſe to the Point, and not ſuffer him to wander from it (which, in diſpute, he is as apt to do as any Man living) I ſhall preſume to hint this to him, That the Point to be proved by this Author, is not that the *Three Divine Perſons* have one and the ſame *Numerical Nature*, or *Eſſence*, nor that they are *Mutually Conſcious* to one another of whatſoever each of them *is*, or *knows*; no, nor yet that this *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* infers an *Unity of Nature* in them, as a Thing inſeparable from it. But he is to prove, That this *Unity of Nature*, and this *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* are Convertibly one and the ſame Thing, or that this latter is to the former what the *Eſſence*, or *Form* of any Thing is to that Thing: That is to ſay, That the *Unity* of the *Divine Nature* formally *Conſiſts in*, and is, what it *is*, *by* that *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* which belongs to the *Three Divine Perſons*. This, I ſay, is the Thing to be proved by Him.

And ſo I proceed to his Arguments (which I aſſure the Reader, he ſhall find very ſtrange ones) nevertheleſs to give him as eaſie and diſtinct a view of them, as I can, I will ſet down the ſeveral Heads of them before I particularly diſcuſs them.

1. The Firſt of them is from the μία ἐνέργεια aſcribed, by the *Fathers*, to all the *Three Divine Perſons* joyntly.

2. The

2. The Second from the μία κίνησις καὶ διακόσμησις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βουλήματος.

3. The Third from the περιχώρησις, or Circumincession attributed likewise by the *Fathers* to them.

4. The Fourth from the Representation, which St. *Austin* makes of the *Trinity*, by the *Mind*, and its *Three distinct Faculties of Understanding, Memory, and Will.* And,

5. The Fifth and last from the *Unity* of the *Original Principle*, or *Fountain of the Deity*, or rather (say I) of the second and third *Persons* of the *Trinity*.

All which I shall examine distinctly, and in their order. But before I do so, I think fit to give the Reader an Account in one word of this Author's whole design in all the Particulars above specified. And that is, to prove, That the *Unity* of the *Divine Nature* consists in *Unity of Operation*, and then to suppose (for he does not so much as go about to prove it) that this *Unity of Operation is Mutual-Consciousness*. This is the Sum Total of the Business; but I now come to Particulars. And

First, For the μία ἐνέργεια, quoted by him out of *Greg. Nyssen.* Where, before we see how far it may be formed into an Argument, I think it requisite to give some Account how this Author Discourses of it. I must confess, I have sometimes wondred, what design he could have in so zealously exploding those commonly received Terms of *Substance, Essence and Nature* from any application of them to God: which here he does again afresh, telling us in *Page* 115. *lines* 24, 25, 26, 27. *That it confounds our minds when we talk of the Numerical Unity of the Godhead to have the least Conception or Thought about the Distinction and Union of Natures and Essences.* And that therefore we are to speak of God only in words importing *Energy or Operation*: And accordingly for this reason

Gr.

Gr. Nyssen expresses God by Θεατὴς and ἔφορος, words not signifying *Nature* or *Essence*, but only *Sight* and *Inspection*; Nay and this Author has gone *a step* much beyond this, plainly telling us, *That the Father and the Son are Energy or Operation*, Page 132. Line 13. And *that Nature and Energy are the same in God*, P. 133. L. 20. and consequently, That we are to entertain no other Conception of God, but as *of a pure simple Operation*. And thus, when we have degraded the *Divine Nature* from *Substance* to *Operation*, it is but *one step* more to degrade it to bare *Notion*. This conceit of this Author, I say, at first I could not but wonder at, but am since pretty well aware of what he drives at by it. And that is in short, That he thinks it a much easier Matter to make *Action*, or *Operation*, than *Substance*, *Essence*, or *Nature* pass for *Mutual-Consciousness*: And this upon good Reason, I am satisfied, is the Thing he designs: But I believe he will fall short of fetching *his Mutual-Consciousness* out of either of them. And therefore first to Correct that Crude Notion of his, *That we must not speak of God in Terms importing Nature, but Operation*; I desire this Bold Man (as I urged before in Chap. 2.) to tell me whether the Names of *Jah* and *Jehovah*, and *I am that I am*, by which *God* revealed himself to his People, were not Names of *Nature* and *Essence?* and whether *God* revealed them for any other purpose than that he might be *known* and *understood* by them? But for all this he will have us to know from *Gr. Nyssen*, That the *Divine Nature* is *quid* ἀκατωνόμαστον καὶ ἄφραστον, a Thing above Name or Expression. And it is so, I confess, as to an adequate complete Conception or Description of it. But then, I ask him, are not the *Divine Operations so too?* Are we able to comprehend them perfectly, and to the utmost of *what*, and *how* they are? When the Psalmist tells us, that *God has put darkness under*

der his feet, Pſal. 18. 9. *and that his footſteps are not known*, Pſal. 77. 19. And the Apoſtle in *Rom.* 11. 33. *That his judgments are unſearchable, and his ways paſt finding out.* And are not theſe paſſages an Account of his *Dealings* and *Operations* in the Government of the World? And yet ſurely, notwithſtanding all this, we may have ſome true, though imperfect Conceptions both of his *Nature* and of his *Operations* alſo: And I deſire this Aſſuming Man to inform me, What ſhould hinder, but that ſo much as we *Conceive* of *God*, we may likewiſe expreſs, and (what is more) prove too? For though *Gregory Nyſſen* has told us, That the *Divine Nature* is *unexpreſſible*, yet, I hope, a Thing may be proved, though the *Nature* of it cannot always be throughly expreſſed. But the Truth is, he makes this *Father* Argue at a very odd rate. For he tells us, *Page* 115. That one way, by which *Gregory Nyſſen* undertakes to prove, That the ὁμοούσιον, or *Specifick Sameneſs of Nature*, (as this Man underſtands it) proves a *Numerical Unity of Nature* in the *Divine Perſons*, is, *becauſe the Name* [*God*] does not ſo properly ſignifie the *Divine Nature as ſomething relating to it*: Which is a rare Proof indeed; it being as much as to ſay, That the ὁμοούσιον, or *Sameneſs of Nature*, proves one *God*, becauſe [*God*] *does not ſignifie Nature.* But St. *Gregory* is far from arguing ſo (which, beſides the Abſurdity of it, is only *denying* inſtead of *proving*) but he proves *Sameneſs and Unity of Nature, by Sameneſs, or Unity of Operation*, and that ſurely he might very well do, without making *Unity of Nature* only an *Unity of Operation.* And no leſs abſurd is it, to repreſent St. *Gregory* making *Unity of Operation* one way, whereby the ὁμοούσιον, or *Specifick Sameneſs of Nature*, proves a *Numerical Unity of Nature*: For though *Unity of Operation* it

ſelf proves this, yet ſurely it is not a Medium, whereby a *Specifick Unity* of the ſaid *Nature*, does, or can prove it.

But to proceed, That Aſſertion of this Author, [*That God is properly, Energy, or Operation*] contains in it more Abſurdities than one. For firſt he takes *Energy* and *Operation* for the ſame Thing; whereas ἐνέργεια is properly *vis activa*, and *Operation* is only the ἐνέργησις, or actual Exerciſe of that *vis*, or *Power*. But whether it ſignifies one or both, it is certain, that *God* is properly neither of them. For (as I have ſhewn before) we muſt ſpeak of *God* as we are able to conceive of him; and we conceive of *God*, not as of an *Action*, but as of an *Agent*; that is, as of a *Subſtance acting*, or *exerting* it ſelf; and upon this Account I do here tell this Author, that it is impoſſible for Humane Reaſon to conceive of *Action, or Operation, but as founded in Subſtance*; and that nothing would more confound and overturn all the Methods, Ways, and Notions of Men's Minds, than to endeavour to conceive of it otherwiſe. And therefore if *God* is ſometimes called ἐνέργεια, or Action, it is by a Metonymy of the Adjunct for the Subject, or the Effect for the Cauſe; for truly and properly he is not ſo. And now, if this Author ſhall think to take Sanctuary in that known Expreſſion of *God, That he is a pure ſimple Act*, he may pleaſe to take notice, that the Term *Act* is Ambiguous; and ſometimes ſignifies an *Actus Entitativus*, which is no more than the *Entity*, or *Being* of a Thing, and ſometimes an *Actus Phyſicus*, which is the *Operation*, or *Exertion* of ſome *Active Power*. And it is in the former ſenſe only in which *God* is ſaid to be *a pure ſimple Act*, and not in the latter. And, by this Author's Favour, every *Subſtance*, *Eſſence*, or *Nature* is ſuch an *Act*, which quite

quite ſpoils all his fine Notion about expreſſing *God* only by Terms of *Energy* and *Operation*, in excluſion of thoſe of *Nature*, *Eſſence* and *Subſtance*. This I thought fit to premiſe, as throwing up the very foundation of all his Arguments, and indeed of his whole Hypotheſis.

And ſo I come to his Argument, the Sum of which, is this.

That the *Divine Nature* is *Divine Energy*, or *Operation*; And therefore, That the *Unity* of *Divine Operation*, is *Unity* of *Divine Nature*; And Laſtly, That this *Unity* of *Divine Nature* is *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*.

Now it is certain, That there is not one of all theſe Three Propoſitions true; but that is no fault of mine: ſince if they were caſt into a Syllogiſm, that would not mend the Matter; for the Syllogiſm muſt proceed thus.

Unity of Divine Energy, or Operation is Mutual-Conſciouſneſs.

Unity of Divine Nature is Unity of Divine Energy, or Operation.

And therefore, *Unity of Divine Nature is Mutual-Conſciouſneſs.*

Every one of which *Propoſitions* is ſtill falſe. And yet I ſhall refer it to this Author himſelf, or to any one, who has Read and Conſidered his Book, to form a better Argument from what he has ſaid of a μία ἐνέργεια, with reference to the preſent Subject, if he can.

Nevertheleſs whether it be an Argument, or no Argument, my Anſwer to his Allegation of the μία ἐνέργεια, with relation to the *Unity of the Divine Nature*, and to *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, is thus.

Firſt, That it is one Thing to be a *Proof* of a Thing, and another to be that wherein the *Nature of the Thing* proved, does conſiſt. Thus actual Ratiocination is a

certain Proof of a Principle of Reason, yet nevertheless it is not that wherein a Principle of Reason does consist; since that may be and continue when actual Ratiocination ceases. In like manner I will allow the μία ἐνέργεια, to be a Proof of the μία οὐσία. But I absolutely deny, That the ἑνότης of the *Energy*, is that wherein the ἑνότης of the *Nature* is, or ought to be placed; or that the *Fathers* ever accounted it so, how truly and strongly soever it might, in their judgment, infer it.

What the *Fathers* designed to prove by *Unity of Operation in the Three Divine Persons*, is evident from the following Passages; (to which Twenty times as many might be added.) *Gregory Nyssen* tells us, *That those whose Energy is the same, have their Nature altogether the same.* And St. *Basil*, *That those who have the same Operations, have also the same Essence* [or Substance.] *But the Operation* [or Energy] *of the Father and the Son is one, as appears in that Expression*, Let us make Man. *And again*, Whatsoever the Father does, that likewise does the Son, *and therefore there is but one Essence of the Father and the Son.* And again, *The Sameness of Operation in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, evidently shews, That there is no difference in their Essence, or Substance.* And accordingly St. *Austin*, *The Operation cannot be diverse, where the Nature is not only equal, but also undivided.* From all which, it is most clear, That the *Fathers* alledge this *Unity of Operation* only as a Proof or Argument of this *Unity of Nature, or Essence*: And therefore, since nothing can be a Proof of it

Ὧν δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια μία καὶ ἡ φύσις πάντως ἡ αὐτὴ τούτων ἐστίν. *Greg. Nyssen in Orat. Dom. Nat.* 3.

Ὧν αἱ αὐταὶ ἐνέργειαι τούτων καὶ ἡ οὐσία μία· ἐνέργεια δὲ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ μία ὡς τὸ ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον. καὶ πάλιν, ἃ γὰρ ἂν ὁ πατὴρ ποιῇ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ὁμοίως ποιεῖ ἀρὰ καὶ οὐσία μία πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ. *Basil. lib.* 4. *contra Eunomium.* οὐκ οὖν ἡ τῆς ἐνεργείας ταυτότης ἐπὶ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος δείκνυσι σαφῶς τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπαράλλακτον. *Basil Epist. ad Eustathium.* Non potest operatio esse diversa ubi non solùm æqualis, verùm etiam indiscreta Natura. *August. Serm. de Verbo Dom.* 63. *Cap.* 3.

it ſelf, That they did not take *Unity of Operation*, and *Unity of Nature* for one and the ſame Thing. But,

Secondly, Suppoſing (but not granting) that it were ſo, *viz.* That *Unity of Operation*, did not only prove, but really was it ſelf this *Unity of Nature*, or *Eſſence*; yet how will this Author prove, that *Unity of Nature*, or *Unity of Operation* is properly *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*? Is there ſo much as one Tittle in the *Fathers* expreſſing, or neceſſarily implying, that it is ſo? And as to the Reaſon of the Thing it ſelf; Will any one ſay, That there is no other ἐνέργεια belonging to the *Divine Nature*, but *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*? Or that this ἐνέργεια in the whole Latitude and Compaſs of it extends no further? Nay, on the contrary, does it not Exert it ſelf in Infinite other Acts? And, what is yet more, does it not more properly belong to any other of the *Divine Acts*, than to an *Act* of *Knowledge*? (bare *Knowledge*, as ſuch being of it ſelf unoperative) and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* is but an *Act* of *Knowledge*. I proteſt *I am aſhamed to diſpute* ſeriouſly againſt ſuch Stuff.

2. His next Argument to prove, *That Mutual-Conſciouſneſs is formally that Unity of Nature which is in the Three Divine Perſons*, is taken from another Expreſſion of the ſaid *Gregory Nyſſen*; viz. That there is amongſt the *Divine Perſons*, μία κίνησις ἢ διακόσμησις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βουλήματος. Concerning which, this Author has the boldneſs to appeal to any one to judge, whether this μία κίνησις βουλήματος, this ſingle Motion of the Will, which at the ſame inſtant, is in *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt*, can ſignifie any thing but *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, which makes them *Numerically One*, Page 117. Lines 8, 9, 10. &c. And he adds, That it is impoſſible they ſhould have ſuch a ſingle Motion of Will paſſing through them all, without this *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, Page 124. Lines

30, 31. And this is the Sum of his Argument from the μία κίνησις βελήματος.

In Anſwer to which, before I addreſs my ſelf to his Argument, I will give ſome Account of the Quotation. In which, by his Favour, we are to take the ſenſe of the *Father*'s words from the *Father* himſelf, and not from the Inferences which he who Quotes them, thinks fit to draw from them (how good ſoever he may be at that Work.) Now, what St. *Gregory* means by them, appears plainly by his manner of Reaſoning. The Queſtion before him was, *Whether the Three Divine Perſons were Three Gods?* Which St. *Gregory* denies, and amongſt other Proofs, ſays, That *God* is the Name of *Energy*, and from the *Unity* of *Energy*, proves the *Unity* of the *Deity*, and that *Three Perſons* are but one *God* becauſe the *Operation* is the ſame in all. To this he raiſes an Objection from the *Sameneſs* of *Faculty*, *Office*, or *Operation* amongſt Men, as *Geometricians*, *Husbandmen*, *Orators*, whoſe *Office*, *Buſineſs* and *Operations*, (in their reſpective way) are the ſame; which yet does not hinder, but that they are ſtill Three or more ſeveral Men. To which he Anſwers, That theſe act ſeparately and by themſelves; but that it is not ſo in the *Divine Nature*; no *Perſon*, in the *Holy Trinity*, doing any Thing by himſelf only, or acting ſeparately from the other Two, but that there is one and the ſame *Motion and Diſpoſition of Will* paſſing from the *Father*, through the *Son*, to the *Holy Ghoſt*. This is the force of St. *Gregory*'s Reaſoning, and the plain meaning of it is no more but this, That Three Men acting the ſame Thing, are ſtill Three Men, becauſe they act ſeparately and by themſelves: but that the *Three Perſons* in the *Trinity*, are but *One God*, becauſe they do not act *ſeparately*, but that there is the *ſame Motion and Diſpoſition of Will* in all the *Three Perſons*; as, on the contrary, Three Men's not having one

one and the ſame Motion of Will, equally proves, That they are not *One*, but *Three* ſeveral Men; and accordingly makes a manifeſt difference between Three Men acting the ſame Thing, and the Operation of the *Three Perſons* in the *Bleſſed Trinity*; which is the Sum of St. *Gregory*'s Anſwer to the forementioned Objection. And now, what does all this prove? Why truly neither of thoſe Two Things, which this Author muſt prove, or he proves nothing, viz. *That this Unity of Motion, and Diſpoſition of Will, is properly and formally Unity of Divine Nature:* And next, *That this Unity of Divine Nature is properly Mutual-Conſciouſneſs.* Theſe Two Things, I ſay, it is incumbent upon him to prove: But how it can be done from the fore-mentioned Words, or Argument of *Gregory Nyſſen*, I believe will poſe the Learneſt Man alive to ſhew.

The proper Anſwer therefore to this Argument will be much the ſame with that juſt before given to the Argument drawn from the μία ἐνέργεια, (of which this μία κίνησις βουλήματος is but a Branch) and it proceeds thus.

Firſt, I deny the μία κίνησις βουλήματος, to be any more than a proof of the *Unity of the Divine Nature*; juſt as either the *Effect*, or the Cauſality is a ſure proof of the *Cauſe*; but for all that, is not the Cauſe: or as a Conſequent proves its Antecedent without being the Antecedent, or that wherein the *Nature* of the Antecedent does conſiſt.

Secondly, In the next place I deny that μία κίνησις βουλήματος, is formally and properly the ſame with *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, any more than an Act, or Motion of the *Will*, is formally the ſame with an Act of the *Underſtanding*: And before this Author takes it for granted, (which is his conſtant way of proving things) I expect, that

that he make it appear, That βούλημα, or βούλησις, and εἴδησις, or γνῶσις, ſignifie formally one and the ſame Thing: And it was boldly done of him (to ſay the leaſt) to appeal to his Reader about a Thing, in which, if he underſtood the difference between an *Act of Volition*, and an *Act of Intellection*, he muſt certainly judge againſt him.

But it may be replyed, That this μία βούλησις does at leaſt infer a μία γνῶσις, εἴδησις, or συνείδησις. I grant it may: But affirm, that this is nothing to his Purpoſe; unleſs it could follow from hence, that that which infers, or proves a Thing, is the very Thing which it infers and proves; which it neither is, nor, for that Reaſon, can be.

As for what he adds, That this μία κίνησις βουλήματος cannot be in the *Three Divine Perſons*, *without ſuch a Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*: I do readily grant this alſo. But in the mean time, is not this *Dictator* yet old enough to diſtinguiſh between the *Cauſa ſine quâ non*, or rather *the Condition of* a Thing, and the *Ratio formalis*, or *Nature* of that Thing? Between That, *without which* a Thing cannot be, and that, which that Thing *properly is*? There can be no ſuch Thing *as Sight*, without a due Circulation of the Blood and Spirits: But is ſuch a Circulation, therefore, properly an Act of Sight? Or an Act of Sight ſuch a Circulation? To diſpute this further, would be but to abuſe the Reader's Patience.

And laſt of all, if this Author ſhould take advantage of thoſe words from *Gregory Nyſſen*, *That God is the Name of Energy*. Beſides, that it is not the bare *Notation*, but *uſe of the Word*, that muſt govern its ſignification: I would have this Author know, That *God* may have many Names, by which his *Nature* is not ſignified; as well as ſeveral others by which it is, and may be.

But

But I muſt confeſs, it is a very pleaſant Thing (as was in ſome meaſure hinted before) to prove the *Divine Nature to be Energy*, becauſe the Name [*God*] does not *ſignifie Nature, but Energy, or Operation*; whereas in Truth (if it proves any thing) it proves that *Nature* and *Energy* (applyed to *God*) do by no means ſignifie the ſame Thing.

And ſo I have done with his Argument from the μία κίνησις βουλήματος, and effectually demonſtrated, That there is not ſo much as the leaſt ſhew, or ſemblance of any proof from this, *That Mutual-Conſciouſneſs is properly that wherein the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Perſons of the Bleſſed Trinity does conſiſt.*

3. His Third Argument is from the Word περιχώρησις, commonly Tranſlated *Circumince ſſion*, and ſignifying a *Mutual-Inexiſtence*, or *In-dwelling* of each *Perſon* in the other Two. The Word was firſt uſed in this ſenſe (ſo far as I can find) by *Damaſcen*, a *Father* of the 8th Century. But the Thing meant by it, is contained in thoſe words of our Saviour in *John* 14. 11. 21. *Believe me that I am in the Father, and the Father in me*, which, I confeſs, are a ſolid and ſufficient proof of the *Unity* and *Identity* of the *Divine Nature*, both in the *Father* and the *Son*; and withal a very happy and ſignificant Expreſſion of the ſame.

But what is this to our Author's Purpoſe? And how does he prove this περιχώρησις to be *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs?* Why truly, by no Argument, or Reaſon produced, or ſo much as offered at by him, but only by a confident, Over-bearing Affirmation, *That there is no other Account to be given of that Mutual-In-being of the Divine Perſons in each other, (which the Fathers call* περιχώρησις*) but by Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, Page 125. Lines 6, 7, 8.

But, by his leave, I muſt debate the caſe a little with him, before he carries it off ſo. And in order to this, I muſt tell him in the firſt place, That the Queſtion is not whether *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs beſt explains this* περιχώρησις, but whether it be the περιχώρησις it ſelf, and that περιχώρησις be the *Unity* of the *Divine Nature* in the *Three Perſons*? And in the next place, I demand of him, Whether our Saviour's Words do not plainly and expreſly ſignifie the *Mutual-In-being*, or *In-exiſtence* of the *Perſons* in one another, without any ſignification of their *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs at all*? And if ſo; let me hear a Reaſon, Why we ſhould not take our Saviour's meaning from the Native ſignification of his own Words, rather than from thoſe of this Author. For will he venture to affirm, That the *Father* cannot be in the *Son*, and the *Son* in the *Father* by a *Mutual-Inexiſtence* in one another, but only by a *Mutual-Knowledge* of one another? Let him take heed what he ſays, and how he ventures beyond his Depth. Or will he ſay, That our Saviour meant the ſame Thing with himſelf, but was *not ſo happy in expreſſing it*? For no other Reaſon, but one of theſe Two can be aſſigned, That when our Saviour expreſſes himſelf in Terms importing *Mutual-In-exiſtence*, this Man ſhall dare to ſay, That he means nothing by them but *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*. I refer it to the Serious and Impartial Reader to judge of the Horrible Boldneſs of this Man: and withal, to obſerve how extremely he varies from himſelf about this περιχώρησις and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*. For

Firſt, He ſometimes ſays, That *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs is the only Thing wherein both the Unity of the Divine Nature, and this Mutual-In-dwelling of the Three Divine Perſons does Conſiſt*, Page 124. Lines 4, 5. And

Secondly,

Secondly, He ſays, *That Mutual-Conſciouſneſs is the only thing that can explain, or give an Account of this Mutual-In-dwelling, or* περιχώρησις, Page 125. Lines 6, 7.

To which I Anſwer, That when he ſpeaks of giving an Account of this περιχώρησις, if he means only *an Account that there is ſuch a Thing belonging to the Divine Perſons*, Our Saviour's Words have given a ſufficient Account of that already. But,

Secondly, If he means ſuch an Account of it, as explains and makes clear to us the *Nature* of it, by ſhewing *what it is*, and *how it is*. I deny that any ſuch Account can be given (or perhaps *underſtood*) by Humane Reaſon; and much leſs, that his *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* does or can give it.

Concerning which, I ſhall ask him this one Queſtion, *viz.* Whether the *Three Perſons of the Bleſſed Trinity* are not *Mutually-Conſcious* to one another of their *Mutual-In-exiſtence* in one another? I ſuppoſe he will not (becauſe he dares not) deny it. And if he grants it, then it manifeſtly follows, That their *Mutual-In-exiſtence* in one another, is in Order of *Nature* before their *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*; and conſequently cannot be the ſame with it, nor Conſiſt in it. For certainly thoſe *Divine Perſons* muſt *Exiſt Mutually* in one another, before they can know, or be *Conſcious* to themſelves that they do ſo.

So that we ſee here, that nothing is, or can be concluded from this περιχώρησις for his *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, whether we conſider the *Uſe* of the Word, or the *Nature* of the Thing. But let us ſee, how he makes good his Point from the Authority of the *Fathers*, which was the grand Thing undertook by him in this his 4th Section. And here as for the *Fathers*, he both Deſpiſes and Reproaches them, and that very groſly too. For firſt he

tells us, *That ſuch an Union amongſt the Divine Perſons* (as is expreſſed by the word περιχώρησις) *they all agree in, but how to explain it they knew not*, Page 125. Lines 17, 18. And why then, in the Name of *God*, does he refer to the *Fathers* to juſtifie his Explanation of that, which in the very ſame Breath he ſays, *They knew not how to Explain?* And the Truth is, the *Fathers* never owned themſelves able to explain it; and that for a very good Reaſon; *viz.* becauſe they held it unexplicable and unconceivable; and not for that Scandalous Reaſon given by him, *viz.* That they *had groſs Material Conceptions of the Deity*, by conceiving of it as of a *Subſtance*, Page 125. Lines 27, 28. For, ſays he, within Two Lines after, *Had they Contemplated God as a pure Mind, it had been eaſie to explain this* περιχώρησις, *or Indwelling of the Divine Perſons in each other. Good God!* That any *Profeſſor of Divinity* ſhould call *that eaſie to explain*, which the Reaſon of all Mankind has hitherto bent under, as a Thing too great, and myſterious for it to comprehend, or to grapple with! So that if ever we have cauſe to cry out ὦ βάθος, it is here: Or that he ſhould tax all thoſe, who own themſelves at a loſs about it, *for not Contemplating God as a pure Mind!* But to him, I confeſs, who can Conceive *of ſuch a Pure Mind, as is no Subſtance*; that is to ſay, in other words, *No Being.* (For I am ſure he will not ſo much as pretend it to be *an Accident*) to Him, I ſay, I cannot wonder, if nothing ſeem difficult, or myſterious. In the mean time, it is ſhameleſs and inſufferable in this Man to ſay, as he does Page 100, 101. *That his Explication of the Trinity is* not new, *but* the ſame *with that of the Fathers*, and afterwards in purſuance of this Aſſertion, to ſay, *That the Fathers knew not how to explain it*, and to give this as a Reaſon of their not knowing how to do ſo, viz. *That they had ſuch groſs*

groſs Notions of God, that they could not conceive rightly of this Myſtery. For this he has roundly affirmed; and therefore ought in all Reaſon, either to prove this Charge upon the *Fathers*, or to give the World, and the Church of *England* in particular, ſatisfaction for ſpeaking ſo falſely and ſcandalouſly of ſuch glorious Lights and principal Pillars of the *Chriſtian Church*; and ſuch as, I dare ſay, never Preached nor Prayed in any Conventicle.

But what the Doctrine of the *Fathers* is concerning this περιχώρησις, and how they underſtood thoſe words of our Saviour (expreſſed by this Term) is manifeſt from the Teſtimony of two or three of them, which I ſhall ſet down, as (in ſo known a caſe) abundantly ſufficient. St. *Cyrill* of *Alexandria*, ſays expreſly, *Chriſt's ſaying*, that he is in the Father, and the Father in him, *ſhews the Identity of the Deity, and the Unity of the Subſtance, or Eſſence.* And ſo likewiſe *Athanaſius*: *Accordingly therefore* (ſays he) *Chriſt having ſaid before*, I and my Father are one: *He adds*, I am in the Father, and the Father in me, *that he might ſhew both the Identity of the Divinity, and the Unity of Eſſence.* And ſo again St. *Hilary*: *The Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father, by the Unity of an inſeparable* [*Undivided*] *Nature.* By which Paſſages, I ſuppoſe any Man of ſenſe will perceive, That the Thing which the *Fathers* meant and gathered from thoſe words of

Ἵνα διὰ μὲν τοῦ, τοῦτον ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἐν τούτῳ φαίνειν ᾖ ταυτότητα ᾖ θεότητος καὶ τὴν οὐσίας ἑνότητα, λέξῃ, *Cyril. Theſaur. lib.* 12. *p.* 109.

Διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ, καὶ εἰκότως εἰρηκὼς προέτιξεν, Ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἓν ἐσμὲν, ἐπήγαγετο Ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ ἐν, Ἐμοὶ ἵνα ᾖ μὲν ταυτότητα ᾖ θεότητος, ᾖ δὲ ἑνότητα ᾖ οὐσίας δείξῃ, *Athanaſius Oratione quarta contra Arianos.*

Pater in filio eſt & filius in Patre per inſeparabilis Naturæ Unitatem, *Hilarius de Trinitate, lib.* 8.

of our *Saviour* (ſince expreſſed by this περιχώρησις) was no *Unity of Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* (which they never mention) but an *Unity of Eſſence, or Nature* (which they expreſly and conſtantly do.) Nor does this very Author deny it, as appears from his own words, though he quite perverts the ſence of the *Fathers*, by a very ſenceleſs Remark upon them, *Page* 125. Lines 20, 21. *This Sameneſs* [or Unity] *of Nature* (ſays he) *might be the Cauſe of this Union* [in the *Divine Perſons*] viz. by a περιχώρησις, *but not explain what this Intimate Union is.* Now this Author has been already told, That the Queſtion here is not, what *explains this Union*, but what *this Union is?* But beſides this his miſtake of the Queſtion, I deſire him to declare, what he means *by the Cauſe of this Union?* (as he here expreſſes himſelf.) For will he make an *Union* (as he calls an *Unity*) in the *Divine Perſons by Sameneſs of Nature a Cauſe of their Intimate Union by a* περιχώρησις, *or Mutual-In-being of them in each other*, and affirm alſo this περιχώρησις to be the ſame Thing *with Mutual-Conſciouſneſs?* If he does ſo, he makes the ſame Thing the Cauſe of it ſelf. For the *Sameneſs of Nature in the Three Perſons*, and their *Mutual-In-being, or In-dwelling*, are the very *ſame Thing*, and the *ſame Unity*, though differently expreſſed. But however, if we take him at his own word, it will effectually overthrow his Hypotheſis. For *if the Sameneſs of the Divine Nature* in the *Three Perſons*, be (as he ſays) the cauſe of this περιχώρησις, and this περιχώρησις be the ſame with *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*; it will and muſt follow, That this *Sameneſs, or Unity of Nature* can no more conſiſt in *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, than the *Cauſe* can conſiſt in its *Effect*, or the Antecedent in its Conſequent. And this Inference ſtands firm and unanſwerable againſt him.

But

But as to the Truth of the Thing it ſelf, though we allow and grant *the Unity of the Divine Nature* in the *Three Perſons*, and *the Mutual In-being, or In-dwelling* of the ſaid *Perſons* in each other, to be the ſame Thing, yet we deny, That this their *Mutual In-being* is the ſame with their *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*. But that their *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* follows and *reſults from it*, and for that cauſe cannot be *formally the ſame* with it. And ſo I have done with his 3d Argument, which he has drawn from the περιχώρησις, and is indeed nothing elſe, but a bold downright *Perverſion of Scripture, and a* groſs Abuſe of the *Fathers*.

4. His fourth Argument is from an Allegation out of St. *Auſtin*, who, though he does not (as our Author confeſſes) *Name this Mutual-Conſciouſneſs, yet he explains a Trinity in Unity* (as he would perſwade us) *by Examples of Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*; particularly by *the Unity of the Three Faculties of* Underſtanding, Memory *and* Will *in the ſame Soul, all of them Mutually Conſcious to one another of the ſeveral Acts belonging to each of them.* And his 9th Book is ſpent upon this Argument; In which he makes *the Mind*, conſidered *with its knowledge of it ſelf, and its love of it ſelf* (all three of them (as he ſays) but one and the ſame Thing) *a faint Reſemblance of the Trinity in Unity.* And this is, what he Argues from St. *Auſtin*.

To which I Anſwer.

Firſt, That *Faint Reſemblances* are far from being ſolid Proofs of any Thing; and that, although ſimilitudes may ſerve to illuſtrate a Thing otherwiſe proved, yet they prove and conclude nothing. The *Fathers* indeed are full of them both upon this and ſeveral other Subjects, but ſtill they uſe them for Illuſtration only, and nothing elſe. And it is a ſcurvy ſign that Proofs and Arguments

run

run very low with this Author, when he paſſes over thoſe Principal Places in which the *Fathers* have plainly, openly and profeſſedly declared their Judgment upon this great Article, and endeavours to gather their ſence of it only from Similitudes and Alluſions; which looks like a deſign of putting his Reader off with *ſomething like an Argument, and not an Argument*, and *of which the Tail ſtands where the Head ſhould*: For according to the True Method of proving Things, the *Reaſon* ſhould always go firſt, and the *Similitude* come after; but by no means ought the *Similitude* ever to be put inſtead of the *Reaſon*. But

Secondly, To make it yet clearer, how unconcluſive this Author's Allegation from St. *Auſtin* is, I ſhall demonſtrate, That this *Father* does not here make uſe of *an Example of Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, by ſhewing the great diſparity between the Thing alledged, and the Thing which it is applyed to, and that, as to the very Caſe, which it is alledged for. For we muſt obſerve, That *the Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* of the *Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity* is ſuch, as is fully and entirely in each *Perſon*, ſo that by vertue thereof every one of them is truly and properly *Conſcious* of all that belongs to the other Two. But it is by no means ſo in thoſe three Faculties of the Soul, *Underſtanding*, *Memory*, *and Will*. For though the *Underſtanding* indeed be *Conſcious* to all that paſſes in the *Will*, yet I deny the *Will* to be *Conſcious* to any Thing, or Act that paſſes either in the Underſtanding, or the Memory, and it is impoſſible it ſhould be ſo, without exerting an Act of Knowledge, or Intellection; which to aſcribe to the Faculty of the *Will*, would be infinitely abſurd. It is true indeed, That one and the ſame Soul is *Conſcious* to it ſelf of the Acts of all theſe Three Faculties: But ſtill it is by vertue of its Intellectual Faculty alone,

alone, that it is ſo. And the like is to be ſaid of its *Knowledge* and of its *Love* of it ſelf: For though it be the ſame Soul which both Knows and Loves it ſelf, yet it neither Knows it ſelf by an Act of *Love*, nor Loves it ſelf by an Act of *Knowledge* any more, than it can *Will* by an Act of the *Memory*, or *Remember* by an Act of the *Will*; which is impoſſible: and amongſt other proofs that it is ſo, it ſeems to me a very conſiderable one, that, if a Man could *remember* by his *Will*, this Author in all likelyhood, would not *forget* himſelf ſo often as he does. It is clear therefore on the one ſide, That the *Acts* of *Underſtanding*, *Memory*, *and Will*, neither are nor can be *Acts* of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*; and on the other, that *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt* do every one of them Exert *Acts* of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* upon one another, and conſequently, that, as to this thing, there is a total entire difference between both ſides of the Compariſon. For which cauſe it is to be hoped, that this Author himſelf will henceforth Conſult the Credit of his own Reaſon ſo far, as to give over proving, *That the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Bleſſed Perſons conſiſts wholly and ſolely in the Mutual-Conſciouſneſs of the ſaid Perſons*, by Examples taken from ſuch Created Things as are by no means *Mutually-Conſcious* to one another.

But to manifeſt yet further the Vanity of this his Allegation out of St. *Auſtin*, I ſhall plainly ſhew, wherein this *Father* placed the *Unity* of the *Three Divine Perſons*. And that, in ſhort, is *in the Unity of their Nature, Eſſence, and Subſtance. This is the Catholick Faith* (ſays he) *that we believe Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt to be of one and the ſame Subſtance.*

Patrem Filium & Spiritum Sanctum, unius ejuſdemque Subſtantiæ, *Lib.* 1. *de Trinitate, Cap.* 4.

Credamus ergo in Patrem & Filium & Spiritum Sanctum: Hæc æterna ſunt & incommutabilia, id eſt, Unus Deus, Unius Subſtantiæ, Trinitas æterna. Ibid.

And again, *Let us believe in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt. Theſe are Eternal and Unchangeable*, that is, *One God, of One Subſtance, the Eternal Trinity.* And moreover, ſpeaking of ſuch as would have *Three Gods* to be Worſhipped, he adds,

Neſciunt enim quid ſit Una eademque Subſtantia, &c. *Lib. de Agone Chriſtiano.*

That they know not what is the meaning of One and the ſame Subſtance, and are deceived by their own Fancies; and, becauſe they ſee Three Bodies ſeparate in Three Places, they think the Subſtance of God is ſo to be underſtood.

I think it very needleſs to add the like Teſtimonies from other *Fathers* (how numerous and full ſoever they may be) for our Author having here quoted only St. *Auſtin*, I ſhall confine my Anſwer to his Quotation, and think it enough for me to over-rule an Inference from a *Similitude* taken out of St. *Auſtin* by a *Plain, Literal, Unexceptionable* Declaration of St. *Auſtin*'s Opinion.

The Sum of the whole Matter is this, That the Thing to be proved by this Author, is, *That the Three Divine Perſons are One, only by an Unity of Mutual-Conſciouſneſs:* And to prove this, he produces only a Similitude out of St. *Auſtin*, and that alſo, a *Similitude* taken from Things, in which no ſuch Thing as *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* is to be found. By which it appears, That his Argument is manifeſtly Lame of both Legs, and, as ſuch, I leave it *to ſhift for it ſelf.*

5. In the fifth and laſt place, He tells us, *That the Fathers alſo reſolved the Unity of the God-head in the Three Divine Perſons into the* Unity of Principle; *meaning thereby, That though there be Three Divine Perſons in the God-head,*

head, Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt; yet the Father is the Original and Fountain of the Deity, who begets the Son of his own Subſtance; and from whom, and the Son, the Holy Ghoſt eternally proceeds of the ſame Subſtance with the Father and Son; ſo that there is but one Principle and Fountain of the Deity, and therefore but one God, Page 128. Line 6.

Now all this is very true; but how will our Author bring it to his purpoſe? Why, thus, or not at all, *viz.* That the *Numerical Unity of Nature* in the *Three Divine Perſons*, by being founded in, and reſolved into this *Unity of Principle*, does therefore properly conſiſt in *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*. This, I ſay, muſt be his Inference, and it is a *large ſtep*, I confeſs, and larger than any of the *Fathers* ever made: Nevertheleſs without making it, this Author muſt ſit down ſhort of his Point. And yet if he really thinks, that his Point may be concluded from hence; why, in the Name of Sence and Reaſon might he not as well have argued from *Gen.* 1. 1. *That God Created the Heavens and the Earth*, and that therefore the *Three Divine Perſons* are and muſt be one, only by an *Unity* of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs?* For it would have followed every whit as well from this as from the other. But, ſince the Creation of both, I believe, never Man diſputed as this Man does, while he pretends to prove his *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* from *the Unity of Principle* in the *Oeconomy* of the *Divine Perſons*: And yet, if he does not deſign to prove it from thence, to what purpoſe is this *Unity of Principle* here alledged, where the only Point to be proved is, That the *Unity* of the *Divine Nature* in the *Three Perſons* is only an *Unity* of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs?*

But to come a little cloſer to him. If this Author can make it out, That the *Father* Communicates his Sub-

ſtance to the *Son*, and the *Father* and the *Son* together Communicate the ſame to the *Holy Ghoſt* by one *Eternal Act* of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, Common to all *Three Perſons*, then his Argument from *Unity of Principle to an Unity of Nature, conſiſting in Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, may ſignifie and conclude ſomething; but this he attempts not, nor if he ſhould, would he or any Man living be ever able to prove it.

But he is for coming over this Argument again, and tells us, *That (as* Petavius *well obſerves) it does not of it ſelf prove the Unity (that is to ſay, the Numerical Unity) of the God-head, but only the* ὁμοουσιότης, *or Sameneſs of Nature*, i. e. as he elſewhere explains himſelf [*the Specifick Sameneſs of Nature.*] *And that therefore the Fathers thought fit to add*, That God begets a Son, not without, but within Himſelf, *Page* 128. *Line* 17, &c.

In Anſwer to which Obſervation, though it affects the Point of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* (the only Thing now in hand) no more than what he had alledged before; yet in vindication both of the *Fathers* and of *Petavius* himſelf, I muſt needs tell this Author, That it is equally an Abuſe to both. For as to the *Fathers*; it has been ſufficiently proved to him, That neither is there any ſuch Thing as a *Specifick Unity, or Sameneſs of Nature* in the *Divine Perſons*, nor that the *Fathers* ever owned any ſuch, but ſtill by the ὁμοούσιον held only a *Numerical Unity of Nature*, and no other; ſo that their ſaying, That *God begot a Son within himſelf*, was rather a further Explication of the ὁμοούσιον, than any *Addition* at all to it. And as for *Petavius*, whereas this Man ſays, That he has obſerved, *That this Argumentation of the Fathers, does not of it ſelf prove the Numerical Unity of the God-head in the Three Perſons*; I averr, That *Petavius* obſerves no ſuch Thing. He ſays indeed; *If this Reaſoning (viz.*

from

from Unity of Principle) *were conſidered Abſolutely and Univerſally, it would prove rather a Specifick than a Numerical Unity of Nature,* and gives a Reaſon for it from *Humane Generation:* But then he does by no means ſay, That the *Fathers Arguments* in this Caſe ought to be ſo conſidered, but plainly limits them to the *Divine Generation,* as of a peculiar kind, differing from all others. And thereupon no leſs plainly Aſſerts, *That when the Father begets the Son, he Communicates to him the ſame Numerical Subſtance and Nature,* and ſays expreſly, *That the force and ſtrength of the Fathers Argumentation is taken from the proper Condition and Nature of the Divinity, and the Divine Generation, from whence they collect, not any kind of Unity of Eſſence, but only a Singular and Numerical Unity in the Three Divine Perſons:* Which he makes good by Inſtances from St. *Athanaſius* and St. *Hilary.* And this is the true ſtate of the Caſe, and ſhews, That *Petavius* underſtood the *Fathers*; whether he, who takes upon him to be his Corrector and Confuter, does or no. In the mean time it is ſhameleſs to inſinuate in this manner, that *Petavius* repreſented theſe Arguments of the *Fathers,* as proving only the [*Specifick*] *Sameneſs of Nature,* and *not the Numerical Unity of the God-head,* when he plainly ſhews, That they deſigned thereby to prove a *Numerical Unity of Eſſence* in the *Divine Perſons,* and nothing elſe.

Ex *propria* Divinitatis divinæque Generationis Conditione ac natura Vis & robur Argumentationis iſtius petitur, quatenus non qualemcunque Eſſentiæ Unitatem ſed Singularem & Numeralem ineſſe Tribus Perſonis colligit. *Petav. Dog. de Trinitate. Lib.* 4. *Cap.* 15.

But this Author ſeems to aſſume to himſelf a peculiar Priviledge of ſaying *what he will, and of whom he will.* In which nevertheleſs I cannot but commend his Conduct, as little as I like his Arguing. For that, as he makes ſo bold with ſo Learned and Renowned a Perſon as *Petavius*:

vius; So he wiſely does it now that he is laid faſt in his Grave. For had *Petavius* been living, and this Man wrote his Book in the ſame Language in which *Petavius* wrote his (which, for a certain Reaſon, I am pretty well ſatisfied he never would) there is no doubt but *Petavius* would have toſſed him and his *New Notion* of *Three diſtinct Infinite Spirits*, long ſince, in a Blanket, and effectually taught him the difference of Inſulting over a Great Man when his Head is low, and when he is able to defend himſelf.

We have ſeen how little our Author has been able to ſerve himſelf of the fore-mentioned *Reſolution of the Unity of the Divine Nature, into an Unity of Principle*, by way of Argument in behalf of his *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*. Nevertheleſs, though it fails him, as an *Argument*, yet, that he may not wholly loſe it, he ſeems deſirous to cultivate it as a *Notion*; and upon that ſcore tells us, That it needs ſomething further both to *Complete* and *Explain* it, (which, with reference to his own Apprehenſions of it, I eaſily believe) but however, I ſhall take ſome Account of what he ſays, both as to the *Completion, and Explication of it*. And

Firſt, For the *Completion*. He tells us, *That Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, are Eſſential to One God*, and that upon this Account there muſt be neceſſarily *Three Perſons in the Unity of the Godhead, and can be no more*. As to which laſt Clauſe he muſt give me leave to tell him, That it is not the *bare Eſſentiality* of the *Three Perſons* to the *God-head*, which proves that there can be no more than *Three* belonging to it: but it is the *Peculiar Condition* of the *Perſons*, which proves this; without which the *Eſſentiality* of the *Three*, would no more hinder the *Eſſentiality* of a *Fourth* or *Fifth*, than the *Eſſentiality* of *Two* could take away the *Eſſentiality* of a *Third*. And therefore though the

the Propoſition laid down by him be true, yet his Reaſon for it will not hold.

But one choice Paſſage quoted by him out of a great *Father*, I muſt by no means omit, *viz.* That upon Account of this *Unity of Principle*, St. *Auſtin* calls the *Trinity*, *Unam quandam ſummam Rem*, Page 123. Line 8. Concerning which, I deſire any Man living (except this Author) to declare freely, whether he thinks that St. *Auſtin*, or any one elſe of Sence and Learning would call *Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits* (which are neither *Numerically*, nor *Specifically*, nor ſo much as *Collectively One*) *Unam quandam ſummam Rem.* But in the

Second Place: As for his *Explication* of the ſaid *Notion*, he tells us, *That he ſhall proceed by ſeveral ſteps*, and thoſe (as he would perſwade us) *very plain, and Univerſally acknowledged by all*, Page 126. Lines 16, 17, *&c.*

Nevertheleſs, by his good leave, I ſhall and muſt demur to Two of them, as by no means fit to be acknowledged by any, and much leſs *ſuch as are acknowledged by all.* And they are the *Third* and *Fourth.* In which he tells us, That, in the firſt place, *Original Mind and Wiſdom*, and in the ſecond, *That Knowledge of it ſelf*, and laſtly, *Love of it ſelf*, are all of them *diſtinct Acts, and ſo diſtinct, that they can never be one Simple Individual Act.* And withal, that theſe Acts being thus diſtinct, muſt be *Three Subſtantial Acts in God*, That is to ſay, *Three Subſiſting Perſons*: By which *Three Subſtantial Acts* he muſt of neceſſity mean *Three ſuch Acts, as are Three Subſtances.* Foraſmuch as he adds in the very next words, *That there is nothing but Eſſence and Subſtance in God*, Page 130. Lines 7, 8, 9. to the middle of the Page.

Now againſt theſe ſtrange Poſitions, I Argue thus.

First,

Firſt, If the Three fore-mentioned *Acts* are ſo diſtinct in *God*, that they can never be *One Simple Individual Act*, then I infer, That the ſaid *Three Acts* cannot poſſibly be *One God*. Foraſmuch as to be *One God*, is to be *One Pure Simple Indiviſible Act*. And thus we ſee how at *one ſtep*, or ſtroke, he has *Ungodded* the *Three Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*. For *theſe Three Acts* (he tells us) *are the Three Perſons in the Godhead*. Though I believe no *Divine* before him, ever affirmed a *Perſon to be an Act*, *or an Act a Perſon*; with how great Confidence ſoever (and ſomething elſe) this Man affirms it here.

Secondly, If thoſe *Three Acts* in the *God-head* are *Three diſtinct Infinite Subſtances* (as he plainly ſays they are, by telling us, Page 130. Line 19. *That there is nothing but Eſſence and Subſtance in God*) then in the *Godhead* there are and muſt be *Three diſtinct Gods*, or *Godheads*. Foraſmuch as an *Infinite Subſtance* being properly God, every *diſtinct infinite Subſtance*, is and muſt be a *diſtinct God*.

Theſe I affirm to be the direct unavoidable Conſequences of thoſe two ſhort Paragraphs in *Page* 130. which he makes his *Third* and *Fourth Explanatory Steps*.

But becauſe he may here probably bear himſelf upon that Maxim, *That there is nothing but Eſſence and Subſtance in God*, (which yet by the way might better become any one to plead than himſelf) let me tell him, That that *Propoſition* is not abſolutely, and in all Sences true. If indeed he means by it, That there is no *Being*, whether *Subſtance*, or *Accident* in *God*, beſides his own moſt *Pure*, *Simple*, *Indiviſible Subſtance*, or *Eſſence*, (which is the commonly received ſence of it) it is moſt true. But if he therefore affirms, That neither are there any *Modes*,

Modes, or *Relations* in *God*, this will not be granted him. For in *God*, beſides *Eſſence*, or *Subſtance*, we aſſert, That there is that, which we call *Mode*, *Habitude*, and *Relation*: And by one or other of theſe in Conjunction with *Eſſence*, or *Subſtance*, we give account of all the *Acts*, *Attributes*, and *Perſonalities* belonging to the *Divine Nature*, or *Godhead*. This is the conſtant, unanimouſly received Doctrine of *Divines*, *School-men*, and *Metaphyſicians*, in their Diſcourſes upon *God*, and without which, it is impoſſible to Diſcourſe intelligibly of the *Divine Acts*, *Attributes*, or *Perſons*. And as it ſtands upon a firm bottom, ſo it may well be defended: And if this Author has ought to except againſt it, I ſhall be ready to undertake the defence of it againſt him at any time.

But ſtill, that he may keep up that Glorious, ſtanding Character of *Self-Contradiction*, (which, one would think to be the very *Ratio formalis*; or, at leaſt, the *Perſonal Property* of the Man.) Having here, in *Page* 130. made a very bold *ſtep*, by Aſſerting *the Three Divine Perſons, to be Three diſtinct Acts, and ſo diſtinct, that they can never be one Simple, Individual Act.* In the very next Page but one, *viz.* 132. Line 13. he roundly affirms, *That the Father and the Son are one ſingle Energy and Operation.* Now, how ſafe and happy is this Man, that no Abſurdities, or Contradictions can ever hurt him! Or at leaſt, that he never feels them, let them *pinch* never ſo cloſe and hard.

What remains, is chiefly a Diſcourſe about the different way of the *Son*'s iſſuing from the *Father*, and the *Holy Ghoſt*'s iſſuing from both: As that the former is called *Generation*, becauſe the *Son* iſſues from the *Father* by a *Reflex Act*, and the latter termed *Proceſſion*, becauſe the *Holy Ghoſt* iſſues from both by a *direct Act*. But

why a *Reflex Act* muſt needs be termed properly a *Generation*, and a *direct Act* not be capable of being properly ſo accounted, this our Acute Author very diſcreetly ſays nothing at all to; though (under favour) all that he ſays beſides, leaves us as much in the Dark as we were before. And for my own part, I cannot think my ſelf concerned to clear up a Point wholly foreign to that, which alone I have undertook the Diſcuſſion of.

And thus I have finiſhed my Diſpute with Him, concerning the Authorities of the *Fathers* alledged in behalf of his *Notion* of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, as that, wherein he places the *Unity* of the *Divine Nature* belonging to the *Three Bleſſed Perſons*. The Sum of which whole Diſpute is reſolved into this ſingle Queſtion, viz. *In what the Fathers placed the Unity in Trinity?* And if they placed it in the *Sameneſs*, or *Unity* of *Nature*, *Subſtance*, or *Eſſence*, (words applyed by them to this Subject at leaſt a Thouſand Times, and ſtill uſed *to ſignifie one and the ſame Thing*) then it is plain that they did not place it in an *Unity of Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*. For, I ſuppoſe, no Man (this Author himſelf not excepted) will ſay, That *Eſſence*, or *Subſtance*, and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* are Terms *Synonymous*, and of the ſame ſignification. And as the whole Diſpute turns upon this ſingle Queſtion; ſo in the management of it, on my part, I have with great particularity gone over all the Proofs by which this Author pretends to have evinced his Doctrine from the *Fathers*. The utmoſt of which Proofs amounts to this, That the *Fathers* proved an *Unity of Nature* in the *Divine Perſons*, from the μια ἐνέργεια, the μια κίνησις βουλήματος, and the περιχώρησις Common to them all: And moreover, ſometimes illuſtrated the ſaid *Unity* by the *Three Faculties* of the *Underſtanding*, *Memory*, and *Will* being one with the Soul which they belonged to. And Laſtly, That

That they reſolved *the Unity of the Trinity* into *an Unity of Principle*; the *Father* being upon that account ſtyled, *Principium & fons Deitatis*, as Communicating the *Divine Subſtance* to the *Son* and together with the *Son* to the *Holy Ghoſt*. And what of all this, I pray? Do all, or any of the fore-mentioned Terms ſignifie *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*? Why, No: But this Author with a *non obſtante* both to the proper ſignification and common uſe of them all, by abſolute Prerogative declares them to mean *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*: And ſo his Point is proved, viz. *That Mutual-Conſciouſneſs is not only an Argument inferring the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Bleſſed Perſons*, (which yet was all, that the *Fathers* uſed the fore-mentioned Terms for) but, (which is more) *That it is that very Thing wherein this Unity does Conſiſt*. This, I ſay, is a True, though a ſhort Account of all his *Arguments* upon this *Subject*; and (according to my cuſtom) I refer it to the Judicious Reader, to judge impartially, whether it be not ſo, and withal to improve and carry on the aforeſaid *Arguments* in his behalf to all further advantage that they may be Capable of.

But in the iſſue, methinks the Author himſelf ſeems to review them with much leſs Confidence of their Puiſſance, than when at firſt he produced them. For if we look back upon the Triumphant Flag hung out by him at his *Entrance* upon this part of his Work (the only proper time for him to Triumph in) and when he declared, *That his Explication of the Trinity was the Conſtant Doctrine of the Fathers and the Schools*, Page 101. Lines 24, 25. who could have imagined but that he then foreſaw, that he ſhould prove his Point with all the ſtrength and evidence which his own Heart could deſire? And yet alas! Such, for the moſt part, is the vaſt diſtance between Promiſes and Performances, that we have him

bringing up the Rear of all with this ſneaking Concluſion, Page 138. Line 22, &c. *It muſt be confeſſed,* (ſays he) *That the Ancient Fathers did not expreſs their ſence in the* ſame Terms *that I have done. But I leave it to any Indifferent and Impartial Reader, whether they do not* ſeem to have intended *the ſame Explication which I have given of this Venerable Myſtery.* Theſe are his words; and I do very particularly recommend them to the Reader, as deſerving his peculiar Notice. For is this now the Upſhot and Reſult of ſo daring a Boaſt, and ſo confident an Undertaking, to prove his Opinion *the Conſtant Doctrine of the Fathers?* viz. *That though the Fathers ſpeak not one word of it*; nay, *though they knew not how to expreſs themſelves about it,* Page 125. Line 18. Yet *that to an Indifferent Reader* (and a very *indifferent* one indeed he muſt needs be in the worſt ſence) they may *ſeem to intend the ſame Explication he had given of it?* So that the Sum of his whole Proof and Argument amounts to this and no more, *viz.* That to ſome Perſons *videtur quòd ſic,* and to others, *videtur quòd non.* For ſee, how low he ſinks in the iſſue. Firſt of all from the *Fathers poſitive ſaying, or holding* what he does, it is brought down to their *Intending* it; and from their *Intending* it, it falls at laſt to their *ſeeming to Intend it*; and that is all. And now, is not this a worthy Proof of ſo high a Point? And may it not juſtly ſubject this Author to the ſame *Sarcaſtical Irony* which he paſſed upon his *Socinian Adverſary?* Page 92. Line 17, &c. *Right, very Right, Sir, a plain Demonſtration!*

But ſtill there is one half of his Promiſe to be yet accounted for, viz. *The proving his Opinion to have been the conſtant Doctrine of the Schools.* And how does he acquit himſelf as to this? Why, in a very extraordinary manner too. For, firſt, inſtead of alledging the Authority of

of the *School-men*, he tells us, Page 138. *That they are of no Authority at all, but as they fall in with the Fathers.* And withal, That inſtead of doing ſo, *They uſe to miſtake, and clog the ſence of the Fathers with ſome peculiar Niceties and Diſtinctions of their own.* And *that, the Truth is, the vain Endeavours of reducing this Myſtery to Terms of Art, ſuch as Nature, Eſſence, Subſtance, Subſiſtence, Hypoſtaſis, Perſon, and the like,* (which (he ſays) ſome of the *Fathers* uſed in a very *different ſence from each other) have wholly confounded this Myſtery.*

And here I cannot but deſire the Reader to judge, whether this be not a new and wonderful way of procuring Credit to an Hypotheſis, upon the ſcore of its being *the conſtant Doctrine of the Schools*, by telling the World (as this Man here does) that the *School-men* are a Company of *Impertinent Fellows*, of little or no Authority in themſelves, and who have by their uſeleſs abſurd Niceties, confounded this whole Myſtery? For if they are of no Authority but what they derive from the *Fathers*, (as he avers) why does he quote them upon the ſame level with the *Fathers*, and plead them both as *two diſtinct Authorities?* And if they do nothing but pervert and confound this Myſtery, why, inſtead of alledging them, does he not earneſtly caution his Reader againſt them, and diſſwade him from having any Thing to do with their dangerous and abſurd Writings? This certainly is a way of proving a Point by *Teſtimony* and *Authority*, ſo beyond all Example ridiculous, that unleſs the Reader will vouchſafe to read theſe Paſſages in the Author himſelf, and ſo take his Conviction from his own Eyes, I can hardly blame him, if he refuſes to believe my bare Affirmation in a Thing ſo Incredible.

As for the Terms *Eſſence, Subſtance, Subſiſtence, Perſon, and the like*, which he ſo explodes, I hope I have given

given my Reader a ſatisfactory Account both of their Uſefulneſs, and of the uſeleſneſs of ſuch as this Author would Subſtitute in their room, in *Chap.* 2. at large, to which I refer him. And whereas he ſays, Page 139. Line 25. &c. *That the Deity is above Nature, and above Terms of Art; and that there is nothing like this Myſterious Diſtinction and Unity; and therefore, no wonder, if we want proper words to expreſs it by; at leaſt, that ſuch Names as ſignifie the Diſtinction and Unity of Creatures, ſhould not reach it.* If by all this he means, That there are no *Terms of Art* Comprehenſive, and fully expreſſive of the *Divine Nature*, and the *Myſterious Diſtinction* and *Unity* of the *Perſons* belonging to it, none that I know of thinks otherwiſe. But if he means that no *Terms of Art* can be of any uſe to aid us in our inadequate imperfect Conceptions of thoſe great Things, ſo as thereby we may conceive of them in ſome better degree, and clearer manner, than we could without ſuch *Terms*, pray then, of what uſe are his *Self-Conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* in this Matter? For I ſuppoſe he will allow theſe to be *Terms of Art* too; and ſuch (I am ſure) as he has promiſed the World no ſmall Wonders from. But if he will allow any Uſefulneſs in thoſe two *Terms of Art* (of his *own Inventing*) towards our better Apprehenſion of the *Divine Nature* and *Perſons*, the ſame and greater has the conſtant uſe of all *Church-Writers* proved to be in the *Terms Eſſence, Subſtance, Hypoſtaſis, Perſon*, &c. as the propereſt and moſt ſignificant, the fitteſt and moſt accommodate to help and methodize Men's Thoughts in diſcourſing of *God*, and *Immaterial Beings*, of all or any other *Terms of Art*, which the Wit of Man ever yet invented, or pitched upon for that purpoſe. And I hope, the known avowed uſe and experience of ſuch great Men, and thoſe in ſo great a number,

is

is an abundant overpoiſe to the contrary Affirmation of this, or any other *Novel* Author whatſoever.

But all this (it ſeems) he endeavours to overthrow and daſh with *Three* Terrible Confounding Queſtions, *Page* 139. Lines 22, 23, *&c.* Which yet I can by no means think ſo very formidable, but that they may be very ſafely Encountered, and fairly Anſwered too. As,

Qu. 1. *What* (ſays our Author) *is the Subſtance, or Nature of God?*

I Anſwer. It is a *Being* exiſting of, and by it ſelf, Incorporeal, Infinite, Eternal, Omniſcient, Omnipotent, *&c.*

Qu. 2. *How can Three diſtinct Perſons have but One Numerical Subſtance?*

I Anſwer. Every whit as well as they can be ſaid to have but one *Numerical Godhead*, or *Divine Nature*; or as they can have one *Numerical Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* common to them all.

Qu. 3. *What is the Diſtinction between Eſſence, and Perſonality, and Subſiſtence?*

I Anſwer. The ſame, that is between a *Thing*, or *Being, and the Modes of it*. And he, who neither knows, nor admits of a difference between theſe, is much fitter to go to School himſelf, than to ſit and paſs judgment upon the *School-men*. And as for the Terms *Subſiſtence* and *Perſonality*, they import the laſt and utmoſt Completion of the Exiſtence of Things, by vertue whereof, they exiſt by themſelves ſo, as neither to be *Supported* by, nor *Communicable* to any Subject. Of which Two *Modes*, *Perſonality* belongs only to *Intelligent Beings*, but *Subſiſtence* to all others, to whom the aforeſaid Definition does agree. And this is the True, Proper Difference and Diſtinction between theſe Two. And this

this Author may take Notice of it, if he pleaſes.

However, having thus anſwered his Queſtions (tho' to what purpoſe he propoſed them, I cannot imagine) yet that he may ſee how ambitious I am to follow his great Example, I ſhall, in requital of his Three Queſtions, propoſe theſe Four to him: As

Firſt, Since in *Page* 139. he affirms *the Deity to be above Nature, and all Terms of Art; ſo that we want proper Words and Names to expreſs the Diſtinction and Unity of the Divine Perſons by, and that ſuch, as ſignifie the Diſtinction and Unity of Creatures, cannot reach it.* I deſire to know of him upon what ground of Reaſon it is, That ſpeaking of this ſame *Myſterious Unity and Diſtinction* in *Page* 106. *Lines* 11, 12, &c. He ſays, That *the Fathers uſed ſeveral Examples, and alluded to ſeveral kinds of Union, thereby to form an adequate Notion of the Unity of the Godhead?* For if the Deity be ſo far above *Nature* and all *Terms of Art*, that there is an utter want of words, or Names to expreſs the *Unity* of it by, *How could any Examples, or Alluſions drawn from Nature* (though never ſo many) form in us *an Adequate Notion thereof?* Hitherto both *Divines* and *Philoſophers* have judged the *Divine Nature* abſolutely Incomprehenſible by any *Adequate*, or *Complete Conception* of it. And for my own part, I account *the Unity of it in Trinity*, much leſs capable of having an *Adequate Notion* formed of it, than the *Deity* conſidered barely in it ſelf is, and conſequently that it is as much as Humane Reaſon can reach to, to have a *true* and *certain* Notion of it, though very *Imperfect and Inadequate.* But as for an *Adequate Notion of the Unity of the Godhead in Three Divine Perſons*, if this Author can form to himſelf ſuch an one, let him enjoy it as a Priviledge peculiar to himſelf, and not obtainable by any other Mortal

Mortal Man whatſoever. And this is not the firſt Inſtance of his miſrepreſenting the *Fathers*.

Secondly, Whereas this Author in the latter end of *Page* 138, and the beginning of *Page* 139. explodes the Terms *Eſſence, Subſtance, Subſiſtence, Hypoſtaſis, Perſon*, &c. *as uſeleſs Niceties, and ſerving only to confound the Myſtery of the Trinity*; and yet nevertheleſs in *Line* 12, *&c.* of *Page* 139. acknowledges, That *theſe very Terms were found out and made uſe of to encounter the Hereſie of* Sabellius, who had turned this Sacred Myſtery into a *Trinity of Names*, or, at moſt, of *Offices*; I deſire to know of him, what greater Proof he could have given of the exceeding Uſefulneſs and Importance of theſe Terms, than by thus deriving the Invention and Uſe of them from ſuch an Occaſion? And eſpecially when, notwithſtanding *all the Curious Examination ſince paſſed upon them*, whereby (he ſays) *they were found in ſome reſpect or other defective* (as what Terms are not when applyed to *God?*) experience yet ſhews, that they have maintained their Uſe and Credit from that Age all along to this very Day. Certainly it is a great Unhappineſs, when a Man can neither forbear Writing, nor yet know when he *Writes for a Thing*, and when againſt it.

Thirdly, I deſire to know of this Author, whether in the very ſame place, *viz. Page* 130. in which he profeſſes to *explain an Unity in Trinity by an Unity of Principle*, he does well to tell us in *Line* 19. of the ſaid *Page*, *That there is nothing but Eſſence and Subſtance in God*, having ſo often, and ſo poſitively declared, *That theſe Terms ſerve only to obſcure and confound Men's Notions of God?* And whether he accounts ſuch Terms, as ſerve only thus to *confound Men's Thoughts and Notions about the Godhead*, and the *Unity* thereof, the fitteſt *to explain the Unity of*

the said Godhead, with reference to the *Divine Persons*? Which is *the Thing there* promised and undertaken by Him.

Fourthly and Lastly, Since this Author has condemned all the forementioned Terms both as useless, and fit only to *obscure* and *confound*, instead of *explaining*, the Doctrine of the *Trinity*, I desire to know of him, why he tells us at the close of *Page* 139. That he *does not think it impossible* (which is only a *Figure* called, a μειωσις, signifying, that it is *very possible and easie*) *to give a Tolerable Account of the said School-Terms and Distinctions*? For since by a *Tolerable* he must mean (if he means any Thing to the Purpose) such an *Account* of them, as shews them to have a *Rational sence and meaning under them*, I desire him to tell me whether every *Rational Sence* is not (as such) also a *True one*? And if *True*, whether *one Truth* can any more *obscure, perplex, and confound*, than it can *Contradict another Truth*? Which being invincibly evident, as to the Negative, I desire this Author in the last place to tell me, whether it does, or can become a Man Consistent with himself, to pass so Reproachful a Character upon the Terms of the *Schools*, in the beginning of *Page* 139, and afterwards to give so contrary and commendatory an Account of the said Terms in the latter end of the very same Page?

I hope the Reader will be pleased to take this Notable Instance also of this Author's Consistency with himself (so far as *Self-Contradiction* may be so called) into his Consideration.

And so these are the *Four Questions*, or *Queries*, which I would have him resolve me, or rather the World, in; for I am sure it concerns Him and his Credit, so to do.

Having

Having thus followed this Author both in his Reaſonings and Quotations, and found him equally Impertinent in both, I muſt again deſire my Reader to joyn with me in admiring the ſtrange Confidence of the Man. I have already noted, with what a daring Aſſurance he vouched his New Opinion *for the conſtant Doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools*, Page 101. Line 24. *&c.* After which Peremptory Aſſeveration, who could have expected, but that he would have appeared in the Head of Thirty, or Twenty *Fathers* at leaſt (*Greek* and *Latin* together) to have reſcued his beloved *Hypotheſis* from the Imputation and Charge and Novelty, which he ſeems ſo deſirous to Ward off? *P.* 100. *L.* 22. And that beſides *Gr. Nyſſen*, *Athanaſius*, *Maximus*, *Nazianzen*, *Damaſcen* (and theſe for the moſt part quoted upon an Account not at all relating to his *Hypotheſis*) and St. *Cyrill*, (who is not ſo much as Quoted, but only Named) we ſhould have had *Juſtin Martyr*, *Irenæus*, *Origen*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, St. *Baſil*, *Theodoret*, *Epiphanius*, with ſeveral more, all alledged in his behalf? And amongſt the *Latins* that we ſhould beſides St. *Auſtin*, whom alone he quotes, and St. *Ambroſe*, whom he only mentions about the ὁμοούσιον, *Page* 107. *Line* 10. have heard alſo of *Tertullian*, *Lactantius*, St. *Cyprian*, St. *Jerome*, and St. *Hilary*, with a great many others? And then laſtly for the *Schoolmen*, who could have expected fewer of them alſo, than Ten, or Twenty? And that we ſhould have ſeen *Alexander Alenſis* (the firſt who Commented upon the *Oracle*) with *Durandus*, *Aquinas*, *Scotus*, *Major. Biel*, *Soto*, *Vaſquez*, *Cajetan*, *Gr. de Valentiâ*, *Eſtius*, and many more of the *Scholaſtick Tribe*, all drawn forth in Rank and File, to have fought his Battels? But when after all, none but poor *Peter Lombard* comes forth like a *Doughty Captain*, with none to follow him, this methinks looks

more like the Deſpair of a Cauſe, than the Defence of it. For though our Author calls *Peter Lombard the Oracle of the Schools*, and all know his Sentences to be the Text which the *School-men* undertake to Explain and Comment upon: Yet Experience has told us, That the *Reſponſes of this Oracle* (as well as of thoſe heretofore) are often found very *Dubious and Ambiguous*. Witneſs *Thomas* and his Followers expounding them one way, and *Scotus* and his Diſciples underſtanding them another; and ſeveral, (amongſt whom *Durandus* and *Greg. Ariminenſis*) going a different way from both. So that ſometimes there is but too much need of a good Interpreter to fix the ſence of this *Oracle*, (as great a Veneration as the *Schools* may have for him.) And therefore ſince his Text is not always ſo very plain and eaſie as to make an Explication of it ſuperfluous, this Author having quoted *Peter Lombard* in ſuch, or ſuch a ſence, ought in all Reaſon to have produced the Major and more eminent part of the *School-men* and *Writers* upon him, and ſhewn their Unanimous Concurrence in the ſame Sence and Notion, which he took him in, and quoted him for. And this indeed would have been to his Purpuſe, and look'd like proving his Opinion to have been *the Doctrine of the Schools*. Otherwiſe I cannot ſee how the *Maſter of the Sentences* can be called, or paſs for all the *School-men*, any more than the *Maſter of the Temple* can paſs for all the *Divines* of the *Church of England*. Unleſs we ſhould imagine, that this *Peter Lombard* had by a kind of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* gathered all his Numerous Brood into Himſelf, and ſo United them all into one Author. So that the Sum of all is this, That this Author, having declared his Opinion, *the conſtant Doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools*, to make his words good, has produced for it Three or Four *Greek Fathers*, and Two

Latin

Latin (though even theſe no more to his purpoſe than if he had quoted *Dod* and *Cleaver*, or τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενον, out of *Homer*) and laſtly, *One* Sentence out of *one Schoolman*. Which if it be allowed to paſs for a good, juſt, and ſufficient Proof of any Controverted Concluſion, let it for the future, by all means, for this our Author's ſake, be an Eſtabliſhed Rule in Logick from a Particular, to infer an Univerſal.

And now that I am bringing my Reader towards a cloſe of this long Chapter, I muſt deſire him to look a little back towards the beginning of the foregoing Chapter, wherein, upon this Man's Confident Affirmation, That *his Opinion was the Conſtant Doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools*, I thought it neceſſary to ſtate what his Opinion was, and accordingly I ſhew'd, that it Conſiſted of Four Heads.

1ſt. That the *Three Perſons of the Bleſſed Trinity were Three diſtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits*; which how far he was from being able to prove from the Authority of any of the *Fathers* cited by him, was ſufficiently ſhewn by us in the preceding Chapter. The

2d. Was, *That Self-Conſciouſneſs was the formal Reaſon of Perſonality in the ſaid Three Perſons, and conſequently That, whereby they were diſtinguiſhed from each other*; which (in the ſame Chapter) I ſhew'd he was ſo far from proving from the Authority of thoſe *Ancient Writers*, that he did not alledge one Tittle out of any of them for it, nor indeed ſo much as mention it in any of the Quotations there made by him. And as for the

3d. Member of his ſaid *Hypotheſis*, viz. *That the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Bleſſed Perſons, Conſiſted in the Mutual-Conſciouſneſs belonging to them*, This we have Examined at large, and Confuted in this Chapter. But ſtill there remains the

4th. And

4th. And laſt to be ſpoken to, as completeing his whole Hypotheſis, and reſulting, by direct Conſequence, from the other Three, viz. *That a Trinity in Unity, and Unity in Trinity, explained by the Three foremention'd Terms, or Principles, is a very plain, eaſie, and Intelligible Notion*; which having been in a moſt Confident, Peremptory manner, affirmed by him all along, (as I ſhew in *Chap.* 1.) and upon that Score, making ſo great a part of his *Hypotheſis*, ought in all reaſon to be be proved to have been the Sence and Doctrine of the *Fathers* concerning this Article. But not one word does he produce upon this Head neither. Nor, for my own part, do I expect ever to find the leaſt *Sentence* or *Syllable* in any *Ancient Writer* tending this way. And I challenge this Author to produce ſo much as one to this purpoſe.

In the mean time, how, and with what kind of words I find theſe *Ancient Writers* expreſſing themſelves about this Venerable Myſtery, I ſhall here ſet down. Only I ſhall premiſe a Sentence or two out of this Author himſelf; and which I have had occaſion to quote more than once before, from *Page* 106. *Line* 7. viz. *That the Unity in Trinity being* (as he confeſſes) *ſo great a Myſtery, that we have no Example of it in Nature, it is no wonder if it cannot be explained by any one kind of Natural Union*; *and that therefore it was neceſſary to uſe ſeveral Examples, and to allude to ſeveral Kinds of Union, to form an Adequate Notion of the Godhead*; and moreover, *Page* 139. *Line* 26. &c. *That there is nothing like this Myſterious Diſtinction and Unity, and that we want proper words to expreſs it by.*

All which Paſſages lying clear, open, and expreſs in the fore-cited places of this Author, I muſt needs ask him, Whether all theſe are uſed by Him to prove *the Unity*

Unity in Trinity a plain easie and Intelligible Notion, as he has frequently elsewhere asserted it to be? As, to go over each of the Particulars;

First, Whether we must account it *Plain*, because he says, *It is a Great Mystery, of which we have no Example in Nature?* And

Secondly, Whether we must reckon it *easie*, because he says, *That it cannot be Explained by any one kind of Natural Union, but that several Examples must be used, and several sorts of Union alluded to for this purpose?* And

Lastly, Whether it must pass for *Intelligible*, because he tells us, *That we want proper words to express it by*, that is, in other Terms, to make it *Intelligible?* since *to express a Thing*, and *to make it Intelligible*, I take to be *Terms* equivalent.

In fine, I here appeal to the Reader, Whether we ought from the forementioned Passages of this Author, to take the *Unity in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity for a plain, easie, Intelligible Notion*, according to the same Author's affirmation so frequently inculcated in so many Parts of his Book?

But I shall now proceed to shew, (as I promised) how the *Fathers* speak and declare themselves upon this great Point. And here we will begin first with *Justin Martyr*. *A Singularity, or Unity* (says he) *is understood by us, and a* Trinity in Unity *is acknowledged. But how it is thus, I am neither willing to ask others, nor can I perswade my self, with my Muddy Tongue and Polluted Flesh, to attempt a Declaration of such*

Μοναὶ ἐν τριάδι νοεῖται, καὶ τριὰς ἐν μονάδι γνωρίζεται. Καὶ πῶς τοῦτο δὲ διερωτᾶν οὔτ' ἄλλους ἐβουλόμην, οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐμαυτὸν δυναίμην πείθειν τοὺς περὶ τῶν ἀπορρήτων λόγους γλώσσῃ πηλίνῃ καὶ σαρκίῳ ῥυπῶνι καταλαλεῖν. *Justin. Martyr. Exposit. Fidei de rectâ Confessione. Pag. 379. Edit. Colon. 1686.*

Ineffable

Οἰκονομίαν τὴν θείαν Τριάδος ἀῤῥητος μὲν ὁ λόγος. *Juſtin. Mart.* ibid. p. 381.

Ineffable Matters. And again, ſpeaking of the *Oeconomy* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*, The *Nature* and *Manner* (ſays he) of this *Oeconomy* is *unutterable.* And yet again, ſpeaking of this Myſterious *Oeconomy* of the *Deity* and the *Trinity*, as one of the greateſt *Myſteries* of the *Chriſtian Faith: I cry out* (ſays he) *O wonderful! For that the Principles and Articles of our Religion ſurpaſs, and tranſcend the Underſtanding, Reaſon, and Comprehenſion of a Created Nature.*

Ἀνακεκράζω δὲ θαῦμα, ὅτι ὑπὲρ νοῦν, ὑπὲρ λόγον, ὑπὲρ καταλῆψιν τῆς κτιστῆς φύσεως τὰ ἡμέτερα. *Juſtin. Mart.* ibid. p. 387, 388.

Τριὰς ὑπερέσιος καὶ ὑπέρθεος. *Dionyſius Areopagita in Myſticâ Theologiâ*, cap. 1. pag. 271. *Pariſ. Edit.* 1615.

In the next place, *Dionyſius* the *Areopagite* (or ſome very *Ancient Writer* under that Name) calls it the *Tranſcendent*, *Supereſſential*, and *Superlatively Divine Trinity.* In like manner *Gregory Nyſſen*, *We apprehend* (ſays he) *in theſe* (viz. the *Three Divine Perſons*) *a certain Inexpreſſible, Inconceivable Unity* (or *Communication*) *and Diſtinction*, &c. St. *Baſil* alſo, Writing againſt ſuch as would derogate from the Equality of the *Divine Perſons*, ſpeaks of the *Trinity* thus, *Either let theſe Inexpreſſible Things be ſilently Reverenced, or Religiouſly and Becomingly Repreſented.* And again, in a Diſcourſe againſt ſuch as uſed Contumelious Words of the *Trinity*, ſpeaking there of the *Holy Ghoſt* as *Eſſentially* one with the *Father*

Ἀῤῥητός τις ἡ ἀκαταληψία ἐν τούτοις καταλαμβάνεται καὶ ἡ κοινωνία καὶ ἡ διάκρισις, &c. *Greg. Nyſſen.* Pag. 465. Tom. 2. *Edit. Pariſienſ.* 1615.

Ἡ δὲ σιωπῇ τιμάσθω τὰ ἄῤῥητα, ἢ εὐσεβῶς ἀπεικονιζέσθω τὰ ἅγια. *Baſilius libro de Spiritu Sancto ad Amphilochium*, cap. 18. p. 332. Tom. 2. *Edit. Pariſ.* 1637.

ther and the *Son*, he ſays, *The Intimate Conjunction between him and them is hereby declared* (*viz.* by the *Scripture* there quoted by him, and applyed to them) *but the* Ineffable Manner *of his Subſiſtence hereby Inviolably preſerved.* So that ſtill (we ſee) with this *Father* the *Oeconomy of the Three Divine Perſons in the Bleſſed Trinity*, is a Thing *Ineffable*, and above all Deſcription, or Expreſſion. *Nazianzen* alſo ſpeaks of the *Trinity* under theſe Epithetes, ſtyling it *the Adorable Trinity*, Above, and before the World, before all Time, of the ſame Majeſty, of the ſame Glory, Increate, and Inviſible, above our Reach, and Incomprehenſible. And the ſame Epithetes are given it by *Nicephorus* Patriarch of *Conſtantinople*, in the *Acts* of the *Council* of *Epheſus*, declaring the *Trinity* to be of *One and the ſame Eſſence, Tranſcendent in its Subſtance, Inviſible, and Inconceivable.* And Laſtly, *Eulogius*, Archbiſhop of *Alexandria*, ſets it forth thus. *We divide not* (ſays he) *what is but One, we part not the Singularity, nor diſtract the Unity; but ſo Aſſert this*

Τῆς μὲν οἰκειότητος δηλουμένης ἐντεῦθεν, τοῦ δὲ τρόπου τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἀῤῥήτου φυλασσομένου. ibid. pag. 333.

Τριὰς προσκυνητὴ, ὑπερκόσμιος, ὁμόθρονος, ὁμόδοξος, ὑπέρχρονος, ἄκτιστος, ἀόρατος, ἀναφὴς, ἀπερίληπτος. *Greg. Nazianzen. Oratione* 12. P. 204. *Edition. Pariſienſ. Anno Dom.* 1630.

Τριὰς ὁμοούσιος, ὑπερούσιος, ἀόρατος, ἀκατάληπτος. *Nicephorus Conſtantinopolitanus in Actis Synodi Epheſinæ*, Pag. 307. *Editionis Commelianæ* 1591.

Οὐ δὲ ἓν διαιροῦμεν, οὐ τὴν μονάδα μερίζομεν, οὐ τὴν ἑνάδα διασπῶμεν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀϊδίῳ μονότητι θεολογοῦντες ταύτην, ἐν τρισὶν αὐτὴν συνθεολογοῦμεν ὑποστάσεσιν, οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνοις λογισμοῖς τὰ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ὑποβάλλοντες, οὔτε περινοητικαῖς ἐρευναῖς τὰ ὑπὲρ εὕρησιν ἐνυβρίζοντες. *Eulogius Archiepiſcopus Alexandrinus in Bibliothecâ Photii.* Cod. 230. Pag. 865. *Rothomagi Anno Dom.* 1653.

 Unity,

Unity, in an Eternal Singularity, as to aſcribe the ſame to Three diſtinct Hypoſtaſes; by no means ſubjecting things above our Underſtanding, *to Human Reaſonings, nor by an Over-curious Search undervaluing Things ſo much* above all Search, or Diſcovery.

Having given this Specimen of what the *Greek Fathers* and *Writers* thought and ſpoke of the *Trinity*, let us now paſs to the *Latines*. And amongſt theſe, we have in the firſt place, St. *Hilary* expreſſing himſelf thus. *The Myſtery of the Trinity is Immenſe and Incomprehenſible, not to be expreſs'd by Words, nor reach'd by Sence, Imperceivable, it blinds our Sight, it exceeds the Capacity of our Underſtanding. I underſtand it not. Nevertheleſs, I will comfort my ſelf in this, That neither do the Angels know it, nor Ages apprehend it, nor have the Apoſtles enquired of it, nor the Son himſelf declared it. Let us therefore leave off complaining*, &c.

Trinitatis Myſterium eſt immenſum, & Incomprehenſibile, extra ſignificantiam ſermonis, extra ſenſûs intentionem, Imperſpicabile, Lumen occæcat, Intelligentiæ Capacitatem excedit. Ego neſcio; ſed conſolabor me tamen: Angeli neſciunt, ſæcula non tenent, Apoſtolus non interrogavit, Filius ipſe non edidit. Ceſſet ergo dolor querelarum, &c. *Sanctus Hilarius Libro ſecundo de Trinitate.*

After him, let us hear St. *Ambroſe*, *The Divinity of the Holy Trinity* (ſays he) *is to be believed by us to be without beginning or end; albeit, hardly poſſible to be comprehended by the Mind of Man.*

Abſque ullo Principio aut fine credenda eſt Sanctæ Trinitatis Divinitas. Licèt humanæ ſit menti ipſa comprehenſione difficilis. Unde non incongruè dicitur quòd hoc ſolum ex eâ comprehendimus, quia prorſus comprehendi non poteſt. *Ambroſius Tract. in Symbolum Apoſtolicum.* Tom. 4. p. 43. col. 1. *Edit. Colon.* 1616.

Upon

Upon which Account it may be not improperly ſaid concerning it, That we comprehend this only of it, That in truth it cannot be comprehended.

To St. *Ambroſe* ſucceeds St. *Auſtin*. *In this Trinity* (ſays this Learned Father) *is but One God, which is indeed wonderfully unſpeakable, and unſpeakably wonderful.*

In illâ Trinitate, Trinitas eſt unus Deus, quod ſanè eſt mirabiliter ineffabile, vel ineffabiliter mirabile, *Aug. de Trinitate Lib.* 15.

To the ſame purpoſe *Fulgentius*. *So far as I can judge, only the Eternal and Unchangeable Trinity ought to be looked upon by us, as worthy to be eſteemed Incomprehenſibly Miraculous; and as much exceeding all that we can think or imagine of it, as it ſurmounts all that we are.*

Sola (quantùm arbitror) immutabilis illa ſempiternitas Trinitatis reperietur Incomprehenſibilitatis digna miraculo, quæ ſic excedit omne quod cogitare vel ſapere poſſumus, ſicut ſuperat omne quod ſumus. *Fulgentius ad Thraſymundum Regem*, lib. 2. cap. 1.

After him we ſhall produce *Hormiſda* Biſhop of *Rome*, in a Letter to *Juſtinian* the Emperour, about the beginning of the Sixth Century, ſpeaking thus. *The Holy Trinity* (ſays he) *is but One, It is not multiplyed by Number, nor grows by any Addition, or Encreaſe: Nor can it either be comprehended by our Underſtanding, nor in reſpect of its Divinity be at all Divided.* And a little after. *Let us Worſhip Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, diſtinct in themſelves,*

Unum eſt Sancta Trinitas, non multiplicatur Numero, non creſcit Augmento; nec poteſt aut Intelligentiâ comprehendi, aut hoc quod Deus eſt diſcretione ſejungi. *Ac paulò pòſt.* Adoremus Patrem & Filium & Spiritum Sanctum Indiſtinctum diſtinctè Incomprehenſibilem & inenarrabilem ſubſtantiam Trinitatis. *Atque iterum*, Magnum eſt ſanctæ & incomprehenſibile Myſterium Trinitatis, *Crabb. Concil.* Tom. 1. Pag. 1034, 1035.

themselves, but with one indistinct Worship, That is to say, *The Incomprehensible and Unutterable Substance of the* Trinity. And presently again, *Great and Incomprensible is the Mystery of the* Holy Trinity.

In the last place St. *Bernard* delivers himself upon the same Subject thus. *I confidently affirm* (says he) *that the Eternal and Blessed Trinity, which I do not understand, I do yet believe, and embrace with my Faith, what I cannot comprehend with my Mind.*

Fidenter dixerim æternam beatamquè Trinitatem, quam non intelligo, credo, & fide teneo, quod non capio mente, *Bernardus Sermone 76. super Cantic.*

I have here, as I said, given a Specimen of what the *Ancient Writers* of the *Church*, both *Greek* and *Latin*, thought and said of the *Blessed Trinity*, and it is, I confess, but a Specimen; since I think that enough for an Universally acknowledged, and never before contradicted Proposition: Whereas, had it but in the least seemed a Novelty, (as this Author's *Hypothesis* not only *seems*, but unquestionably *is*) I should have thought my self obliged to have brought as many Quotations for it from Antiquity, as would have filled a much larger Book than I intend this shall be.

But as for those which I have here produced, I do solemnly appeal to any Man living, *Christian*, or not *Christian* (who does but understand these Languages) whether the *Fathers* now Quoted by me (and all the rest upon the same Subject speak agreeably to them) looked upon *Trinity in Unity, and Unity in Trinity, as a Plain, Easie, and Intelligible Notion?* So that if the Judgment of the *Fathers*, and of this Author, be in this point *one* and the *same*, it must unavoidably follow, That either the *Fathers* have not yet declared their Judgment and Doctrine, or that this Author has not yet declared his:

Since

Since ſo much as has been declared on the one ſide, is a direct and groſs *Contradiction* to what has been Aſſerted on the other.

And moreover the fore-alledged Teſtimonies of the *Fathers* are ſuch, that we are not put to draw what we contend for, by remote, far fetched Conſequences from them, but it lies plain, open, and manifeſt in them; in words too clear and full to be denyed, and too convincing to be evaded. So that we are ſure both of their Words and Expreſſions, and of the common ſence of all Mankind to expound and underſtand them by. And will this bold over-bearing Man, after all this, *Claim their meaning to be the ſame with his?* What *his meaning* is, he has told us forty times over, *viz. That Unity in Trinity*, &c. is ſo far from being an *Unintelligible Notion*, that it is not ſo much as *difficult*, how much ſoever the dull miſtaken World has for near 1700 Years thought otherwiſe.

And now if this be the True Account and ſtate of this Matter, that when the *Fathers* ſay of the τριας, or *Trinity*, that it is ἄῤῥητος, ἀνεπίληπτος, ἀνεπινόητος, ἀπερίληπτος, ὑπερύσιος, ὑπερθεος, ὑπὲρ νοῦν καὶ ὑπὲρ λόγον, ὑπὲρ ἀνθρωπίνους λογισμοὺς & ὑπὲρ εὕρησιν: That is to ſay, *Ineffable, Inconceivable, Unintelligible, Incomprehenſible, and (if poſſible) tranſcending the very Notion of the Deity it ſelf, above all Humane Underſtanding and Reaſon, Diſcourſe and Scrutiny*, I ſay, if by all this, he can prove that the *Fathers* meant, *That it was a very Plain, Eaſie, and Intelligible Notion* (as, by affirming that thoſe (who uſed all theſe Expreſſions) *meant the ſame with himſelf*, he does and muſt affirm; or ſay, That they knew not their own *meaning*, or at leaſt were not able to expreſs it, but in words quite contrary to it;) I muſt needs own the *Fathers* to have been not only *leſs happy in expreſſing themſelves*

ſelves about this Myſtery, than this Author (as with great Modeſty and Deference to them, he often tells us they were) but, which is yet much worſe, that they were the moſt wretchedly unhappy in wording their own *Notions* of all Men, who ever yet ſet Pen to Paper. And as for this Author, if *Unutterable, Unconceivable and Unintelligible* can paſs with him for *Plain, Eaſie, and Intelligible*, it is high Time for me to leave off diſputing with him, and either to have no more to do with him, or, without any further demurr, to profeſs my ſelf as ready to believe and grant *Contradictions*, as he is, or can be, to Write them.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

In which is ſet down the Ancient, and generally received Doctrine *of the* Church, *concerning the Article of the* Bleſſed Trinity, *as it is Delivered and Explained by* Councils, Fathers, School-men, *and other later* Divines; *together with a Vindication of the ſaid* Doctrine *ſo Explained from this* Author's Exceptions.

THough I cannot think that the Nature and Deſign of the Work undertook by me (which was only to Animadvert upon, and Confute this Author's *Novel, Heterodox Notions* about the *Trinity*) does, or can directly engage me to proceed any further; or lay any Neceſſity upon me to give a poſitive Account of the *Doctrine* and *Sence* of the *Church* about this great *Article*; yet ſince this Author in aſſerting his own Opinion, could not be content to do it without reproaching and reflecting upon thoſe *Ancient Terms*, which the *Church* has been ſo long in poſſeſſion of, and has ſtill thought fit to uſe in declaring it ſelf upon this Subject, (as if inſtead of *Explaining*, they ſerved only to *perplex, obſcure,* and *confound it*) and ſince the Reaſonableneſs, or Unreaſonableneſs of either *Hypotheſis*, is moſt likely to appear by fairly ſetting down one, as well as the other, and ſhewing

ing what this *Opiniator* is gone *off from*, as well as what he is gone *over to*, I judge it neither improper, nor unuſeful to repreſent what the Church has hitherto held and taught concerning this *Important Article of the Trinity*, as I find it in *Councils*, *Confeſſions*, *Fathers*, *Schoolmen*, and other *Church-Writers*, Ancient and Modern. And in this alſo I muſt be again content to entertain my Reader only with a Taſt, or *Specimen* out of ſo vaſt a ſtore; which yet I do, with very good Reaſon, judge both ſatisfactory and ſufficient, in a Point of *Divinity* Univerſally owned, received, and embraced; and (unleſs by ſuch as reject and deny the *Trinity* it ſelf) never Impugned, or Contradicted before.

Now the commonly received *Doctrine* of the *Church* and *Schools*, concerning the *Bleſſed Trinity* (ſo far as I can judge, but ſtill with the humbleſt Submiſſion to the Judgment of the *Church of England* in the Caſe) is this, That the *Chriſtian Faith* having laid this *ſure Foundation*, That there is but *One God*; and that there is nothing (*i.e.* no *Poſitive*, *Real Being*, ſtrictly and properly ſo called) in *God*, but what is *God*, and laſtly, That there can be no *Compoſition* in the *Deity* with any ſuch *Poſitive Real Being* diſtinct from the *Deity* it ſelf; and yet the *Church* finding in *Scripture* mention of *Three*, to whom diſtinctly the *Godhead* does belong, it has by warrant of the ſame *Scripture*, *Heb.* 1.3. expreſſed theſe *Three* by the Name of *Perſons*; and ſtated their *Perſonalities* upon *Three diſtinct Modes of Subſiſtence* alloted to *One* and the ſame *Godhead*, and theſe alſo diſtinguiſhed from one another by *Three diſtinct Relations*. Concerning which, we muſt obſerve, That albeit, according to the Reality of the *Thing*, the *Subſiſtence* and *Relation* of each *Perſon* make but *One Single Indiviſible Mode of Being*, yet according to the Natural Order of Conceiving Things, we muſt Conceive of the *Subſiſtence* as

as precedent to the *Relation:* Foraſmuch as Humane Reaſon conſiders Things ſimply as *Subſiſting*, before it can conſider them as *Relating* to one another.

But for the further Explication of the Point before us, it will here be neceſſary to premiſe what is properly a *Mode of Being*. And this the *School-Divines* do not allow to be either a *Subſtance*, or an *Accident* (which yet makes the adequate Diviſion of *Real Beings*; ſince there is no ſuch *Being* but what is contained under one of them) but a *Mode* is properly a certain *Habitude* of ſome *Being*, *Eſſence*, or *Thing*, whereby the ſaid *Eſſence*, or *Being* is determined to ſome particular State, or Condition, which, barely of it ſelf, it would not be determined to. And according to this account of it, a *Mode* in Things Spiritual and Immaterial ſeems to have much the like reference to ſuch kind of *Beings*, that a Poſture has to a Body, to which it gives ſome difference, or diſtinction, without ſuperadding any new *Entity*, or *Being* to it. In a word, a *Mode* is not properly a *Being*, either *Subſtance*, or *Accident*, but a certain affection cleaving to it, and determining it from its *common general Nature* and *indifference* to ſomething more particular, as we have juſt now explained. As for Inſtance, in *Created Beings*, *Dependence is a Mode* determining the *general Nature* of *Being* to that particular State, or Condition, by vertue whereof it proceeds from, and is ſupported by another; and the like may be ſaid of *Mutability*, *Preſence*, *Abſence*, *Inherence*, *Adherence*, and ſuch like, *viz.* That they are not *Beings*, but *Modes*, or *Affections of Being*, and inſeparable from it ſo far, that they can have no Exiſtence of their own, after a ſeparation, or diviſion from the Things, or *Beings* to which they do belong.

And thus having explained, in General, what *a Mode* is, we are to know, That the *Perſonalities*, by which

the *Deity* ſtands diverſified into *Three diſtinct Perſons*, are by the Generality of *Divines*, both *Ancient* and *Modern*, called and accounted *Modes*, or at leaſt ſomething Analogous to them (ſince no one Thing can agree both to *God* and the *Creature*, by a perfect *Univocation*.) And moreover, as every *Mode Eſſentially* includes in it the *Thing*, or *Being* of which it is the *Mode*, ſo every *Perſon* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*, by vertue of its proper *Mode* of *Subſiſtence*, includes in it the *Godhead* it ſelf, and is properly *the Godhead as ſubſiſting with and under ſuch a certain Mode, or Relation.* And this I affirm to be the Current Doctrine both of the *Fathers* and the *Schools*, concerning the *Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*, and the conſtantly received Account given by them of a *Divine Perſon*, ſo far as they pretend to Explain what ſuch a *Perſon* is.

And accordingly, as theſe *Relations* are *Three*, and but *Three*, ſo the *Perſons* of the *Godhead*, to whom they belong, are ſo too, viz. *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt*. But then, we muſt obſerve alſo, That the *Relations* which the *Godhead* may ſuſtain, are of Two ſorts.

1ſt. *Extrinſecal*, and founded upon ſome *External Act* iſſuing from *God*; of which ſort are the *Relations* of *Creator*, *Preſerver*, *Governor*, and the like, to the *Things Created*, *Preſerved*, and *Governed* by him. Which, though they leave a real effect upon the Things themſelves, yet derive only an *External Habitude*, and denomination conſequent from it upon the *Deity* it ſelf: The

2d. Sort of *Relation*, is *Intrinſecal*, and founded upon thoſe *Internal Acts*, by which one *Perſon produces* another, or *proceeds* from another: For to *produce* and to *proceed* (whether by *Generation*, or *Spiration*) is that which makes, or Conſtitutes a Plurality of *Perſons* in the *Godhead*.

From

From all which it follows, That the *Relation*, by which *God* as a *Creator*, or *Preſerver*, reſpects his Creatures, is extremely different from that by which *God* as a *Father* reſpects *his Son*. The former adding only to the *Deity* an *Extrinſecal denomination*, but the latter leaving upon it an *Internal Incommunicable Character, Eſſentially Inſeparable* from the *Deity*. So that although it may well enough be ſaid, That *God* might never have been a *Creator*, yet it cannot be ſaid of Him, That he might never have been *a Father*; the former being only an effect of his Will, but this latter the Neceſſary Reſult of his *Nature*.

Now theſe *Internal Acts*, upon which the *Divine Relations* are founded, and from which they flow, are,

Firſt, That *Eternal Act*, by which the *Father* Communicates his *Divine Nature* to the *Son*, which accordingly is called *Generation*.

And that by which the *Son* receives his *Divine Nature* from the *Father*, which is called *Filiation*. And

Thirdly, The *Act of Spiration*, by which the *Father* and the *Son* together, eternally breath forth the *Holy Spirit*. And,

Laſtly, The *Act of Proceſſion*, by which the *Holy Ghoſt proceeds*, and receives his *Divine Nature*, joyntly from them both. Theſe, I ſay, are thoſe *Internal, Incommunicable* and *diſtinguiſhing Acts*, from which the *Perſonal Relations* belonging to the *Three Divine Perſons* are derived.

But you will ſay: *Does not this infer Four Perſons in the Godhead?* viz. That as *Generation* and *Filiation* make two, ſo *Spiration* and *Proceſſion* ſhould make two more?

I Anſwer, No: Becauſe the ſame *Perſon* may ſuſtain ſeveral *Perſonal Relations*, and Exert, and receive ſeveral *Perſonal Acts*, where thoſe *Acts*, or *Relations* are not *oppoſite to*, or inconſiſtent with one another in the ſame Subject. As for inſtance, The *Perſon* of the *Father* may Exert both an *Act* of *Generation and of Spiration*, and ſo ſuſtain the *Relations* reſulting from both without any Multiplication of his *Perſon*; and the *Son* likewiſe may receive and ſuſtain the *Act* of *Filiation*, and withal Exert an *Act* of *Spiration*, without any Multiplication of *Perſonality*. And this, becauſe neither are the *Acts* of *Generation* and *Spiration* inconſiſtent in the *Father*, nor the *Acts* of *Filiation* and *Spiration*, incompatible in the *Son*. Though indeed the *Acts* of *Generation* and *Filiation*, and the *Relations* ſpringing therefrom, would be utterly inconſiſtent (becauſe oppoſite) in any one *Perſon*, as likewiſe upon the ſame Account would the *Acts* of *Spiration* and *Proceſſion*.

From whence by plain and undeniable Conſequence it follows, That *Generation* and *Filiation*, *Spiration* and *Proceſſion* Conſtitute only *Three Perſons* in the *Eternal Godhead* and no more. For *Relations* merely *diſparate*, do not Conſtitute ſeveral diſtinct *Perſons*, unleſs they be *oppoſite* too. That Maxime of the *Schools* being moſt true, That *Sola Oppoſitio multiplicat in Divinis*. So that albeit, *Filiation* and *Spiration* are Terms oppoſite to their reſpective Correlates, yet being only *diſparate* with reference to one another, and as both of them meet and are lodged in one and the ſame Subject, (*viz.* the *Perſon* of the *Son*) they neither cauſe, nor infer in him any more than one *Single Perſonality*.

But now if any one ſhould ask me, What this *Generation* and *Filiation*, this *Spiration* and *Proceſſion* are?

I Anſwer,

I Anſwer, That herein conſiſts the Myſtery; and ſince ſuch Myſteries exceed the Comprehenſion of Human Reaſon, I am not in the leaſt aſhamed, moſt readily to own my ignorance thereof, in that known Anthem uſed in the Church.

Quid ſit Gigni, quid Proceſſus,
Me neſcire ſum profeſſus.

For though the Author whom I have been Diſputing with, by the help and vertue of Two Wonder-working Words (able to make one, *who is no Conjurer*, do ſtrange things) undertakes to make this greateſt of Myſteries *Plain*, *Eaſie*, and *Intelligible*; and when he has done this, (as he ſays he has) owns it nevertheleſs for a *Myſtery* ſtill: yet in the Judgment of other Mortals, to acknowledge a Thing *Inexplicable*, and in the ſame Breath to offer *an Explication of* it too, will be thought a little too much for one of an ordinary pitch of Sence and Reaſon to pretend to; and therefore, for my own part, I dare not look ſo high.

Upon the whole matter, in diſcourſing of the *Trinity*, Two Things are abſolutely neceſſary to be held and inſiſted upon. One, That each, and every *Perſon* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*, entirely contains and includes in himſelf the whole *Divine Nature*. The other, That each *Perſon* is *Incommunicably different* and *diſtinct* from the other.

And here if it ſhould be asked. *How they differ, and whether it be by any real Diſtinction between the Perſons?*

I Anſwer, Yes: But for the better explaining of my Anſwer, we muſt diſtinguiſh of Two ſorts of *Real* Diſtinctions.

1. The

1. The firſt greater, *viz.* When Two Things, or real *Beings*, differ from one another.

2. The other leſſer; as when the difference is between a Thing, or real *Being* on the one ſide, and the *Mode* of it on the other: Or between Two or more *Modes* of the ſame *Being*. And this Diſtinction, or Difference is called *Real* in oppoſition to that which is wholly founded upon the Apprehenſion, or Operation of the Intellect, and has of it ſelf no Exiſtence without it. But a *Being*, and the *Mode* adhering to it differ, whether the Mind ever apprehends and thinks of them, or no. And thus we affirm, That the *Divine Perſons* really differ, and are diſtinguiſhed from one another, *viz.* by a *Modal*, or *leſſer* ſort of *Real Difference*; according to which, the *Divine Nature Subſiſting* under, and being determined by ſuch a certain *Mode*, perſonally differs from it ſelf, as *Subſiſting* under, and determined by another. Foraſmuch as the *Divine Nature*, or *Godhead* ſo *Subſiſting* and determined is properly a *Perſon*. Nor ought this ſmallneſs of difference between the *Divine Perſons* to be any preſumption againſt the Truth of what we have delivered concerning the *Oeconomy* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*, as ſhall be more particularly ſhewn in Anſwer to one of this Author's Objections againſt it, before we come to a concluſion of this Chapter.

In the mean time to ſum up the foregoing Particulars, the Reader may pleaſe to take what I aver to be the *Doctrine* of the *Catholick Church* about this great Article, in this following Account of it, viz. *That there* is one, and but one *Self-Exiſting*, *Infinite*, *Eternal*, &c. *Being*, *Nature*, or *Subſtance*, which we call *God*. And that this *Infinite*, *Eternal*, *Self-exiſting Being*, or *Nature*, Exiſts in, and is common to *Three diſtinct Perſons*, *Father*, *Son* and *Holy Ghoſt*. Of which the *Son* eternally iſſues from the

Father

Father by way of *Generation*, and the *Holy Ghoſt* joyntly from both, by way of *Spiration*; which *Three Divine Perſons* ſuperadd to this *Divine Nature*, or *Deity*, *Three different Modes of Subſiſtence*, founding ſo many *different Relations*; each of them belonging to each *Perſon* in a peculiar Uncommunicable manner; ſo that by vertue thereof, each *Perſon* reſpectively differs and ſtands diſtinguiſhed from the other Two: And yet by reaſon of one and the ſame *Numerical Divine Nature*, or *Godhead* equally Exiſting in, and common to all the *Three Perſons*, they are all but *One and the ſame God, who is Bleſſed for Ever.*

This I reckon to be a True and Juſt Repreſentation of the *Doctrine* of the *Catholick Church*, ſo far as it has thought fit to declare it ſelf upon this Great and Sacred Myſtery. Not that I think this ſets the Point clear from all Difficulties and Objections. For the Nature and Condition of the Thing will not have it ſo, nor have the *Ableſt Divines* ever thought it ſo, (for where then were the *Myſtery?*) But that it gives us the faireſt and moſt conſiſtent Account of this Article, both with reference to Scripture and Reaſon, and liable to the feweſt Exceptions againſt it, of any other *Hypotheſis*, or *Explication* of it whatſoever.

And the ſame will appear yet further from thoſe Terms which the *Writers of the Church* have all along uſed in expreſſing themſelves upon this Subject. And that both with reſpect

Firſt, To the *Unity* and *Agreement* of the *Three Divine Perſons* in one and the ſame *Nature*. And

Secondly, To their *Perſonal diſtinction* from one another.

And firſt, For their *Unity* and *Agreement* in one and the ſame *Nature*. The *Greeks* expreſſed this by the Terms ὁμοουσιότης, or ὁμοούσιον, ταυτότης, and ἑνότης. And the

the *Latines* by *Conſubſtantialitas* and *Coeſſentialitas*. By all which I affirm, That they underſtood an *Agreement* in one and the ſame *Numerical Nature*, or *Eſſence*. For, though this Author has affirmed, That the *Nicene Fathers* underſtood no more by the ὁμουσιότης, than a *Specifick Unity of Nature*, this Matter has been ſufficiently accounted for, and his Aſſertion effectually confuted in the foregoing Chapter.

In the next place. As for the Terms expreſſing the Diſtinction and Difference of the *Divine Perſons* from one another, the *Greeks* make uſe of theſe, Τριάς *Trinity*, πρόσωπα *Perſons*, ὑποστάσεις *Subſiſtences*, or *Perſons*, τρόποι ὑπάρξεως *Modes of Subſiſtence*, ἰδιότητες *Properties*, χαρακτῆρες *Marks of Diſtinction*, χαρακτηριστικὰ ἰδιώματα *Diſtinguiſhing Properties*, γνωρίσματα *Notes of Signification*. And agreeably to them, the *Latines* alſo make uſe of the following Terms, *Trinitas*, *Perſonæ*, *Subſiſtentiæ*, *Modi Subſiſtendi*, *Proprietates*, *Relationes*, and *Notiones ſeu Notionalia*. By which laſt the *Schoolmen* mean ſuch Terms and Expreſſions, as ſerve to notifie and declare to us the proper and peculiar diſtinction of the *Divine Perſons*. And they reckon four of them, *viz.* the above-mentioned *Paternitas*, *Filiatio*, *Spiratio & Proceſſio*; all of them importing Relation. To which ſome add a fifth, which the *Greeks* call ἀγεννησία, or τὸ ἀγέννητον· and the *Latines*, *Innaſcibilitas*; a Term not importing in it any *Poſitive Relation*, but only a meer Negation of all *Producibility*, by any *Superiour Principle*, and upon that account peculiar to the *Father*, who alone, of all the *Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*, is without Production. Touching all which Terms, I cannot think it neceſſary to enlarge any further, in a particular and more diſtinct Explication of them; ſince, how differing ſoever they may be in their reſpective Significations, they all

all concur in the ſame uſe and deſign; which is to expreſs ſomething proper and peculiar to the *Divine Perſons*, whereby they are rendred diſtinct from, and Incommunicable to one another.

But theſe few general Remarks I think fit to lay down concerning them. As,

1. That albeit moſt of theſe Terms, as to the Form of the Word, run *Abſtractively*, yet they are for the moſt part to be underſtood *Concretively*, and not as ſimple Forms, but as Forms in Conjunction with the Subject, which they belong to. In the former abſtracted ſence they are properly *Perſonalities*, or *Perſonal Properties*, viz. Thoſe *Modes*, or *Forms* by which the *Perſons*, whom they appertain to, are formally conſtituted and denominated what they are; but in the Latter and Concrete Sence, they ſignifie the *Perſons* themſelves.

2. The Second Thing, which I would obſerve, is, That there has been in the firſt Ages of the Church ſome Ambiguity in the uſe of the words οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, Πρόσωπον, or *Perſona*. For neither would the *Latines* at firſt admit of *Three Hypoſtaſes* in *God*, as taking οὐσία and ὑπόστασις for the ſame Thing; for that they had no other *Latin* Word, to Tranſlate ὑπόστασις by, but *Subſtantia*, by which alſo they Tranſlated οὐσία; (the Word *Subſiſtentia* being then looked upon by them as Barbarous, and not in uſe) ſo that they refuſed the Term τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, for fear of admitting of *Three diſtinct Subſtances*, or *Eſſences* in the *Trinity*, which they knew would lead them into the Errour of *Arius*. Nor on the other ſide would the *Greeks* acquieſce in a μία ὑπόστασις, nor admit of the πρόσωπα, for fear of falling thereby into the contrary Errour of *Sabellius*; for that they thought the Word πρόσωπον imported no *real Internal difference*, but only a difference of *Name*, or *Attribute*, or at moſt

of *Office*; and for them to allow no more than ſuch an one amongſt the *Divine Perſons*, they knew was *Sabellianiſme*. And this Controverſie of Words exerciſed the Church for a conſiderable time; to appeaſe and compoſe which (amongſt other Matters) a Council was called and held at *Alexandria* about the Year of *Chriſt*, 362. in which amongſt many other Biſhops Convened from *Italy*, *Arabia*, *Ægypt* and *Lybia*, was preſent alſo *Athanaſius* himſelf. And in this Council both ſides having been fully heard, and found to agree in ſence, though they differ'd in words, it was ordained, That they ſhould thenceforth Mutually acknowledge one another for *Orthodox*, and for the future ceaſe contending about theſe words to the diſturbance of the Church. By which means, and eſpecially by the Explication given of theſe words by *Athanaſius*, (whereby (as *Gregory Nazianzen* tells us in his Panegyrick upon him) he ſatisfied and reconciled both *Greeks* and *Latines* to the indifferent uſe of them, and indeed that Oration made by *Nazianzen* himſelf in the Council of *Conſtantinople* (*viz.* the ſecond General) before 150 Biſhops, not a little contributing to the ſame;) the ſence of theſe Terms from that time forward came generally to be fixed, and the Ambiguity of them removed, and ſo the Controverſie by degrees ceaſed between the *Greeks* and *Latines*, and the Words πρόσωπα, or *Perſonæ*, and ὑποστάσεις, or *Subſiſtentiæ* grew at length to be promiſcuouſly uſed without any Jealouſie or Suſpicion, and to be accepted on all hands (though not preſently) in the ſame ſignification.

3. The Third Thing which I would obſerve, is, That ſome of the forementioned Terms ſignifie *Cauſally*, and ſome only *Declaratively*, that is to ſay, ſome import the *Ground and Reaſon* of the Diſtinction of the *Divine Perſons*,

Perſons, and ſome import only *Marks*, *Notes*, *and Signs* of ſuch a Diſtinction. Of the firſt ſort amongſt the *Greeks*, are ὑποστάσεις, τρόποι ὑπάρξεως, and ἰδιότητες; and amongſt the *Latines*, *Subſiſtentiæ*, *Modi Subſiſtendi*, *Proprietates & Relationes*. Of the Latter ſort amongſt the *Greeks* are χαρακτῆρες and γνωρίσματα: and amongſt the *Latines*, *Notiones*. But for the fuller and further illuſtration and improvement of this Note, I cannot but add the Obſervation of the ſolid and exactly Learned *Forbeſius*, *viz.* That of theſe *Modes*, called by the *Greeks*, τρόποι ὑπάρξεως, there is a four-fold Uſe, or Effect, as they ſuſtain four ſeveral Conſiderations. *viz.* That

Firſt, As *Modes of Subſiſtence*, they *Conſtitute the Perſons*. And

Secondly, That by the *Relations*, which they imply and include, they cauſe the ſaid *Perſons* to be referred to one another. And

Thirdly, That as they are *Properties* they diſtinguiſh the Perſons from each other. And

Laſtly, That, as *Notions*, they are Means, and (as it were) Inſtruments whereby we are enabled in ſome meaſure to apprehend and conceive of the *Divine Perſons*. *Forbeſius Inſtruct. Hiſt. Theolog.* Lib. 1. Cap. 35. Sect. 16.

By all which it appears, That the ſeveral forementioned Terms do really import but one and the ſame Thing, differently conſidered, according to the ſeveral Uſes and Effects aſcribed to it, in reſpect of the *Oeconomy* of the *Three Divine Perſons* amongſt themſelves.

4. In the Fourth and Laſt place, we may obſerve, That the words moſt commonly and frequently uſed by *Writers* in treating of the *Divine Perſons*, are the forementioned ὑποστάσεις, τρόποι ὑπάρξεως, and ἰδιότητες a-

mongſt the *Greeks*. And the Terms *Perſonæ*, *Relationes*, *Proprietates*, and (in the latter Ages eſpecially) *Subſiſtentiæ*, and *Modi Subſiſtendi* amongſt the *Latines*.

Theſe Obſervations I thought fit to lay down for our clearer and readier Apprehenſion of the Expreſſions uſed by the *Fathers*, and other *Church-Writers* in their Diſcourſes about this great Article of the *Chriſtian Faith*.

And ſo I proceed now to my Authorities, ſhewing both from the Ancient and Modern uſe of the Terms aforeſaid, and more eſpecially of the ὑποστάσεις, and τρόποι ὑπάρξεως, the *Subſiſtentiæ & Modi Subſiſtendi*, that the Church has all along placed the reſpective *Perſonalities of the Three Divine Perſons in Three diſtinct Modes of Subſiſtence*, according to the Doctrine Aſſerted by us. And here I ſhall begin with the *Greek Writers*, ſetting them down according to the Order and Age in which they Lived.

Juſtin Martyr. And firſt with *Juſtin Martyr*, who in his ἔκθεσις τ῀ πίστεως, or Expoſition of Faith, ſpeaks thus. Οὐ ταὐτὸν τῷ πατρὶ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἅγιον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀγέννητον καὶ γεννητὸν καὶ ἐκπορευτὸν οὐκ οὐσίας ὀνόματα ἀλλὰ τρόποι τ῀ ὑπάρξεως. *The Son* (ſays he) *and the Holy Ghoſt, are not the ſame with the Father; for the Terms Unbegotten, Begotten, and Proceeding, are not the Names of Eſſence, but Modes of Subſiſtence. Juſtin. Expoſition. fidei.* p. 373. *Colon. Edition.* 1686. Again, ſpeaking of the ſame Terms, he tells us, *That they are not* οὐσίας δηλωτικὰ, but σημαντικὰ τ῀ ὑποστάσεων, that is to ſay, *not denoting the Eſſence, but ſignifying the Hypoſtaſes, or Subſiſtences*; adding withal, ἱκανὰ γὰρ ἡμῖν διακρίνειν τὰ πρόσωπα, καὶ τ῀ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ, καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος. ἰδιαζόντως δεικνύειν ὑποστάσιν, *That they are ſufficient for us to diſtinguiſh*

ſtinguiſh the Perſons, and to ſhew the proper and peculiar Subſiſtence of *Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt by.* Pag. 374. And again, Ἕνα Θεὸν προσῆκεν ὁμολογεῖν ἐν πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ, καὶ πνεύματι ἁγίῳ γνωριζόμενον, ἢ μὲν πατὴρ καὶ υἱὸς, καὶ πνεῦμα ἅγιον τὴ μιᾶς Θεότητος τὰς ὑποστάσεις γνωρίζοντας, ἢ δὲ Θεὸς τὸ κατ' οὐσίαν κοινὸν τῶν ὑποστάσεων νοοῦντας. That is, *we ought to own, or Confeſs One God, expreſſed to us in Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, hereby acknowledging, as they are Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt, Three Subſiſtences of one and the ſame Godhead; but as they are God, underſtanding thereby one Eſſence, or Subſtance common to all the Subſiſtences,* p. 379. *ibid.* By all which Expreſſions we ſee *Perſonality* ſtated upon *Subſiſtence.*

Athanaſius. Our next Teſtimony ſhall be from *Athanaſius*, who in his Treatiſe *de Sanctiſſimâ Virgine Deiparâ*, gives this Account of his Faith. Πιστεύομεν εἰς Πατέρα, καὶ υἱὸν, καὶ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, τριάδα ὑποστάσεων ἀδιάστατον ἐχόντων τὴ διαίρεσιν, καὶ τὴ ἕνωσιν ἀσύγχυτον. That is, *We believe in Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, a Trinity of Hypoſtaſes, or Perſons, having amongſt them ſuch a Diſtinction, as admits of no Diviſion, and ſuch an Union, or Unity, as is without all Confuſion. Athan. Tom.* 1. *p.* 1029. *Colon. Edit.* 1686.

Dionyſius Areopagita. The Author called *Dionyſius* the *Areopagite* (though by a falſe Title, for the *Areopagite* lived in the firſt Century, but this *Writer* in the fourth) in his Book *de Divinis Nominibus* cap. 1. ſets forth the Trinity thus. Τριὰς ἡ διὰ τὴ τελεσυποστάτον τὴ ὑπερουσίᾳ γονιμότητος ἔκφανσιν. *The Trinity* (ſo called) *becauſe of its manifeſtation of a Divine, or Superlative Fecundity ſhewn in Three Subſiſtences, or Perſons.*

Epiphanius. *Epiphanius* alſo in the 62d. Hereſie, and 3d. Paragraph, gives the like account of the ſame, Τριὰς ἀριθμουμένη Πατὴρ, καὶ υἱὸς, καὶ πνεῦμα ἅγιον, οὐχ ὡς ἔν τι τρισὶν ὀνόμασιν κε-

κεκλημένον, ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς τέλεια τὰ ὀνόματα, τέλειαι ὑποστάσεις. *The Trinity is numbred by Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, not as one Thing called only by Three Names, but as being in Truth Three perfect Subſiſtences, [or Perſons] as well as Three perfect Names.*

Gregory Nazianzen. In like manner *Gregory Nazianzen* ſpeaks much the ſame Thing in his 29th Oration. Χρὴ δὲ τὸ ἕνα Θεὸν τηρεῖν καὶ τὰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις ὁμολογεῖν, εἰτ' οὖν τελείας προσώπα, καθ' ἑκάστην μετὰ τῆς ἰδιότητος. *We ought* (ſays he) *to hold one God, and to confeſs Three Subſiſtences, or Three Perſons, each with his reſpective Property according to his Subſiſtence, Greg. Nazianz. Tom. 1. P. 490. Edit. Pariſ. 1630.*

Gregory Nyſſen. *Gregory Nyſſen*, upon thoſe words in the firſt of *Geneſis, Let us make Man*, expreſſes himſelf thus. Ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς ἄνθρωπον ἵνα ἑνώσῃς τὴν Θεότητα, ἑνώσῃς δὲ καὶ τὰς ὑποστάσεις, ἰδία γὰρ ὑπόστασις Πατρὸς, ἰδία υἱοῦ καὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου. *God* (ſays he) *made Man* (laying the ſtreſs upon the Word ἐποίησεν of the Singular Number) *that you may reckon, or account the Godhead to be but One: But not ſo the Subſiſtences*; for there is a *proper Subſiſtence* of the *Father*, a *proper Subſiſtence* of the *Son*, and a *proper Subſiſtence* of the *Holy Ghoſt. Greg. Nyſſen Tom. 1. p. 141. Edit. Pariſ. 1615.*

St. *Baſil.* St. *Baſil* in his Book de *Spiritu Sancto*, Chap. 18. ſpeaks thus of the Second *Perſon* of the *Trinity*. Δεύτερον δὲ Θεὸν οὐδέποτε καὶ τήμερον ἀκηκόαμεν. Θεὸν γὰρ ὄντα Θεοῦ προσκυνοῦντες καὶ τὸ ἰδιάζον τῶν ὑποστάσεων ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ μίαν φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν μοναρχίαν. *We* (ſays he) *never to this Day heard of a Second God; but Worſhipping the Son as God of God, we both acknowledge the Property of the Hypoſtaſes [or Perſons] and inſiſt upon one Supreme Governor, or Lord of all Things. Baſ. Tom. 2. p. 332. Edit. Pariſ. 1637.*

Likewiſe

Likewiſe St. *Cyrill* of *Alexandria* declares himſelf much the ſame way in his third Dialogue *de Trinitate*. Ἐνεςι γὰρ ἰδεῖν τὸ ἓν μιᾷ τῇ θεότητι τριττὸν καθ' ὑποςάσιν. *We may obſerve* (ſays he) *in one Deity, a Ternary, or Triplicity according to* [*or in reſpect of*] *Subſiſtence.* St. *Cyrill* of *Alexandria.*

The ſame we find alſo in *Iſidorus Peluſiota*, *Lib.* 1. *Epiſt.* 247. Μία γὰρ ὄζιν ἡ Θεότης, τρεῖς δὲ αἱ ὑποςάσεις· τοῦτο τήρει, τοῦτο ἔχε. *There is* (ſays he) *One Godhead, but Three Hypoſtaſes, or Subſiſtences. This keep, this hold*, &c. *Iſidorus Peluſiota.*

Theodoret alſo ſpeaks very fully upon the ſame Subject, in his firſt Dialogue *contr. Anomæos*. Τὰ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας ἴδια ὁμοίως εἰσὶ κοινὰ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος· τὸ δὲ Πατὴρ οὐ κοινόν. Οὐκ ἄρα τῆς οὐσίας ἴδιον τὸ Πατὴρ, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑποςάσεως, εἰ δὲ ἄλλο τῆς ὑποςάσεως τὸ ἴδιον καὶ ἄλλα τῆς οὐσίας ἰδιώματα, οὐ ταυτὸν ὄζι σημαινόμενον οὐσία καὶ ὑπόςασις. That is to ſay, *Such Things as belong properly to the* [*Divine*] *Eſſence, or Subſtance, are in like manner common to Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt.* But the Term [*Father*] *is not common to them*; *and therefore* [*Father*] *is no Property of the Eſſence, but of the Subſiſtence, or Perſon*: *But now, if one Thing be proper to the Hypoſtaſis, or Subſiſtence, and there be other Properties of the Eſſence*, it follows, That *Eſſence* and *Hypoſtaſis do not ſignifie one and the ſame thing.* And again, a little after: Ἡ δὲ οὐσία πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος κοινή· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἀθάνατος, ὁμοίως ἄφθαρτος, ὁμοίως ἁγία καὶ ὁμοίως ἀγαθή. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο λέγομεν μίαν οὐσίαν, τρεῖς ὑποςάσεις. That is, *the Eſſence, or Subſtance of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt is common, being equally and alike Immortal, Incorruptible, Holy and Good. And for this Reaſon we affirm One Eſſence, and Three Hypoſtaſes, Auctarium ſive Tom.* 5. *Theodoret. p.* 286. *Edit. Pariſ.* 1684. Certainly *Theodoret.*

tainly nothing could, with greater Evidence, ſtate the Perſonalities of *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt* upon Three ſeveral *Subſiſtences*, than the Words here quoted out of this *Father*. And I quote them out of him, though I know the ſame Dialogues are inſerted into *Athanaſius*'s Works; but I am convinced by the reaſons given by *Garnerius* the Learned Editor of this *Auctarium*, that the ſaid Dialogues cannot belong to *Athanaſius*.

Baſilius Seleucienſis.

Next to him let us hear *Baſilius Seleucienſis* ſpeaking the ſame Thing in his firſt Oration, upon the firſt Verſe of the firſt Chapter of *Geneſis*, where, upon theſe words, *Let us make Man after our own Image and Likeneſs*, he diſcourſes thus. Μία μὲν εἰκὼν ἡ πλατυομένη, οὐχ ἑνὸς ὃ προσώπου μνήμη, ἀλλὰ τριῶν ὑποστάσεων· κοινὸν γὰρ τῆς Θεότητος δημιούργημα τὸ πλατυόμενον, τριάδα μὲν ἐμφαίνει τὴν πλάτυσαν, μίαν δὲ εἰκόνα τὴν τριάδος ὑπάρχουσαν, εἰ δὲ μία τῆς τριάδος ἡ εἰκὼν μία τῶν ὑποστάσεων ἡ φύσις. Τὸ γὰρ ταυτὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἡ τῆς εἰκόνος ἑνότης κηρύττει. That is to ſay, *The Image here formed is but One, but the mention here made is not of One Hypoſtaſis, or Perſon only, but of Three. For the Thing formed being the common Work of the whole Deity, ſhews the Trinity to have been the Former thereof, and ſo gives us one Image, or Reſemblance of the Trinity: But if the Image of the Trinity be but One, the Nature of the Hypoſtaſes [or Perſons] muſt be One too. For the Unity of the Image, proclaims the Unity of the Subſtance, or Eſſence. Baſil. Seleucenſ. Orat.* 1. *p.* 5. Printed at *Paris* with *Gregorius Thaumaturgus*, &c. *Anno Dom.* 1622.

Zacharius Scholaſticus.

Zacharias Sirnamed *Scholaſticus*, and ſometime Metropolitan of *Mitylene* (of the Sixth Century) in his Diſputation againſt the *Philoſophers* who held the *Eternity of the World*, to a certain *Philoſopher*, asking him, How the *Chriſtians* could acknowledge the ſame both a

Trinity

Trinity and an *Unity* too? Makes this Anſwer. Τριάδα φαμὲν εἶ) ὂν μονάδι ἐν μονάδα ἐν τριάδι, τῷ τὰς μὲν ὑποστάσεις τρεῖς εἶ), τὴ δ ὐσίαν μόνλω. That is, *We affirm a Trinity in Unity, and an Unity in Trinity; hereby affirming the Subſiſtences* [or *Perſons*] *to be Three, and the Eſſence, or Subſtance to be only One.*

Johannes Damaſcenus, a Writer of the Eighth Century, in his third Book *de Orthodoxâ fide*, Chap. 11. about the end of it ſpeaks thus. Θεότης μὲν γὰ φύσιν δηλοῖ, τὸ δ πατὴρ τὴ ὑπόστασιν, ὥσπερ ἀνθρωπότης τὴ φύσιν, Πέτρος δ τὴ ὑπόστασιν. Θεὸς δ ἐν τὸ κοινὸν τῆ φύσεως σημαίνει, ἐφ' ἑκάστης τῶν ὑποστάσεων τάττεται παρωνύμως. That is, *The Godhead declares the Nature, but the Term* [*Father*] *the Subſiſtence; as Humanity does the Humane Nature, but* Peter *the Subſiſtence, or Perſon. For the Term* [*God*] *denotes the Divine Nature in Common, and equally denominates, or is aſcribed to each of the Hypoſtaſes, or Subſiſtences. Damaſcen. Page* 207. *Edit. Baſil.* 1575. *Damaſcen.*

I ſhall cloſe up theſe particular Teſtimonies with ſome Paſſages in the Creed, commonly called the *Athanaſian*; which I place ſo low, becauſe it is manifeſt, that *Athanaſius* was not the Author of it, it being not ſo much as mentioned in any *Ancient Writer* (as the very Learned Dr *Cave* affirms) till it occurs in *Theodulphus Aurelianenſis*, who lived about the latter end of the Eighth Century. Now the Paſſages are theſe, Μητὲ συγχέοντες τὰς ὑποστάσεις (in ſome Copies πρόσωπα) μητὲ τὴ ὐσίαν διαιρῶντες, ἄλλη γὰ ἔστιν ἡ τῦ πατρὸς ὑπόστασις, ἄλλη τὴ υἱῦ, καὶ ἄλλη τῦ πνεύματος τῦ ἁγίυ, ἀλλὰ Πατρὸς καὶ υἱῦ καὶ πνεύματος ἁγίυ μία Θεότης, &c. That is, *Neither confounding the Hypoſtaſes* [or *Perſons*] *nor dividing the Subſtance. For there is one Hypoſtaſis of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghoſt, but the Godhead of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt is One*, &c. And again, *Athanaſian Creed.* *Hiſtor. literar.* p. 146. & 500.

ὅλαι αἱ τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις συνδιαιωνίζουσαι ἑαυταῖς εἰσι καὶ ἴσαι. That is, *The whole Three Hypoſtaſes* [or *Perſons*] are *Coeternal together, and Coequal.* Theſe Paſſages are full and plain, and the *Creed* it ſelf may well claim the Antiquity at leaſt of the Eighth Century.

My next *Authorities* ſhall be thoſe of the *Councils*. But before I paſs to them, I cannot but obſerve and own to the Reader concerning ſome of the firſt of my Quotations, *viz.* thoſe out of *Juſtin Martyr*, and that out of St. *Athanaſius*, that it has been very much queſtioned by ſome Learned Men, Whether thoſe Books, from whence they are taken, do really belong to the Authors to whom they are aſcribed, and among whoſe Works they are inſerted, or no. This, I ſay, I was not ignorant of, nevertheleſs I thought fit to quote them by the Names under which I found them placed; ſince many very Learned Perſons, and much more acquainted with the *Writings* of the *Ancients* than I pretend to be, have upon ſeveral Occaſions done ſo before me. And the ſaid Tracts are certainly of a very early date, and though the Authors of them ſhould fall a Century or two lower, yet they ſtill retain Antiquity enough to make good the Point for which I alledged them. Nevertheleſs I muſt and do confeſs it very probable, That the more diſtinct and exact uſe of the Terms ὑποστάσεις, and τρόποι ὑπάρξεως, as applyed to the *Divine Perſons*, did not generally and commonly take place, but as by degrees the Diſcuſſion of the *Arian* and other the like Controverſies, through frequent Diſputes, grew to ſtill a greater and greater Maturity. And that the uſe of theſe Terms did obtain then, and upon that Account, I think a very conſiderable Argument to authorize, and recommend them to all Sober and Judicious Minds.

And

And so I pass to the Testimonies of Councils concerning the same. Amongst which, we have here, in the first place, the Council of *Chalcedon*, making a Confession, or Declaration of their *Faith*, concerning the *Person* of our *Saviour*, and that, both as to the Absolute undivided *Unity* of his *Person*, and as to the Difference and Distinction of his Two *Natures*, part of which Confession runs thus. Ὁμολογοῦμεν ἕνα καὶ ταὐτὸν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, κύριον, υἱὸν μονογενῆ, ἐν δύο φύσεσι ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, καὶ ἀχωρίστως γνωριζόμενον· οὐδαμοῦ ἁφ᾽ τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνῃρημένης διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν, σωζομένης δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ἰδιότητα τῆς ἑκατέρας φύσεως, καὶ εἰς ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν συντρεχούσης. That is, *We confess One and the same Lord Jesus Christ, the only Begotten Son of God in Two Natures, without Confusion, &c. the difference of the said Natures, being by no means destroyed by their Union, but rather the Property of each Nature being thereby preserved, and both concurring to [or meeting in] One Person, or Hypostasis.* This Account of the *Chalcedon*-Confession we have in the 2d Book of *Evagrius*, towards the latter end of the 4th Chapter; and a lively Instance it is of the *Council*'s expressing the *Personality* of *Christ* by, and stating it upon, *Subsistence*. Council of *Chalcedon*.

In the next place, upon *Justinian*'s calling the second *Council* of *Constantinople* (being the Fifth General one) in the Year 553, for Condemning of the *Tria Capitula*, we have a large and Noble Confession of Faith made by that Emperor, and owned and applauded by all the *Council*, and inserted amongst the *Acts* of it: And in this we have the *Three Divine Persons* several times expressed by so many ὑποστάσεις, as a Term equivalent to πρόσωπα, and indeed importing withall the *Personality*, or *Formal Reason* of the same; and that so fully and plainly, that nothing could, or can be more so. Ὁμο- *Justinian*'s Confession.

λογῦμεν τοινὺν πιςεύειν εἰς Πατέρα, καὶ Υἱὸν, καὶ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα, Τριάδα ὁμοούσιον, μίαν Θεότητα, ἤτοι φύσιν καὶ ὐσίαν, καὶ δύναμιν, καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἐν τρισὶν ὑποςάσεσιν, ἤτοι προσώποις, δοξάζοντες, &c. That is, *We profess to Believe One Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Glorifying thereby a Consubstantial Trinity, One Deity, or Nature, or Essence, and Power and Authority in Three Subsistences, or Persons.* And again to the same purpose, Μοναδα ἐν τριάδι καὶ τριάδα ἐν μοναδι προσκυνῦμεν, παράδοξον ἔχουσαν τὴ διαίρεσιν καὶ τὴ ἕνωσιν, μοναδα μὲν κατὰ τὸ τῆς ὐσίας ἦγουν Θεότητος λόγον, τριάδα δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἰδιότητας ἦγουν ὑποςάσεις ἤτοι πρόσωπα. *We Worship* (says he) *an Unity in Trinity, and a Trinity in Unity, having both a strange and wonderful Distinction and Union*, that is to say, *an Union, or Singularity in respect of the Substance or Godhead, and a Trinity in respect of Properties, Subsistences, or Persons*; with several more such Passages to the same Purpose and Signification.

Fifth *General Council.*

And then, as for the *Council* it self, the first Canon of it speaks thus; "Ει τις ὐχ ὁμολογεῖ Πατρὸς, ὑιῦ, καὶ ἁγίυ πνεύματος μίαν φύσιν, ἤτοι ὐσίαν, καὶ μίαν δύναμιν, καὶ ἐξουσίαν, τριάδα ὁμοούσιον, μίαν Θεότητα ἐν τρισὶν ὑποςάσιν, ἤτοι προσώποις προσκυνητὴν, τοιῦτος Ἀνάθεμα ἔςω. That is, *If any one Confess not One Nature, or Substance, One Power and Authority of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, a Coessential Trinity, and One Deity to be Worshipped in Three Subsistences, or Persons, Let such an one be Accursed.*

The Sixth *General Council.*

In the next place, we have the Sixth *General Council*, and the Third of *Constantinople*, called by *Constantinus Pogonatus* against the *Monothelites* in the Year 681. In the *Acts* of which *Council*, Article 6. we have the *Council* owning the same Thing, and in the same words, which a little before we quoted out of the *Council* of *Chalcedon*: And moreover in the Tenth Article, the *Council* declares it self thus. Τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησῦν Χριςὸν

ςὸν τ ἀληθινὸν θεὸν πιςεύοντές φαμεν δύο αὐτῷ τὰς φύσεις ἐν τῇ μιᾷ αὐτῷ διαλαμπύσας ὑποςάσει, &c. That is, *We believing our Lord Jesus Christ to be the True God, do affirm in him Two Distinct Natures, shining forth in One Subsistence, or Person.*

Agreeably to this, the *Council* immediately following called by the *Greeks*, Σύνοδ. πενθέκτη, and by the *Latines*, *Concilium Quini-Sextum*, Consisting chiefly of the same *Persons* with the former, and called by the same *Constantine* about Ten Years after, for the making of Canons about Discipline, by way of Supplement to the Fifth and Sixth *Councils*, which had made none. This *Council*, I say, in the first of its *Canons*, which is as a kind of Preface, owns and applauds the *Nicene Fathers*, for that, with an Unanimous Agreement and consent of Faith, they had declared and cleared up one *Consubstantiality* in the *Three Hypostases*, or *Subsistences* of the *Divine Nature*. Οἱ τῇ ὁμολογομοσύνῃ τ πίςεως τὸ ὁμοούσιον ἡμῖν ὅτι τῶν τριῶν τ Θεαρχικῆς φύσεως ὑποςάσεων ἀπεκάλυψάν τε καὶ διετράνωσαν, &c. The *Council* called *Quini-Sextum*.

And Lastly in the *Florentine Council*, held in the Fifteenth Century, in which the *Greeks*, with their Emperor *Johannes Palæologus* met the *Latines* in order to an Accord between them, touching that so much controverted Article about the *Procession* of the *Holy Ghost*. In this *Council*, I say, we have the *Greeks* also expressing the *Personality* of the *Holy Ghost*, by the τὸ ὑποςατικόν. For whereas the *Latines* affirmed, that the *Holy Ghost* the τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα did ἀναβλύζειν ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ. That is to say, *stream, or flow from the Son*, the *Greeks* desired them to explain what they meant by that Expression, ἀναβλύζειν ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ, and whether they understood, that he derived both his *Essence* and *Personality* from him, and that in these words very significant to our Purpose, Εἰ τ ὐσίαν The *Council* of *Florence*.

οὐσίαν ἢ τὸ ὑποςατικὸν εἶ ἔχει τι ἢ λαμβάνει ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ. By which we ſee that even with theſe *Modern Greeks* alſo the οὐσία and the τὸ ὑποςατικὸν, which is all one with the ὑπόςασις, ſignifie *Eſſence* and *Perſon*, as applyed to the *Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*, *Hiſt. Concil. Florent.* in the laſt Chapter, and Queſtion 7. of Section 8. Pag. 246. ſet forth by Dr. *Creyghton*, 1660.

I cannot think it requiſite to quote any Thing more from the *Greeks* upon this Subject, it being as clear as the Day, that both *Fathers* and *Councils* ſtated the *Perſonalities* of *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt*, upon *Three diſtinct Hypoſtaſes*, or *Subſiſtences* of one and the ſame *Godhead*, *Eſſence*, or *Subſtance*, diſtinguiſhed thereby into *Three Perſons*.

And ſo I paſs from the *Greeks* to the *Latines*, whom we ſhall find giving an Account of the ſame, partly by *Subſiſtences* and *Modes* of *Subſiſtence*, and partly by *Relations*. But not equally by both in all Ages of the *Church*. For we have before ſhewn, That there was a long and ſharp Conteſt between the *Greeks* and the *Latines* about the Word *Hypoſtaſis*, and that the *Latines* dreaded the uſe of it, as knowing no other *Latin* Word to render it by, but *Subſtantia*, which they could by no means aſcribe *plurally* to *God*; and as for the Word *Subſiſtentia*, that was not then accounted properly *Latin*; and it was but upon this occaſion, and to fence againſt the Ambiguity of the Word ὑπόςασις, that it came at length into uſe amongſt the *Latines*. And even after all, it muſt be yet further confeſſed, That notwithſtanding that fair foundation of Accord between the *Greeks* and *Latines* laid by the forementioned Council of *Alexandria*, and the hearty Endeavours both of *Athanaſius* and of *Gregory Nazianzen* after him, to accommodate the buſineſs between them, the *Latines* were not ſo ready to come over to the *Greeks*,

The *Latin* Church.

Greeks, in the free uſe of the Word *Hypoſtaſis*, as the *Greeks* were to comply with the *Latines* in the uſe of the Word πρόσωπον, anſwering to their *Perſona*. And therefore in vain would any one ſeek for an Explication of the *Divine Perſons* in the *Trinity*, by the Terms *Subſiſtentiæ*, or *Modi Subſiſtendi*, in the earlier *Latin Writers*, ſuch as *Tertullian* about the latter end of the ſecond Century, and St. *Cyprian* about the middle of the Third, and *Lactantius* about the latter end of the ſame, and the beginning of the Fourth. Nevertheleſs find it we do, in the Writers of the following Ages; And how, and in what ſence it was uſed by them, ſhall be now conſidered.

And here we will begin with St. *Ambroſe*, who is full and clear in the caſe, in his Book *in Symbolum Apoſtolicum* Cap. 2. Tom. 2. in theſe Words. *Ita ergò rectum, & Catholicum eſt, ut & unum Deum ſecundùm Unitatem Subſtantiæ fateamur, & Patrem, & Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum in ſuâ quemque* Subſiſtentiâ *ſentiamus*. A Paſſage ſo very plain, that nothing certainly could more effectually declare, That this *Father* reckoned the *Perſonalities* of the *Three Divine Perſons* to conſiſt in their ſeveral and reſpective *Subſiſtences*. St. *Ambroſe*.

The next whom we ſhall alledge, is St. *Hilary*, who flouriſhed in the Fourth Century, and wrote Twelve Books of the *Trinity*, and ſome other Tracts upon the ſame Subject againſt the *Arians*. He, I confeſs, frequently, and particularly in Book 4. *de Trinit.* p. 36. *Baſil. Edit.* 1570. calls the *Three Divine Perſons*, *Tres Subſtantias*; but it is evident, that he took *Subſtantia*, in the ſame ſence with *Subſiſtentia*, or *Hypoſtaſis*; foraſmuch as he elſewhere often affirms that, which muſt of neceſſity infer this to be his meaning. As for inſtance, in his Book *de Synodis contra Arianos*, Page 223. he tells us, That St. *Hilary*.

That *Nullam* diverſitatem *aut diſſimilitudinem admittit Geniti & Gignentis Eſſentia.* And again, That there is *Indifferens in Patre & Filio divinitatis* ſubſtantia, p. 224. And *nulla differentis Eſſentiæ diſcreta Natura*, ibid. And *nulla Originalis* ſubſtantiæ *diverſitas*, ibid. And that there is between them *nulla diverſitas Eſſentiæ*, p. 225. None of all which Propoſitions could poſſibly be true, if the *Divine Perſons* were *Three diſtinct Subſtances* according to the proper ſence and ſignification of the Word *Subſtance*. And therefore the Learned *Forbeſius* in his *Hiſtorico-Theological Inſtructions*, Book 1. Chap. 2. quoting the aforeſaid Paſſage, after the Words *Tres ſubſtantias*, ſubjoyns theſe of his own, *Eo [nempe] ſenſu quo Græci dicebant* τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις. And accordingly St. *Hilary* explaining himſelf further, in his fore-cited Book *de Synodis contra Arianos*, p. 226. ſays, That though between the *Father* and the *Son* there was *nulla diverſitas Eſſentiæ*, yet they did *reſpuere Perſonalium Nominum Unionem, ne Unus* Subſiſtens *ſit*, qui & Pater dicatur & Filius: Which Words manifeſtly infer, That the *Father is ſaid to be a Father, and the Son to be a Son*, by a *diſtinct Subſiſtence* proper to each of them. And again, ſpeaking of thoſe *Fathers* who oppoſed the Hereſie of *Sabellius*, ſays of them: *Idcircò* Tres Subſtantias *eſſe dixerunt*, Subſiſtentium *Perſonas per* Subſtantias *edocentes*, *non* ſubſtantiam *Patris, & Filii, & Spiritis Sancti, diverſitate diſſimulis eſſentiæ ſeparantes*, p. 228. By which Words, he ſpeaks all that the *Greeks* meant by ὑπόστασις, or the *Latines* of the following Times, by *Subſiſtentia*. For which reaſon it is, that the Learned *Collator* and *Editor* of this *Father*'s Works, uſes, now and then, to ſuch Paſſages as theſe to add an Explicatory Marginal Note to this purpoſe; as in Page 36. Book 4. *de Trinitate*, he puts in the Margin, *Tres Subſtantiæ, id eſt*, ὑποστάσεις, and in this Book *de Synodis*,

nodis, &c. p. 127. he remarks in the ſide, *Trina in Divinis* ὑπόστασις; which manifeſtly ſhews, what the Judgment of Learned Men was concerning St. *Hilary*'s ſence in the uſe of the words *Tres Subſtantiæ* with reference to the *Divine Perſons*.

From St. *Hilary* we paſs to St. *Jerome*; who indeed ſcrupled the uſe of the Word *Hypoſtaſis*, (as applyed to the *Divine Perſons*) in Epiſtle 57. to Pope *Damaſus*. But that he did only ſcruple it, and not abſolutely refuſe, or reject it, is evident from ſeveral other Paſſages in that Epiſtle; which ſhewed his Judgment to be, that there was nothing of it ſelf ill and hurtful in the uſe of it. For, had he judged otherwiſe, ſurely he would not have told *Damaſus*, that he was ready to own the Expreſſion of *Tres Perſonas Subſiſtentes*: And moreover, That if *Damaſus* would command the uſe of the Term *Hypoſtaſis*, he would uſe it. But his Exception againſt it (for it was not the Word *Perſon*, as a great Man miſtakes it, but the Word *Hypoſtaſis*, which St. *Jerome* demurred to the uſe of) was built upon theſe Two grounds, both expreſſed in the ſame Epiſtle. St. *Jerome*. See the Four Sermons on 1 *John* 14. p. 120. Printed 1692.

Firſt, That *Hereticks* abuſed, or made an ill uſe of this Term, to deceive and impoſe upon the Minds of Weak, and Unwary Perſons. And, in good earneſt, that muſt be a very extraordinary Word indeed, which is uncapable of being one way or other abuſed by ſome, and miſunderſtood by others.

Secondly, The other ground (which, as there is great reaſon to believe, was the main and principal cauſe of St. *Jerome*'s diſlike of this Term) was its being impoſed by an Incompetent Authority, *viz.* That ſome of the *Greek Church* would needs command him (and him a very warm Man too) who was of the *Latin Communion*, to the uſe of that, which the *Latin Church* had not obli-

ged him to. And *Calvin*, in *Lib.* 1. *Chap.* 13. of his Inſtitutions, *Sect.* 5. ſhrewdly intimates the peculiar Pique, which St. *Jerome* bore to the Eaſtern Biſhops, to have been the chief, if not the ſole cauſe of his Exception againſt this Word; adding withal, that it was not fairly done of him (which *Calvin* was a very Competent Judge of) to Aſſert (as in that Epiſtle he does) that in *omnibus Scholis*, οὐσία was *nihil aliud quàm* Hypoſtaſis; which *Calvin* there ſays, *Communi tritóque uſu paſſim refellitur.* But after all, it ſeems, St. *Jerome* could relent from his ſtiffneſs, and reconcile himſelf to this ſo much ſcrupled Expreſſion. For in his Epiſtle, or Diſcourſe *ad Paulam & Euſtochium de aſſumptione Beatæ Mariæ*, ſpeaking of our *Saviour*'s exerciſing Two diſtinct kinds of *Operation*, according to his Two *Natures* combining in one *Perſon*, has theſe Words, *Per hoc, quod audiêrant, quod viderant, quod tractârant* (viz. *Apoſtoli*) *verbum vitæ erat, & nihil aliud ex duabus Naturis, quàm Unum juxta* Subſiſtentiam *vel* Perſonam. *Hieronym. Tom.* 9. *p.* 113. *Edit. Pariſ. apud Nivellium*, 1579. So that I am in good hopes, that for the future St. *Jerome*'s Authority will not be alledged againſt expreſſing the *Divine Perſons* by *Hypoſtaſes*; till it be proved, that there cannot be a *Greek* and a *Latin* Word for one and the ſame Thing: For, what ὑπόστασις ſignifies in the *Greek*, That, it is certain, *Subſiſtentia* ſignifies and declares to us in the *Latin*.

St. *Auſtin.* As for St. *Auſtin*, though he looks upon the Word *Hypoſtaſis*, or *Subſiſtentia*, as new and ſtrange to the *Latines*, in the ſence, in which it was uſed by the *Greeks*, yet he is ſo far from abridging the *Greeks* in their way of ſpeaking, that he very amicably allows even of thoſe *Latines* alſo, who choſe to follow the *Greek* Expreſſion, as to this Particular, in his 5th Book *de Trin. Chap.* 8, 9. where he tells us, *Qui hæc tractant Græco eloquio dicunt*

μίαν

μίαν οὐσίαν, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις. *Latinè ista tractantes cùm alium modum aptiorem non invenirent, quo enuntiarent verbis, dicunt* Unam Essentiam *vel* Substantiam, Tres *autem* Personas, *ibid.* By which this *Father* manifestly shews, That the *Latines* indeed understood the very same Thing by *Persona*, which the *Greeks* did by ὑπόστασις; and that they really rendred one by the other, though they were not generally so ready to use the Term. And here I suppose the Reader will easily perceive, that my Intent is not to establish the use of the *Words* hitherto pleaded for, upon the Authority of St. *Austin*, (for the Case needs it not) but only to shew, That albeit this *Father* does both particularly consider, and expressly speak of the said Terms, yet he does not in the least reject, or disallow of them. But however, in the same Book he proceeds to another Topick very much to our present purpose, *viz.* his stating the *Divine Personalities* upon *Relation*, in these Words, *In Deo nihil secundùm Accidens dicitur, quia in eo nihil est mutabile. Nec tamen omne quod dicitur, secundùm Substantiam dicitur, sed secundùm Relativum: Quod tamen Relativum non est Accidens, quia non est mutabile; ut filius dicitur Relativè ad Patrem*, &c. Whereby (as we have said) founding *Personality* in, and upon something *Relative*, he sufficiently proves, That the same neither is, nor can be placed in *Self-Consciousness*; this being a Term, in the import of it, perfectly *Absolute*, and containing nothing *Relative* in it at all.

Next to St. *Austin*, we will produce *Ruffinus* a Writer of the 4th Century, and flourishing about the latter end of it; who, in the short Account he gives us of what was done in the forementioned *Synod* of *Alexandria*, for the Peace of the Church, and the closing up the Division between the *Greeks* and the *Latines* about the Words *Ruffinus.*

οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, in *Chap.* 29. of the first Book of his History, tells us, That although some thought that both these Words were Synonymous, and consequently that as *Three Substances* were by no means to be admitted in the *Trinity*, so neither ought we to acknowledge *Three Subsistences* therein, yet that others, and those much the greater, and more prevailing part, judged quite otherwise; in these Words. *Alii verò quibus longè aliud* Substantia *quam* Subsistentia *significare videbatur, dicebant quòd* Substantia *rei alicujus Naturam rationemque, quâ constat, designet*; Subsistentia *autem uniuscujusque Personæ hoc ipsum quod extat & subsistit, ostendat; ideóque propter Sabellii Hæresin tres esse* Subsistentias *confitendas, quòd quasi Tres Subsistentes Personas significare viderentur, ne suspicionem daremus tanquam ejus fidei sectatores essemus, quæ Trinitatem in* Nominibus *tantùm, ac non in* Rebus, *ac* Subsistentiis *confitetur.* So that we see here a full, and clear Account both of the Sence of this Word, and of the Reason, Why the *Church* thought fit to establish the use of it with reference to the *Persons* of the *Blessed Trinity.*

Boetius. Another Testimony shall be from *Boetius* who flourished about the beginning of the 6th Century. He in *Chap.* 2. of his Book *de duabus Naturis in unâ Personâ Christi*, first gives us this Definition of a *Person*, that it is *Rationabilis Naturæ individua Subsistentia, (according to which, our Author's War-Horse is like to fall from his Personal Dignity.)* And afterwards, having discoursed about the difference of οὐσία, οὐσίωσις, and ὑπόστασις, he concludes the said Chapter thus. *Hæc omnia idcirco sunt dicta, ut differentiam Naturæ atque Personæ, id est* οὐσίας *atque* ὑποστάσεως *monstraremus: Quo verò nomine unumquodque oporteat appellari, Ecclesiasticæ sit locutionis Arbitrium; ut tamen hoc interim constet, quòd inter Naturam Personámque differre prædiximus.*

diximus. By all which he gives us a very Plain, Rational, and Scholastick Account of this Matter.

The next, whom I shall produce to Vouch the same Thing, is *Rusticus Diaconus*, who lived and flourished about the middle of the Sixth Century. He in *Chap. 6.* of his Book *contra Acephalos*; tells the *Nestorian Heretick*, (whom he is there by way of Dialogue disputing with) That *Subsistentia interdum* Personam *significat, nonnunquam verò* Substantiam. And accordingly, that the *Council* of *Ephesus* distinguished in our *Saviour*, *aliud* & *aliud*, viz. in respect of his *Two Natures*, but not *alium* & *alium* in respect of his *Person*, which was but *One*: And this quite contrary to what we observe in the *Trinity*, *Illic enim* alius & alius, *ne Subsistentias confundamus*; *non verò* aliud & aliud. *Unum enim Tria & idem Deitate.* To which Words of the *Synod*, this Author subjoyns these of his own. *Ecce manifestissimè Synodi Universalis Authoritas* Subsistentias *pro* Personis *suscepit atque laudavit*. This also, I think, is very full and satisfactory. *Rusticus Diaconus.*

I shall close these particular Testimonies with Two Passages in the Appendix to the Breviary of *Liberatus* the Deacon, who also lived about the middle of the Sixth Century, as I find it in *Crabb*'s Collection of the *Councils*, *Tom.* 2. *P.* 126. *Col.* 2. and which the very Learned Dr. *Cave* observes, is the only Edition of the *Councils*, where it is to be found. The first Passage is this. *Idem Natura & Substantia, quod commune, non proprium significat, & idem Persona & Subsistentia, quod proprium, & non commune declarat.* And the other follows about Ten Lines after in the same Column. *Sanctæ ergo Trinitatis una quidem est Natura atque Substantia. Communis est enim Trium* Substantia, *non autem una* Subsistentia, *seu Persona Trium*, viz. *Patris, & Filii, & Spiritus Sancti, sed Tres Subsistentiæ sunt.* In which certainly we have *Liberatus Diaconus.*

have ſo very clear and pregnant a Declaration of the Thing Contended for by us, that a clearer cannot poſſibly be given, nor reaſonably deſired.

The *Lateran Council* under *Martin the Firſt.*

And therefore to add no more Private, or Single Authorities, I ſhall conclude all with that of a *Council*; not a *General* one indeed, but that *Lateran* held under Pope *Martin* the firſt of 105 Biſhops about the Year 649, or 650, and by way of Preparation for the Sixth General one, and of *Conſtantinople* the third; called (as we have already ſhewn) by *Conſtantinus Pogonatus*, and held the following Year againſt the *Monothelites*. The firſt Decree of which ſaid *Lateran Synod*, is this: *Siquis ſecundùm Sanctos Patres non confitetur propriè & veraciter Patrem, Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum, Trinitatem in Unitate & Unitatem in Trinitate, hoc eſt, unum Deum in Tribus* Subſiſtentiis *conſubſtantialibus, æqualis gloriæ, unam, eandémque* Trium *Deitatem, Naturam, Subſtantiam, & Virtutem*, &c. *ſit condemnatus.* Now this does as manifeſtly place the *Three Divine Perſons* in *Three diſtinct Subſiſtences*, as it is poſſible for Words to expreſs. For it is evident, that by *Subſiſtentiis* cannot be here meant *Subſtantiis*; foraſmuch as [*Subſtantiis conſubſtantialibus*] would neither be Truth, nor Sence.

And now, all that I pretend to from the foregoing Teſtimonies and Quotations, is not to prove, that the *Latin Church* has alway made uſe of the Terms *Hypoſtaſes, Subſiſtentiæ, & Modi Subſiſtendi*, about the Explication of the *Trinity*, (for I own it to have been otherwiſe,) but that from the Fourth Century downward, thoſe of that Communion were not Strangers to, and unacquainted with theſe Words; many great and Eminent Writers having from time to time more or leſs applyed them to this Purpoſe. But the main Proof of the Point driven at I ſtate upon the Latter Ages of the *Catholick Church.*

Concerning

Concerning which I dare and do affirm, That for the Five or Six laſt Centuries, the ſaid Terms have been Univerſally received and uſed by *Divines* in their Writings and Diſcourſes about the *Trinity*; all ſtating the *Perſonalities* and *diſtinction* of the *Divine Perſons* upon ſo many *diſtinct Subſiſtences*, or *Modes* of *Subſiſtence*; therein following the *Greek Fathers*, who were much more verſed in this Controverſie, and mannaged it much better and more exactly than the Ancient *Latines* did.

Accordingly, I ſhall proceed now to the *School-men*; *Lombard.* amongſt whom I ſhall begin with the Father of them, *viz.* *Peter Lombard*, who in *Book* 1. of his Sentences, *Diſtinct.* 25. and *Point*, or *Sect.* 9. ſpeaks thus. *Cùm dicitur alia eſt Perſona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritûs Sancti, utique id ſanè intelligi poteſt, ut ſit ſenſus talis; Alia eſt Subſiſtentia, vel Hypoſtaſis Patris, alia Subſiſtentia Filii, alia Subſiſtentia Spiritûs Sancti; & alia Subſiſtentia Pater, alia Filius, alia Spiritus Sanctus.* By which ſurely it is plain, That he ſtates the *Divine Perſons* and their *Perſonalities* upon *Subſiſtence*, if any thing can be ſo.

Next to *Lombard*, I ſhall produce *Alenſis*, who in *Vol.* 1. *Alexander* and *Book* 1. *de Divinis nominibus in ſpeciali*, has theſe Paſ- *Alenſis.* ſages. *In Divinis non dicitur una ſubſiſtentia, ſicut una ſubſtantia.* Quæſt. 57. Memb. 3. And *Tres ſunt Hypoſtaſes unius Eſſentiæ*, Quæſt. 58. Memb. 3. And *Perſona eſt Hypoſtaſis proprietate ſuâ diſtincta.* Quæſt. 58. Memb. 4. By all which he manifeſtly Aſſerts the thing here contended for.

After him, let us ſee what *Durandus* ſays, who un- *Durandus.* dertaking to give the ſignification of *Subſtantia*, *Subſiſtentia*, *Eſſentia* and *Perſona*, with reference to *God*, in order to the Explication of the Term *Subſiſtentia*, firſt tells us, What it is to *Subſiſt*, in theſe Words. *Subſiſtere dicit determinatum eſſendi modum, prout ſcilicet aliquid eſt*

Ens

Ens per ſe, & non in alio. A little after which, he tells us, That *Nomen Perſonæ dicit ſuppoſitum Intellectualis Naturæ, cui omnia Prædicta conveniunt*, ſcil. *Eſſentia, Subſtantia* & *Subſiſtentia.* By which he gives us a moſt exact Account and Definition of a *Perſon*; which (in *Intelligent Beings*) is nothing elſe but an *Eſſence*, or *Subſtance* (Terms Synonymous in *God*) *under a Subſiſtence peculiarly belonging to it.* And in the end of this Queſtion, he further explains the *Perſonalities* of the *Divine Perſons* by ſo many *diſtinct Relations*, in theſe Words. *Perſona, quæ multiplicatur in Divinis, includit in eo, de quo dicitur, aliquid, quod non eſt omnino idem ſecundùm rem vel ex naturâ rei cum Eſſentiâ vel Subſtantiâ, ſcilicet Relationem; ratione cujus pluraficatur Perſona in Divinis, & non eſſentia.* Durandus Lib. 1. Diſtinct. 23. Quæſt. 2.

Aquinas. *Thomas Aquinas* alſo we ſhall find giving his Judgment to the ſame purpoſe, and that very fully and clearly. *Dicendum* (ſays he) *quòd quamvis hoc Nomen* [*Subſtantia*] *in Latino reſpondere videatur huic Nomini* [*Hypoſtaſis*] *in Græco, non tamen omninò idem ſignificat ſecundùm uſum utriuſque linguæ. Nam hoc nomen* [*Hypoſtaſis*] *apud Græcos ſignificat tantùm Subſtantiam particularem quæ eſt ſubſtantia prima; ſed Latini utuntur Nomine Subſtantiæ tam pro primâ quàm pro ſecundâ. Subſtantia autem particularis nihil aliud videtur, quàm quid diſtinctum Subſiſtens. Cùm ergo in Divinis invenitur aliquid diſtinctum ſubſiſtens, rectè ibi Nomen* [Hypoſtaſis] *dici poteſt,* ſecundùm quod Divina verbis humanis ſignificari contingit. And again, *Dicendum quòd hoc Nomen* [*Perſona*] *non differt ab hoc nomine* [*Hypoſtaſis*] *niſi quòd addit determinatam Naturam; quod patet ex hoc, quòd Hypoſtaſis eſt Individua ſubſtantia. Perſona verò Individua ſubſtantia Rationalis Naturæ. Hypoſtaſis ergo in Rationali Naturâ accepta nihil aliud eſt, quàm Perſona, ſicut Animal cum Rationali*

Actu

Actu nihil aliud est quàm Homo. Unde cùm Divina Natura sit Rationalis, (largo modo accipiendo Rationale pro quolibet Intellectuali) oportet quòd Hypostasis Divina sit idem quod Persona Divina. And presently after, as to the *Relative Nature* of this *Hypostasis*, he adds this at the end of the Article. *Sicut ergo hoc Nomen [Persona] in Divinis significat Relationem per modum rei Subsistentis, sic & hoc Nomen [Hypostasis.]* Thomas in Scripto 2. in Sentent. Lib. 1. Distinct. 26. Quæst. 1. Artic. 1, 2. And again in his Comment upon the Epistle to the *Romans*, Cap. 1. *Nihil aliud est Persona quàm Hypostasis aut suppositum Rationalis Naturæ.*

Next to *Thomas*, let us hear *Cajetan*, one of the most Eminent Commentators upon him, who defending *Bonaventure* against *Scotus*, speaks thus as to this particular. *Substantia dupliciter sumitur, & pro Essentiâ & pro Hypostasi* (i. e.) *Subsistentiâ. Atque hoc secundo modo Substantia*, id est, *Hypostasis dicitur formaliter de Personâ Divinâ, & quòd simul ac semel Persona Divina est Hypostasis & tamen Relatio.* Adding these Words immediately hereupon. *Hæc omnia communia sunt omnibus Theologis.* Cajetan in 1m Thomæ, Quæst. 40. Artic. 2. *Cajetan.*

From *Cajetan* I shall pass to *Greg. de Valentiâ*, who discourses of the *Divine Persons* and *Personalities* thus. *Ex hoc consequenter apparet, debere concedi in Divinis Tres Subsistentias respectivas, non solùm ut Subsistentia accipitur pro Totâ Personâ, ut definitio Ecclesiæ declarat; sed etiam ut accipitur pro gradu illo ultimo Substantiali constituente Personam & reddente illam incommunicabilem, quem Theologi appellare solent Subsistentiam, & est ipsa Personalitas.* G. de Valentiâ Tom. 1. Disputat. generali 2. Quæst. 3. Artic. 2. p. 741. *Greg. de Valentiâ.*

To *Gregory de Valentiâ*, we will subjoin *Estius*, who speaking of the Words *Persona* and *Hypostasis* as they *Estius.*

were uſed by the *Greeks* and *Latines*, and of the ſence of the *Fathers* about them, ſpeaks thus. *Horum Authoritatem poſteriores Græci ità ſunt ſecuti, ut Hypoſtaſim in Divinis non aliud intelligant, quàm quod Latini Perſonam vocant, maximè cum in promptu non eſſet aliud Vocabulum, quo Subſiſtentiam illam perſonalem, quâ inter ſe diſtinguuntur Pater, & Filius, & Spiritus Sanctus, commodè atque inoffensè exprimerent.* Eſtius in ſentent. lib. 1. Diſtinct. 23. Articulo 3. By which Words it appears, That according to this Author, it is this *Perſonalis Subſiſtentia*, by which the *Three Divine Perſons* are diſtinguiſhed, and conſequently in which the proper *Perſonality* of each of them does conſiſt.

Suarez. After *Eſtius* let us caſt our Eye upon *Suarez*, ſpeaking much the ſame Thing with thoſe before mentioned. *Advertendum eſt* (ſays he) *hoc nomen* [*Subſiſtentia*] *apud Antiquos Patres frequentiùs accipi in Vi concreti ad ſignificandam Hypoſtaſim ſeu Perſonam. In quo ſenſu nulla eſt Quæſtio inter Catholicos, nam de fide eſt, dari in Trinitate Tres Subſiſtentias realiter diſtinctas, id eſt Tres Hypoſtaſes.* Suarez in 1m Thomæ de Trinitatis Myſterio lib. 3. cap. 4. And then again for the *Relative Nature* of the ſaid *Subſiſtences*, he gives this Account of the *Divine Perſons* and their *Perſonalities*. *Ex his quæ hactenus diximus*, &c. *concluditur Relationem Perſonalem eſſe etiam proprietatem conſtituentem Perſonam* [*ſeu quâ conſtituitur Perſona.*] De Trinit. lib. 7. cap. 7. in the beginning.

Ripalda. To all which I ſhall add, *Martinez Ripalda*, a ſhort, but Judicious Writer upon the Sentences, ſpeaking of the Term [*Hypoſtaſis*] in theſe Words. *Hæretici* (ſays he) *referente Hieronymo, eâ voce abutebantur ad decipiendum fideles; jam eâ ſignificantes Eſſentiam, jam Perſonalitatem & incommunicabilem Subſiſtentiam.* By which laſt Expreſſion this Author manifeſtly ſhews, That he takes

Perſonality

Perſonality and *Incommunicable Subſiſtence* for Words Synonymous; and conſequently that ſuch a *Subſiſtence* is and muſt be that, by which a *Divine Perſon* is conſtituted formally, what he is.

I cannot think it neceſſary to quote any more of this ſort of Writers, nor am I ſollicitous to alledge many of them, becauſe I am well aſſured (according to the forecited Saying of *Cajetan*) that *theſe are the Terms, and this the Language of them all upon this Subject.* Only I think fit to remark this: That, whereas I have alledged ſome of the *School-men* (and particularly *Durandus*, *Thomas*, and *Suarez*) expreſſing the *Divine Perſonalities* by *Relations*, as well as by *Hypoſtaſes*, or *Subſiſtences*, as they do in both theſe mean but one and the ſame Thing, *viz.* a *Relative Subſiſtence*, or a *Subſiſting Relation*; ſo by both of them they equally overthrow this Author's *Hypotheſis*, deriving the *Divine Perſonalities* from *Self-Conſciouſneſs*. Foraſmuch as *Subſiſtence* is in *Nature* before it, and *Relation* is oppoſite to it; it having been demonſtrated by me in Chap. 4. That *Self-Conſciouſneſs* is a Thing wholly *Abſolute* and *Irrelative*, and therefore cannot poſſibly be the *Formal Reaſon* of that which is *Eſſentially Relative*. In a word, *Self-Conſciouſneſs* is neither an *Hypoſtaſis*, nor a *Relation*; and therefore can have nothing to do here, whatſoever other Employment this Author may have for it.

And now I ſhall at laſt deſcend to the Teſtimony of ſeveral *Modern Divines*, and all of them Men of Note in the Times in which they lived. And amongſt theſe, let us firſt hear *Philip Melancthon* in his common places ſpeaking thus upon this Head. *Satis conſtat* (ſays he) *veteres Scriptores Eccleſiæ ſolitos hæc duo vocabula diſcernere* οὐσίαν *&* ὑπόςασιν, *& dicere unam eſſe* οὐσίαν, id eſt, *Eſ-* *Melancthon*

ſentiam æternam Patris, & Filii, & Spiritûs Sancti, ſed tres ὑποστάσεις.

Chemnitius From him we will paſs to *Chemnitius* who Wrote upon *Melancthon*'s Common Places: He in the firſt Chapter of his Book *de duabus in Chriſto Naturis*, gives his Opinion thus. *Hypoſtaſes ſeu Perſonæ Trinitatis omnes unum ſunt propter Identitatem Eſſentiæ ſuæ, atque adeò non differunt Eſſentialiter, nec ſeparatim una extra aliam & ſine aliâ ſubſiſtit.* And preſently after this, *Relatione autem ſeu* πρόσω ὑπάρξεως, *modo ſcilicet Subſiſtendi realiter differunt.*

Calvin. After *Chemnitius* let us conſider what *Calvin* ſays; in Book 1. of his *Inſtitutions*, Chap. 13. Sect. 2. *Filium Dei Apoſtolus characterem Hypoſtaſeos Patris nominans, haud dubiè aliquam Patri Subſiſtentiam aſſignat in quâ differat à Filio. Nam pro Eſſentiâ accipere (ſicuti fecerunt quidam Interpretes,* &c.) *non durum modò ſed abſurdum quoquè eſſet.* And again in *Sect.* 6. of the ſame Chapter. *Perſonam voco Subſiſtentiam in Dei eſſentiâ, quæ ad alios relata proprietate incommunicabili diſtinguitur. Subſiſtentiæ nomine aliud quiddam intelligi volumus quàm Eſſentiam.*

Peter Martyr. In the next place *Peter Martyr* gives us the ſame Account of the ſame Subject. *Multò rectiùs* (ſays he) *& veriùs intelligemus ex iſto loco* (nempe 2 Samuelis Cap. 7. Commate 23.) *Tres Perſonas in Unâ Naturâ Divinâ, Patrem, inquam, Filium & Spiritum Sanctum, quæ cum ſint Tres Hypoſtaſes, tamen concluduntur in Unam Eſſentiam.* Petrus Martyr Loc. Com. p. 50. col. 2. Loco de Dei Attributis & Sacro-Sanctâ Trinitate.

Wolfg. Muſculus. Likewiſe *Wolfgangus Muſculus* in his Common Places under the particular Head or common Place *de Deo*, declares the Matter thus. *Eſt itaque Deus Eſſentiâ Unus quemadmodum & Naturâ & Divinitate, Hypoſtaſi verò Trinus.* And a little after, *Hæc ſunt manifeſtâ fide tenenda, Deum,*

Deum, viz. *Eſſe Unum Eſſentiâ, Naturâ, Divinitate, ſententiâ, motione, & Operatione, Trinum verò Tribus Perſonis, quarum ſingulis ſua eſt Hypoſtaſis & Proprietas.* Muſc. Loc. Comm. cap. 6. p. 7. And a little before ſpeaking of the difference of οὐσία and ὑπόςασις, and in what ſence the *Ancients* underſtood theſe Words. *Voce Eſſentiæ* (ſays he) *id expreſſerunt (nempe Veteres) quod commune eſt in Sacrâ Triade: per Hypoſtaſim verò quod Unicuique Perſonæ proprium in illâ eſt, ſignificârunt.* p. 6. ibid.

Piſcator alſo in his *Theological Theſes*, ſpeaks after the ſame manner. *Piſcator.* *Quum igitur* λόγος *ſemper fuerit filius Dei, quis non videt* λόγον *de quo loquitur Johannes, ſemper fuiſſe Perſonam ſeu Hypoſtaſim, rem ſcilicet per ſe Subſiſtentem*, Loc. 2. de Deo. p. 57, 58.

Agreeably to this, *Tilenus* an Eminent *Divine* expreſſes himſelf in his Body of Divinity, ὑποςάσεις (ſays he) *ſive Perſonæ ſunt illa ipſa* οὐσία *quæ in ſingulis Perſonis eſt Tota; ipſæ verò Relationibus ſive Proprietatibus* χαρακτηριςικαῖς *ſunt diſtinctæ.* And again, *Simpliciter dicimus Proprietates iſtas* διακριτικὰς *eſſe diverſos* τρόπους ὑπάρξεως *hoc eſt, modos Subſiſtendi.* Tilen. Syntag. par. 1. cap. 20. p. 129. *Tilenus.*

The Learned *Urſinus* in his *Theological Treatiſes* under the Head *De tribus Perſonis in Unâ Deitate* declares the ſame. *Tenendum eſt, nequaquam eandem eſſe Patris, Filii & Spiritûs Sancti Perſonam; ſed Tres eſſe Perſonas ſeu Hypoſtaſes Divinitatis reipsâ diſtinctas, nec plures nec pauciores.* Urſini Oper. Theol. Quæſt. 4. Theſi 2. By which we ſee that this great Divine reckons *Subſiſtence* to be ſo much the Ground and Reaſon of *Perſonality*, that he uſes *Perſona* and *Hypoſtaſis* as Terms perfectly equivalent. *Urſinus.*

But there would be no end of Particulars ſhould I quote all that might be quoted, and therefore I ſhall conclude *Turretinus.*

conclude all theſe ſingle Teſtimonies with that of *Turretinus*, late Profeſſor of Divinity at *Geneva*, who gives us this full and Judicious Account, in his common Places, of the Point here before us. *Fides Orthodoxa hæc eſt, in Unicâ ac Simpliciſſimâ Dei Eſſentiâ Tres eſſe diſtinctas Perſonas, quæ Proprietatibus Incommunicabilibus ſive Modis Subſiſtendi ità inter ſe diſtinguuntur, ut una non ſit alia, licèt per ineffabilem περιχώρησιν maneant ſemper & exiſtant in ſe invicem.* Turretinus part. 1. Loco 3. Quæſt. 28.

The *Auſperg* Confeſſion.

In the laſt place to confirm the Teſtimonies of particular Perſons, with the joynt Suffrage and Concurrence of whole *Churches* in their *Publick Confeſſions*, I ſhall mention ſome of them. And amongſt theſe, the *Auguſtan*, or *Auſperg Confeſſion*, gives this Account of the *Trinity*. *Eccleſiæ (ſcilicet Reformatæ) magno conſenſu docent Decretum Synodi Nicænæ credendum eſſe*, viz. *Quòd ſit Una Eſſentia Divina, & tamen ſint Tres Perſonæ ejuſdem Eſſentiæ*, &c. *Et Utuntur nomine Perſonæ eâ ſignificatione quâ uſi ſunt Scriptores Eccleſiaſtici, ut ſignificet non partem, aut qualitatem, ſed quod propriè Subſiſtit.* Confeſſio Auguſtana in Articulo fidei 1.

Wirtimberg Confeſſion.

Next to this we have the *Wirtemberg* Confeſſion declaring the ſame in the very beginning of it. *Credimus & confitemur Unum ſolum Deum*, &c. *Et in hâc unâ & Æternâ Deitate Tres eſſe per ſe Subſiſtentes proprietates ſeu Perſonas, Patrem, Filium & Spiritum Sanctum.* This Confeſſion was made and given forth in the Yeár 1552.

The *Gallican* Confeſſion.

Likewiſe the *Gallican Reformed Churches* in their Confeſſion made in the Reign of *Charles* the IX. and in the Year 1561. declare themſelves much the ſame way upon this Article. *Sancta Scriptura nos docet in illâ ſingulari & ſimplice Eſſentiâ Divinâ Subſiſtere Tres Perſonas, Patrem, Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum.*

Add

Add to theſe the *Belgick* Confeſſion alſo, recognized, approved, and ratifyed in the Synod of *Dort*; which in its eighth Article ſpeaks of the *Divine Perſons* in the *Bleſſed Trinity* thus. *Hæc diſtinctio* [viz. *Perſonarum*] *non efficit ut Deus in Tres ſit diviſus, quandoquidem Scriptura nos docet Patrem, Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum ſingulos diſtinctam habere ſuis Proprietatibus Hypoſtaſim,* which Words are extremely expreſſive and full. The *Belgick* Confeſſion.

But as touching theſe Confeſſions, the Reader ought not in Reaſon to be diſſatisfied that I produce no more of them to the preſent purpoſe, (out of thoſe many which are extant) ſince it has been ſtill the Cuſtom of moſt Churches to draw up their Confeſſions in Terms as general and ſhort as they well could. So that we are the leſs to wonder if we ſeldom meet with ſuch Words in them as are Explicatory and Particular.

And now after all theſe Authorities thus alledged by me, I would deſire this Confident Man (whom I am here diſputing with) to look back upon the fore-mentioned *Greek* and *Latin Fathers, Councils, School-men,* and all thoſe Eminent *Modern Divines,* together with the *Clergy* of whole *Countreys* and *Nations,* Solemnly and Unanimouſly declaring themſelves in their Publick Avowed *Confeſſions of Faith,* upon this great Article and Myſtery; I ſay, I deſire him to look all theſe in the Face, and to tell them, That they have hitherto abuſed the whole World with falſe Notions of the *Trinity,* by expreſſing the *Divine Perſons* and *Perſonalities* by *Hypoſtaſes, Subſiſtences,* and *Modes of Subſiſtence,* Words (as he ſays) importing *little better than Sabellianiſm,* and ſerving for nothing elſe but to *obſcure, perplex,* and *confound* the Minds and Thoughts of Men in conceiving, or diſcourſing of this Weighty and Sacred Point of our *Chriſtian Faith.* This, I require him, in defence of what

what he has ſo expreſly, peremptorily, and Magiſterially affirmed all along in his Book, to do; if his *Heart* and *Forehead* will ſerve him for it.

In the mean time I have here delivered in all the Teſtimonies both *Greek* and *Latin*, *Ancient* and *Modern*, which I think fit to offer in behalf of the Point pleaded for: Though, ſhould I have repreſented all that occurrs in the fore-cited Authors (beſides many others not mentioned) to the ſame purpoſe, I ſhould not ſo much have *quoted*, as (upon the Matter) *Tranſcribed* them.

And now, if any one ſhould ask me, Whether I look upon theſe Teſtimonies as ſufficiently repreſenting the Doctrine of the *Catholick Church* upon this Head of *Divinity*?

I Anſwer, That barely by way of *Induction* they do not; ſince an *Induction* ought to conſiſt of a greater Collection of Particulars. Nevertheleſs I avouch this number of Teſtimonies to be a full and ſufficient Repreſentation of the ſence of the Church herein, if we conſider them as joyned with, and ſupported by theſe Three following Conſiderations. As

Firſt, That it is morally impoſſible, that the *Perſons* above quoted, being of ſuch Eminent Note in the Church, both for Orthodoxy and Learning, and Living (moſt of them) at ſuch great diſtance both of Time and Place, (rendring all Communication between them impracticable) ſhould, or could preſume to expreſs themſelves upon ſo Sacred an Article, and ſo Tender a Point, but in ſuch Terms as were generally received, uſed, and approved of by the Church.

Secondly, That theſe Terms were never yet Condemned, nor the Uſers of them Cenſured by any *Church*, or *Council*, accounted Orthodox; which in ſo great, and ſo revered an Article they would infallibly have been, had

had they been judged *unfit* for, or *unapplicable* to, the Things to which they were actually applyed, as this bold Author with great Confidence affirms them to be.

Thirdly and Laſtly, That hardly any Church-Writer of conſiderable Remark and Name can be produced, who ever treated of this great Subject in any other Terms than thoſe expreſſed by us, or particularly made uſe of the Terms *Self-Conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* to explain it by. All being wholly ſilent of them in all thoſe Writings in which they do moſt particularly and exactly deſign a Diſcuſſion of theſe Matters.

Theſe Three Conſiderations, I ſay, added to the fore-alledged Quotations irrefragably prove them to be a true, juſt, and ſufficient Repreſentation of the Sence and Doctrine of the *Catholick Church* in this Matter; and that it is utterly inconſiſtent with the Common Reaſon, Principles and Practice of Mankind, that it ſhould be otherwiſe. And as for what concerns this Author, whom I am diſputing with, I dare affirm yet further, that any one or two of the Paſſages quoted by me, are more full and clear to the purpoſe I quote them for, than all that he has produced from the ſeveral *Fathers* alledged by him for his *Self-Conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* put together; and much more than his forlorn νοερόν τι χρῆμα cited out of *Gr. Nyſſen* to prove the *Son an Infinite Mind diſtinct from the Father*, Page 102. That is to ſay, than Three vagrant Words applyed by him, *to he knows not what*, and to be found (for ought appears) *he knows not where*.

All which being manifeſtly ſo, I deſire any Sober Perſon to ſhew me ſomething but like a Reaſon to prove, That the *Fathers* and other *Church-Writers* (from whom all theſe Quotations were drawn) placed the *Perſonal*

Diſtinction of the *Divine Perſons* in *Self-Conſciouſneſs, and their Unity only in Mutual-Conſciouſneſs.* On the contrary, as theſe Words were never ſo much as mentioned by them, ſo I affirm, That, whenſoever, in ſpeaking of the *Trinity* they proceed beyond the bare Word and Name of *Perſon*, ſo as to give any Account of the Thing ſignified thereby, and the Reaſon thereof, they do it conſtantly by *Subſiſtences, Modes of Subſiſtence*, and *Relations.* This I am poſitive in; and withal, that, as they never mention the Terms *Self-Conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* upon this Subject, ſo I averr moreover, That when they uſe the Words *Subſiſtences, Modes of Subſiſtence* and *Relations* on the one ſide, and of *Unity, or Identity of Nature, Eſſence, or Subſtance* on the other, (which they always do) they neither do, nor can mean *Self-Conſciouſneſs* by the former, nor *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* by the latter, nor yet the Things ſignified by either of theſe Terms. And that for theſe Reaſons.

Firſt, Becauſe all *Modes of Being* importing *Exiſtence*, are in Order of *Nature* antecedent to the other Attributes of *Being*; ſuch as are *Knowledge, Wiſdom, Power*, and the like. And *Self-Conſciouſneſs* is no more; as being but a branch, or ſort of *Knowledge*, and nothing elſe. And

Secondly, Becauſe nothing *Abſolute* can give *Diſtinction* and *Incommunicability* to the *Divine Perſons*, the Rule of the *Schools* being undeniably true, *Non dari in Divinis Abſolutum Incommunicabile*, Gr. Valent. Tom. 1. Pag. 874. But ſuch a Thing I affirm *Self-Conſciouſneſs* to be, and in *Chap.* 4. have abundantly proved it ſo. So that it is evident, That all the *Fathers* and *Ancient Writers* in all the Terms which they uſed to expreſs the *Trinity* and *Divine Perſons* by, had no regard to *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, either *Name* or *Thing*, and conſequently.

ly that it is a Term wholly foreign and unapplicable to this purpoſe. And what is ſaid of their ſilence about *Self-Conſciouſneſs* extends to *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* too.

And the Truth is, the other forementioned Terms aſſerted by us againſt this Innovator, are to be looked upon by all Sober Intelligent Men as a ſet of ſtated Words, or Forms of Expreſſion firſt pitched upon by the Ableſt *Divines* and *Writers* of the *Church*, then countenanced and owned by *Councils*, and laſtly eſtabliſhed by a kind of Preſcription founded upon a long continued uſe of the ſame throughout the ſeveral Ages of the Church, as the beſt and fitteſt helps to guide Men in their Conceptions of, and Diſcourſes about this great Myſtery; and ſuch as the *Church*, in treating of ſo arduous a Point, never yet would, nor durſt go beyond. So that the Queſtion now is, Whether they ought to be abandoned and made to give place to a New, Muſhrom, unheard of Notion, ſet up by one Confident Man preferring himſelf before all Antiquity? A Notion, (no doubt) long before he was Born, throughly conſidered, canvaſed and laid aſide, as not only inſufficient, but Impertinent to give any tolerable Account of the *Trinity* by.

Well; but having declared this for the *Catholick*, *Orthodox*, and *Received Doctrine* about the *Bleſſed Trinity*, viz. *That it is one and the ſame Divine Nature, Eſſence, or Subſtance diverſified into Three diſtinct Perſons by Three diſtinct Modes of Subſiſtence, or Relations, ſo that by vertue thereof God is truly and properly ſaid to be Three Perſons, and Three Perſons to be One God.* Having, I ſay, vouched this for the Doctrine of the Church, let us in the laſt place ſee what this Author has to object againſt it. And here his

Firſt Reaſon (to put it into Form for him for once) may run thus: Whatſoever conſtitutes and diſtinguiſhes

the *Divine Perſons*, is really and truly in *God*, but *Modes of Subſiſtence* are not really and truly in *God*, and therefore *Modes of Subſiſtence* do not conſtitute, or diſtinguiſh the *Divine Perſons*. The Major is evident, and ſhall be readily granted him. And the Minor he poſitively aſſerts, by denying any *Modes to be in God*, as particularly in *Page* 47. in theſe Words. *All Men grant* (ſays he) *that there are no Accidents, Qualities, or* Modes *in God.* And again, *Pag.* 84. *There are no* Modes, *no more than there are Qualities and Accidents in the Deity.* So that we ſee here, what this Author holds concerning all *Modes* with reference to *God.*

In Anſwer to which Argument, as I have formed it (and I challenge him to ſhew that I have at all wronged him in it, if he can) I deny the Minor, viz. *That Modes of Subſiſtence are not in God:* And as for his Two forecited general Aſſertions: *That Modes are no more to be allowed in God than Qualities and Accidents* (which by the way are ſo put together, as if *Qualities* were not *Accidents*) I have theſe Two Things to remark upon thoſe Two Aſſertions ſo poſitively laid down by him.

Firſt, That it is a groſs Abſurdity, and no ſmall proof of Ignorance, to reckon things ſo vaſtly different as *Modes* and *Accidents* are, upon the ſame Range, or Level, and then to argue and affirm the ſame thing of both. And therefore I do here with the ſame Poſitiveneſs tell him, That *Modes* and *Accidents* do extremely differ; and that none of any skill either in *Logick*, or *Metaphyſicks* ever accounted them the ſame. For an *Accident* affects the Subject, it belongs to, ſo, that it is alſo a *diſtinct Being* it ſelf. But a *Mode* affects it ſo, that it is not a *diſtinct Being* it ſelf. I will not deny but *Accidents* may ſometimes in a large and looſe ſence be called *Modes*: But I deny, That *Modes* are either *Accidents*, or ever ſo called, where

where they are particularly and distinctly treated of by themselves. *School-men* and *Metaphysicians* may speak very differently of *Modes* when they mention them *occasionally*, and when they discourse of them *professedly*, and under a certain and peculiar Head. And whensoever they do so, if this Author can bring me any one *Logician*, *Metaphysician*, or *School-man* who takes *Accidents* and *Modes* promiscuously for the same Things, I dare undertake to forfeit to him a greater Sum, than ever yet he received for Copy-money in his Life.

Secondly, My next Remark upon his foregoing Assertion is this: That as it is grosly absurd to confound *Modes of Being* with *Accidents*; so it is equally absurd to deny *Modes of Being* to belong to *God*. And this I shall prove both from the manifest Reason of the Thing, and from Unquestionable Authority. And

First, For the Reason of the Thing. If *Modes of Being* should not be allowed in *God*, then I affirm it to be impossible for any Distinction, and consequently for any *Persons* to be in *God*. Which I prove thus. If there be any distinction in *God*, or the *Deity*, it must be either from some distinct *Substance*, or some *Accident*, or some *Mode of Being*, (for I defie him or any Mortal breathing to assign a fourth Thing besides these.) But it cannot be from any distinct *Substance*, for that would make a manifest Composition in the *Divine Nature*; nor yet from any *Accident*, for that would make a worse Composition: And therefore it follows, That this *Distinction* must unavoidably proceed from one or more *distinct Modes of Being*. This I affirm, and (according to my promise made to this Author in the foregoing Chapter) I shall be ready to defend the Truth of this Assertion against him, whensoever he shall think fit to engage in the Dispute.

Secondly,

Secondly, In the next place, for the proof of this from Authority, I affirm, that all *Metaphyſicians*, *Schoolmen* and *Divines* (at leaſt, all that I have yet met with) do unanimouſly concurr in theſe Two Things.

1. That they utterly deny any *Accidents* in *God*. And

2. That they do as univerſally affirm *Modes of Being* to be in *God*, and to belong to him. Nay, and (which is more) That they do in theſe very *Modes* ſtate the Ground and Reaſon of the *Perſonalities*, and the diſtinction thereof reſpectively belonging to the *Three Perſons* of the *Godhead*.

And for a further proof of what I have here affirmed, and withal to ſhew how unable this Man's *Memory* is to keep pace with his *Confidence*, whereas in the foremention*ed page* 47. he affirms, *That all Men* (mark this Word) *deny Accidents*, *Qualities and Modes to be in God*. He himſelf afterwards, in *page* 48. owns, That the *School-men* hold theſe different *Modos Subſiſtendi* in the *Godhead*, and accordingly there ſets himſelf (as well as he is able) to confute them for it. Now how ſhall we reconcile theſe blind Aſſertions, that ſo cruelly butt and run their Heads againſt one another? For will he ſay, That the *School-men* do not grant ſuch *Modes* to be in *God*, after he himſelf has done his poor utmoſt to confute them for holding it? Or having ſaid, *That all Men deny theſe Modes to be in God, and yet that the School-men grant and hold it*, will he ſay, That the *School-men are not Men*, and ſo come not under that Univerſal Appellative? What the *School-men* hold and aſſert in this Matter, has been ſufficiently ſhewn already. But I muſt needs tell this Author upon this occaſion, That he ſeems to have ſomething a *bad Memory*, and withal to have more than ordinary need of a very *good one*.

There

There is one Thing more which I think fit to obſerve, and it is ſomething pleaſant, *viz.* That our Author having exploded all *Modos Subſiſtendi* in *God*, and Chaſtiſed the *School-men* for holding them, even to a forfeiture of their very *Humanity*; he yet vouchſafes afterwards, by a kind of Correctory Explication, to allow them in this ſence, viz. *That the ſame Numerical Eſſence is whole and entire in each Divine Perſon, but in a different* Manner, P. 84. Lines 12, 13, 14. By which Words it appearing that he grants that of the *Manner*, which he had before denied of the *Modus*, it is a ſhrewd Temptation to me to think, That certainly this Acute Author takes *Modus* for one Thing, and *Manner* for another.

In fine, I appeal to the Judicious and Impartial Reader, Whether a Man could well give a more convincing Argument of his utter Unacquaintance with the True Principles of Philoſophy and Theology, than by a Confident Aſſertion of theſe Two Poſitions.

1. That *Accidents* and *Modes of Being* are the ſame Things. And

2. That ſuch *Modes are not at all to be* allowed of, or admitted in *God*.

Secondly, His Second Objection againſt our ſtating the *diſtinction* of the *Divine Perſons* upon *Three different Modes of Subſiſtence*, is, That *theſe Modes are little better than Three Names of One God*. Which was the Hereſie of *Sabellius*. P. 83.

To which, I Anſwer Two Things.

Firſt, In direct and abſolute Contradiction to what he aſſerts, I affirm, That the difference between *Three Modes of Subſiſtence* in the *Godhead*, and only *Three diſtinct Names* applyed to it, is very great. For Names and Words depend only upon the Will and Pleaſure of the Impoſer, and not upon the *Nature* of the Thing it ſelf,

ſelf, upon which they are impoſed, and for that cauſe neither do nor can *Internally* affect it. But on the contrary, all *Modes of Subſiſtence* ſpring from the *Nature* of the *Thing*, or *Being*, which they affect, both antecedently to, and (by conſequence) independently upon the Apprehenſion, or Will of any one. So that altho' neither Man nor Angel had ever conſidered, or thought of, or ſo much as known that there were ſuch or ſuch things; yet the *Modes of Subſiſtence* proper to them, would have belonged to them, as really and as much as they do now. And if this Author cannot by this ſee a vaſt difference between theſe, and ſo many bare *Names*, (thanks be to God) others can both ſee, and defend it too. But

Secondly, Whereas he ſays, *That theſe Three Modes are but little better than Three Names.* I Anſwer, That his very ſaying ſo is a Conceſſion that they are ſomething at leaſt *more and better.* To which, I add further, That *this ſomething* (as ſmall a Difference as it makes) is yet ſufficient to diſcriminate things, which are only *Diſtinguiſhable*, and no more. For *ſeparable*, or *diviſible* from one another, I am ſure they are not. Nay, this is ſo far from being a juſt and rational Exception againſt placing the difference of the *Divine Perſons* in ſo many different *Modes of Subſiſtence*, that, in the Judgment of very Great and Learned Men, it is no ſmall Argument for it: For St. *Cyril* ſays, *That the difference between the* Divine Perſons *(by reaſon of the perfect Unity of their Nature* (as it were) blotting out, *or taking away all Diverſity between them) is ſo very* ſmall *as but juſt to diſtinguiſh them,*

Ὁμούσιον τοίνυν τῷ Θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ τὸν υἱὸν ὁμολογοῦντες ὑπάρχειν ἐν ἰδίᾳ τε ὑποστάσει συναφῶς τε ἅμα καὶ διωρισμένως ἐναῦθαί φαμεν τοῖς τ ταυτότητος λόγοις, ἀναγκαιοτάτως εὖ μάλα συναπτοντες τῶν προσώπων ἤτοι

them, and no more; and to cauſe that One of them cannot be called the other; the Father not the Son, nor the Son, upon any Account, the Father, &c. I thought fit to Tranſcribe the whole Paſſage, tho' the latter part, *viz.* from the Words *ἵνα μὴ ταύτης, &c.* is moſt immediately and directly to the Purpoſe, which I here alledge the whole for.

And *Thomas Aquinas* tells us, *That the Divine Perſons ought to be diſtinguiſhed by that, which makes the leaſt diſtinction.*

In like manner *Durandus* affirms, *That the firſt Inſtance of Plurality* [or remove from Unity] *ought to be the leaſt. And therefore that the diſtinction of the Divine Perſons, ſince it is the firſt, ought to be by diſtinct Relations compatible in the ſame Eſſence: Which for that cauſe, is a leſs diſtinction than any that can be made by Things Abſolute.*

And Laſtly, *Bellarmine* averrs poſitively, *That the diſtinction of the Divine Perſons ought to be the leaſt that is poſſible.* Suppoſing all along, that it muſt ſtill be *Real*, and not barely *Nominal*, or *Imaginary*. This was the Judgment of theſe

τῶν ὀνομάτων διαφολῶ καὶ τῶν ὑποστάσεων ἑτερότητα, ὡς ἂν Πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ· κατ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ μόνον ἵνα μὴ ταύτης οὐσίας εἰς πᾶν ὁτιοῦν ἐμφερὲς, καὶ τὸ καθὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον ἀπαραλλάκτως ἔν τε τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῷ υἱῷ, καθαλεαίνῃ τρόπον τινὰ τὴ διαφορὰν καὶ δυσδιάκριτον κομιδῇ τὸ ἀναμέσον ἴδιον ἑκατέρου καθεργάσαιτο πῶς. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὃν Πατὴρ καὶ οὐχ υἱὸς· ὁ δ' αὖ υἱὸς καὶ ἔστι που Πατήρ. &c. *Cyril. Dial.* 1. *de Trinit. p.* 409. *Edit. Lutet.* 1638.

Diſtinctio Perſonarum non debet eſſe niſi per id, quod minimùm diſtinguit, hoc eſt, per Relationem. *Aquin. primâ parte. Quæſt.* 40. *Articulo* 2. *prope finem.*

Prima pluralitas debet eſſe minima; & ideo diſtinctio Perſonarum, quæ eſt prima, debet eſſe per Relationes compoſſibiles in eâdem Eſſentiâ: Et ob hoc, eſt minor aliâ quâcunque diſtinctione, quæ fit per Abſoluta. *Durandus Lib.* 1. *Diſtinct.* 16. *Quæſt.* 1. *in fine.*

Diſtinctio inter Divinas Perſonas debet eſſe minima. *Bellarminus Tom.* 1. *P.* 337. *Lutetiæ Pariſ.*

Learned Men; who as they were far from being *Sabellians*, ſo they very well knew both what to aſſert and how to expreſs themſelves without giving any ground for their being thought ſo.

From all which it follows, That for this very cauſe, that *Modes of Subſiſtence* import the leaſt *Real difference* that can be, they are therefore the fitteſt to ſtate the *Diſtinction* of the *Divine Perſons* upon. So that our Author here relapſes into a fault which he has been guilty of more than once, *viz.* in alledging that as an Argument againſt a Thing, which is indeed a moſt *Effectual Reaſon for it*. And ſo I come to his

Third and Laſt Objection againſt our making theſe *Modes of Subſiſtence* the ground, or *Formal Reaſon* of the *Diſtinction* between the *Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*, which is, *That it makes the Three Divine Perſons only Three Modes of the Deity, or only Modally diſtinguiſhed*; whereas (according to his Doctrine) there are no *Modes in the Deity, and much leſs can a Mode be God*. And that, *As all muſt grant, that the Father is not a Mode of the Deity, but Eſſentially God; ſo no Man can think that the Father begot only a Modus, and called it his Son; whereas a Son ſignifies a Real Perſon of the ſame Nature, but diſtinct from the Father*. Thus he diſcourſes, *pag.* 83, 84. And is not this cloſe and profound reaſoning? But as profound as it is, if it be at all to his Purpoſe, his Argument muſt lie in this, That all the forementioned Abſurdities unavoidably follow from deriving the *Diſtinction* of the *Three Divine Perſons* from *Three diſtinct Modes of Subſiſtence* belonging to one and the ſame *Divine Nature*. But this conſequence I utterly deny, and to make out the Reaſon of this denial, I ſhall conſider what he has ſaid particularly.

And

And here, firſt of all, I would fain know, Whether this Man will never leave confounding things perfectly different, and taking them for the very ſame? For to affirm the *Three Divine Perſons* to be only *Three Modes* of the *Deity* is one Thing; and to affirm them to be only *Modally diſtinguiſhed*, is quite another. The former we abſolutely deny, and as poſitively hold the latter. And yet this wretched Fallacy would he impoſe upon his Reader all along, *viz.* That the Aſſertors of theſe *Modes of Subſiſtence* in the *Trinity*, make a *Perſon* to be only a *Modus Subſiſtendi*. But that is his own Blunder. For we do not ſay, That a *Perſon is only a Modus*, but that it is the *Divine Nature*, or *Godhead* Subſiſting under ſuch a *Modus*; ſo that the *Godhead* is ſtill included in it, joyned to it, and diſtinguiſhed by it. This is what we affirm and abide by, and what ſufficiently overthrows his pitiful Objection.

And as for his Abſurd Denial of all *Modes* in *God*, that has been throughly confuted already; ſo that we have nothing more to do, but to admire that Invincible and Glorious Ratiocination of his in theſe Words, *p.* 84. *No Man* (ſays he) *can think that the Father begot only a Modus, and called it his Son.* No, good Sir, No; none that I know of is in any danger of thinking, or ſaying ſo; no more, than that *Socrates* begot only the Shape and Figure of a Man, and then called it his *Son*; or (to turn your own blunt Weapon upon your ſelf) no more than *God* the *Father* begot another *Self-Conſciouſneſs* beſides his own, and called that his *Son*. Nevertheleſs I hope it will be granted me, That *Socrates* might beget *one* of ſuch a Shape and Figure, and (by this Author's and *Xantippe*'s good leave) call that his *Son*; and that *God* the *Father* might beget a *Perſon* endued with ſuch a *Self-Conſciouſneſs* (amongſt other Attributes) and call

that his *Son* too. But I perceive this Author and the *Fallacy of the Accident* are ſuch faſt Friends, that it is in vain to think of parting them.

In the mean time, as I told him what we do not hold concerning the *Father*'s Generation of the *Son*, ſo for his better Information I ſhall tell him, what the Aſſertors of theſe *Modes of Subſiſtence* do hold concerning it, *viz.* We do hold and affirm, That the *Father* Communicates his Nature under a different *Mode of Subſiſting*, from what it has in himſelf, to another, and that ſuch a Communication of it, in ſuch a peculiar way, is properly called his begetting of a *Son*. In which we do not ſay, *That the Father begets a Modus*, no nor yet an *Eſſence, or Nature*, but that he Communicates his own *Eſſence*, or *Nature* under ſuch a *diſtinct Modus* to another, and by ſo doing begets a *Perſon*, which *Perſon* is properly his *Son*. This, Sir, is the true Account of what the Aſſertors of the *Perſonal Modes of Subſiſtence* hold concerning the *Eternal Generation*. And if you have any thing to except againſt it, produce your Exceptions, and they ſhall not fail of an Anſwer.

I am now come to a cloſe of this Chapter, and indeed of the whole Argument undertook by me againſt this Author. In which I have Aſſerted the commonly received Doctrine about this great Article of the *Trinity*, both from the *Ancient Writers* of the *Church*, and againſt this Author's particular Objections; and in both fully ſhewn, That the *Three Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity* are one and the ſame *undivided Eſſence, Nature*, or *Godhead*, diverſified only by *Three diſtinct Modes of Subſiſtence*, which are ſometimes called *Properties*, and ſometimes *Relations*. *So that a Divine Perſon is formally and properly the Divine Nature, Eſſence, or Godhead with, and under ſuch a diſtinct Mode, Property, or Relation.* And this I averr to be the common, current, generally received Doctrine.

Doctrine of the *Church* concerning the *Trinity*. For *Councils* and *Fathers* hold it, the *School-men* teach it, the Confeſſions of *Churches* (where they are any thing particular upon this Subject) declare it; and all *Divines* both *Papiſt* and *Proteſtant*, in the ſeveral Bodies of Divinity wrote by them, do Aſſert it; only this Author, who yet (forſooth) owns himſelf a *Proteſtant* of the *Church of England*, denies and explodes it. To whom therefore (if he were not too great in his own Eyes to be Counſelled and Adviſed) I would give this Charitable piece of Counſel for once, *viz. That for the future he would not preſume at ſuch a rate to contradict the whole World, till he has learn'd not to contradict himſelf.*

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

In which this Author's Paradoxes, *both* Philoſophical *and* Theological, *as they occurr in this his Diſcourſe, are drawn together, Examined, and Confuted.*

I Am ſenſible, that I am now engaged in a Subject that would threaten the Reader with a very long Chapter, ſhould I follow it, as far as it would carry me: For I am entered into a large Field, *viz.* this Author's *Paradoxical Aſſertions:* In the traverſing of which, I ſhall obſerve no other Method, but juſt to take them in that order in which they offer themſelves throughout his Book; ſave only, that I ſhall give my Reader this premonition, That ſuch of them as I have particularly examined, and laid open in the foregoing Animadverſions, I ſhall now ſet down without any further Deſcant, or Enlargement upon them, or at leaſt with very little.

But as for thoſe, which I there paſſed over without any Notice, or Remark, (as I did it all along with full purpoſe to treat of them by themſelves, ſo) I ſhall particularly inſiſt upon them now. And the Reader may pleaſe to take them as they follow.

PARADOX.

It is a vain and arrogant preſumption (ſays this Author) *to ſay, What is, or what is not a Contradiction, when we confeſs*

confeſs we do not underſtand, or comprehend *the thing we ſpeak of*, p. 4. And again, *I know nothing in the World that we do* perfectly underſtand, p. 7. line 19.

Anſwer. According to theſe Two Aſſertions taken together, I affirm, That though a Man diſcourſes never ſo falſly and inconſiſtently of *God*, or indeed of any thing in the World beſides, yet he cannot juſtly be charged as guilty of a Contradiction. And moreover, ſince this Author affirms, *page* 97, That for any one to ſay, *That Three Divine Perſons who are divided and ſeparated from each other, are each of them God, and yet that they are not Three Gods, but one God*, is a direct *Contradiction*; I deſire to know of him, *Whether he* comprehends *what the Godhead, and what the Divine Perſons are?* And if not, *Whether* (according to his own Rule) *it is not a vain and arrogant Preſumption in him to ſay what is a Contradiction, when he profeſſes himſelf not to* comprehend *the thing he is ſpeaking of, and about which the Contradiction is ſaid to be?*

PARADOX.

This Author having declared the *Intimate* and *Eſſential Unity* between the *Father* and the *Son* from thoſe Words of our *Saviour*, John 14th. Chap. 10th. Ver. *I am in the Father, and the Father in me*: Subjoyns, *That this Oneneſs between them is ſuch an Union, as there is* nothing in Nature like it; *and we cannot long doubt what kind of Union this is, if we conſider that there is* but one poſſible *way to be thus United, and that is by this Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, p. 57.

Anſwer. Theſe Words I charge with Contradiction, and conſequently with Abſurdity upon two Accounts.

Firſt, becauſe they Contradict our Saviour's Words. And

Secondly, Becauſe they Contradict the Author's own Words.

1. And

1. And firſt concerning thoſe of our *Saviour*. Whereas this Author ſays, *That this Oneneſs between the Father and the Son, is ſuch an Union, as there is nothing in Nature like it*. Our *Saviour* in *John Ch.* 17. (where this whole Paſſage is repeated twice) affirms ſomething to *be like it*; *viz.* in *ver.* 11. where he prays to his *Father*, *That they* (viz. Believers) *may be One, as We* (viz. his *Father* and *Himſelf*) *are One*: And again, *ver.* 21. *That they may be One, as thou Father art in me, and I in thee.* So that our *Saviour* expreſly aſſerts a *Likeneſs* of ſomething *to this Union* on the one ſide; and this Author as expreſly denies it on the other. In which (according to his blundering, undiſtinguiſhing way) he confounds [*Likeneſs*] and [*Sameneſs of kind*] as all One; as ſhall preſently be further ſhewn.

In the next place, our *Saviour* (as plainly as Words can expreſs a Thing) ſays, *That he and his Father are One, by a Mutual In-being, or In-exiſtence in one another.* And this Man as expreſly ſays, *That there is no* poſſible *way for them to be one but by Mutual-Conſciouſneſs.* But I on the contrary deny, That *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* is *Mutual-Inexiſtence*, or *Mutual-Inexiſtence Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, any more, than that *Being*, or *Exiſtence* is properly *Conſciouſneſs*, or *Knowledge*; and therefore if *they cannot poſſibly be one, but by Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, it is certain that they are not ſo by *Mutual-Inexiſtence*; which yet our Saviour, in Words properly and naturally ſignifying *Inexiſtence*, affirms that they are.

And the more intolerable is this Aſſertion in this Author, for that in *Pag.* 56. he affirms, that theſe Words of our Saviour *ought to be underſtood properly*; and if ſo, I hope they do not only exclude *Metaphors*, but all other *Tropes* and *Figures* alſo; for [*Proper*] is not, adequately oppoſed to *Metaphorical*, but to *Figurative*, whatſoever

ver the *Figure* be. And I do here affirm, That if our *Saviour*'s Words be underſtood of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, they do not ſignifie *Properly*, but *Figuratively*; and the *Figure* is a *Metonymy* of the *Subject* for the *Adjunct*; forasmuch as in *God*, *Being*, or *Inexiſtence* are to be look'd upon as the *Subject*; and *Knowledge*, and the like Attributes as the *Adjuncts*. And therefore I do here tell this bold Man again, that for him to ſay, as he does, that the forementioned Words of our *Saviour* ought to be underſtood *properly*, and yet to interpret them to a ſence not *Proper*, but *Figurative* (which, by interpreting them of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, he evidently does) is both an Abſurdity and a Preſumption, equally inſufferable. But in the

2d. Place I charge the forecited Paſſage of this Author with the ſame Abſurdity, for being as Contradictory to his own words, as it was to thoſe of our *Saviour*. For whereas he here ſays,

Firſt, *That this Oneneſs between the Father and the Son*, expreſſed in thoſe Words, *I am in the Father, and the Father in me, can be no other kind of Union, than an Union by* Mutual-Conſciouſneſs. And

Secondly, *That it is ſuch an one, that there is nothing in Nature like it.*

I deſire him to turn to *Page* 106. of his Book, where he tells us, *That the Fathers uſe ſeveral Examples, and allude to ſeveral ſorts of Union, thereby to form a Notion of the Unity of the Godhead in the Three Divine Perſons.* Let him, I ſay, read this, and tell me, Whether thoſe *Examples and Alluſions* could be of any uſe *to form a Notion of that Unity* to which they bore no *Reſemblance* at all? For I, for my part, ever thought, that there can be no Alluſion of one thing to another without ſome ſimilitude between them, and that a ſimilitude is always on both

ſides; it being not poſſible for *Peter* to be like *John*, but *John* muſt be like *Peter* too. And if this Man does not yet bluſh at ſuch Contradictory Aſſertions, let him turn a little further to *Page* 126, 127. where he tells us particularly, that St. *Auſtin* explains this *Unity* by Examples of *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, and by ſeveral *Similitudes* (mark the words) of which the Unity of *Underſtanding*, *Memory*, and *Will* with the Soul of Man is alledged by him for *One*; and that a notable one too, for that *theſe Faculties* (as he there ſays) *are Mutually in one another*; and the Example of *Love* and *Knowledge* in the ſame Mind, is alledged by him as another ſuch a Simile, affirming them in like manner to *be Mutually in one another*. Now, I ſay, after all this, ought not the Reader to ſtand amazed, when he reads the Man firſt affirming that the *Unity* between the *Father* and the *Son Mutually exiſting* in one another by virtue of the *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs between them has nothing like it in Nature, nor has any Example, Metaphor, or Similitude, beſides it ſelf to allude to*; and yet afterwards producing ſeveral *Similitudes*, *Alluſions*, and *Metaphors* out of the *Fathers*, to explain both this *In-being*, and this *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* by? *God* give him a better Memory; for as theſe things repreſent him, no Man living (would he but impart his skill) could be ſo fit to teach the *Art of Forgetfulneſs* as himſelf.

But after all, I muſt not omit to give the Reader notice of another of his Abſurdities, though of a lower rate, *viz.* That all along *Page* 57. he takes a *Pattern*, or *Example*, and a *Similitude*, or *Metaphor* for Terms equivalent; whereas a *Pattern*, or *Example* imports a perfect entire Reſemblance between it ſelf and the thing of which it is the *Pattern*, and indeed approaches next to a *Parallel Inſtance*; while, on the other ſide, an A-

gree-

greement in any one reſpect, or degree, is ſufficient to found a *Metaphor*, or *Similitude* upon. And therefore tho it may eaſily be granted this Author, That there is no *Pattern*, or *Example* of ſuch an *Union* as is between the *Father* and the *Son*; yet that does not infer, that there is nothing in Nature that bears any ſimilitude to it; ſince this may very well be without the other, as that place in *John* 17. 11. and 21. has already proved.

And now I ſhould here have finiſhed my Remarks upon this particular Head, but that there is a certain Paſſage in order to his proving that there is nothing in Nature like *the Unity between the Father and the Son*, and it is this, *That in Subſtantial Unions, that which* comprehends, *is greater than that which is* comprehended: So that if Two Subſtances ſhould be *United* by a *Mutual-Comprehenſion* of one another, the ſame would be both greater and leſſer than the other, *viz.* greater as it *comprehended* it, and leſs, as it was *comprehended* by it, *P.* 57. Now this Propoſition I will neither note as Paradoxical, nor abſolutely affirm to be *falſe*. But ſo much I will affirm, *viz.* That it is nothing at all to his Purpoſe; and that he can never prove it to be *True*. For beſides, that he ſtill confounds an *Example*, or *Parallel Caſe* with a *Similitude*, I would have him take notice,

Firſt, That this Maxime, *Omne continens eſt majus contento*, upon which he founds a majority of the thing *comprehending* to the Thing *comprehended*, is wholly drawn from, and founded upon the Obſervations made by the Mind of Man about *Corporeal Subſtances*, endued with Quantity and Dimenſions; in which the *Subſtance Comprehending* is, and muſt be of a greater Dimenſion than the *Subſtance Comprehended*. But what is this to *Spiritual Subſtances?* Concerning which, I demand of this Author a ſolid Reaſon, Why Two ſuch *Subſtances* may not be

intimately United by a *Mutual-Permeation*, or *Penetration* of one another? For all that can hinder ſuch a *Penetration*, or *Permeation* (as far as we know) is Quantity; which in *Spiritual Subſtances* has no place; and then, if ſuch a *Mutual-Penetration* be admitted, theſe *Subſtances* will be *Mutually* in one another, and *United to one another*, not indeed by a *Comprehenſion* of one another, (of which there is no need, if ſuch a thing could be) but by a *Mutual-Adequation*, or *exact Coequation* of one to the other; ſo that nothing of one *Subſtance* ſhall *exiſt*, or *reach beyond*, or without the other, but the whole of both by ſuch a *Permeation*, *Mutually Exiſt* in each other. This, I ſay, I neither do, nor will affirm to be actually ſo, but I challenge this Author to prove that it *cannot be ſo*; and, till he can, it may become him to be leſs confident.

In the *next place*, I have one thing more to ſuggeſt to him about *Subſtantial Unions*, which he talks ſo much of, *viz.* That the Term is Ambiguous, and may ſignifie either,

Firſt, The *Union* of Two or more *Subſtances* together, and ſo the *Father* and the *Son*, who are not *Two Subſtances*, but only *Two Perſons* (as has been ſhewn in the foregoing Chapter) can never be *Subſtantially United*. Or,

Secondly, It may ſignifie the *Union* of Two, or more *Perſons* in one and the ſame *Subſtance*; which is truly and properly the *Union* of the *Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity*.

And thus, though there is no Inſtance in *Nature* of *Perſons* ſo *United*, yet by way of Alluſion and Similitude, the *Union* of the three fore-mentioned Faculties of *Underſtanding*, *Memory* and *Will*, in *one and the ſame Soul*, (alledged by St. *Auſtin*) may paſs for a ſmall, or (as this Author himſelf calls it) *Page* 126. *Line* 28. *A faint*

faint Reſemblance of the *Union* of the ſaid *Three Divine Perſons in the ſame Nature, or Subſtance*; which, according to his Excellent Talent of *Self-Contradiction*, he poſitively denies here in *Page* 57. and as poſitively affirms in that other now pointed at. In fine, this Aſſertion, *That the Father and the Son cannot poſſibly be One, or in One another* (which is here the ſame) *but by Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*, Page 57. Line 23, 24, 25. unavoidably infers, and implys, That they are not *One* by *Unity* of *Subſtance*, *Unity* of *Eſſence*, or *Unity* of *Nature*. For I am ſure neither *Subſtance*, *Eſſence*, or *Nature*, are *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs*. And if the *Church* will endure a Man aſſerting this, I can but deplore its Condition.

PARADOX.

If we ſeek for any other Eſſence, or Subſtance in God, (ſays this Author) *but Infinite Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs, the Eſſence of God, though conſidered but as one Numerical Perſon, is as perfectly unintelligible to us, as one Numerical Eſſence, or Subſtance of Three Perſons in the Bleſſed Trinity*, Page 69, 70.

Anſwer. This *Propoſition* is falſe and Abſurd, and to prove it ſo, I ſhall lay down theſe following Aſſertions.

Firſt, That it is certainly much eaſier for Humane Reaſon to conceive one and the ſame *Divine Nature*, or *Deity*, as *Subſiſting* in one *Single Perſon*, than in *Three diſtinct Perſons*.

Secondly, That *Eſſence*, *Subſtance*, *Wiſdom*, *Power* and *Goodneſs* are in the *Divine Nature* (which is a pure ſimple *Act*) all but one and the ſame Thing, or *Being*.

Thirdly, That, notwithſtanding this, *Eſſence, or Subſtance, and Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs* are formally diſtinct from one another. That is to ſay, The *Conceptus Objectivus*, or proper *Eſſential Conception* of one does not imply,

imply, or involve in it the proper Conception of the other: Upon which Account one of them cannot properly be ſaid to be the other.

Now theſe Three Things thus laid down, it is readily granted to this Man, *That Eſſence, or Subſtance, Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs are really one and the ſame Being*, and that therefore it is vain and fooliſh to ſeek for any *Eſſence, or Subſtance in God, which is not alſo Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs.* But this, by his favour, is not the point. For if he will nevertheleſs ſay, *That the Divine Nature expreſſed by one Infinite Eſſence, or Subſtance Subſiſting in One Perſon, is as unintelligible, as the ſame Subſiſting in Three diſtinct Perſons*; Nay, that One and the ſame *Numerical Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs* conſidered, as *Subſiſting* only in one *Perſon*, is not more Intelligible than the ſame, as *Subſiſting* under Three; This is manifeſtly falſe, and contrary to common Experience, and without any further arguing the caſe, I appeal to the Reaſon of all Mankind, Whether it be not ſo?

PARADOX.

What is Intellectual Love (ſays this Author) *but the True Knowledge, or Eſtimation of Things? What is Juſtice and Goodneſs but an equal Diſtribution of, or a true and wiſe Proportion of Rewards and Puniſhments? What is perfect Power, but perfect Truth and Wiſdom which can do whatſoever it knows?* Pag. 71, 72.

Anſwer. We have here a whole Knot, or Cluſter of *Paradoxes*, but I ſhall take them aſunder, and conſider them ſeverally: And becauſe they run all in the way of *Interrogations*, I ſhall take them out of their *Interrogative Form*, and caſt them into ſo many *Categorical Aſſertions.* The firſt of which is,

That Intellectual Love is nothing elſe but the true Knowledge and Eſtimation of Things.

This

This is falſe and Abſurd. For *Love* is one Thing, and *Knowledge* another; each of them diſtinguiſhed by *Eſſentially different Acts* and *Objects*, *Knowledge* importing no more than a bare Speculation, or Apprehenſion of the *Object*; whereas *Love* is properly an Adheſion to it: *Love Eſſentially* preſuppoſes the *Knowledge* of the Thing *Loved*; but *Knowledge* cannot preſuppoſe it ſelf. *Knowledge* is the firſt *Act* of an *Intelligent Mind*, *Love* the ſecond. And I would fain know, Whether this Man of *Paradox*, will affirm, That *God Loves* every Thing which he has *a true Knowledge and Eſtimation of?* But to give him one Argument for all, are not the Eternal Diſtinguiſhing Characters of *Two Perſons* of the *Bleſſed Trinity* founded in the diſtinction of *Love* and *Knowledge* in *God*, the *Son* iſſuing from the *Father by way of Knowledge*, and the *Spirit* iſſuing from both *by way of Love?*

In the next place he affirms *Juſtice and Goodneſs to be the ſame Thing, and to conſiſt both of them in a true and wiſe Proportion of Rewards and Puniſhments.*

But this alſo is falſe. Theſe Two being as properly and formally diſtinguiſhed by their *Acts* and *Objects*, as the Two former. And I do here tell this Author, That *God's Goodneſs* is the proper Qualification of his own Actions, without referring neceſſarily to any other beſides; but that his Juſtice bears an *Eſſential Relation* to the Actions of others, *viz.* as *Rewardable*, or *Puniſhable*. And conſequently *God* might have exerted innumerable *Acts* of his *Goodneſs*, though there had never been any *Object* for him to have exerted ſo much as one *Act* of his *Juſtice* upon. And to give him one Inſtance that may Convince any Man of ſence of the vaſt difference of theſe two Attributes; was that *Act of Creation*, by which *God* firſt Created the World, an *Act* of his Juſtice? Or did that *Act* conſiſt in a *Wiſe proportion of Rewards*

wards and Puniſhments, before there was any *Act* of the Creature to be Rewarded, or Puniſhed? But I am ſure it was an *Act* of the *Divine Goodneſs*, whereby *God* communicated much of the Perfection of *Being* to ſomething without himſelf. Again, is Pardon of Sin an *Eſſential Act* of *God's Juſtice?* But I am ſure it is an *Act* of his *Goodneſs*. Certainly this Man neither knows, nor cares what he ſays.

His Third Aſſertion is, *That perfect Power is nothing elſe, but perfect Truth and Wiſdom.*

But this alſo is a groſs *Paradox*, and as falſe, as that *Omnipotence* and *Omniſcience* are not Two *diſtinct Attributes* of *God*. *God's Power* acts by and under the direction of *God's Wiſdom*, and therefore neither is, nor can be *formally* the ſame with it. And beſides this, all *Acts* of *Wiſdom* and *Truth* proceed from *God* by a Neceſſity of *Nature*, but the *Acts* and Exerciſe of his *Power*, by a free determination of his *Will*. For in ſpeaking of *God*, no Man ſays, That *God is Wiſe, Knowing, or True, or Acts according to theſe Perfections, becauſe he will do ſo*; for he can neither be, nor *Act* otherwiſe; but we truly and properly ſay, That *God does this or that, becauſe he will do it*; for if he had pleaſed, he might have choſe, whether he would do it, or no. From all which, I conclude, That nothing could be more improperly and abſurdly affirmed than, *That the Divine Power is nothing elſe but the Divine Truth and Wiſdom.*

PARADOX.

In Men (ſays he) *it is only Knowledge that is Power; Humane Power, and Humane Knowledge, as that ſignifies a Knowledge how to do any Thing, are Commenſurate; ſo that every Man can do what he knows how to do: Nay,* Knowledge, *is not only the Director of* Power, *but it is that* very Power *which we call* force, Page 72.

Anſwer.

Anſw. This is ſo groſs a *Paradox*, that, I think, it can need no other Confutation than to oppoſe the ſenſe of all Mankind to it, nevertheleſs I ſhall offer this one Conſideration towards the diſproving the Identity of *Knowledge* and *Power*, *viz.* That a Man's Knowledge and Skill about the doing any Work of Art, may increaſe, as his power of Execution for the Actual doing the ſaid Works may decreaſe, nay, wholly ceaſe, and therefore they cannot be the ſame. For ſuppoſe a Carpenter diſabled by Age, or Accident, that he cannot ſtrike a ſtroke towards the building an Houſe; does he therefore ceaſe to know how to build it, while another ſhall build it wholly by the direction of his Skill and Knowledge? This Man may as well prove his Head and his Hands to be one and the ſame Thing, as *Knowledge* and *Power* to be ſo. But I ſhall go no further than this very Author, to confute this Author's Aſſertion, who has told us in *P.* 9. *l.* 3,4. *That we underſtand nothing of the Secrets and Myſteries of Nature*; *nor are concerned to underſtand them, any more than it is our Buſineſs to underſtand how to make either a Body, or a Spirit, which we have* no power *to do*, (mark that) *if we* did underſtand it, *and therefore it would be an uſeleſs piece of Knowledge.* Now I beſeech the Reader to ſet theſe Two Aſſertions together, *viz.* that in *Page* 72. *That to know how to do a Thing is to be able to do it*, and that other in the *Page* 9. *viz. That though we underſtood how to make a Body, or a Spirit, yet we have no Power to do it.* I ſay let theſe Two Propoſitions be compared; and then I hope that for the future, *Knowledge how to do a thing*, and *Power to do it*, ought not, even according to this very Author, to paſs for the ſame thing. In the mean time we ſee how one of his Aſſertions contains a groſs Abſurdity, and the other completes it with as groſs a Contradiction.

PARADOX.

This Word Infinite (ſays he) *confounds our Notions of God*, p. 77.

Anſwer. This is falſe. The Thing indeed ſignified by the Word *Infinite*, exceeds and tranſcends our Notions, but the Word *Infinite* does not confound them. And I would have this Man take notice, that for an Object to ſurpaſs and be above our Thoughts, and to diſorder and confound them, are very different Things. And moreover, that it is the height of Impudence and Ignorance too, to ſay, That *that Word confounds our Thoughts, Notions and Conceptions of God*; which all *Divines* and *Philoſophers* in all Places and Ages have conſtantly expreſſed the *Nature* of *God* by: And which, after the Notion of his bare Exiſtence, does, next in order, offer it ſelf to the Mind of Man, in its Speculations of this Great Object.

PARADOX.

We know not (ſays he) *how far* Infinite *Wiſdom and Goodneſs, and Power reaches; but then we certainly know, that they have their* Bounds, *and that the Divine Nature is the utmoſt* Bounds *of them*, p. 79.

To which I *Anſwer*, That for an *Infinite Wiſdom* to have *Bounds*, and the *Bounds* of it to be the *Divine Nature* (which it ſelf has no Bounds) is *in ipſis Terminis* an expreſs, downright, and ſhameleſs Contradiction. See this further laid open in my 2d Chapter.

PARADOX.

This Creed (ſays he, ſpeaking of the *Athanaſian*) *does not ſpeak of the Three Divine Perſons as diſtinguiſhed from one another*, P. 88. Line 21.

In reply to which, I am amazed to read an Aſſertion ſo manifeſtly falſe, and yet ſo poſitively uttered. For will this Author put out the Eyes of his Reader? He tells

tells us here that *Athanaſius* (or whoſoever elſe might be the Author of this Creed) *does not herein ſpeak of the Three Divine Perſons as diſtinguiſhed from one another.* But I demand of him, does *Athanaſius* here ſpeak of them as of *Three Perſons*, or no? If the firſt; then he does and muſt ſpeak of them as *diſtinguſhed* from one another, for that without ſuch a diſtinction they are not ſo much as *Three.* But if he does not ſpeak of them *as of Three*, and as *of Three thus diſtinguiſhed.* What then mean thoſe Words of the Creed? *There is one Perſon of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghoſt?* Do theſe Words ſpeak of theſe Perſons *as diſtinguiſhed*, or do they not? If they do; then what this Man has here ſaid of the Creed, is ſhameleſly falſe; and if they do not expreſs the ſaid *Perſons as diſtinct*, I defie all the Wit of Man to find out any Words that can.

PARADOX:

He tells us, *That the Title of the one Only true God cannot be ſo properly attributed to any one Perſon, but only to the Father*, p. 89.

Anſwer. This I have already ſhewn in *Chap.* 5. *p.* 137. to be both falſe and dangerous; as by direct conſequence either making ſeveral ſorts of *Gods*, or excluding both the *Son* and the *Holy Ghoſt* from the one true *Godhead.* At preſent I ſhall only ſay thus much, That [*the One only true God*] and [*the true God*] are Terms perfectly equivalent, and not only Commenſurate but Identical in their ſignification; and withal, That this very Author himſelf affirms *Page* 186. *Line* the laſt, *That the Son muſt be included in the Character of the only True God*; which how he can be, without having this Character properly affirmed and predicated of him, and his ſu-

ſtaining thereby the Denomination of the *only True God*, let this Confident, Self-contradicting Man declare if he can. In the mean time let me tell him further, That theſe Terms [*the True God*] and [*the only True God*] do both of them import an Attribute, or Denomination purely *Eſſential*, and by no means *Perſonal*, or *Oeconomical*: And moreover that every ſuch Attribute does and muſt agree to all the *Three Perſons* equally, and whatſoever equally agrees to them all, may with equal Propriety be affirmed of all and each of them, and conſequently that the Title of [*the One only True God*] may every whit as truly and properly be attributed to the *Son* and *Holy Ghoſt*, as to *the Father* himſelf. See more of this in my forementioned Chapter.

PARADOX.

I affirm (ſays he) *that the Glory and Majeſty and all the other perfections of the Three Divine Perſons are as diſtinct as their Perſons are.* And again, *Theſe perfections are as diſtinct as the Perſons, and yet as Numerically one and the ſame as the Godhead is*, p. 91.

Anſwer. The firſt part of theſe Aſſertions is utterly inconſiſtent with, and wholly overthrows the laſt. And it is indeed very horrid, as by inevitable conſequence inferring a Tritheiſme. For if the *Eſſential* Perfections of *God* (which in Truth are only the *Divine Eſſence* under ſeveral Conceptions and Denominations) are as *diſtinct as the Perſons*, whom the Church acknowledges to be *really diſtinct*, then it will and muſt follow, That in the *Trinity* there are *Three really diſtinct Eſſences, or Godheads*, as well as *Three really diſtinct Perſons*: And if they are thus diſtinct, it is impoſſible that the *Three Perſons* ſhould by vertue thereof, either be, or be truly ſaid to be, really one; ſo that this Author, we ſee, has herein aſſerted

aſſerted a *Trinity* with a Witneſs; but as for any *Unity* in it, you may go look.

But I perceive he was driven to this falſe and abſurd Aſſertion by that Argument of his *Socinian* Adverſary urging him, That if the *Eſſential* Glory and Majeſty in *Father*, *Son* and *Holy Ghoſt* be but One, then it cannot be ſaid that their Glory is equal, their Majeſty co-eternal; foraſmuch as *Unity* is not capable of *Equality*; which muſt of neceſſity be between two or more. This, I ſay, no doubt drove him to this Inconvenience.

In Anſwer to which Objection, (though I owe not this Author ſo much Service) as I ſhall readily grant, That where there is an *Equality*, there muſt be alſo a *Plurality*, of ſome ſort or other, whatſoever it be: So I ſhall obſerve, That the *Divine Eſſence*, *Glory*, *or Majeſty*, (which I ſtill affirm to be but different Names of the ſame thing falling under divers Conceptions) and every other *Eſſential perfection* of the *Godhead*, may be conſidered two ways.

Firſt, Abſolutely and Abſtractedly in it ſelf, and as preſcinding from all *Perſonal Determinations*, in which ſence the *Divine Nature*, *Eſſence* (and every *Eſſential Attribute* included in it) is, and always muſt be taken, whenſoever, in Diſcourſe, it is ſpoken of, either as *compared with*, or *contra-diſtinguiſhed to* all, or any of the *Perſons*. And accordingly, in this ſence being *abſolutely One*, it is incapable of any *Relation of Equality*. Foraſmuch as *one Thing* conſidered but as *One*, cannot be ſaid to be equal to it ſelf. Or,

Secondly, This *Glory*, *Majeſty*, *or any other Eſſential perfection of the Godhead*, may be conſidered as ſuſtaining *Three ſeveral Modes of Subſiſtence in Three diſtinct Perſons*; which ſaid *Modes*, as they found a *Plurality in this Eſſential Glory*, *or Majeſty*, (though by no means *of it*)

it) ſo this *Plurality* founds a Capacity of *Equality*; by virtue whereof, the ſame Glory according to its peculiar way of *Subſiſting* in the *Father*, may be ſaid to be equal to it ſelf as *Subſiſting* after another way in the *Son*, and after a third in the *Holy Ghoſt*; ſo that immediately and ſtrictly this *Equality* is between the Three ſeveral *Modes of Subſiſtence*, which this *Eſſential Glory*, or *Majeſty* ſuſtains, or (if you will) belongs to the ſaid *Glory*, for and by reaſon of them. And this is the true Anſwer to this *Socinian Objection*, which by a manifeſt fallacy proceeds *à dicto ſecundùm quid ad dictum ſimpliciter*, viz. That becauſe *Equality* cannot belong to the *Eſſential Glory*, or *Majeſty* of the *Godhead* conſidered *abſtractedly* from the *Divine Perſons*, therefore neither can it agree to the ſame *Glory*, or *Majeſty*, upon any other Account whatſoever, which is utterly falſe; foraſmuch as conſidered according to the *Three different ways* of its *Subſiſtence* in the *Three Perſons*, it may, as *Subſiſting* under any one of them be ſaid to be equal to it ſelf, as *Subſiſting* under the other Two.

PARADOX.

This Author repreſents Gregory Nyſſen *as firſt aſſerting a Specifick* Sameneſs, *or* Unity *of Nature, in the Divine Perſons (which alſo he makes all along to be ſignified by the* ὁμοουσιότης*) and then aſſerting that this Specifick* Sameneſs, *or* Unity *of Nature, makes the ſaid Three Perſons* Numerically One, Page 118. the latter end.

Anſwer. This is too great an Abſurdity for ſo Learned a *Father* to be guilty of, and therefore ought to lie at this Author's own Door; for that a *Specifick Sameneſs*, or *Unity of Nature*, ſhould make any *Thing*, or *Perſon*, *Numerically One*, (any more than a *Generical Unity* can make Things

Things *Specifically One)* is beyond meaſure ſenceleſs and illogical.

PARADOX.

Though the Fathers (ſays he *) aſſert the ſingularity of the Godhead, or the Numerical Unity of the Divine Eſſence; yet they do not aſſert ſuch a Numerical Unity, as where there is but one Perſon as well as one Eſſence, but ſuch a Numerical Unity as there is between Three, who are* ὁμοούσιοι, *of the very ſame Nature, but are not merely united by a ſpecifick Unity, but by an eſſential Union; and therefore are Three and One,* Pag. 121. Line 15.

Anſwer. In theſe Words there are ſeveral Abſurdities, which he falſly charges upon the *Fathers*, but ought in all Reaſon to take to himſelf. As,

1. He ſuppoſes a *Specifick Unity*, and an *Eſſential Unity* to be *diſtinct Unities:* whereas every *Specifick Unity*, or *Union*, (call it, at preſent, which you will) is alſo an *Eſſential Unity*, or *Union*. For a *Specifick Unity* is one ſort of an *Eſſential Unity* (which in its whole compaſs contains the *Generical*, the *Specifical*, and the *Numerical*) and therefore thus to *contra-diſtinguiſh* a *Species* to its *Genus*, is fit for none but ſuch a *Logician* as this Author; it being all one, as if one ſhould ſay of *Peter*, That he is not only a Man, but alſo a Living Creature.

2. The ſecond Abſurdity is, That he owns a *Specifick Unity* of *Nature* in the *Divine Perſons* (which ſort of *Unity* I have abundantly proved in *Chap.* 7. the *Divine Nature* not to be capable of) for he ſays here of the *Divine Perſons, That they are not* meerly *United by a Specifick Unity:* which Words muſt imply, that however, ſo *United* they are.

3. He makes Two ſorts of *Numerical Unity*, contrary to all Rules of *Logick*, viz. *One*, where there are ſeve-

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ral *Perſons* of *One Nature*, as here in the *Trinity*; and the other, where there is but *One Perſon*, as well as *One Nature*. But let me here tell him, That the *Divine Nature* is every whit as *Numerically One* in the *Three Perſons*, as if there were but one *Perſon* in the *Godhead*, and no more. And in this very Thing (as has been ſhewn) does the Myſteriouſneſs of an *Unity in Trinity* conſiſt. I ſay, The *Divine Nature* is as *Numerically One* in the *Three Perſons*, as the *Humane Nature* was *Numerically One* in *Adam*, while there was no other Perſon in the World but himſelf; nay, much more ſo, ſince it is not *multiplicable*, as that was. And to affirm, That the *Numerical Unity* of the *Godhead* is not ſo perfect, or is not the very ſame, *Subſiſting* in *Three diſtinct Perſons*, as if we could imagine it to *Subſiſt* but in *One*, Subverts and Overthrows ſuch *an Unity in Trinity*, as the *Church* in all *Ages* hitherto has maintained.

PARADOX.

Having told us, *That the Fathers univerſally acknowledged, the Operation of the whole Trinity* ad Extra *to be but One, and from thence concluded the Unity of the Divine Nature and Eſſence; for that every Nature has a Virtue and Energy of its own; (Nature being a Principle of Action,) and if the Energy and Operation be but One, there can be but One Nature.* He adds within four Lines after, *That this is certainly True, but gives no Account, how Three diſtinct Perſons come to have but One Will, One Energy, Power and Operation; nor that any Account* (that he knows of) *can be given of it but by* Mutual-Conſciouſneſs, Page 124. Line 7, *&c.*

Anſwer. Were I not acquainted with this Man's way of Writing, I ſhould be amazed to ſee him in ſo ſmall a compaſs ſo flatly contradict himſelf. For will he, in the firſt place, aſſert, in the *Three Divine Perſons* a *Numerical*

merical Unity of Nature? And in the next, aſſert alſo, that this *Unity of Nature* is proved by *Unity of Energy* and *Operation?* And after this tell us, *That this gives no Account at all, how Three diſtinct Perſons come to have but one Will and Energy, Power and Operation?* For does not *Unity of Nature* in theſe *Three diſtinct Perſons* prove this? While the ſaid *Unity of Nature* proves *Unity of Operation*, as the Cauſe proves its Effect, and *Unity of Operation* again proves *Unity of Nature*, as the effect proves its cauſe? This, any one of ſence would think, is a fair, full, and ſufficient Account how *Three diſtinct Perſons, having all but One Nature, come thereby all to have but One Will, Energy and Operation.* And ſhould any one elſe argue otherwiſe, I ſhould think him *beſide himſelf*; but this Author in this diſcourſes *like himſelf.*

PARADOX.

Knowledge, Self-reflection, and Love are diſtinct Powers and Faculties in Men, and ſo diſtinct, that they can never be the ſame; Knowledge is not Self-Reflection, nor Love either Knowledge, or Self-Reflection; though they are inſeparably United, they are diſtinct, Pag. 130. Line 11, 12, *&c.*

Anſwer. Here alſo is another knot of Abſurdities. For,

Firſt, *Knowledge, Self-Reflection*, and *Love* are not in Men *diſtinct Powers and Faculties* (as this unfledged Philoſopher calls them) but only *diſtinct Acts.*

Secondly, Admitting that *Knowledge* were a *Faculty* (as it is not) yet I deny that *Knowledge* and *Self-Reflection* would make Two *diſtinct Faculties*, foraſmuch as it is one and the ſame *Intellectual Faculty*, which both exerts an *Act* of *Knowledge*, and an *Act* of *Reflection* upon that *Act* of *Knowledge*, or upon it ſelf as producing the ſaid *Act.* For which Cauſe it is (as has been obſerved before) that Philoſophers hold that the *Underſtanding* is *Facultas ſupra ſe Reflexiva*; all of them allowing both

the *direct* and the *Reflex Acts* of *Knowledge* to iſſue from the ſame Faculty.

Thirdly, He ſays, That albeit the forementioned *Acts are diſtinct, yet they are inſeparably United.* But this alſo is falſe; for (whether an *Act* of *Knowledge* may be without an *Act* of *Self-Reflexion*, as ſome, not without Reaſon, think it may) I am ſure in Men (of whom alone we now ſpeak) both an *Act* of *Knowledge* and of *Self-Reflexion* too may be without an *Act* of *Love* conſequent thereupon: And if the former may be without the latter, then they are not *inſeparably United*, as this Author here ſays they are.

PARADOX.

He ſays, *That Love is a diſtinct Act, and therefore in God muſt be a Perſon*, P. 133.

Anſwer. If this be a true and good conſequence, then the Ground and Reaſon of it muſt be This, *That every diſtinct Act in God, is, and muſt be a diſtinct Perſon.* And if ſo, then every Decree in *God*, whether it be his Decree of *Election*, or of *Reprobation* (if there be ſuch an one) or of creating the World, and ſending *Chriſt* into it, and at laſt of deſtroying it, and the like, are each of them ſo many *Perſons*. For every Divine Decree is an *Act* of *God*, and an *Immanent Act too*, as reſting within him, and (as ſuch) not paſſing forth to any Thing without Him; that Maxime of the *Schools* being moſt true, that *Decreta nihil ponunt in eſſe.* Nor is this all, but moſt of the *Divine Acts* are free alſo; ſo that there was nothing in the Nature of them to hinder, but that they equally *might*, or *might not* have been; which applyed to the *Divine Perſons*, would make ſtrange work in Divinity. In the mean time if this Author will maintain this Doctrine, *viz.* That *Acts* and *Perſons*, are the ſame in *God*, (as, I think, he ought in all Reaſon to maintain the immedi-

immediate conſequences of his own Aſſertion) I dare undertake that here he will *ſtand Alone* again; and that he is the only Divine who ever owned, or defended ſuch wretched Stuff.

PARADOX.

Theſe Three Powers of Underſtanding, Self-Reflexion, and Self-Love are One Mind, viz. *in Created Spirits*; of which alone he here ſpeaks, adding in the very next words, *What are meer Faculties and Powers in Created Spirits, are Perſons in the Godhead*, &c. Page 135. at the latter end.

Anſwer. This is a very groſs Abſurdity, and to make it appear ſo, I do here tell him, That the Three forementioned *Powers* are no more *One Mind*, than *Three Qualities* are *One Subſtance*; and that very Term [*Powers*] might have taught him as much; *Potentia* and *Impotentia* making one Species of *Quality*; under which all *Powers* and *Faculties* are placed. So that *his Three Powers of Underſtanding, Self-Reflexion*, and *Self-Love are One* only *Unitate Subjecti*, as being Subjected in One and the ſame Mind; but not *Unitate Eſſentiæ*, as *Eſſentially* differing both from one another, and from the Mind it ſelf too, in which they are. Certainly if this Man did not look upon himſelf as above all Rules of *Logick* and *Philoſophy*, he would never venture upon ſuch Abſurd Aſſertions.

PARADOX.

He tells us, *That the Son and Holy Ghoſt* Will *and* Act *with the Father*; *not the Father with the Son and the Holy Ghoſt*, Pag. 169. Line 13, 14, *&c.*

Anſwer. This is a direct Contradiction: For if the *Son* and *Holy Ghoſt* Will and Act with the *Father*, the *Father* muſt Will and Act with the *Son* and the *Holy Ghoſt*. And he who can find a diſtinct ſence in theſe Two *Propoſitions*,

ons, and much more, affirm the firſt, and deny the latter, has a better Faculty at diſtinguiſhing than any Mortal Man, uſing his Sence and Reaſon, will pretend to. It being all one, as if I ſhould ſay, *I ſaw* Thomas, William *and* John *together*; *of whom* William *and* John *were in the Company of* Thomas, *but* Thomas *was not in the Company of* William *and* John. And I challenge any ſenſible thinking Man to make better ſence of this Author's fore-mentioned Aſſertion if he can. But this muſt not go alone without a further caſt of his Nature, by heightning it with another Contradiction too, which you ſhall find by comparing it with *Page* 188. *Line* 4. where he affirms, *That Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt Act together*, having before expreſly told us here, *That the Father does not Will and Act with the Son and Holy Ghoſt*; which very Aſſertion alſo, (to ſhew him the further fatal Conſequences of it) abſolutely blows up and deſtroys his whole Hypotheſis of *Mutual Conſciouſneſs*, by deſtroying that upon which he had built it. *For if the Father may and does Will and Act without the Son and Holy Ghoſt*, then farewel to the μία ἐνέργεια, and the μία κίνησις βουλήματος, for they muſt never be alledged in this Cauſe more.

PARADOX.

Nothing can make God viſible but a Perſonal Union to a Viſible Nature, Page 234. Line 22, 23.

Anſwer. This is a moſt falſe Aſſertion, and directly contrary to Scripture. And to prove it ſo, I ſhall lay down theſe Four Concluſions.

Firſt, That the *Godhead*, or *Divine Nature*, neither is nor can be viſible to a Corporeal Eye, by an Immediate ſight, or Intuition of the *Godhead* it ſelf.

Secondly, That *God* is viſible to ſuch an Eye only by the ſpecial Signs, or Symbols of his Preſence.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, That *God* is visible by a Body Personally United to him, only as the said Body is such a Sign, or Symbol of his peculiar Presence. And

Fourthly and Lastly, That a Body actually assumed by *God* for a Time, is during that Time as true, and visible a Symbol of his Presence, as a *Body*, or *Nature personally United* to him can be.

And thus it was, that *God* appeared visibly to the *Patriarchs* in Old Time, and particularly to *Abraham*, to *Gideon*, and to the Father and Mother of *Sampson*, who thereupon thought *that they should Die for having seen God Face to Face.* For generally all Interpreters hold the *Person* who thus appeared, to have been the *Second Person* of the *Blessed Trinity*, the *Eternal Son* of the *Father*; though sometimes called simply the *Angel*, and sometimes *the Angel of the Covenant*, from the Office he was then actually imployed in by his Father, as the Extraordinary Messenger and Reporter of his Mind to Holy Men upon some great Occasions.

This supposed, I desire this bold Author to tell me, Whether the *Second Person* of the *Trinity (God* equal with the *Father)* was *personally United* to the *Body*, which he then appeared in, or not? If not; then the forementioned Assertion, *That nothing can make God visible, but a Personal Union to a Visible Nature*, falls shamefully to the Ground, as utterly false. But if he was *Personally United to it*, then these *Paradoxes* must follow,

1. That he either laid down that *Assumed Body* afterwards, or he did not: if he did, then an *Hypostatical Union* with *God* may be dissolved; and not only so, but there may be also a Thousand *Personal Unions* one after another, (if *God* shall think fit to Assume a Body, and appear in it so often;) which would be contrary to the *Sence* of

of all Divines, and to all Principles of ſound Divinity, which own but one *Hypoſtatical Union* and no more. Or,

2. He ſtill retains an *Union* to that *Aſſumed Body*, and then there is a double *Hypoſtatical Union*, viz. One to the *Viſible Body* Aſſumed by him, in which he appeared of Old, and the other to that *Body* which he was Born with in the World. All which *Poſitions* are horrid and monſtrous, but unavoidably conſequent from the foregoing Aſſertion. But for the further illuſtration of the caſe I do here affirm to this Author, That *God* is as Viſible in an *Aſſumed Body*, whether of Air, or Æther, or whatſoever other Materials it might be formed of, as in a Body of Fleſh and Blood *Perſonally United* to him: I ſay, as *Viſible*. For notwithſtanding the great difference of theſe *Bodies*, and the difference of their *Union* and *Relation* to *God*, One being by a *Temporary Aſſumption*, and the other by a *Perſonal Incarnation*; yet no Corporeal Eye could diſcern this Difference, during the Appearance, but that one was, for the time, as Viſible as the other; and therefore ſince both of them were truly Symbols of *God*'s peculiar Preſence (the only way by which the *Divine Nature* becomes viſible to a Mortal Eye) it demonſtratively overthrows that poſitive, falſe Aſſertion of this Author, *That nothing can make God Viſible, but a Perſonal Union to a Viſible Nature.*

PARADOX.

All the Circumſtances of our Saviour's Birth, and Life, and Death, were ſo punctually foretold by the Prophets, and ſo peremptorily decreed by God, that after he was come into the World, there was no place for his Choice *and* Election. *And he could not ſhew either his Love, or his Humility by* chooſing *Poverty, Death,* &c. Page 242. Line 5.

Anſwer. This is Falſe, Abſurd, and Dangerous, and indeed next to Blaſphemous; as overthrowing the whole

Oeconomy

Oeconomy of Man's Redemption by the Merits of *Chriſt*. For that which leaves no place for *Choice*, leaves no poſſibility for *Merit*. For all Merit is founded in *freedom of Action*, and that in *Choice*. And if *Chriſt*, after his *Incarnation*, had not this, he could not *Merit*. And whereas the Author ſays, *That Chriſt choſe all this as the Second Perſon of the Trinity antecedently to his Incarnation*. I Anſwer, That this is indeed true, but reaches not the preſent Caſe. For what he did before he was Incarnate, was the *Act* of him purely *as God*; but a *Meritorious Action* muſt ſtill be an *Humane Action*; which could not proceed from the *Second Perſon* before his Aſſumption of an *Humane Nature*. I readily grant and hold, That the Actions of *Chriſt*'s *Humane Nature* received a peculiar Worth and Value from its *Union* with his *Divine Perſon*, yet ſtill I affirm, that this Worth and Value was Subjected and Inherent in his *Humane Actions*, as ſuch; and thereby qualified them with ſo high a degree of *Merit*. So that, whenceſoever this *Merit* might flow, they were only his *Humane Actions*, *viz.* ſuch as proceeded from him as a Man, that were properly and formally Meritorious.

And whereas this Author ſtates the Reaſon of this his horrid Aſſertion upon the Predictions of the *Prophets*, and the *peremptory Decrees of God* concerning all that belonged to, or befell *Chriſt*, I do here tell him, That neither *Predictions* nor *Decrees*, though never ſo punctual and peremptory, do, or can infringe, or take away the freedom of Man's Choice, or Election about the Things ſo Decreed, or foretold; how difficult ſoever it may be for *Humane Reaſon* to reconcile them; and if this Man will affirm the contrary, he muſt either baniſh all *Choice* and *Freedom of Action*, or all certain *Predictions* and *peremptory Decrees* out of the World; let him

him chooſe which of theſe Two Rocks he will run himſelf againſt, for he will be aſſuredly ſplit upon either. This vile Aſſertion really deſerves the Cenſure of a *Convocation*, and it is pity, for the *Church's* ſake, but in due time it ſhould find it.

PARADOX.

Concerning *Perſon* and *Perſonality* he has theſe following Aſſertions, which I have here drawn together from ſeveral parts of his *Book*, viz. *The Mind is a Perſon*, Page 191. Line 21, 22. *A Soul without a Vital Union to a Body, is a Perſon*, Page 262. Line 17. *And the Soul is the Perſon, becauſe it is the Superiour governing power, and Conſtitutes the Perſon*, Page 268. Line 28. *A Beaſt which has no Reaſonable Soul, but only an Animal Life, is a Perſon*, &c. Page 262. Line 18, 19, 20. And again, *We may find the Reaſonable and Animal Life Subſiſting apart, and when they do ſo, they are Two* [*Perſons*] *and but One* [*Perſon*] *when United*, Page the ſame, at the end of it. And laſtly, *One Agent is One Perſon*, Page 268. Line 2.

Anſwer. In all theſe *Propoſitions*, ſo confidently laid down by this Man, there are almoſt as many Abſurdities and Falſities as there are Words. I have already ſhewn this of ſome of them in *Chap.* 3. and therefore I ſhall be the briefer in my Remarks upon them here.

And firſt for that Aſſertion, *That the Mind is a Perſon.* To this I Anſwer, That the Mind may be taken Two ways.

Firſt, Either for that *Intellectual Power*, or *Faculty*, by which the Soul underſtands and Reaſons. Or,

Secondly, For the *Rational Soul* it ſelf.

In the former ſence, it is but an Accident, and particularly a Quality: In the ſecond it is an *Eſſential* part of the Whole Man; and therefore upon neither of theſe

theſe Accounts can be a *Perſon*. For neither an *Accident*, nor a *Part* can be a *Perſon*; which (as ſuch) muſt be both a *Subſtance*, and a *Complete Subſtance* too.

And ſecondly, Whereas, he ſays, *That a Soul without a Vital Union to the Body is a Perſon*; I tell him, That the *Soul* without ſuch an *Union*, is ſtill an *Incomplete Being*; as being Originally and Naturally deſigned for the *Completion* and *Compoſition* of the Whole Man, and therefore for that reaſon, cannot be a *Perſon*.

And then Thirdly, Whereas he adds, *That the Soul is the Perſon, becauſe it is the Superiour Governing Power, and Conſtitutes the Perſon*. I Anſwer, That it is the former, and does the latter, only as it is the *prime Eſſential part* of the whole Man; and for that very cauſe is an *Incomplete Being*, (as every *part* is and muſt be) and conſequently cannot be a *Perſon*.

In the next place, For an Anſwer to his ſaying, *That a Beaſt is a Perſon*. I refer him to his own poſitive Affirmation, Page 69. Line 18. *That a Perſon, and an Intelligent Subſtance, are reciprocal Terms*: And the ſame may ſerve for an Anſwer to his next Abſurdity, *That when the Reaſonable and the Animal Life ſubſiſt apart, they are Two Perſons*. For the *Animal Life* ſeparate from the *Rational*, is void of all Reaſon, and the very Definition of a *Perſon* is, That it is *Suppoſitum Rationale, aut Intelligens*.

In the laſt place, By his ſaying, *That One Agent is One Perſon*, (which, I am ſure, he affirms univerſally of every ſingle Agent) he makes every Living Creature under Heaven, a *Perſon*: For every ſuch Creature is endued with a Principle of *Life* and *Action*, and accordingly Acts by it, and by ſo Acting, is properly an *Agent*: From all which it follows, That this Author (as great as his Retinue may be) has many more Perſons in his

Family, than he is aware of; there being not ſo much as a Rat or a Mouſe within the Walls of his *Deanry*, but, according to this Aſſertion of his, is as truly and properly a *Perſon* as himſelf. So that although he *ſeldom* (as he ſays) *makes Viſits*, yet he is ſure never to want Company.

PARADOX.

He Aſſerts, *That every Man has Two diſtinct Reaſons; and Two diſtinct Wills, and thoſe as diſtinct as if he had Two Souls*, Page 267. Line 7, 8, 9.

Anſwer. This Aſſertion, and the Abſurdity of it are perfectly his own. For certainly Two *Reaſons* and Two *Wills*, and thoſe as diſtinct in each Man, as if he had *Two diſtinct Souls*, were never Aſſerted to be in any One [meer] Man, by any Perſon of Sence and Learning before: It has indeed been diſputed by Philoſophers, *Whether there be Three Souls in the ſame Man*, viz. *A Rational, a Senſitive, and a Vegetative?* And it has been generally concluded in the Negative, and that the *Gradus Intellectivus, Senſitivus, & Vegetativus* were only *Three diſtinct Powers*, or *Faculties* lodged in one and the ſame Soul: But as for *Two diſtinct Reaſons* and *Two diſtinct Wills* in one Soul, none that I ever met with, affirmed it. And in Anſwer to it, it were enough to overwhelm the Aſſertor of it with the Univerſal Judgment of all Philoſophers holding the contrary, *viz. That in each Individual Perſon there is only One Individual* Reaſon *and* Will, *and no more.*

But I ſhall diſcourſe the Matter a little further with this Author; though yet as briefly as I can.

And firſt of all, I lay down this as certainly true, *That if One ſingle* Reaſon, *and One ſingle* Will *are ſufficient to give an Account of all the* Acts, Offices, *and* Operations *belonging to the Nature of Man, then it is ſuperfluous, and conſequently*

conſequently Abſurd to Aſſert any more. But the former is undoubtedly true. And to ſhew that it is ſo, we are to conſider what Human Reaſon, and the Offices of it properly are; and ſo for the Humane Will, and the proper Acts and Functions of that. Now they are both of them *Intellectual Faculties*, and thereby diſtinguiſhed from, and Superiour to all Acts of *Senſation*, whether External, or Internal, and all Acts of *Deſire* and *Appetition*, proceeding from the Senſitive Appetite. And as they are ſuperiour to them, ſo it is the proper Office of *Reaſon* to Arbitrate upon, Judge of, and Direct all the Apprehenſions and Reports of the Senſes, and upon ſuch a Judgment paſſed upon them, to declare authoritatively, *What ought, or ought not to be done*; and in the like manner the *Will* is to Govern and Control all the *Inferiour Appetites, Deſires*, and *Inclinations*, by an effectual diſpoſal of them, to *what ſhall, or ſhall not be done.* And this is the Order and Oeconomy of all the *Rational* and *Senſitive Powers* and *Faculties* of the *Soul of Man*, and of the *Functions* and *Operations* reſpectively belonging to them. And now I deſire any one to ſhew me, what uſe there is of a *ſecond Reaſon*, and a *ſecond Will*, and what are thoſe particular, proper *Acts* proceeding from them, which are neither *Intellectual*, nor *Senſitive.* For if they are either of theſe, all ſuch *Acts* have been fully accounted for, from the *Intellectual* and *Senſitive Principles* already mentioned, and therefore muſt needs be Superfluous. Again, I would know, whether theſe Two Reaſons are *Subordinate*, ſo that one is ſubject to and governed by the other, or *Co-ordinate* and *Equal*, and neither of them Subject to, or Governed by the other? If they are *Subordinate*, the Inferiour is uſeleſs, ſince the *Acts* proceeding from both, being equally *Acts* of *Reaſon*, the Superiour can and may dictate all that the Inferiour can

ſuggeſt immediately by it ſelf, and without the *Subordinate Operation* of the other; and what I have ſaid of an *Humane Reaſon*, will proportionably hold in an *Humane Will*: But if, on the other ſide, there are *Two Co-ordinate Reaſons*, and *Two Co-ordinate Wills*, neither of them ſubject to, or governed by the other, then, in the Direction and Diſpoſal of Mens Actions, they either ſuggeſt the very ſame Directions and Commands, or ſuch as are quite different, and ſometimes perhaps contrary. If the very ſame, then *One* of the *Reaſons* and *One* of the *Wills* are again ſuperfluous: For what need can there be of *Two* to ſuggeſt the very ſame things? But if theſe *Two Reaſons* ſuggeſt different, or contrary Directions, and theſe *Two Wills* exert *Two* different, or contrary *Influences* upon the Inferiour and Senſitive part, then the Soul muſt be diſtracted between both, and not able to proceed determinately to Action; but the *Two Reaſons* muſt diſpute the Matter, and the *Two Wills* muſt fight it out. And this will be the admirable Harmony and State of an *Humane Soul*.

If it be here Objected, That we ſometimes find mention in *Scripture* of a *Senſual*, or *Carnal Reaſon*, and of a *Senſual Will*: and that therefore *Two Reaſons*, and *Two Wills* muſt be admitted in each Man.

I Anſwer, That we Read in *Scripture* of the *Old Man* and the *New Man*, in *Perſons Regenerate*, and yet I cannot from hence infer, That *Two diſtinct Men* do, or can Subſiſt in *One Perſon*. And therefore as to that Objection of a *Carnal, Senſual Will and Reaſon*,

I Anſwer, That *Reaſon* is called *Senſual*, when it directs and preſcribes according to the Exorbitant Inclinations and Deſires of the *Senſitive Part*; and the *Will* is called ſo likewiſe, when it does not interpoſe its Sway and Authority, but ſuffers the *Senſitive Appetites* to take their own

own courſe without control: So that this Term *Senſual*, or *Carnal* applyed either to *Reaſon*, or *Will*, does not import, or inferr another *Reaſon*, or another *Will*, but the ſame *Reaſon* and *Will* under different, and ſometimes contrary *Qualifications*, and otherwiſe acting and behaving themſelves, than, according to their Natural Prerogative and Office in the Soul, they ought to do. It is indeed a diviſion *Subjecti in Accidentia*. And this is all that can be drawn from thence.

In fine, I think a ſtranger and a ſillier Paradox could not well be advanced; and it is great pity but the *Author* of it ſhould be Known by this *Glorious Character*, That this is that great *Philoſopher* and *Divine*, who affirms and holds, *That there are Three diſtinct Infinite Minds in One God: And Two diſtinct Reaſons, and Two diſtinct Wills in One and the ſame Man.* And long may he live to have the fame of ſuch Aſſertions ringing in both his Ears; and when he is Dead, I doubt not but he will be remembred by them, though they be never writ upon his Tomb: For certainly he who affirms *Two Reaſons* in the ſame Man, hardly diſcourſes at the rate of *One*.

PARADOX.

He Aſſerts, *That the Body moves at the Command of the Will, and is ſo far* Conſcious *to its Commands*, Pag. 269. Lin. 18, 19.

In *Anſwer* to which, I affirm it to be abſolutely falſe, and extremely abſurd, to ſay, *That the Body is at all* Conſcious *to the Commands of the Will*. Foraſmuch as *Conſciouſneſs* is an *Act* of *Intellection*, and ſo muſt iſſue from an *Intellective Faculty*, which the *Body* is not endued with, and therefore cannot act by; and withall, every *Act* of the *Will* is only an *Intelligible*, and not a *Senſitive Object*; and conſequently cannot be otherwiſe apprehended and perceived than *Intellectually*. And as for the *Commands* of

it;

it; a Command operates and moves only by way of *Moral Cauſation*, *viz.* by being firſt known by the Thing, or Agent which it is directed to, which thereupon by ſuch a Knowledge of it, is induced to move, or *Act* accordingly. But now, the *Will* does not thus *Act* upon the *Body*, the *Body* having no Principle whereby to know, or underſtand what it Commands. And therefore, when we ſay, That the *Will Commands the Body*, in ſtrictneſs of Truth, it is only a Metaphorical Expreſſion. For the *Will*, or *Soul* exerting an *Act* of *Volition*, moves the *Body*, not by *Command*, but by *Phyſical Impulſe*: That is to ſay, It does by its *Native force*, *Energy*, and *Activity*, firſt move and impell the *Spirits*, and by the Inſtrumental Mediation of them ſo moved and impelled, it moves and impells the *Body*; and this, by as real an Impulſe, as when I puſh, or thruſt a thing with my hand. For though indeed a *Material* Thing cannot actively, or efficiently move, or work upon an *Immaterial*, yet *Philoſophers* grant that an *Immaterial* (as being of the nobler and more active Nature) can move, impell, or work upon a *Material*; and if we cannot form in our Minds an Idea of the Mechaniſm of this Motion, it is becauſe neither can we form in our Minds an Idea of a *Spirit*: But nevertheleſs Reaſon and Diſcourſe will Evince, That the Thing muſt be ſo.

PARADOX.

He tells us, *That the Humane Nature of Chriſt* may be Ignorant *of ſome things*, *notwithſtanding its perſonal Union to the Divine Word*; *becauſe it is an* Inferiour and Subject *Nature*, Page 270. Line 12, 13, 14.

Anſwer. Theſe Words alſo are both abſurd and falſe. And

Firſt, They are Abſurd, becauſe no Rules of Speaking, or Arguing, permit us to ſay of any Thing, or Perſon,

Perſon, *That it may be ſo, or ſo*; when *neceſſarily* it is, and muſt be ſo. For the Term [*may*] imports an *Indifference*, or at leaſt, a *poſſibility* to both ſides of the Contradiction: So that when a Man ſays, That a Thing [*may be thus, or thus*] he does by conſequence ſay alſo, [*That it may not be thus, or thus.*] And therefore to ſay, *That the Humane Nature of Chriſt, notwithſtanding its Perſonal Union to the Word*, may be ignorant *of ſome Things*, when it cannot but be ignorant of *ſome*; nay, of very many Things, is Abſurd.

And in the next place alſo, *To make the Subjection of the Humane Nature to the Divine, the proper Cauſe of this Ignorance is falſe, and the Aſſignation of a* non cauſa pro causâ: It being all one, as if I ſhould ſay, *That ſuch an one cannot be a good Diſputant, becauſe he has a blemiſh in his Eye.* For it is not this *Subjection* of it to the *Divine Nature*, that makes it ignorant of many Things known by that *Nature*; but the vaſt diſparity that is between theſe *Two Natures, viz.* That one of them is *Infinite*, the other *Finite*, which makes it impoſſible for the *Infinite* to *Communicate* its whole *Knowledge* to the *Finite*. Foraſmuch as ſuch a *Knowledge* exceeds its *Capacity*, and cannot be received into it, ſo as to exiſt, or abide in it, any more than *Omnipotence*, or *Omnipreſence*, or any other *Infinite Divine Perfection* can be lodged in a *Finite Being*.

And beſides this, this very *Author*, in the immediately foregoing Page, had not only allowed but affirmed, *That the Body* (which certainly is both United to the *Soul*, and of a *Nature Subject* and *Inferiour to it*) was yet *Conſcious to the Dictates and Commands of the Soul*. Wherefore where *Two Natures* are *United*, the bare *Subjection* of one to the other, is not the proper Cauſe, that the *Nature* which is *Subject*, is ignorant of what is known.

known by the *Nature* which it is *ſubject to*. For if *Subjection* were the ſole and proper Cauſe of this Ignorance, the *Inferiour Nature* would be equally ignorant of every Thing known by the *Superiour*; which yet, according to this Man's own Doctrine of the *Conſciouſneſs of the Body to the Soul*, is not ſo. This Conſideration I alledge only as an Argument *ad hominem*, having already, by the former Argument, ſufficiently proved the falſeneſs of his Aſſertion.

But I ſhall detain my Reader no longer upon this Subject; though I muſt aſſure him, that I have given him but a *Modicum*, and (as it were) an handful or two out of that full heap which I had before me; and from which I had actually collected ſeveral more Particulars, which I have not here preſented him with, being unwilling to ſwell my Work to too great a Bulk. Nevertheleſs I look upon this Head of Diſcourſe, as ſo very uſeful to place this *Author* in a true Light, that if I might be ſo bold with my *Reader*, I could wiſh, that he would vouchſafe this Chapter (of all the reſt) a ſecond Peruſal; upon which I dare undertake, that it will leave in him ſuch Impreſſions concerning this Man's fitneſs to Write about the *Trinity*; as will not wear out of his Mind in haſte. And yet after all this, I will not preſume to derogate from this *Author's* Abilities, how inſolently ſoever he has trampled upon other Mens; but content my ſelf, that I have fairly laid that before the *Reader*, by which he may take a juſt, and true meaſure of them. And ſo I ſhall conclude this Chapter with an Obſervation, which I have, upon ſeveral occaſions, had cauſe to make, *viz. That* Divinity *and* Philoſophy *are certainly the worſt Things in the World, for any One to be* Magiſterial *in, who does not underſtand them.*

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

In which the Author's Grammatical, (*and ſuch like*) *Miſtakes, as they are found here, and there in his Writings, are ſet down, and remarked upon.*

COuld this Author have carried himſelf with any ordinary degree of Candor and Civility towards thoſe, whom he wrote againſt, he had never had the leaſt Trouble given him by me upon this Head of Diſcourſe. But when I find him treating Learned Men with ſo much Diſdain and Inſolence, and much liker a rough, ill-bred *School-Maſter* domineering over his Boys, than a fair *Opponent* entring the Liſts with an *Ingenuous Antagoniſt*, I muſt confeſs, I cannot think my ſelf obliged to treat him upon ſuch Terms, as I would an Adverſary of a contrary Temper and Behaviour. One Man (and a very Learned one too) he flirts at, as if he could not diſtinguiſh between *Conjunctive* and *Disjunctive* Particles; Vindication of his Caſe of Allegiance, *pag.* 76. the Two laſt Lines. Another he *Scoffs*, or rather *Spits* at, as neither *underſtanding Greek nor Latine*. Vindic. Trin. *Pag.* 95. *Lin.* 25. and thereby, I ſuppoſe, would bear himſelf to the World as no ſmall Critick in both. As for the *Socinians* (of which number this latter is) I do from my Heart Condemn their Opinions, as falſe, and deſtructive, not only of the *Chriſtian*, but (in ſeveral

Inſtances) even of *Natural Theology* and *Religion* it ſelf. Nevertheleſs I do not find, that theſe Men uſe to be reproached *for want of* Greek, *or* Latine, or for any Notable Defect of Parts, either Natural, or Acquired. *Fauſtus Socinus* was a Perſon undoubtedly of great Wit and Strength of Mind, and of Competent, though not very deep Learning; but his Uncle *Lælius Socinus* before him, and *Crellius* who lived ſome time after him, were Perſons very well ſtocked with both; and ſo have been many more (indeed too many) beſides theſe. And where the Caſe ſtands thus, I think, what the *Poet* ſaid of *Probity* and *Integrity*, may very well be ſaid of *Learning* alſo, viz. *That it is Commendable even in* an *Enemy*, how much ſoever we may blame him for the ill uſe of it. But this Author ſpares neither Friend nor Foe, but comes like a kind of Hurricano upon his Adverſary, not vouchſafing him ſo much as one grain of Allowance, whereſoever he finds (or rather thinks he finds) him Tripping. And therefore, let him not, of all Men, complain that he is hardly dealt with, *if with the ſame meaſure, with which he has hitherto meted to others, it be meaſured to him again.*

Accordingly, I ſhall in this Chapter proceed to examine his *Grammatical*, *Vocabular* Miſtakes. And that I may do this juſtly, and without the leaſt ſhadow of unfair dealing, I will firſt ſet down the Table he gives us of the *Typographical Errata*, in the firſt Edition of his Book; that ſo we may diſtinguiſh, what ought to be laid at the *Printer*'s Door, and what at the *Author*'s.

The

The Table of Errata *prefixed to the Firſt Edition of the* Vindication of the Bleſſed Trinity, &c. *is as follows.*

PAge 50. Line 2. read περιχώρησις, P. 51. L. 15. for *Corinthus* read *Cerinthus*. P. 93. L. 26. for *ſs* read *is*. P. 95. L. 32. for *his* read *Tres*. P. 96. L. 2. for *Perſons* read *Perſonæ*, and L. 30. for *the* read *Three*. P. 105. Line 5. for *whence* read *when*. P. 155. Line 33. for *to* read *too*. Pag. 203. L. 15. for *we* read *He*. P. 214. L. 29. for *Convict* read *Convinc't*. P. 227. L. 10. for *World* read *Word*. P. 238. L. 18. dele *it*. P. 249. L. 18. read *Challenged*.

This is a true and exact Tranſcript of the Table of the *Errata* prefixed to that *Book*. (Whether the ſaid Table be True, or no) concerning which, I cannot but obſerve, That moſt of theſe *Errata* are much more eaſily Corrigible by an Ordinary Reader (without any Admonition) than thoſe that I ſhall mention, and remark upon. And I ſhall add further, That, had he but ſaid [*That theſe and the like Errata the Reader is deſired to Correct as he ſhall meet with them*] he ſhould have heard of none of them from me; though I am pretty well ſatisfied, and ſo will any *Judicious Reader* be too, that as none of them in any probability are, ſo ſome of them (as they ſtand here placed in this Book) neither are, nor could be any one's but his own. But ſince he has laid in no ſuch *Salvo*, and this ſtands as a full Account of the *Errata*; and not only ſo, but ſince in the Second Edition ſome Faults not mentioned in this Table, are Corrected, while others remain the ſame, or as bad, as in the Firſt Edition, there is all the Reaſon in the World, that

the Author ſhould be charged with that, from which he himſelf has thus diſcharged the *Printer*. And beſides, in the Second Edition of his Book, the Reader is deſired to take Notice, that there is no Table of *Errata* at all; by which we may juſtly conclude, That he reckoned it ſo *Correct*, as to need no further *Correction*. So that what I find there, I judge my ſelf, to have all the right that can be, to Account with him for.

A Letter to *Anonymus*, *p.* 1. Printed 1683.

And the rather, for that Ten-Years ago he publickly declared in Print, *That he was reſolved in what he ſhould publiſh for the future, to Correct the Preſs himſelf*; though, on my Conſcience, it was one of the unfitteſt Employments (next to the *Writing of Vindications*) that he could take to; as, I doubt not, but this Chapter will pretty well ſhew.

Now the Words, which I intend to Remark upon, ſhall be of theſe Two ſorts.

Firſt, Such as may be conſidered ſingly in themſelves. And

Secondly, Such as muſt be conſidered in Conjunction with other Words, in Sentences and Forms of Speaking.

Of the firſt ſort the Reader may pleaſe to take notice of theſe that follow.

As in *Page* 16. *Line* 23. I find an extraordinary word called ἐκπορευόμεσθα: the meaning of which I would gladly know: For I can no more find it in any *Lexicon*, than I can in the Table of the *Errata*: And yet certainly it muſt be ſome excellent Word, as having ſtood its ground in both Editions of his Book. I confeſs I have been apt to think it ſtands for ἐκπορευόμενοι; but why it ſhould do ſo, the Author (who, no doubt, is a *Grecian* in his Heart) may poſſibly give us a good Reaſon; but I, for my part, cannot.

Such

Such another Word we have cloathed indeed in *Greek* Characters, but, by no means, of *Greek* Extraction; and that is ἀκατωνόμιστον, *Pag.* 115. *Lin.* 11. I have read, I confeſs, of ἀκατονόμαστον, ſignifying *innominabile*, or *quod nominari non poteſt*; and I do not deny but that I find ἀκατωνόμαστον alſo; and that not only in the place here cited out of *Greg. Nyſſen*, but twice alſo in St. *Baſil*'s *Hexaemeron* (from whence I quoted it ſo written, *Ch.* 7. *p.* 192.) But I very much queſtion, Whether the Word be ſo wrote in other and Ancienter Copies of thoſe *Father*'s Works; and that for theſe Two Reaſons.

Firſt, Becauſe it muſt be derived from the *Preterperfect Tenſe* ὠνόμασαι; and if ſo, then according to the Rule of *Grammar* in ſuch *Verbal Derivatives*, the Augment muſt be thrown away, and the Original Letter retained; as in ἔγερσις *ab* ἤγερσαι, ὁμαλισμὸς *ab* ὡμάλισμαι, and conſequently ὀνόμαστος *ab* ὠνόμασαι. And that ὀνόμαστος with an *Omicron* is the Regular and proper Word, appears from thoſe Cognate Words ſo common amongſt the *Grammarians*, ὀνομαστικὴ & ὀνομαστικόν. Nevertheleſs if ὠνόμαστος be admitted, it muſt be by the *Attick Dialect*; which very often (eſpecially in Compounds) puts an ω for an ο; as in ἀνώμαλος and ἀνώνυμος, and ſeveral other like Words.

But my Second *Reaſon*, why I think the Ancienter Editions of St. *Baſil* have it ἀκαλονόμαστος with an *Omicron*, is, becauſe I find thoſe *Lexicographers* who write it ſo, quote this Word out of that very place of St. *Baſil*'s *Hexaemeron*, where now it ſtands wrote ἀκατωνόμαστον; which ſurely proves that they found it not there ſo wrote then, when they quoted it from thence. But admitting that it may be ſo wrote, *viz.* with an ω as well as with an ο, yet what does, or can this make for our Author's new-coined ἀκατωνόμιστον? For till there can

Inſtance. Conſtantine Stephanus.

be

be found ſuch *Greek* Words as ὀνομίζω and ὀνομίζομαι to derive it from (which none ever yet met with, nor ever will) in vain ſhall we ſeek for ἀκατονόμιςον any where but in this Author.

In the next place, to paſs from *Greek* Words to *Latine*, or ſuch at leaſt as are *Latinized*, I would gladly know, who thoſe *Anti-Nicene Fathers* were, who are mentioned by him, *Pag.* 24. *Lin.* 5. And whether they were *Arians*, or *Novatians*; who (as I take it) were the great Oppoſers of the *Nicene Council*. But that, I find, cannot be, ſince our Author tells us, *That the Perſons, ſpoken of by him, were of the ſame Faith with the* Nicene Fathers. So that upon that Account, I ſhould think, it ought to be the *Ante-Nicene Fathers*. And if ſo, I think the Author would do well to take notice, that there is a great difference between *Anti-Nicene* and *Ante-Nicene*, between ſuch as lived *before* the *Council*, and ſuch as were *againſt* it. And the more particular and exact notice ought he to take of it here, ſince (though the difference be only in an *Iota*) he yet knows what a Diſturbance this little Letter made in the *Homoouſian* and *Homoiouſian* Controverſie, even ſo great as to occaſion the Convening of this Famous *Council*. Nevertheleſs, that this word *Anti-Nicene* paſſed for good and current with this Author, is evident from hence, that it is (as well as ſome others) free of both Editions of this extraordinary Book.

Again in *Page* 105. *Line* 8. we are told of the *Favourites* of ſome Opinions. As to which, I had thought, that Men uſe to favour and countenance Opinions, and not to be countenanced and favoured by them. And yet the Word *Favourite* ſignifies *paſſively*, and ſo muſt be taken for one who *receives favour*, and not *actively* for one who *ſhews it*. And therefore if to repreſent any one

as

as the *Favourite of an Opinion* be not good ſence, I know no way, but by ſtriking it out, and putting *Favourer* in the room of it, to make it better.

In *Page* 106. *Line* 16. I read *Intenſion* uſed in the ſame ſence with *Intention*, or *Purpoſe*; and I muſt declare, that I never found it ſo uſed before.

And in *Page* 108. *Line* 31. I am told of the *Council* of *Lateran*; and I wondered a good while, what *Council* it ſhould be; for though I had heard of *ſeveral* Lateran *Councils*, yet I never heard of the *Council of the* Lateran, till I met with it here.

Likewiſe I find an Extraordinary Perſon in *Page* 43. *Line* 1. named *Lucifer Carolitanus*, and was thereupon in ſome thoughts with my ſelf, whether there might have been any place called in former times *Carolina*, or by ſome Name like it. But then out comes the Second Edition and alters it into *Caralitanus*; which (in my poor Opinion) looks very ſuſpiciouſly, as if ſome Body had a mind to Correct it, but knew not how. As for † *Lucifer Calaritanus* ſo called from *Calaris*, now *Cagliari*, the Metropolis of *Sardinia*, I have heard much of him; but I will ſuppoſe our Author had ſome Body elſe in his Eye. And upon this occaſion, I cannot but take notice of ſome other *Writers* quoted by him, whom the World ſeems as much unacquainted with, as with this *Carolitanus*. As for inſtance St. *Hillary* in his *Apol. P.* 15. at the latter end. And *Albaſpinus* in his Defence of Dr. *Stillingfleet*, *Pag.* 165. *Lin.* 22. And *Nonnas* in his *Knowledge of Chriſt*, *Pag.* 218. Now St. *Hilary* indeed, a Famous Father of the Church, and Biſhop of *Poictiers*, and *Albaſpinæus* Archbiſhop of *Orleans*, Eminent for his Learned Works, and *Nonnus* who Wrote a Paraphraſe upon St. *John*'s Goſpel, in *Greek* Verſe, are every one of them known and celebrated by all. But as for St. *Hil-*

lary,

lary, *Albaſpinus* and *Nonnas*, I never heard of them till this Author was pleaſed to bleſs the World with theſe New Names.

As for *Erronious* inſtead of *Erroneous*, and ἁγιωσύνη inſtead of ἁγιωσύνη, they are ſmall things, and ought to make no difference amongſt Friends, though I have known many a poor *School-boy* forced to *Water his Plants* for a leſs Miſtake.

But there is a Word of ſingular note, which I have met with at leaſt ſix or ſeven times in this Book, and four times in one Page, *viz.* 227. and it is *Proſopopæa*, which alſo, as well as its Companions has given the Catalogue of *Errata* the ſlip, and ſo, weathered it out in Two Editions: But what to make of it, I cannot tell. There is indeed a certain Figure in *Rhetorick*, called *Proſopopœia*, which I know well enough, but *Proſopopæa* I am wholly a Stranger to: And ſurely this Author could not mean the Figure προσωποποιία; foraſmuch as the ſtrict Literal ſignification of that is *fictio Perſonæ*. And I cannot imagine how this Author ſhould miſtake about this *Word* (of all others) having had ſo Excellent an Hand at the *Thing* ſignified by it; as having, I dare ſay, *made more Perſons* than ever *God* thought fit to furniſh the World with.

And to ſhew the Reader that our Author's ſtore extends much further than one Book, I will preſent him with ſome more of the like Rarities out of ſome of his other Pieces.

As firſt in *Page* 65. of his Anſwer to the *Proteſtant Reconciler*, he makes mention of *Exorciſme*, *Chryſom*, *Vnction*, *Dipping*, *Trine Immerſion*, &c. as rejected by the *Church of England*. And here I was extremely at a loſs to learn what *Chryſom* was; and after all my ſearch, no *Lexicon* could inform me, till at laſt I hit upon a certain

tain little *Lexicon*, called, *The Bill of Mortality*, and there I found a Word very near it, as differing from it but by one Letter, which was *Chriſom*, ſignifying a Child that dies preſently after it is Born: But then conſidering again, that the *Church of England* did not declare her ſelf to reject ſuch, I was as much at a loſs as ever; till at length ſetting my Gueſſing Faculty on work, I concluded, that certainly it ſhould be *Chriſme*, which is a *Greek* Word for *Unction*, as *Immerſion* is a *Latine* one for *Dipping*. And this our Author ſhould have taken notice of, for though he quotes it out of the *Reconciler*, yet ſince he neither rectifies it, nor reflects upon him for it, we may very reaſonably ſuppoſe, that he took it for good Payment; and really thought, that it ought to be *Chryſom* as he found it. Otherwiſe he who had been ſo quick and ſharp upon him at other turns, would, no doubt, have took him upon ſuch an advantage, and well-favouredly expoſed him for ſo foul a Blunder.

But to go on. In *Page* 209. *Line* 13. of the ſame Book, I find mention of the *Quadrigeſimal Faſt*. And this put me as much to a ſtand, as the other, to imagine what kind of *Faſt* this ſhould be. For the neareſt and likeſt Word I could derive it from, was *Quadriga*, ſignifying a *Coach, Cart, or Waggon*. And accordingly as the *Jews* had their *Feaſt* of *Weeks*, and of *Tabernacles*, ſo I did not know, but the *Papiſts*, or ſome *Chriſtians* like them, might have ſome *Faſt*, called, *The Faſt of Coaches, or Waggons*; and might poſſibly give it that Name from its being carried on with the Diſcipline of the *Whip* and the *Laſh*, as *Coaches* and *Waggons* uſed to be. This Conjecture, I ſay, I made with my ſelf. For I concluded, that this Author could not mean it of the *Lenten-Faſt*; for that is called *Quadrageſima*, or *Jejunium*

Quadrageſimale, and iſſues from the Numeral *Quadraginta*, and ſo is quite another Thing from this *Quadrigeſimal-Faſt*; which I cannot find in all the *Rubrick* of our Church; though perhaps when thoſe *Excellent Perſons* ſpoken of, *Apology*, *P.* 5. *Lin.* 20. have finiſhed their Intended *Alterations of our Rubrick*, we ſhall find it there too.

In the next place, let us paſs to ſuch of his Words as ſtand conjoyned with others in Sentences, or Forms of Speaking. And here let us firſt of all conſider his abſurd uſe of that form of Expreſſion [*as I may ſo ſpeak*] which he has at leaſt Twenty times in this one Book: Now the proper uſe of theſe Words, is to beſpeak excuſe for that which they are joyned to, as for ſomething that is *legendum cum veniâ*, and containing in it a kind of *Catachreſis*, or at leaſt ſome Inequality, ſome Defect or other in the Expreſſion, with Reference to the Thing deſigned to be expreſſed by it. And this, I am ſure, is all the true and proper Reaſon aſſignable for the uſe of theſe Words [*as I may ſo ſpeak.*] But this Author applies and uſes them, even when he pretends to give the propereſt and moſt Literal Account and Explication of Things, and ſuch an one, as is not only better than all others, but even excluſive of them alſo, as the *only* True Account that can be given of them. As for inſtance, where he affirms *Self-Conſciouſneſs* to be the True and only *Formal Reaſon* of *Perſonality*, and *Mutual-Conſciouſneſs* to be the ſame of the *Unity* of the *Divine Nature* in the *Three Perſons*, he uſhers it in with thoſe Words [*as I may ſo ſpeak*] *Page* 56. *Line* 6, 7, 8, &c. which (according to what he holds about theſe Two Terms) is all one, as if I ſhould ſay, *God* is an Infinite Eternal, Almighty Being *(as I may ſo ſpeak)* and *God* is the Creator and Governor of the World *(as I may ſo ſpeak)* and Man is a Rational Creature, having Two Eyes,

Eyes, Two Arms, and Two Legs; *(as I may ſo ſpeak)* all which is egregiouſly Abſurd and Ridiculous. And the more ſo; for that this very Author reproaches one of his Adverſaries (whether *Owen*, *Baxter*, *Lobb*, or the *Reconciler*, I cannot at preſent remember, but the Thing I perfectly do) for uſing the like Expreſſion [*as I may ſo ſay*,] with great ſcoff and ſcorn, telling him thereupon, That *certainly no Man had ever more need of* [*ſo ſays*] *than he had.* Now for my own part, I think this *Author*'s [*ſo ſpeaks*] are every whit as bad and contemptible as his Adverſary's [*ſo ſays*] unleſs he can perſwade the World, That a Man may *ſpeak* an Abſurd thing much more excuſably than he can *ſay it.*

To this we may add ſome more ſuch Abſurd Expreſſions. As for inſtance, that in *P.* 55. *Lin.* 26. where he ſays, *That the Three Divine Perſons are ſo United to each other, as every Man is to himſelf.* In which Words, beſides the falſeneſs of the Propoſition; it being impoſſible for the *Three Divine Perſons* to be ſo *United* to each other, as to be but *One Perſon*, which yet *every Man is*, we ought to note alſo the Abſurdity of the Expreſſion. For all *Union*, or *Unition*, is *Eſſentially* between two things at leaſt; ſo that unleſs the *Man* be *One thing*, and *himſelf* another, He cannot be ſaid *to be United to Himſelf.* He may, perhaps, be properly enough ſaid to *be One with Himſelf*; but to ſay, *That he is United to himſelf*, is unpardonable Nonſence. Again, in *Page* 85. *Line* 8. He tells us, *That the Infinite Wiſdom which is in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, is* [*Identically the ſame*] which is as much as to ſay, *That a Man is Wiſely Wiſe, Honeſtly Honeſt, Learnedly Learned*, and the like: For though I know what it is to be *perfectly, or abſolutely the ſame*, yet to affirm any Thing, or Perſon to be *Identically the ſame*, is an Idle, and a Nauſeous Tautology. Likewiſe in

Page 182. *Line* 19. He tells us, *That God intercedes with no Body but himſelf.* Concerning which Form of Speaking, I muſt obſerve, That when the Term [*But*] is uſed as a Particle of *Exception*, it implys the Thing, or, Perſon excepted from others, to be of the *ſame kind*, or at leaſt, *condition* with the reſt, from which it was excepted. And therefore, unleſs *God* were a *Body*, it can with no Congruity of Speech be ſaid, *That God intercedes with no Body but himſelf.* So that this alſo muſt paſs for another Blunder. With the like Abſurdity he tells us in *Page* 124. *Line* 15. *Where there are Two diſtinct and divided Operations, if any of them can act alone without the other, there muſt be Two divided Natures.* Now it is a Maxime in Philoſophy, and that ſuch an one, as, I think, ought to take place in *Grammar* too, That *Actionis non datur Actio.* And accordingly if the *Reaſon of Things* ought to be the *Rule of Words*, then to ſay, That *an Operation Acts, or Operates*, is extremely Senceleſs and Ridiculous.

But to proceed, he has a way of promiſcuouſly applying ſuch Words to *Things* as are properly applicable to *Perſons* only, ſuch as are [*who*] and [*whoſe.*] As for inſtance, he tells us of the Being of a Thing [*whoſe*] Nature we cannot conceive, *Page* 6. *Line* 11. And in the ſame Page, *Line* 23. *We may know* (ſays he) *that there are a great many things* [*whoſe*] *Nature and Properties we cannot conceive.* And in *Page* 7. *Line* 18. *It is ſo far from being a wonder to meet with any Thing* [*whoſe Nature*] *we do not underſtand*, &c. But is this Sence, or *Grammar?* Or does any Man ſay, *Reach me that* Book, [who *lies there*] *or that* Chair [who *ſtands there?*] No, certainly, none who underſtands what proper ſpeaking is, would expreſs himſelf ſo. And moreover (to ſhew that he can ſpeak of *Perſons* in a *Dialect* belonging only to *bare Things*, as well as he did of *bare* Things in words,

proper

proper only to *Perſons)* he tells us of a *Son produced out of the Subſtance of* [its Parent] inſtead of *his Parent*, *Page* 257. *Line* 19. which is a way of ſpeaking every whit as improper and abſurd as the other. In the next place he has a cuſtom of joyning a Verb of the *Singular Number* with a Noun of the *Plural*, and ſo *vice versâ*. As *there is Three Gods*, inſtead of, *there are Three Gods*, *Page* 2. *Line* 9. And *the Nature of moſt things* [are] *very dark and obſcure*, inſtead of [*is ſo*] *Page* 6. *Line* 20. which alſo is ſo Ungrammatical that it would not be endured in a *School-Boy*; it being as arrant a Soleciſm in *Engliſh*, as *Homines currit*, or *Socrates diſputant* would be in *Latine*. Likewiſe he often uſes the Particle [*then*] inſtead of [*than*] as, *The Scripture teaches more* [then] *Natural Reaſon does*. Pag. 148. Line 19. And *a more Glorious Authority* [then] *he exerciſes himſelf*, Page 173. Line 28. This, I ſay, is familiar with him, but withal exceedingly Abſurd, Improper, and not *Engliſh*. For [*then*] is a Note of Time, but [*than*] is a Note of Compariſon, importing a greater or leſſer degree of that Thing wherein the Compariſon is made; and is commonly joyned with the Words *ſooner*, or *rather*, but always with ſome word or other, denoting the *Comparative Degree* of a Thing. As, *ſuch* an one has more or leſs Strength, or Wiſdom [than] another. And I will Die *ſooner*, or *rather* [than] I will do ſuch a Thing, or the like. But no Man who Speaks, or Writes true *Engliſh*, will uſe theſe two words indifferently. But I muſt not omit that Notable Paſſage, *Page* 119. *Line* 25. where he tells us, That there is μήτε φύσεως μήτε ἐνεργείας τινα διαφορὰν ἐν τῇ Θεότητι. Theſe are the very words, and as they ſtand (though in conjunction with Two or Three *Engliſh* Words to complete the Sentence) do in my Opinion, carry much of the Air of a Soleciſm upon them;

ſo

ſo that according to the Conſtruction of them here, if it had been for my Life, inſtead of ſaying, *There is* τινὰ διαφορὰν, I would have ſaid, *There is* τὶς διαφορὰ, and ſo have joyned true *Greek* and *Engliſh* together.

And thus I have preſented the Reader with ſome of this Author's Ways and Forms of Expreſſion, which *Grammarians* call *Loquendi Genera*. From all which, according to the ſingular skill he has ſhewn in this ſort of Learning, it is to be hoped, that as he has already bleſt the World with a New Divinity and Philoſophy, ſo he will in due time oblige it with a new *Grammar* too.

And great need (as we ſhall preſently ſee) there ſeems to be of ſuch an one. In order to which, I ſhall mention but one more of this Author's Pieces. And that is a Book, Intituled, *A Defence of Dr.* Stillingfleet, *&c.*

In the beginning of which, there is a *Table of Errata* prefixed, that fills almoſt a whole Page; ſo that I verily thought, that it had ſo clearly carried off the whole Crop, as to leave no Gleanings behind. Nevertheleſs I ſhall preſent the Reader with this ſmall *Spicilegium* of what I gathered up after it; not mentioning any one Word that ſtands Corrected there.

In *Page* 53. therefore, and *Line* 10. He tells us of a Counterfeit *Epithite*; but what that is, I do not know. I have indeed often heard of an *Epithete* from the *Greek* ἐπίθετον and ἐπίθετος, ſignifying *quid appoſitum aut adjectum*, and imports properly, an Adjective joyned to a Subſtantive, and giving the Subſtantive a Denomination accordingly. But as for this Author's *Epithite*, it may, for ought appears, ſignifie ſomething to *ſtop Bottles*. For as for any other Signification (that I know of) it has none.

In

In the next place, *Page* 64, 65. he quotes *Baxter* for an Expreſſion uſed by him, *viz. of ſuch People as talk through a Window on the Weſt-end of* Moore-Fields; and calls it Mr. *Baxter*'s *Elegant Paraphraſes* for Madmen. But here (beſides the miſtake of *Paraphraſes* for *Paraphraſis*, which is only one Number put for another) our Learned Author muſt give me leave to tell him, That by this Paſſage, he ſeems not to underſtand what a *Paraphraſis* means. For a *Paraphraſis*, or *Paraphraſe* (to put it into *Engliſh* for his ſake) ſignifies properly a Tranſlation of ſome *Writing*, with Additions and Enlargements to Illuſtrate and Explain the ſence of them, and is therefore uſually called *Liberior Tranſlatio*. In which ſence we read of this or that *Paraphraſe upon the Pſalms*, and *Eraſmus*'s *Paraphraſe* upon the *New Teſtament*, and the like. So that unleſs the *Mad-men* here ſpoken of, were a certain *Book*, or *Writing*, and Mr. *Baxter*'s Words concerning them, an *Explicatory Tranſlation* of the ſaid *Writing*, this *Great-Good* Man could not properly call them a *Paraphraſe*. But what muſt we call them then? Why truly the forementioned Words might be properly enough called a *Periphraſis*, or *Circumlocution* (which, being ſo like the word *Paraphraſis*, might eaſily deceive a Man who cares not what he Writes) and when it is ſo taken, it is a certain Figure in Speech, whereby we expreſs a Thing by ſeveral Words, which otherwiſe might, and, for the moſt part, is expreſſed by one. As *Sophroniſci filius*, is a *Periphraſis* for *Socrates*, and *the Man who Conquered* Pompey the Great, is a *Periphraſis* for *Julius Cæſar*; and ſo to bring the matter home to Mr. *Baxter*'s Inſtance; that forementioned Expreſſion of, *Men who talk through the Windows at the Weſt-end of* Moore-Fields, is a proper *Periphraſis* for *Mad-men*. But as for a *Paraphraſe upon Madmen*, I leave it to this wonderful

derful Perſon, to make a *Paraphraſe* upon any Man, (whether Mad or Sober) if he can.

Likewiſe in *Page* 112. and the laſt Line, he tells us, out of *Calvin*'s Epiſtles of a *Publica præcum formula*. Concerning which, though I muſt confeſs, that I do by no means aſpire to be one of the Number of this Author's *Excellent Perſons*, who were for *altering* our Liturgy, or Publick Form of Prayer. Yet, if it were expreſſed by *Publica præcum formula*, I ſhould be one of the foremoſt who ſhould deſire that *Præcum* might be altered into *Precum*. In the mean time, why ſhould any one who had read but a Page in *Calvin*, quote him for ſuch a word as could not poſſibly drop from ſo Learned a Pen?

But it would be endleſs to deſcant particularly upon all this Author's *New-found Latine*, and Proprieties of Speech. And therefore to ſet them down briefly as they offer themſelves. In *Page* 122. in the Quotation in the Margin, the Reader will find a moſt choice word, *viz. Conſcionator*, not to be met with in any ſuch puny *Author* as we commonly call *Claſſick*, but cited by him inſtead of *Concionator* out of the 57th Canon of our *Church*; which, I muſt tell him, is not an ordinary ſlip, but a foul *ſtumble*, attended with Two more in the ſame Quotation, *viz. Sique* for *Siqui*, and a leſſer one, which is *Utrum*, for *Utrùm*; for that is no greater than the difference of a Noun from an Adverb, which, we know, is below a Perſon, Paramount to all rule, to take notice of. Though by his good leave the *Church of England* both Writes and Teaches better *Latine* to ſuch as are diſpoſed to learn it.

Again in *Page* 139. in the Quotation on the ſide, we have theſe Words cited out of the third *Book* of *Optatus Milevitanus*. *Recordamini quomodò à vobis jamdudum Matris Eccleſiæ membra diſtracta ſunt, non enim* [*Unamquamque*

quamque demum] *ſemel ſeducere potuiſtis.* Of which Paſſage I muſt confeſs I could make neither Sence nor *Grammar*, till conſulting the Author himſelf of *Albaſpinæus*'s Edition, inſtead of *Unumquamque demum*, I found it *Unamquamque Domum*; which, no doubt, is an admirable Various Lection (of which this Author ought to have the Glory) upon the Text of ſuch a *Father*. But this is not all the Blunders which this fruitful Sentence affords us; there being yet another, *viz. recedit* for *reſedit*; and that ſuch an one as utterly perverts the ſence of the Author, who ſpeaks here of ſome who *left*, and ſome who *remained in* the *Communion* of the *Church*, oppoſing them in this reſpect to one another; as, *Aut* ivit *uxor*, *aut* reſedit *maritus*, *aut Parentes ſeducti ſunt & filii ſequi noluerunt*, *aut ſtetit frater migrante ſorore*, &c. Thus the Father here ſpeaks; but, pray, what oppoſition could there be between *aut ivit uxor* aut *recedit maritus*, any more than there is between *going away* and *departing*? Beſides, that all the reſt of the Verbs running in the *Preterperfect Tenſe*, this muſt needs do ſo too, or make a very groſs fault in the Conſtruction: So that this is an Illiterate Perverſion of the ſence of this *Father*. Upon which, as well as upon other occaſions, I look upon this as the only ſure Rule of dealing with this Author's Quotations, *viz.* To *truſt them* no further than one *can ſee* them in their Originals.

In like manner, *Page* 178. in the place there quoted in the Margin out of St. *Cyprian*'s 55. *Epiſt.* (and not the 52d. as this Author there miſtakes it) we meet with theſe words, *à Coepiſcoporum ſuorum Corpore & ab Eccleſiæ Unitate* [*diſciſſerit*:] But the word in St. *Cyprian* is (as it ought to be) *deſciſceret*, from *deſciſco* to fall off; between which, and the other word uſed by this Author, there is a wide difference, *deſciſceret* being a moſt pro-

per *Latine* Word, but *diſciſſerit* ſo far from *Proper*, that it is not ſo much as *Latine*.

And in *Page* 187. *Line* the laſt, we find ω ὁμονοίᾳ for ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ, which makes the whole Period neither Sence nor *Greek*. Again, *Page* 188. *Line* the laſt but one we have this Paſſage, *Videte annon dicantur martyres, ſed aliquid* [Alium] *dici mereantur*; which being there put for *Aliud*, is a downright Soleciſm. And laſtly, in *Page* 198. in the Quotation in the Margin, we have thoſe remarkable words, *Simiarum more*, [qui] *cùm homines non ſint, homines tamen imitantur?* Which is another Soleciſm every whit as bad and ſcandalous as the former.

Now all theſe words and Paſſages, I aſſure the Reader, as they ſtand in the Authors, from whence they are quoted, carry a very different face, from what this Writer has given them; which ſhews, that whenſoever the words of the *Fathers* are tranſcribed into any of his Books, they are quite out of their Element. For amongſt them (as they ſtand here) there are ſome ſuch vile faults, or rather ſuch clamorous ſins in *Grammar*, that ſhould a *School-Boy* tender an Exerciſe to his Maſter with but Two or Three ſuch in it, he would ſoon find himſelf very roundly and ſeverely *took up* for them; and that perhaps more ways than one. But *Hands that can reſtore diſpoſſeſſed Princes*, may Write any Thing, and Authorize what they have Wrote, by their very *Writing* it. For otherwiſe, the Truth is, the *Latine*, which the forecited Paſſages are dreſſed up in, ſeems a ſort of *Providential Latine*, as being above all *Rules* and *Laws* of Speaking and Writing whatſoever.

As for faults about Accents, ſuch as are νοεϱὸν τι χρῆμα for νοεϱόν τι, *&c. Vind. P.* 102. *Line* 3. And συγχωρεῖ for συγχωρεῖ, *Page* 113. *Line* 2. of the Quotation in the Margin, and the like, they are too numerous for me to trouble

trouble the Reader with. But this I desire him to take notice of, upon the whole that has been produced by me, That as none of the forementioned Faults are in the Table of the *Errata*; so some of them in the first Edition of his *Vind. Trin.* stand Corrected in the second; as δείνυθαι, *Page* 115. *Line* 1. of the Quotation in the Margin of the first is Corrected into δείκνυθαι in the second: And ὁμουσίν, *Page* 121. *Line* 21. in the former, is changed into ὁμούσιοι, in the latter. And therefore according to the old Maxime, That *Exceptio firmat Regulam in non Exceptis*, it is to me a sufficient proof, That since this Author Corrected some Passages and not others, which yet need correcting as much, if not more, it was, because *His Acuteness* did not see, that these last needed any *Correction* at all: And in such a case some are of Opinion that where the Words escape it, the Author himself ought to have it.

But I shall hold my Reader no longer upon this Subject, how diverting soever it may be; this being enough to satisfie any Rational Person, how unfit this Man is to upbraid any one *with want of* Greek, *or* Latine: Though had I in my first perusal of his several Pieces foreseen this my Engagement with him, I might and would have presented my Reader with a more complete Collection of his *Greek* and *Latine* Elegancies. For I had not gone far in the Reading of him, but I found the Blows come so thick and fast upon poor *Priscian*, that, to prevent downright Blood-shed, still as I drew near to a *Latine* Quotation of any length, I presently advised him as a Friend to get out of the way as fast as he could.

And now, if either he, or any one else for him, shall pretend to slight and despise this charge, and tell me that the Faults and Mistakes here alledged by me, are *small Things*; so, say I, is the point of a Dagger too; but

for all that, it may ſtab a Man to the Heart; and, I think, it matters not how ſmall the Thing is, which wounds a Man's Credit, if it chance to bleed to Death of the Wound. But there are ſome Things in the World, the *Knowledge* of which ſeems but ſmall, but the *Ignorance* of them is not ſo. And certainly of all Men living, ſuch as will be Writers, eſpecially provoking, Inſulting Writers, are concerned to tread tenderly, and to take every ſtep with the utmoſt Caution, where they do not find a *Grammatical* Bottom firm under them. For my own part, I dare account nothing ſmall, or deſpicable, which may either do a Man a great miſchief, or is neceſſary to prevent one. The firſt ſtep in any Aſcent may be reckoned but a low and a mean thing, nevertheleſs there is no getting to the top without it. As the Great St. *Baſil* himſelf tells us, *That nothing is to be ſlighted, or deſpiſed by ſuch as are to be inſtructed and led into the knowledge of Things. For if a Man* (ſays he) *looks upon the firſt Elements as* [*ſmall inconſiderable Things*] (the word by which ſome are pleaſed to call the *Rites* and *Ceremonies* of our Church) *when will ſuch a One be able to attain to the Perfection of Wiſdom and Learning?*

οὐδενὸς ὑπεροπτέον τοῖς εἰς τὴν γνῶσιν εἰσαγομένοις, ὡς εἴ τις τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων ὡς σμικρῶν ὑπερίδοι, πότε τῶν τελείων τῆς σοφίας ἐφάψεται; *Baſilius in Libro ad Amphilochium de Spiritu Sancto, Tom. 2. p. 292. Edit. Pariſ.* 1637.

And ſo I ſhall cloſe up the preſent Subject with this Note, That St. *Paul*'s *School* is certainly an Excellent School, and St. *Paul*'s *Church* a moſt Noble Church; and therefore, I think, that he directs his Courſe very prudently, and happily too, who in his Paſſage to ſuch a *Cathedral*, takes ſuch a *School* in his way.

CHAP. XI.

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In which is given ſome Account of this Author's *Temper and inſolent way of Writing, as well in extolling himſelf, as in depreſſing and ſcorning his* Adverſaries; *in both which he has not his Parallel.*

THough in all Conteſts and Controverſies, how ſharp ſoever on both ſides, and juſt on one, there is ſtill a duty, which every Man ows both to Decency and to Himſelf, always obligeing him to utter only ſuch things, as may become him to ſpeak, whatſoever his Adverſary may deſerve to hear; yet, as to the Adverſary himſelf, it is, no doubt, a courſe juſtifiable beyond all exception, to take ones meaſures of Treating him, from the meaſures he has allowed himſelf of dealing with others. And, as I hope, for my own, and the Churches ſake, to acquit my ſelf as to the former part of the Rule, ſo let my Adverſary take his lot as to the other. For I doubt not but to ſatisfie the World, (were it not ſuperabundantly, from his own Writings, ſatisfied already) That he is a Perſon of ſuch an inſufferable Inſolence both of Style and Temper, that all, that he has met with in the foregoing Chapters, has by no means paid off his Scores. In all his expreſſions concerning his Antagoniſts, he is infinitely

ſcornful; and not only ſo, but very often alſo, extremely ſpiteful and malicious. For what but the height of ſpight could make him in his Vindication of his *Caſe of Allegiance* tax his Learned Adverſary, as an *Epicurean and an Atheiſtical Ridiculer of Providence*, only for maintaining, that the Paſſages and Events of Providence are not the Rule, which God will have us govern our Actions by; but the Precepts and Prohibitions of his Law? And what, but the ſame malice, could make him inſinuate that the ſame Author was inclined to *Popery and an Infallible Interpreter*, only for ſaying that one Text of Scripture was *obſcure* and *much controverted*? which yet St. *Peter* had ſaid of many *Paſſages of* St. *Paul*'s *Epiſtles*, 1 *Pet.* 3. 16. and yet without giving any wiſe man the leaſt occaſion from thence to think that he was then providing an Argument for the *Infallibility* of his ſuppoſed *Succeſſor*. And Laſtly what but the bittereſt Rancour could make him charge his Adverſary, as if he had compared the ſwearing Allegiance to K. *W.* and Q. *M.* for the great and notorious Impiety of it, with the Villanies foretold by the Prophet of *Hazael*; only, becauſe he had told Him, that *as* Hazael *had changed his mind*; (notwithſtanding his confident Opinion of himſelf to the contrary;) *ſo had this Author too*? For who but one of equal Virulence and Ignorance would have ſtretched the compariſon, which reſpected only *the changing of Minds*, to a Compariſon as to the *merits of the Cauſe*, which it had no relation to at all? Indeed no more than that Reply of *Hazael*, *Is thy Servant a Dog*? was deſign'd to convince the Prophet, *That he had not four Leggs*, and not rather only to clear himſelf from ſuch a curriſh and belluine temper of mind, as thoſe Actions foretold of him muſt needs imply? And I ſuppoſe, when a certain Perſon ſpeaking of

Vind. Caſe, &c. p. 58. l. 28.

Vind. Caſe p. 48. *and the two laſt lines.*

Vind. of the Caſe, &c. p. 79. l. 10.

of the New Oath to a certain Biſhop, ſaid, *My Lord, I will be Crucified before I will take this Oath*, His meaning was not, that he thought the taking it more Painful and Tormenting than a *Crucifixion*, but that he had a greater unwillingneſs to take the one, than to undergo the other. And yet this was this Author's way of Treating a very Worthy Man, an old Acquaintance, and a fair Adverſary. I am not at all concern'd to eſpouſe or abett the Cauſe defended by that Learned Perſon. But this I do and ever ſhall averr, That there is a *Jus Belli*, in theſe Controverſial, as well as in Military Conflicts, and conſequently an obligation to Truth and Juſtice and common Ingenuity even in the exerciſe of the greateſt Hoſtilities. But this Man's uſage of his forementioned Adverſary is not more Senſeleſs and Illogical, than Diſingenuous, Barbarous, and Unchriſtian. And ſo let the Reader take this as a Specimen of his impotent ſpleen and malice. After which, let us ſhew him in his next good Quality, his *Inſolence*; and firſt in that Branch of it, which concerns his wonderful Opinion and Applauſe of Himſelf. B. K.

As to which, we ſhall firſt of all ſee him (as we have in ſome degree ſhewn him before) preferring himſelf before all the Fathers, as *much happier in giving an explication of the Trinity than they were*; and this, in ſuch a fleering ſcoptical way, (ſcoptical I mean as to the *Fathers*, but highly *Commendatory* of himſelf) that it would even turn ones ſtomach to read his fulſom expreſſions. For he tells us, (and that with the moſt profound humility, no doubt) *p.* 101. *l.* 1. &c. *If that explication which I have given, be very conſiſtent with, nay, be the true Interpretation of that account the Antients give of a Trinity in Unity, I hope it will not be*

thought an unpardonoble Novelty, if I have expreſſed the ſame thing in other Words, which give us a more clear and diſtinct apprehenſion of it, &c. And again *p.* 126. *l.* 2. *I hope this is no fault neither, to give an Intelligible explication of that, which all the Fathers taught, but were not equally happy in their explication of it.* No; for his comfort, no; to excell and outdo all the Fathers (if a man can do it) can be no fault at all. But before this be allow'd him, I do here require him to name and produce me but one (who acknowledges a Trinity) in the whole World, beſides his own modeſt *ſelf*, who ever preferr'd his explication of the Trinity for the *Happineſs and Intelligibility of it*, before that given by the Fathers. I ſay, let him produce me ſo much as one affirming this, if he can. So that, in ſhort, the Compariſon here ſtands between the Fathers, and this Author: and we ſee the Preheminence given him above all the Fathers by the ſole and ſingle *Judgment of one Doctor*, and that Doctor is *Himſelf*: nay, and (which is more) to put the matter paſt all Compariſon between him and them for the future, He tells us (as was alſo obſerved before in my 7th. Chapter) *That the Fathers neither knew how to ſpeak their own Thoughts of the Trinity, nor indeed ſo much as to conceive of it aright, by reaſon of the* groſsneſs of their Imaginations: *whereas, if they had* (as he adds) *but conceived of it, and expreſſed themſelves about it, as he has done, all would have been plain, eaſie, and intelligible.* And as for *Gregory Nyſſen*, (from whom he had Quoted more than from all the reſt of the Fathers together) he gives him a caſt of his Temper at laſt, *p.* 119. *l.* 5. and ſends him away with this rap over the Pate, *That he could not tell what to make of him and his Reaſonings; for that, in his judgment, he deſtroyed all Principles of Individuation.* And

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in this manner we have him Pluming himſelf, clapping his Wings, and crowing over all the Fathers; for which and his quarrelſome domineering Nature together, moſt think, it is high time, that *his Comb were cut.*

In the next place, let us ſee what Elogies he beſtows upon himſelf for his Atchievements in the *Socinian* Controverſie. Concerning which he tells the Men of that Perſuaſion, That after his Vindication of the Trinity *He believes they will talk more ſparingly of Abſurdities and Contradictions for the future.* p. 153. But, why I pray? Is it becauſe this Author has got the *Monopoly* of them, and engroſſed them all to himſelf? and that therefore the Laws will be very ſevere upon ſuch as invade his Property? For, as for any other Reaſon, they have none, that I know of, to *talk more ſparingly of Abſurdities and Contradictions*, than they uſed to do, having ſo many more, out of his Writings, to talk of, than ever they had before. But he proceeds, and cloſes his Work with this Triumph over his Antagoniſt (and in him, I ſuppoſe, over all the reſt of that Tribe) p. 272. *That he is pretty confident, that he will never be able to reaſon to any purpoſe in this cauſe again.* As for his *confidence*, none doubts of it; but as for his *Prediction*, if he proves no better a *Prophet* in what he here *foretells* of his Socinian Opponent, than in what he foretold of that Learned Perſon, who anſwered both his *Caſe of Allegiance*, and his *Vindication of it*. viz. *That if he would but well examine his Arguments before he anſwered them, he ſhould expect to hear no more from him*: and if withall this Socinian be but able to handle him at ſuch a Rate, as that cloſe Reaſoner has done, I dare undertake for him, that he ſhall go out of the World the moſt baffled Perſon, that ever lived in it. But why, for

Vind. Caſe p. the laſt.

fer God's ſake muſt the *Socinians* Reaſoning Abilities (which his great Lord and Patron has given ſo high, ſo ſignal, and ſo peculiar an *Encomium* of) all of a ſuddain fail them, upon this Author's Publication of his book? what can the meaning of this be? Why the meaning of it is this. *Hic, vir, hic eſt*, &c. according to the words by which *Virgil* pointed out *Auguſtus Cæſar*. *This, This, is the Man.* This is that incomparable, mighty, and irrefragable Divine, who has wrote more convincingly and effectually againſt the *Socinians*, (if you will believe him) than all, that ever wrote againſt them before, put together. For notwithſtanding all that has been wrote by thoſe great Men, who from time to time have appear'd in this Controverſie, the Controverſie is ſtill alive, and the *Socinians* continue writing and reaſoning ſtill: and even by this Author's confeſſion (once at leaſt) *to ſome Purpoſe*. For otherwiſe how could he ſay of his Socinian Adverſary, *That he would never be able to reaſon to any purpoſe in this cauſe again*, if he had never reaſoned ſo at all? But ſo far are the *Socinians* from being put *out of Countenance*, and much leſs *out of Heart*, by what this man has wrote againſt them, That I aſſure him, they look upon him as an Opponent according to their hearts deſire; as having play'd a fairer Game into their hands than ever was dealt into them before: ſo that next to their wiſhing all the World their *Friends*, they wiſh they may always have ſuch *Adverſaries*. And therefore if they ſhould reſolve to *reaſon againſt him no more*, he will have great cauſe to thank either their Inadvertency for overlooking the great advantage given them, or their good Nature for not taking it. For the Book called by him *a Vindication of the Trinity*, is certainly like a kind of Pot or Veſſel with handles quite round

See his four Sermons on the 1 John 14. p. 71. 72.

round it; turn it which way you will, you are ſure to find ſomething to take hold of it by.

And the truth is, upon a ſtrict impartial comparing of things together, I cannot ſee any new Advantage that he has got over the *Socinians*, unleſs it be That he thinks his *Three Gods* will be too hard for their *One*. And perhaps it is upon Preſumption of this, That he diſcharges that clap of Thunder at them in his Preface, where he tells us; *That having dipp'd his Pen in the Vindication of ſo glorious a Cauſe, by the grace of God he will never deſert it, while he can hold Pen in hand.* In which words, methinks I ſee him ready Armed and Mounted (with his face towards the *Weſt*) and brandiſhing his Sword aloft, all wreaking with *Socinian* blood, and with the very darts of his Eyes looking his poor *forgotten Friends* through and through. For in good earneſt the Words ſound very terribly to theſe Men; but moſt terribly of all to the Article it ſelf: (which is like to ſuffer moſt by his *Vindication*): for thus to threaten that he will never leave off vexing it *as long as he can hold Pen in hand*, (which, I dare ſay, will be as long as he can tell Mony with it) This, I ſay again, ſounds very dreadfully.

Nevertheleſs, as fierce and formidable as theſe words may repreſent him, he has yet, like a merciful Enemy, very great reſerves of compaſſion. For otherwiſe how come ſo many *Socinian* Pieces wrote againſt him to lye ſo long unanſwered? He has indeed lately wrote an *Apology for writing againſt the Socinians*; but where is the Apology for writing in ſuch a prevaricating way againſt them at firſt, and for never writing againſt them ſince? For has he loſt his glorious Polemick *Pen*? or has he loſt the *uſe of* his *Hand*? or has he run himſelf *out of Breath*? If this laſt be his caſe (as by ſome *Aſthmatick ſymptoms* one would think it is) he will do

do well to call in his old Friend, and Defender, the *Footman*, to ſecond him: eſpecially ſince the contention, which now ſeems moſt likely to be, is, who ſhall *run* faſteſt from the Enemy, and keep furtheſt from Him.

William Giles ſometimes of Mark-lane.

In the mean time I wonder that in the mannage of this diſputation, he does not take the ſame courſe that other Learned Men in the like caſes uſe to do. For he frequently taxes his Adverſary with *Fallacies*; telling him that this is a *Fallacy* and that is a *Fallacy*: But why does he not expreſs to his Reader, what the particular *Fallacy* is? there being no Sophiſm or Fallacy incident to Speech or Argumentation, but what falls under one of the Thirteen reckoned up by *Ariſtotle*. *Moreover*, while he is Animadverting upon the Hiſtory of the *Unitarians*, he will, I believe, hardly get clear of a ſcurvy lapſe in that Hiſtory himſelf. For concerning the expoſition given by the *Socinians* of that Text in the 3 *John* 13. where our Saviour tells the Jews, *That he came down from Heaven*. He writes thus: *Did* Socinus *find it ſo eaſie a Thing to reconcile this Text to his Darling Opinion, when he was forced to* Faſt and Pray *for it, and to pretend* Revelation *becauſe he wanted Reaſon to ſupport it*? viz. *That Chriſt before he entred on his Prophetick Office, was taken into Heaven to be inſtructed in the Goſpel, and then came down from Heaven again to publiſh it to the World.* p. 143. l. 19. *&c.* Now, the Perſon here ſpoken of, and intended by this Author, muſt needs have been *Fauſtus Socinus*, and I believe he will not pretend that he meant any other; which being ſuppoſed, This Remark of his will appear to have been a very great miſtake. For neither was this the Text, about which this *Praying* and *Pretence of Revelation* was, (for *Faſting* is a word of this Author's putting

putting in:) nor was *Faustus Socinus* the Person who did any of these Things upon this occasion. But the Text was that in the 8 *John* 58. Πρὶν Ἀβραὰμ γενέσθαι ἐγὼ εἰμι. And the Person of whom this was pretended, was *Lælius Socinus* the Unkle of *Faustus*, who interpreted this Text to this sence, *Antequam Abramus factus fuerit Abrahamus*; that is, from *the Father of the Faithful* enclosed within the Church of the Jews, should become the *Father of the Faithful* diffused through many Nations, *Christ* was to preach his Gospel to the World; and by so doing enlarge the Church from the limits of one People, to all Nations throughout the World. So that to the words ἐγὼ εἰμι you are ἀπὸ κοινοῦ to supply the words φῶς κόσμου, importing *Christ*'s *Enlightning* the World by the Publication of his Doctrine. This was *Lælius*'s Interpretation of this Text, which together with the Interpretation of the first Chapter of St. *John* were the Two Scriptures, which he first set up with, for the founding of his new Hypothesis. Which explication of the Text (as it was indeed very forced and unnatural so) *Erasmus Johannis*, in his Disputation with *Faustus*, cryed shame of it in these Words, *Fateor me per omnem vitam non magis contortam Scripturæ Interpretationem audivisse; ideòque eam penitus improbo.* To which *Faustus*, who had a much different Opinion of it, replies. *Cum primùm* [*fatendi*] *verbum in tuis Scriptis animadverti, sperabam te potiùs fassurum nullam in tuâ vitâ Scripturæ Interpretationem audivisse quæ hâc sit aut acutior aut verior, quæque magis divinum quid sapiat, & à Deo ipso patefactam fuisse præ se ferat. Ego quidem certè non leves conjecturas habeo, illum* [viz. *Lælium*] *qui primus ætate nostrâ eam in lucem protulit* (*hic autem is fuit, qui primus quoquè sententiam de Christi Origine,*

See this Learnedly confuted by Bp. Pearson *upon the second Article of the Creed.* p. 219, 220. &c. *in* 4to.

quam ego conſtanter defendo, renovavit) *Precibus multis ab ipſo Chriſto impetrâſſe. Hoc profectò affirmare auſim, cum Deus illi viro permulta aliis tunc temporis incognita patefecerit, vix quicquam inter illa omnia eſſe, quod Interpretatione hâc divinius videri queat. Socinus in Refutatione Arg.* 4. *Eraſmi Johan.* p. 505 *Col.* 2 *Edit. Fratrum Polonor.* Tom. 2.

But as this may ſatisfie the Reader that the forementioned place in the 8 *John* 58. was the Text, for which this *Praying* and *Pretence of Revelation* is ſaid to have been, and conſequently may ſuffice to ſhew this Author's Blunder; ſo I ſhall yet further ſhew, that the other Text in the 3. *John* and the 13. Concerning *Chriſt*'s *coming down from Heaven* was not accounted by *Socinus* of ſo difficult an Interpretation, as to need thoſe peculiar Methods of *Prayer* and *Revelation* for the Diſcovery of it, as this Author has been pleaſed to affirm. And this will appear from theſe words of *Socinus* concerning it. *Poſtquàm ex Mariâ natus eſt, in cælo, antequam moreretur, reverà eſſe potuit; nec ſolùm potuit, ſed* (*ut ita dicamus*) *debuit. Si enim homo ille Paulus Chriſti ſervus ad Tertium uſque Cælum ante mortem raptus eſt, nullo pacto nobis veriſimile eſt Chriſtum ipſum ante mortem in cælo non fuiſſe.* And, a few lines after, ſpeaking of the ſame again with reference to St. *Paul*'s having been taken up into the third Heaven, he thus diſcourſes. *Certè Chriſtus* (*in quo ſine ullâ menſurâ rerum omnium Divinarum cognitio, ut fuit, ſic eſſe debuit, quin ibi* (viz. *in cælo*) *per aliquod Tempus antequàm munus cæleſti doctrinâ homines imbuendi ſibi à Patre mandatum publicè ſuſciperet, verſatus fuerit, nullo modo dubitandum videtur. Socinus in Reſponſione Priore ad Paræneſim Andreæ Volani* Tomo 2do. *Fratrum Polon.* p. 380. Col. 2. By all which we ſee that *Socinus*

nus was ſo far from apprehending any difficulty in finding out this expoſition of the Text, That he affirms it was *nullo pacto veriſimile*, There was *no likelyhood* that it ſhould be otherwiſe, *& nullo modo dubitandum*, that *no doubt* could be made, but it was and *ought to be* ſo. Which ſurely are not forms of expreſſion, to ſhew the difficulty of conceiving, or finding out how the ſaid Thing *could* be ſo. So that this is a manifeſt miſtake in this Author; and let him ſet it off with never ſo much brow and confidence, yet no doubt his *Socinian* Adverſaries deſpiſe him for it ſufficiently. And the Truth is, one would in all Reaſon imagine, that to the Anſwering the *Hiſtory of the Unitarians*, a little more knowledge of their Hiſtory would have done no hurt.

But after the many ample and extraordinary Elogies he has paſſed upon himſelf for his Writings, methinks it is ſomething Pleaſant to ſee him in his *Continuation of the Defence of Dr.* Stillingfleet; *p.* 121. *l. the* 4. &c. ſtrutting himſelf in theſe words, *I am no Archbiſhop yet.* Which ſhewes what his moſt early thoughts ran upon, and what *his Modeſty* would be at from the very Firſt. For otherwiſe, the purpoſe of the place, where this comes in, had been fully ſerved by ſaying, *I for my part am no Arch-biſhop, nor expect to be one.* But the addition of that little word *yet* was very ſignificant, and ſhews that out of the *Abundance of his heart his mouth ſpoke.* For though indeed he preſently adds, *And I very much ſuſpect I ſhall never be one*, yet thoſe words were put in only *ad frangendam invidiam*, and to qualifie the fulſome arrogance of the firſt expreſſion. Howbeit in that he ſpoke his mind, in this he fences againſt an Inconvenience; in that we have *an account* of *his Nature*, in this only *a Copy of his Coun-*

tenance. And I queſtion not, but by this time his pretended ſuſpicion is paſſed into a contrary expectation, and that the *Deanry* of *Paul's* begins to make him think himſelf Heir apparent to *Canterbury*. And therefore no wonder, if while big with ſuch Thoughts, ſpeaking in his Apology of Dr. *Wallis*, and *Himſelf*, he ſets himſelf before Him. *p.* 29. in theſe words. *He* (viz. *The Melancholy ſtander-by*) *concludes with an heavy charge upon my ſelf, and Dr.* Wallis. By which, I ſuppoſe, he would have Dr. *Wallis* know his proper place. Though I muſt tell him, that not only common Modeſty, but alſo the common Cuſtom of the World makes wiſe Men, whenſoever they mention themſelves with others, place themſelves laſt. And ſo it might have become this Author too, eſpecially ſpeaking of himſelf in conjunction with ſuch an one, as Dr. *Wallis*, who was a Perſon of Fame and eminence, while this Man was learning his Grammar; if ever he was ſo.

But to proceed, and paſs from his applauding himſelf to the other Branch of his Arrogance, in his ſcornful undervaluing all ſuch as write againſt him, or differ from him, (though yet no more, nor in any other Thing, than in vvhat his Worſhip had differed from himſelf). We have him in the 4th. *page* of his *Preface to his Caſe of Allegiance*, calling ſuch as in their Writings could not fall in vvith his *laſt* ſentiments about the *New Oath*, *Little Writers*. Concerning whom I muſt tell him, that it is often with *Writers*, as it is with *Books*; Amongſt vvhich there are many *Little ones*, that exceed the worth, and outlive the Reputation of much *Greater*. If indeed number of Pamphlets makes a great writer, this Author is in no danger of being accounted a *Little One*. But as there is ſuch a Thing, as *multum in parvo*, ſo there is alſo *Parvum in multo*;

multo; and He who will digeſt the trouble of Reading this Authors Writings, will need no other Argument to prove it ſo. But as for thoſe excellent Perſons, whom he firſt ſlights, then *challenges*, and afterwards *flyes from*, by never replying upon them, I would have him know, that the World has already paſt it's judgment both upon them and him too: and therefore I would adviſe his *Haughtineſs* for the future to forbear calling his Antagoniſts *Little Writers*, till by his Anſwers he has *made them ſo.*

A further diſcovery of his rude, undecent way of treating ſuch as he writes againſt, is the Language he has beſtow'd upon a certain Writer, a *Nonconformiſt* indeed, but yet a Man of Learning (as a much greater Man than this Author has found by experience) whom he calls a *Trifling Scribler, who underſtands little more than Quibbles and Jeſts*; Charging him withal with *Pertneſs* and *Folly* to complete his Character. *p.* 15. of his Preface to his Defence of Dr. *Stillingfleet.* And in the 12. *page* of the Book it ſelf, and the five firſt lines, He repreſents him under the name of the *Inquirer*, as one, *who cannot underſtand plain and familiar ſenſe; nor carry the Connexion of three or four Sentences together.* Very civil Language indeed, becoming a Scholar, a Divine, and a well-bred Man, to a Perſon who had not in the leaſt provok'd Him. For my own part, I have no knowledge of the Man, but from his Writings; and upon the Stock of that knowledge have often wondred, that one ſo able to humble this Reviler, would take ſuch groſs Reproaches at his hands. Mr. Alſop.

But the Truth is, when I conſider (as I noted firſt in my Preface) how patiently our whole Clergy has hitherto ſuffered him to call them *Fools* and *Hereticks*, by charging all thoſe, as *ſuch*, who concur not with him in holding the Three Divine Perſons to be *Three*

diſtinct

diſtinct Infinite Minds or Spirits (which, I dare ſay, not one of them held at the time of his uttering this Lewd Reproach) I ſay, when I conſider this, I have cauſe to ſurceaſe all wonder, that any Private Man ſhould indure this inſolent *Huff* to inſult over him in ſuch a manner. But I ſhall inſiſt no further upon this maſter-piece of his ſcurrility, having in ſome meaſure accounted with him for it already. Only I ſhall add this, That as it is beyond example marvellous that any one ſingle member of a Church ſhould preſume to load all the reſt with ſuch a charge, ſo it is yet a greater marvel that all ſhould bear it.

It would be endleſs to ſet down all the dirty ſtuff that has flowed from his *Billingſ-gate* Pen. But to repeat and bring together ſo much as we have taken notice of, the Reader may be pleaſed to bear away in his memory ſuch Expreſſions, and Appellations as theſe. viz. *Epicurean*, and *Ridiculer of Providence*, *Popiſhly inclined*, and *looking towards an Infallible Interpreter*, *Diſaffected to*, *and a ſlanderer of the Government*, *Little Writers*, *Fools* and *Hereticks*, *errant Fopp*, *Trifling Scribler*, *ſhamefully Ignorant and Impudent*, *Fit to be ſent to School again*, *One that underſtands little elſe but Jeſts and Quibbles*, *One that cannot underſtand plain and familiar ſenſe*, *One that underſtands neither* Greek *nor* Latine, and the like. Theſe are the choice Embelliſhments of his Style. But above all, that beloved word, *Nonſenſe*, is always ready at hand with him; and out it flies at all Perſons and upon all Occaſions. And hardly can he write three or four Pages together, but, right or wrong, he throws it in his Adverſaries face. One would think that he was Born with the *Word* in his Mouth, and that it grew up with him from his Infancy, and that in his very Cradle he *Cryed Nonſenſe*, before he could *ſpeak* it.

But

But to check this ungovern'd humour of his, in thus uſing this word at all Adventure; Let me tell him, that it is both a very rude, unmannerly *Word*; and moſt commonly, as applyed by him, a very *falſe Charge*. As for the rudeneſs of it, ſince he owns himſelf a *Son of the Church of* England, I think he would be much his own friend, if he would remember the Reprimand given him by his old *Acquaintance* and *Antagoniſt Doctor Owen*; who in his *Vindication*, &c. *p.* 72. having, upon occaſion of ſome of his profane Scoffs, called him *Goodly Son of the Church of* England! immediately ſubjoyns, *That he intended it not as a Reflexion upon the Church it ſelf*, but only *to remind this Man of his Relation to that Church. Which*, (he there ſays) *to his Knowledge, taught better Learning and better Manners*. In the next place, as for the falſeneſs of the Charge in his uſual application of this Word, I would have him know, That the Charge of *Nonſenſe* does not properly lye againſt every one who aſſerts a falſe Propoſition, or is guilty of a miſtake. For *Non ſenſe* is not properly oppoſed to ſtrict *Truth*, but to ſuch plain and manifeſt *Truth* as is obvious to *Common ſenſe*. For *Truth* oftentimes lyes deep, and abſtruſe, and requires a more than ordinary ſagacity to reach and fetch it out; which that low Pitch of Reaſon, which we call *Common ſenſe*, cannot always do. For in diſcourſe a Man may be ſometimes miſtaken in laying his Foundation or Principle, and yet be very Clear and Rational in the Conſequences he draws from it; and ſometimes he may fail in drawing Conſequences from a True and well-laid Principle; in both which caſes, the whole diſcourſe is certainly falſe and Inconſiſtent: Nevertheleſs (according to the common acception of the Word) this cannot be called *Nonſenſe*. It may indeed be called Error or Miſtake; which is a weakneſs

neſs cleaving too cloſe to Human Nature, for any one of the ſame Nature to reproach another for it. But on the contrary, if every Thing, that is not ſtrict Demonſtration and certain *Truth*, muſt paſs for *Nonſenſe*, I fear, it would overlay whole Volumes, and not only prevent the 2d. 3d. and 4th. *Editions* of many Books, but ſhrewdly alſo endanger the *Sale* of the *Firſt*: Eſpecially if 2d. and 3d. by the unlucky eſcape of ſome ſcattering Copies, ſhould chance all to appear in the ſpace of Three or Four Dayes, As in the firſt Publication of a certain Book Entituled *The Caſe of Allegiance*, &c. it fell out. But great, no doubt, is the Art of Beſtowing ſeveral Title-Pages, importing *divers Editions*, upon Books of one and the ſame Impreſſion: and may ſerve to teach the World, what a fruitful Thing the Preſs is, when impregnated by the *Prolifick Genius* of ſome Writers; and that (when it is for the credit of any extraordinary Book and it's Author) it can bring forth *four*, *five*, or *ſix* Editions of it at the ſame time. Which certainly is a moſt Ingenious Contrivance; but whether it were the *Author's* or the *Bookſeller's*, is a Queſtion; though, ſome think, it uſes to be done by a kind of *mutual-Conſciouſneſs* between both.

But to return to the Point in hand. According to the common uſe of the Word *Non-ſenſe*, He, who Diſcourſes of Things obvious to the ordinary Apprehenſions of Men, with groſs and palpable contradictions of one thing to another, or with a plain, manifeſt Incoherence of one part of his Diſcourſe with the other, that Man is properly and juſtly chargeable with *Nonſenſe*. And let thoſe (in the Name of *Senſe* and *Reaſon*) take it to themſelves, who have moſt claim to it.

But becauſe the beſt way of Illuſtrating Things is by

by example. I ſhall alſo take this courſe here. Thus for inſtance. For any one to own a Thing for a *great and ſacred Myſtery* (the very Notion and uſe of the word *Myſtery* importing ſomething *Hidden and Abſtruſe*) and at the ſame time to affirm it to be very *Plain*, *Eaſie* and *Intelligible*, is *Nonſenſe*. To ſay, That in Men *Knowledge* and *Power* are *Commenſurate*; nay That *Knowledge is Power*; ſo that whatſoever a *Man knows how to do*, he is by vertue thereof *alſo able to do it*, is contrary to the *Common Senſe* of all Mankind, and conſequently *Nonſenſe*. To ſay, *A Beaſt is a Perſon*, and yet to ſay withall, *That a Perſon and an Intelligent ſubſtance are Terms reciprocal*, is both *Nonſenſe*, and *Contradiction too*, with a Witneſs. To affirm, *That a ſpecifical Unity can make any Thing or Perſon Numerically One*, is *Nonſenſe*. To affirm, *That there are two diſtinct* Reaſons *and two diſtinct* Wills *in each Man, and thoſe as really diſtinct, as if the ſame Man had Two diſtinct Souls*, is *Nonſenſe*. And to affirm, *That the Body* (which is utterly void of any Intellectual Power or Faculty) *is conſcious to all the Dictates and Commands of the Will*, is groſs and inexcuſable *Nonſenſe*. So that whereas this Author (according to his mannerly way) charges his Adverſary with *unintelligible Nonſenſe*. p. 227. l. 6. it muſt needs be granted, that he has much the advantage of him in this Particular; ſince all muſt acknowledge that his own *Nonſenſe* is very *Intelligible*.

And here I could eaſily direct him where he may be ſupplyed with ſeveral more ſuch Inſtances, as thoſe newly alledged; but that I think theſe may ſuffice for the Purpoſe they are produced for. In the mean time I would adviſe him for the future to uſe this rude Word more ſparingly, and cautiouſly; and to apply it only where the generally received way of ſpeaking applies

it : And now and then alſo to caſt his eye upon his own Writings. Theſe things, I ſay, I would adviſe him to ; and to conſider withal, how unreaſonable and unjuſt it is, for him to beſtow about the *Word* ſo freely upon others, while he keeps the *Thing* to himſelf.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Containing a Brief Review, *and* Concluſion *of the whole* Work.

I AM at length come to a cloſe of that Work, which I ſhould much more gladly have been Prevented, than engag'd in, by being a *Reader*, rather than the *Author* of a Reply to this Man's ſtrange, unjuſtifiable Innovations upon this great Article of our Religion. But it is now a conſiderable Time that the Book, here Animadverted upon, has walked about the World, without any Publick Controll; And though in private Diſcourſe generally cenſur'd by all, yet, (as to the Point undertook by me) hitherto Anſwered by none; which may well be Matter of *Melancholy Conſideration* to all Hearty Lovers of our Church, and Ancient Chriſtianity. Whereas, I dare ſay, had this Heterodox Piece been wrote and publiſhed in a Language underſtood by Foreigners, we ſhould long ſince have had ſeveral Confutations of it ſent us from abroad; and probably not without ſome ſevere Reflexions upon the *Engliſh* Church, and Clergy, for their ſilence in a Cauſe, which ſo loudly called for their Defence. To take off therefore this Reproach from our Church (in ſome degree at leaſt) I have (while

others, far more able to *Defend it*, chuſe rather to ſit ſtill and *enjoy it*) ventur'd to ſet my weak Hand to the Vindication of a Principal Article of her Faith, againſt the rude Attacks of this bold Undertaker. In which, though I freely own, that all, that has been done by me in it, is extremely below the Dignity of the Subject, which I have employed my ſelf in, yet I am well aſſured that I have fully and effectually anſwered this Man; and if it ſhould prove otherwiſe, I muſt aſcribe it to a peculiar Misfortune attending me; ſince none beſides, has hitherto wrote againſt him, but has confuted him. In the Work I have here preſented the Reader with, I have examined and gone over all that, I conceive, requires either Anſwer or Remark; and that according to the following Method and Order, which I ſhall here briefly ſet down.

I have, in the firſt place, laid my Foundation in the Explication and State of the Senſe of the Word *Myſtery*; which I ſhew, in General, ſignifies ſomething *Concealed*, *Hidden*, or *Abſtruſe* in *Religious Matters*; and amongſt Chriſtian Writers not only that, but ſomething alſo neither *Diſcoverable* nor *Comprehenſible* by bare Reaſon: According to which, I ſhew, that this Author's frequent affirming, that his *Hypotheſis* and Explication of the Trinity rendred the Notion thereof *very Plain*, *Eaſie*, and *Intelligible*, was utterly incompatible with the *Myſteriouſneſs* of the ſame. I ſhew alſo upon what abſurd Grounds he ſtated the Nature of a *Contradiction*; according to which, joyned with another of his Aſſertions, I ſhew, That no Man could be juſtly charged with *Contradiction*, though he diſcourſed never ſo incoherently and falſely upon any Subject whatſoever. From hence I proceeded to conſider the *Ancient Terms* conſtantly received and uſed by *Councils*, *Fathers* and *Schoolmen*,

Schoolmen, in ſpeaking of the *God-head* and *Trinity*, which this Author in his Book had confidently and avowedly condemned, as *obſcuring* and *confounding* Men's Notions about theſe great Matters; and upon a diſtinct Explication of each of them, I ſhew the Propriety and ſingular uſefulneſs of them, both againſt all his exceptions, and above thoſe other Terms, which he would needs ſubſtitute in their Room: and under the ſame Head, I laid open the Contradiction of his *Vindication* and his late *Apology* to one another, as I had done before in my Diſcourſe about the Nature of a *Myſtery*. From hence I paſſed to his New Notions of *Self-Conſciouſneſs* and *Mutual Conſciouſneſs*; in the ſtrength of which two Terms he pretended to make a *Trinity in Unity* a *plain, eaſie, and intelligible Notion*; nay ſo very *plain, as to ſolve all Difficulties about it*; theſe being his very words. And as he pretended *Self Conſciouſneſs* to be the *formal conſtituent* Reaſon of *Perſonality* Univerſally, both in Beings Create and Uncreate. I firſt Demonſtrated the contrary in Created Beings; and that both from the general Reaſon of Things, and from Two manifeſt Inſtances; and withal examined and confuted ſeveral extremely abſurd Propoſitions, and Aſſertions advanced by him concerning *Perſonality*. From this I paſſed on, and proved that neither could this *Self-Conſciouſneſs* be the formal Reaſon of Perſonality in the Divine Perſons, ſhewing the impoſſibility thereof by ſeveral clear and unqueſtionable Arguments. And in the next place, with the ſame Evidence of Reaſon I proved, That *mutual Conſciouſneſs* could not be the ground or Reaſon of the Unity or Coaleſcence of the Three Divine Perſons in one and the ſame Divine Nature; and all this upon known, allowed Principles of Philoſophy,

phy, as well as Divinity. And ſo I Naturally went on to the examination of that monſtrous Aſſertion of his, by which he holds and affirms the Three Divine Perſons to be Three diſtict *Infinite Minds or Spirits*; which I ſhew unavoidably and irrefragably inferr'd them to be *Three Gods*; It being impoſſible for the God-head, which is eſſentially *One ſingle infinite Mind or Spirit*, to be multiplyed into three diſtinct Infinite *Minds or Spirits*, without being multiplyed into as many *Gods*. This Opinion of his, I ſhew, was eaſie enough to be confuted; But for all that, I muſt here add further, that for the inſufferable Scandal of it, it is much fitter to be *cenſured* by a *Convocation*, though even he himſelf ſhould be *Prolocutor* of it. After this, ſince he had the Confidence to vouch his Hypotheſis *for the conſtant Doctrine of the Fathers and the Schools*, I firſt proved it quite otherwiſe in the Point of *Self Conſciouſneſs*, and in his Aſſertion of Three *diſtinct infinite Minds*; For the latter of which he quoted *Three* or *Four* Fathers, and *One* Sentence out of one *Schoolman*, viz. *P. Lombard* (which, one would think, was far from proveing it the *conſtant Doctrine* either of the *Fathers*, or, *the Schools*) and yet even theſe very Quotations, I ſhew were no more to his Purpoſe, than if he had alledged them to prove that Twice Three makes Twenty. And as for *Self-Conſciouſneſs*, which is one of the Two main Branches, or members of his Hypotheſis, he does not produce, nor ſo much as mention one *Father* or *Schoolman* in the behalf of it; ſo exact is he in proving his *Doctrine* the very *ſame* with Theirs. And then, in the next place, for the proof of his *mutual Conſciouſneſs* from the *Fathers* and *Schoolmen*, I have diſtinctly conſidered his allegations for it, and forming them into Argu-

Arguments (ſuch as the matter would afford) found them the ſaddeſt woſulleſt things to be called by that Name, that perhaps ever appeared in the World, ſince Argumentation was in uſe. And to complete his excellent and peculiar way of Arguing from the *Fathers* (for not ſo much as one *Schoolman* is cited in favour of *mutual Conſciouſneſs*) His whole buſineſs, I ſhew, was to reproach the *Fathers* as neither *able to conceive* rightly of the Trinity, nor yet *expreſs* themſelves Properly and Intelligibly about the ſame; and all this, becauſe they neither conceived of it, nor expreſſed it, according to his Terms and Hypotheſis, which yet he affirmed to be the *Conſtant Avowed Sentiments of thoſe very Fathers*; though (God help them, poor Men) they were not ſo *happy*, as to know it. And this, I hope all the World will acknowledge, to be a moſt extraordinary way of proving a Thing from the Authority of the *Fathers*, by thus repreſenting them as a Company of Dolts, who neither knew how *to think* or *ſpeak*, as they ſhould, upon the ſubject which they were profeſſedly treating of. Upon which Head having finiſhed my Anſwer as to the main Point I firſt engaged in, I proceeded to mark out, and Animadvert upon ſeveral of his *Paradoxical* Abſurd Aſſertions, both in Divinity and Philoſophy. And I did not only allege them for ſuch, but alſo by the moſt commonly received and current Principles of both, effectually proved them ſuch; and I referr it to any Man of clear and impartial Senſe, upon a ſurvey of the Particulars there diſtinctly examined and remarked upon, to paſs as Judge between this Author and my ſelf, whether the Proof falls at all ſhort of the Charge. Next to which, becauſe of his Inſolent Reflexions upon ſome Learned Men, I took into conſideration alſo his *vocabular* Sins, and manifold

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Tranſgreſſions of the *Laws* of Grammar and Philology: and whereas he had vilified his Adverſary as *having neither Greek nor Latine*, I ſhew, that albeit the Charge had been never ſo true, yet that he was one of the unfitteſt Perſons living to make it, for ſome certain Reaſons fairly preſented to him in that Chapter. And laſtly to bring up the Rear of all, I thought it expedient to lay open the Temper of the Man, and his way of Writing; His Immoderate applauſes of himſelf above all *before* him, or *about* him, together with his diſdainful Treatment of all that come in his way, as if they were not worthy to *carry his Books after him*. Though (by what ſome of them have Wrote againſt him) it appears, that they have made too good uſe of their *own Books*, to be fit *to carry his*. In fine I have, in my Peruſal of this Man's Writings, with the utmoſt exactneſs I was able, obſerved his way of ſpeaking both of himſelf, and others; and upon the reſult of all do moſt ſeriouſly and ſincerely affirm, That never did I (nor perhaps any one elſe) meet with ſo much confidence with ſo thin a Bottom to ſupport it; and yet ſurely that Man ought to ſtand upon a very broad and firm Bottom indeed, who ventures to defie all the World.

And thus, to relieve the Readers memory, I have given him this brief draught or Scheme of the whole Work. In which, as it is this Author alone, whom I have undertook, ſo I think fit to declare, that if any one beſides him, ſhall attempt an anſwer to this Diſcourſe, I ſhall not in the leaſt trouble or concern my ſelf about him, whoſoever he be; but if this Author himſelf ſhall be diſpoſed to defend his New Notions and Hypotheſis by a juſt and Scholaſtick Reply to what I have here offered againſt them, I will not fail

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(God affording me such a measure of Health and Strength as may enable me for Study) to attend his Motions upon this Subject, as soon, and as often as he pleases. For I can hardly perswade my self that I have yet paid him all, that I owe him. Nevertheless I must leave this Admonition with him, That I neither can, nor shall account such a Pamphlet, as his late *Apology*, a just and sufficient Answer to these *Animadversions*.

In the mean time, since the Reverend Dr. *J. W.* (spoken of in the precedeing Chapter) in his *Letters* about the *Trinity*, and *W. I.* another very Learned Person, in his 2*d. Letter* to the said Doctor, upon the same subject, have both of them been pleased to commend this Author *for several excellent Things in this Book*, I do with the greatest earnestness of Entreaty, as well as with the profoundest deference of Respect to their great Judgments beg of them, that they would by a kind of charitable Benefaction to such low, and mean Understandings as mine, vouchsafe to point out in Particular, what *those excellent Things* are, and in what Part of his Book they may be found; and whether I have hit upon any of them in my *Three* immediately foregoing Chapters. For I have read the Book over and over; as (after I had took up Thoughts of Answering it) it concerned me, in all Reason, to do. And I do thereupon solemnly profess, that, according to the best of my poor Judgment, and that ordinary Measure of Learning which God has vouchsafed me, I can hardly find throughout the whole Work (unless perhaps, here and there a Passage or two against the *Socinians*) so much as one True, Through stroke either in *Divinity*, or *Philosophy*, or *Logick*, or even in *Grammar*; and I confidently appeal to the ingenuous, and

An humble Address to the Learned Doctor. J. W. *and* W. I.

unbyas's'd Reader, whether I have not in the foregoing *Animadversions* given very pregnant and particular Instances of this Author's gross Defects in every one of these. And therefore my poor Opinion and Advice is, That if these two Learned Men are resolved to persist in their Commendations of this Author (as there is nothing by which they can oblige him more) and withal to commend him upon sure, undenyable Grounds, they would hereafter wave all the forementioned Topicks of Commendation, and pitch upon his true excellency by commending him for his *Preferment*; for that certainly is very commendable.

And now, that I am taking my Leave of my Reader, (for this time at least) that I may not leave him with any just Distast or Grudg in his Mind against me, as if I had treated this Man too severely, I do assure him, that nothing has been here utter'd by Chance, or in the heat of any present Passion, but upon a due, calm, and sedate Consideration of what he had said *falsly* of others, as a Warrant for what was to be *truly* said of him. And I do further assure the Reader, that I would by no means have treated a Candid, Civil and well-bred Adversary, at the Rate, I have treated him, who has shewn no sign of any one of these Qualifications, either in his Writings or Behaviour. And therefore though to *accept Persons* be a Fault in the Sight of God and Man, yet certainly to *distinguish* them is none. I have used him, as I found him; and for what I found him, he may thank himself.

The Truth is, he has carryed on an offensive War with most that have Wrote; and there are very few, whom he has not, one way or other, struck at and Defied. So that the Matter being in effect brought to this

this Point, whether He ſhall be too hard for the World, or the World for Him, I hope it will not be long deciding. He has for a great while, and in a very audacious manner been Preying, and Privateering upon many a Worthy and good Name, and as far as he was able made prize of the Reputation of Men better than Himſelf: And therefore it is now high time for ſuch to think of repaying the good Turns done them, and for the injured World to retaliate upon the lawleſs *Aggreſſor*. For this is, and has been the *Cuſtom of Nations*; and all muſt grant it to be a moſt juſt, equal, and allowed courſe; and ſince it is ſo, 'tis to be hop'd, that this is not the laſt *Repriſal* that will be made upon him.

To the moſt Holy and Bleſſed Trinity, Three Glorious Perſons in one and the ſame Undivided God-head, be rendred and aſcribed all Honour and Praiſe, Thankſgiving and Adoration, now and for evermore. Amen.

THE END.